



COMPARISONS, REGIMES, ELECTIONS

*Festschrift* for Lauri Karvonen

Editors: Carsten Anckar & Dag Anckar

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## LAURI KARVONEN. SCHOLAR, MENTOR, FRIEND

Professor Lauri Antero Karvonen celebrates his 60<sup>th</sup> birthday on November 21, 2012. Born in Uleåborg, in northern Finland, he spent the years when he was growing up in Kuopio, in the middle parts of Finland. After finished schooling, he enrolled in 1972 at Åbo Akademi, the Swedish university in Finland, graduating in 1976 (political history) and attaining still in the same year the degree of licentiate (political science). Following an appointment in 1977-1981 to a position as junior researcher at the Academy of Finland, he presented and defended in 1981 his doctoral dissertation at Åbo Akademi. Upon extended periods at his Alma Mater as Assistant Professor and Associate Professor, as well as an appointment as senior researcher at the Academy of Finland in 1984-1987, Lauri confronted in 1993 a difficult as well as pleasant choice, as he was in that year ranked the top candidate for professorships at the University of Helsingfors (political science) as well as at the University of Bergen, Norway (comparative politics). The outcome was that Norway got the upper hand of Finland, and Lauri was for a few important and formative years (1994-1997) a member of the well-known comparative politics community in Bergen. However, Alma Mater in Åbo did not resign to her fate but engaged in persistent efforts to win back her Prodigal Son, and Lauri was in 1997 appointed to a newly established chair in political science at Åbo Akademi, assuming at appointment the position as Head of Department. Following administrative re-organization, Lauri is since 2005 at Åbo Akademi the Director of a large-scale research effort, named “Democracy: A Citizen Perspective. An Interdisciplinary Centre of Excellence”.

Lauri Karvonen's scholarship is characterized by scope and sharp-wittedness, by impressive quantity as well as deep-drilling quality. Alone or in collaboration with colleagues he has written or edited well over 20 books, and he has over the years published bunches of chapters and articles, many of which have been placed with leading international journals. In addition, he has published a fair share of reviews, comments and popular articles, many of which have appeared on the pages of *Finsk Tidskrift*, the oldest cultural journal in the Nordic countries and by tradition a special concern of the political science community in Åbo. Also, Lauri's scholarship is characterized by change as well as continuity – continuity in terms of science orientation and methodology, change in terms of topics and research areas. While he has contributed to most main areas of political science, the contributions have almost always a comparative bend, and they always satisfy the highest demands for a cumulative political science. Historians often proud

themselves of being particularly meticulous when it comes to the evaluation of sources, documents and texts, and Lauri's constant and even painstaking concern for matters of validity is among the vestiges of his early occupation with the study of history. Similarly, his positive view of history as a container in which one may find and classify the data that are needed for the scientific treatment of a given topic probably originates from his background in the history discipline. However, ever since his undergraduate days Lauri has also acted up to the conviction that scientific efforts in the study of politics need to strive for more than ideographic knowledge alone. To Lauri, the ultimate goal of inquiry is a body of knowledge, dressed in empirically verified theoretical propositions: theories and empirical data must interact, theories suggesting questions to be answered by means of empirical research, and empirical data verifying, correcting or falsifying theories. This, of course, carries implications. For one thing, research efforts must always, by means of frames of reference, theories and models, connect to the various notions and conceptions that are relevant for a full and comparative understanding of the phenomena that are studied. Also, it should always be spelled out how, to what extent, and with what reservations findings may enrich the field of theories that has inspired the search for findings. Coherent as well as forceful, Lauri Karvonen's scholarship is an outcome from as well as a tribute to the belief that the contributions of political science efforts should always be to a generalized body of knowledge which transcends limits and boundaries in time and space.

Lauri Karvonen's first book-length study was his licentiate dissertation *Mellanstatlig intervention* (International Intervention), published in 1977 by Åbo Akademi. It is evident already from this case-study oriented investigation that Lauri had in a very early stage of his career acquired a talent to survey and cultivate impressive amounts of literature and master large knowledge areas. His capacities and faculty for pursuing scientific research were even more evident and visible in his doctoral thesis *Med vårt västra grannland som förebild* (Our Neighboring Country in the West as a Model), the title of which quotes a frequent saying from Finnish policy documents. In this prize-awarded book Lauri studied policy diffusions from Sweden to Finland during the post-war years; he thereby claimed a research field in which he has acquired an authority position. Innovative in approach and execution, the study combines in a fruitful manner macro-and micro-efforts, the macro-category being about policy mappings in terms of scope and width, and the micro-category being about case studies that penetrate diffusion mechanisms. The thesis carries weight still today and is frequently quoted.

In a co-authored book (with Bengt Sundelius) on *Internationalization and Foreign Policy Management*, published in 1987, Lauri revisited the study of international politics, penetrating now the borderline between politics international and national. At that time, however, he had developed a taste for thematic re-orientation, and the study of political movements, fascism in particular, came to mark another main line of his research. Although sprinkled with comparative insight, his main book-length work in this field is about Finland. It is named *From White to Blue-and-Black*, and was published in 1988 by the Finnish Society of Science and Letters. In this book Lauri analyzes the ecology, history and ideology of the inter-war fascism in Finland, and attempts to explain the resulting patterns by reference to the usual leading theories in the field. The important main finding is that the theories are in fact less than adequate for a full understanding of the Finnish case and, in consequence, that the Finnish variety of fascism displayed particular and somewhat elusive characteristics. Somewhat later, in a small textbook, titled *Fascismen i Europa* (European Fascism) and published in 1990 in Sweden, Lauri followed up and rounded off his efforts in this research area. Still later, he has published important papers on “The Fascist Conception of Law” (1991) and “The New Extreme Right-Wings in Western Europe” (1997).

Lauri’s studies of fascism also served a spring-board purpose, as they inspired him to undertake broader investigations in the field of democracy development and challenges to democratic political life. Already in 1993 followed a brilliant volume on *Fragmentation and Consensus*, published in the Boulder series of Social Science Monographs. Lauri’s research in this book was about European democracy during the interwar period, his point of departure being that democracy survived in some cases but perished in others, and his framework for understanding this variation emanating from two perspectives that deal with party system fragmentation and consociationalism. In terms of design and approach, this study resembles much Lauri’s doctoral dissertation. Again he applies a broader macro-analysis as well as deep-drilling studies of matched pairs – the analysis builds to a large extent on case studies of a good dozen countries, successful and less successful democracies alike. This is indeed a fine study, characterized as it is by learning, empirical effort, methodic pluralism, interesting results and sophisticated reasoning. The same is true also of Lauri’s most recent book-length study, named *The Personalisation of Politics: A Study of Parliamentary Democracies*, and published in 2010 by ECPR Press in a series of ECPR Monographs. Including an abundance of relevant data and examining from a broad comparative perspective four central dimensions of personalization, namely institutions, candidates, party leaders, and

media, Lauri is able to show that he personalization thesis, much in the foreground of recent debates and findings, may in fact be overstated.

Lauri has edited and co-edited several anthologies, contributing chapters as well as editorial efforts. Among the titles are *Nordkalotten i politiken* (Politics in the North Cap, 1983), *Finland. En politisk loggbok* (Finland. Political Log-Book, 1987), *Social Democracy in Transition*, 1991, *Women in Nordic Politics*, 1995, and *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (2001). This last-mentioned volume, authoritatively published by Routledge, updates the classic work from 1967 by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan on *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* as well as assesses the theoretical and empirical relevance of the old title for the present-day study of elections, voters and parties. The various titles certainly testify to Lauri's intellectual inquisitiveness and his eagerness to conquer new thematic domains as well as to his organizational capacities for harnessing as editor intellectual contingents and supporters.

Lauri Karvonen has been and is widely trusted and respected by Finnish and international research societies and colleagues. He has served on a number of selection committees for chairs in political science and neighboring disciplines in Finland and in the Nordic countries, and in recognition of his outstanding research and scholarship he was awarded in the year 2009 by the Finnish Society of Science and Letters the Professor E. J. Nyström Prize, which is the most prestigious and sought-after award that is given by the Society. Among his commitments to the scientific community are several important positions of trust; for instance, for the most part of the 1990s (1993-1998) he served as Secretary of the Research Committee on Political Sociology, which is a joint committee of the International Political Science Association and the International Sociological Association. It needs to be emphasized that Lauri has always had Nordic cooperation very much at heart. In a brilliant and recent chapter to *Kontraster och nyanser* (2010), a volume to celebrate the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Swedish Political Science Association, he characterizes, in the title of his contribution, Swedish political science as "a dear old friend", and he speaks with warmth about his many contacts and bonds of friendship over the years with Swedish and Nordic colleagues. During his early career in the beginning of the 1980s he was a guest researcher at Aarhus University in Denmark, and he was in 1983-1985 editor of *Cooperation and Conflict*, which is the leading Nordic journal in the field of international politics. In 1984-1987 he held the position as Secretary-General of the Nordic Political Science Association; some twenty years later he returned to the front rank of the association, becoming in 2008 through 2011 its President. During some years in the 1990's, as a Visiting Professor, he was associated with the Democracy Institute at the Mid-Sweden

University in Sundsvall, Sweden, contributing as editor and chapter writer to several books published by the institute, like, for instance, *Nordisk demokrati i förändring* (Variations in Nordic Democracy, 1999). Likewise, mention must be made of Lauri's long-standing association with Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle in Stockholm, Sweden, and the well-established Democratic Audit of that organization. Over the years Lauri has submitted several important contributions to the examinations and reports from the Audit.

\*

Lauri Karvonen has been a mentor to tens and tens of graduate students as well as a considerable number of doctoral students. Anyone who has witnessed the commitment and enthusiasm that carry Lauri's presentations and inserts in debates at conferences and meetings will find it easy to believe that he has a talent for arousing enthusiasm among students and for promoting the pleasure that they take in their work. And indeed, his class-room presentations are always well-prepared, well-structured and well-delivered; also, he has an obvious aptitude for the quick and much to the point response to questions and comments. Furthermore, Lauri's manifold ties to the Nordic societies and Nordic culture has in a very specific way been evident also in his teaching appearances. Fluent in many languages, he has an innate talent for linguistic style, and he is an assiduous defender and spokesman for the preservation of the purity of the language. For several years I shared with Lauri the responsibility for the advanced seminars at the Åbo Akademi political science department; Lauri's clarifications of details as well as broader issues in the writing of scientific texts in the Swedish language and his constructive criticism of language errors of respondents were recurrent features of the seminars. Last year Lauri was awarded the Hugo Bergroth-prize, which is given by the Hugo Bergroth Association to reward merits in the field of linguistic skillfulness. The prize statement emphasized, and rightly so, that Lauri's linguistic correctness as well as his high demands as regards style sets future political scientists and social reformers a good example. It is exceptional, to say the least, that a prize for brilliance in managing the Swedish language is awarded to a person who as his mother tongue has Finnish, a very different and difficult language.

Fredrik Lagerroth, a famous Swedish political science professor, dead in 1974, was once portrayed in an elegant essay by Nils Stjernquist, another famous Swedish political science professor, in wordings that fit any description of Lauri amidst his daily occupation and obligations. According to Stjernquist, Lagerroth much resembled an old public servant from the time of Karl XI, who made a duty of his obligations. Work piled up and had to be managed: lectures were to be

prepared and delivered, articles and books were in the process of being finalized and published, his desk overflowed by reports and papers awaiting reading as well as constantly growing heaps of manuscript pages. As is evident from many appreciative statements from adepts and students, this characterization of Lagerroth at work describes well also Lauri's dutiful attitude towards his many commitments in regards to teaching and mentorship. Whereas one student in her preface to her doctoral dissertation proffers thanks for "constant encouragement, excellent advice and a whole-hearted engagement" (Åsa Bengtsson, 2002), another assures that "Without his immense effort, this thesis would not have been written" (Krister Lundell, 2005); and still another explains about Lauri that "His expertise and patience during the final stages of this research have been invaluable and my gratitude is immense" (Johanna Jääsaari, 2007). Of course, these are phrases that one expects to find in almost every dissertation acknowledgement list; however, anyone who has witnessed at arm's length Lauri's relentless efforts to help and educate his students is certainly willing to testify to the authenticity and sincerity of the thanksgivings.

Among Lauri's contributions to teaching are three even extremely useful pocket-type textbooks, which all deal with central comparative politics issues and problem-areas. The first has the laconic title *Demokratisering* (Democratization). Published in 1997 by Studentlitteratur, Sweden, this coherent volume provides an excellent review of democratization theories and mechanisms; furthermore, contrasting definitions of democracy and attempts at measuring this evasive concept are critically examined. In the textbook genre, this is an outstanding work. It was followed in the year 2003 by a treatise on *Statskick. Att bygga demokrati* (Forms of Government. Building Democracy), published by SNS Förlag, Sweden. Taking account of a wealth of studies and empirical data, Lauri skillfully penetrates causes as well as consequences of institutional choice and constitutional engineering. The latest addition to the textbook series is *Diktatur. Om ofrihetens politiska system* (Dictatorship. On the Political Systems of Unfreedom), published in 2008 also by SNS Förlag. The dictatorship concept is defined as well as typologized in an innovative manner; theories about dictatorship causes and the prospective futures of authoritarian states are discussed and examined. A good part of the book is devoted to detailed case studies of countries like North Korea, Brunei and Burma (Myanmar) – Lauri is here indeed entering virgin soil, as he examines systems that have hitherto remained to a great extent outside the democracy-biased field of political research. In Nordic political science at least, this well-executed book is a definite thematic conquest.

\*

This present book is published to celebrate Lauri's 60<sup>th</sup> birthday. Contributors are his closest colleagues and academic friends and collaborators. Several of the contributors have also during earlier stages of their careers been his students, supervised and educated by him. One, the undersigned, has, when the world was young, been his teacher and mentor, and I take the opportunity to end this introduction to the book on a personal note.

Long ago, in 1976, as a then young professor, I participated in a Nordic conference in Silkeborg, Denmark. My travel companion was Lauri Karvonen, at that time an Assistant Professor at his early academic youth. At the conference we presented a joint paper on Finnish foreign policy; however, my most vivid and best recollections from this journey are not about academic endeavors but rather about post-conference activities: ramblings in the streets of Copenhagen, dinners at Tivoli eateries, excursion by steam ferry to Himmelsberget, discussions, marked by profundity and perhaps less so, about such non-academic matters which frequently occupy much interest among young males. From those days on we have been friends, even close friends. The pattern of interaction has in the course of time taken different shadings: at first, I was Lauri's teacher and supervisor, later we became colleagues, since the late 1990's Lauri was for several years as Head of the Department my superior, at about the same time he also became, during extended morning sessions in my office, in a manner of speaking my teacher, introducing me, in debates when we forgot about time and lecturing schedules, to the mysticisms of comparative method and comparative logic. Since then I have been a comparativist by conviction: as I made a positivist scholar of my young student, he, in turn, made a comparativist scholar of his teacher. Today I am old and Lauri is not very young either. But we still derive pleasure from debating comparative politics and from enjoying at meetings and similar occasions each other's company. I salute Lauri with the famous words by Spock, one of the lead figures in Star Trek, the greatest adventure of all times: "Live long and prosper".

*Dag Anckar*





## *Tabula Gratulatoria*

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## COMPARISONS



# PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY IN FORMER BRITISH COLONIES

*Dag Anckar*

## Introduction

About the Westminster system of government it has been said that no other political system 'has been copied so extensively in such a wide variety of societies and continents' (Wilson 1994, 189). While this statement is certainly well-founded, as evident, for instance, from the fact that former British colonies have to a large extent introduced the British parliamentary model (Anckar 2004b) and that the colonies have largely adopted the single plurality electoral system of the Westminster model (e.g. Lundell 2005), it is still a worthwhile hypothesis that some aspects of Westminster Rule are more easily than others adapted for copying. This may in some cases be due to factors that relate to the capabilities and resources of the prospective copyists, but may also follow from the fact that copying is hampered by an imperfect concordance, as some Westminster aspects are more difficult than others to bring together in a coherent manner. This hypothesis frames the discussion in this article of the attitudes of former British colonies towards one central aspect of the Westminster model.

Specifically, the article investigates two inter-related challenges to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, which is one defining feature of Westminster Rule and stands out as a center-piece of the Westminster model. The implication of the doctrine is that the legislative body may change or repeal any prior legislative acts and is supreme to other government institutions. Parliament has, to quote an old but still valid formulation, "the right to make or unmake any law whatever", and the doctrine implies "further, that no person or body is recognized by the law of England as having the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament" (Dicey 1915, 37-38). Indeed, juxtaposing majoritarian and consensual democracy doctrines Arend Lijphart contends that "the parliament sovereignty is a vital ingredient of the majoritarianism of the Westminster model, because it means that there are no formal restrictions on the power of the majority of the House of Commons" (1984, 9). Developments during later decades, not least the membership of Britain in the European Union, have in some regards watered down the doctrine (Norris 2001); still, as evident from recent British efforts to introduce

legislation that promotes the possibilities of the British Parliament to manage in a more independent manner the relations of the country to the European Union, the very idea of parliamentary sovereignty presents continuity and has not become out of date.

In political and constitutional life, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is certainly challenged by several stipulations and arrangements, like judicial review, which is the power of courts to review laws and policies and overturn those that are found unconstitutional. This research, however, is concerned with the use of devices that create tension between popular and parliamentary sovereignty, and the point of departure is that forms of direct democracy may undermine parliamentary sovereignty. Direct democracy means that the citizens make collective decisions without representatives and representative institutions acting on their behalf (e.g. Donovan & Bowler 1998, 2); if frequently substituted for parliamentary decisions, direct democracy hence weakens the prestige and power of Parliament. As stated in an old political-science handbook, "the supremacy of parliament is really weakened by a device ... the referendum and initiative" (Soltau 1951, 193-94). Obviously, then, copying Westminster implies a repudiation of direct democracy devices, and the question to be addressed here is about the extent to which former colonies have really lived up to this expectation. However, while direct democracy is usually conceptualized as involving the devices of initiative, referendum, and recall (e.g. Cronin 1989, 1-2), this study of direct democracy manifestations is about referendums only. The reason for this is simply that the two other direct democracy devices are sparsely represented on a national level among the former colonies and, indeed, among the nations of the world. For instance, a fairly recent mapping of the use of the popular initiative in microstates, an universe imbued with former British colonies, reveals that the institute exists in few states only, none of which is a former British colony (Anckar 2004a, 383).

A similar serious challenge derives from the use of methods of constitutional amendment, which may or may not involve the use of referendums. As pointed out by Lijphart (1984, 9), the multifarious amendment forms can for most analytical purposes be reduced to three basic types, meaning that changes in constitutions may have to be approved by special majorities, by a popular referendum, or merely by a regular parliamentary majority. The Westminster model prescribes amendment by this last method: "exactly the same legislative procedure is followed whether the bill to be passed concerns, say, the placing of restrictions upon the methods of the trainers of performing animals or a radical alteration in the powers of the House of Lords" (Strong 1958, 65). Other methods of



amendment, then, are at distance from the Westminster model, and introduce, in varying extent, deviations from the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. This statement is to some extent challenged by the view that the referendum is the most extreme majoritarian method of decision-making and therefore is in line with Westminster politics; against this view, however, Lijphart has raised the objection that the potential calling of a referendum by a minority, as in cases when referenda are in combination with the popular initiative, may be regarded a strong stimulus for the majority to be heedful of minority views (Lijphart 1999, 231). Furthermore, and especially in regards to constitutional amendment, when and if the referendum is prescribed in addition to legislative approval, this makes amendments harder to adopt and, in consequence, constitutions more rigid. This, again, is in conflict with parliamentary majority and parliamentary sovereignty and therefore serves to classify the referendum as an anti-majoritarian device (Gallagher 1995, as quoted in Lijphart 1999, 230).

In sum, then, copying Westminster implies adherence to flexible amendment and repudiation of rigid amendment, or, to introduce still one terminology, a preference for subordinate constitutions that can be amended by the legislature acting alone to superior constitutions that stipulate the participation of other bodies or groups (Wolff-Phillips 1968, xvi). The research question to be addressed is again about the extent to which former colonies have really lived up to this expectation. As noted above, the study is concerned with policy choices in former British colonies. To be precise, the population consists of the territories that have since the end of World War II emerged as independent countries from British rule. There are in all 54 such territories (Derbyshire & Derbyshire 1999, 811-13). However, two of these territories are not included in this investigation. South Yemen, freed in 1967 from British control, does not exist any longer as an independent state, and Somalia has not since 1991 a recognized central government. The remaining 52 colonies are listed in Table 1.

### A Bird's Eyes View

The main findings from this investigation are summarized in Table 1, which represents a crossing of two trisected dimensions. One is about the use in the former colonies of referendums, whereas the other is about the use of amendment techniques. Concerning referendums, the trisection is between colonies that have not during independence throughout 2010 implemented referendums (not at all),

colonies that have carried out one or two referendums only (seldom), and colonies which have made more frequent use of referendums (repeatedly). Data are from relevant country chapters in the authoritative and very useful electoral data handbooks that have been published in the years 1999-2010 by Dieter Nohlen and his research team (Nohlen et al. 1999b; Nohlen et al. 2001; Nohlen 2005; Nohlen & Stöver 2010), and from other relevant compilations (Kaufmann & Waters 2004; Pállinger et al. 2007; Referendums by Country). There are a few instances in the materials of referendums that have concerned more than one issue; for instance, at one referendum in the Bahamas in the year 2002, the electorate was asked nine questions pertaining to elections and the creation of institutions for the management of elections (Hillebrands & Schwehm 2005, 75). In these cases, the count has been for one referendum, not several. Given that the total number of referendums is fairly low in the materials, the opposite method would have biased unduly the performance of some individual countries, like the Bahamas.

Concerning amendment, colonies are ordered into three groups on the basis of the extent to which the devices that are used deviate from a flexible Westminster standard. First, constitutions that prescribe amendment by regular parliamentary majorities are cases that repeat the Westminster method. Second, majorities within legislatures may be authorized to amend the constitution only if and when the majorities are special; in the case of bicameral parliaments, the quantitative requirement is typically for supermajorities in both chambers. This technique introduces a certain amount of rigidity and thereby encroaches on the right of the parliamentary majority and hence on parliamentary sovereignty. Third, if modifications cannot be approved by the legislature alone, but require confirmation in referendum or by other ratifying procedures, like, typically, by a majority of states in federal systems, then, obviously, the constitution stands supreme over parliament, which is in definite violation of parliamentary sovereignty (Hague & Harrop 2004, 211). Also in this third group are methods that prescribe popular preference inclusions but still entrust the final ratifying decision to an individual ruler like a King or Emir. Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait and Qatar may be quoted as examples. Further in this group are methods that do not prescribe popular preference inclusions; in such cases amendments are decided by a decree of the ruler or by similar methods. Examples from the materials at hand concern cases like Brunei, Libya and Oman.

The placing of cases in amendment categories has been decided on the basis of a close reading of the constitutions of the countries. The reading reveals a particular difficulty in terms of classification – several countries apply parallel but

different amendment methods, as the amendment threshold is higher for certain items than for others. Following a suggestion by Lijphart (1999, 218), the classification is guided here by the principle that the most rigorous requirement counts, except when evident that the requirement is valid for some very specific article or purpose only. For example, in St Vincent and the Grenadines the stipulation is that bills to alter the constitution must be approved on a referendum, when and if they concern the election of representatives, the appointment of Senators, matters of finance and public service, and the like (Constitution, article 38). It is evident from this listing that the referendum device, although in use for a defined set of matters only, is common enough to direct classification. In rare cases and for very specific and fundamental questions only, the possibility of amendment is altogether denied. This is the case, for instance, in Jordan, where the Constitution states (article 126) that "No amendment of the Constitution affecting the rights of the King and the succession to the Throne may be passed during the period of regency", and in Guyana, where the Constitution states (article 284) that "No amendment to the Constitution may affect the democratic and republican nature of the State". These and other similar constitutional bans on amendment are not registered in the present analysis.

Reflecting these classificatory rules and measures, the distribution that is given in Table 1 forms the basis for an analysis of country patterns. A first observation is that the spreading of cases over categories is anything but even. Of altogether nine cells, two (2, 6) are empty and another two (1, 3) are represented by one case only. One cell (9) captures three cases. All remaining 47 cases are packed together in four cells, one of which (5) houses seven cases, whereas the other cells (4, 8, 7) have 9, 15 and 16 cases respectively. In order to bring some clarity to this indiscriminate clump, two groups of countries that differ noticeably in terms of policy are in the following singled out. On the one hand, 10 countries, located in cells 1 and 4, emerge as the most convinced Westminster-adherents. They are countries which have not resorted to referendums and decide amendments on the basis of parliamentary consideration only. On the other hand, 18 countries, located in cells 8 and 9, have the worst record – they are countries which are referendum-users and resort to ratification procedures when it comes to constitutional amendment. Table 2 reports the outcome of an effort to explain by means of some theoretically relevant factors the composition of these two opposite groups, the lead expectation being, of course, that factors that supposedly promote Westminster adherence are clearly better represented in the first group than in the second. In all, five factors are analyzed.

Table 1. Referendum use and amendment methods in 52 former British territories

Use of Referendums:			
Amendment:	Not at all	Seldom	Repeatedly
Simple Majority	Israel <b>1.</b>	<b>2.</b>	New Zealand <b>3.</b>
Special Majority	Barbados Fiji Jordan Malaysia Mauritius Solomon Islands Tanzania Trinidad & Tobago United Arab Emirates <b>4.</b>	Bahrain Belize Guyana Kenya Sudan Tuvalu Zimbabwe <b>5.</b>	<b>6.</b>
Ratification	Antigua-Barbuda Brunei Dominica Grenada India Jamaica Kiribati Kuwait Lesotho Nigeria Oman Qatar St Kitts-Nevis St Lucia Swaziland Vanuatu <b>7.</b>	Bahamas Cyprus Libya Malawi Maldives Malta Myanmar Nauru St Vincent Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Sri Lanka Uganda Zambia <b>8.</b>	Botswana Gambia Ghana <b>9.</b>

Table 2. Explaining Westminster-orientations: a numerical survey of the impact of six factors

Westminster-orientation:	Adherence	Rejection
Ethnicity (index)	.48	.52
Democracies (ratio)	less than one fifth (4/24)	one fourth (6/24)
Microstates (ratio)	very few (3/23)	about one third (7/23)
Long British presence (ratio)	very few (3/27)	about one third (8/27)
African region (ratio)	very few (2/17)	more than half (8/17)

Three of these factors denote qualities that describe the colonies as units. The first factor is about ethnicity, the expectation being that ethnically heterogeneous and therefore cleavage-ridden countries are more than homogeneous countries disposed to introducing veto points and rigidity - relevant data on ethnicity are from an available index construction, which assigns each and every country in the world an ethnic fragmentation value on a scale from 0 to 1 (Anckar, Eriksson & Leskinen 2002). However, as evident from Table 2, the difference between the mean index values in the two groups is small, and the impact of this factor is therefore negligible. All other factors are measured in terms of ratios of the extent to which colonies that display a certain characteristic, like, say, democracy, have found a place in the two groups. For instance, regarding democracy, the numbers in Table 2 imply that relatively few of the democratic former colonies are in the first group as against one fourth in the second - the difference between the groups of states is again less than significant. Data are from a recent presentation of democracy ratings of former British colonies (Anckar 2011, 56-57). The third factor is about state size, the expectation being that smallness, operationalized here as microstate status (populations of less than one million), works in the direction of favoring direct democracy applications. It would appear that this hypothesis is somewhat more substantiated, as about one third of the microstate colonies populate the second group and very few only are in the first.

The two remaining factors link more directly to colonial rule. First, taking notice of the idea in the literature that variations in colony conduct reflect variations in terms of exposure to metropolitan rule (Huntington 1984, 206), colonies are now classified in terms of the time they had been under British rule when becoming independent. The British presence is characterized as long if it had

lasted for about one century or more, and the leading expectation is that long-term colonies are better represented in the first than in the second group. Data are from relevant listings of metropolitan exposure in an authoritative political-science handbook by Denis and Ian Derbyshire (1999, 811-13), and the finding is that the expectation is clearly falsified. The difference between the groups is noteworthy, but is not in the expected direction. Finally, testing the belief that regional patterns may be of importance, and paying due attention to the observation in the literature that especially in Africa imported constitutional regulations hardly ever worked as intended by the former colonial powers, as "the constitutions were either soon withdrawn, fundamentally modified by the new rulers or simply ignored" (Nohlen, Krennerich & Thibaut 1999a, 3), the proportion of African territories in the two groups is calculated. The expectation is now that African colonies are to be found in the second group rather than the first, and this indeed proves to be the case. The difference is striking and in the expected direction. It also serves to illustrate an occurrence of region-based differences between states in policy-copying.

To sum up: the analysis of the above selected factors does not bring forth any great amount of positive results. The impressions from a bird's eyes view inspection are indeed inconsistent and in part contradictory to expectations. Returning to the constellations in Table 1, one would expect a concentration of cases to the upper left half of the table when and if a majority of the colonies hold parliamentary sovereignty in respect. Correspondingly, one would expect few cases only in the lower right half. While to some extent in accordance with this ideal, there is an evident concentration of cases to cells that from the point of view of parliamentary sovereignty represent combinations of acceptable and unacceptable policies (7 and 8). It would appear therefore that the two dimensions, while they certainly both tap parliamentary sovereignty conceptions, still are different and are not easily combined and reconciled. This suggests that efforts at unpacking the pattern should preferably deal with the dimensions separately; in the following, this method will be implemented.

### Unpacking Inconsistency

Concerning the use of referendums, the parliamentary sovereignty doctrine is indeed well and alive. Half of the colonies have never introduced referendums, and another 22 colonies have only seldom and occasionally resorted to the referendum instrument. Only a small handful of cases, four to be exact, are in a category of

frequent users. The resulting pattern therefore suggests a good and even excellent fit with a Westminster standard. As many countries have only in the last decade introduced referendums, the fit was even better at earlier stages. Newcomers in the 2000's on the referendum stage are Bahamas (2002, 2008), Bahrain (2001), Belize (2008), Cyprus (2004), Kenya (2005, 2010), Malta (2003), Nauru (2010), St Vincent (2009), Tuvalu (2008), Uganda (2000, 2005) and Zimbabwe (2000). This means that up to the year 2000 referendums had been arranged in less than one third of the former colonies (15 out of 52); ten years later the share is exactly half of the colonies. Still, the increase notwithstanding, direct democracy remains in the form of referendum a fairly rare occurrence in the British territories concerned.

Interestingly, the pattern in regards to constitutional amendment is much different. The Westminster model simply does not work here. This is evident already from the fact that only two cases, namely Israel and New Zealand, may be classified in a category which answers fully to the Westminster ideal. These two countries became independent without having written constitutions and are still today lacking formal constitutional frameworks; it follows, then, that they lack specific provisions for constitutional alteration. All other cases are at some or considerable distance from the Westminster model. Close to one third of the former colonies amend their constitutions by means of qualified parliamentary majorities. However, a majority of 34 out of 52 colonies are at larger distance still from the model, clearly renouncing flexible amendment, and connecting instead to currents that plead for rigidity. The total picture, then, is that the Westminster model has low steering-power capacity, and even, in most cases, is in lack of such a capacity. In sum: the colonies have implemented the model in regards to direct democracy applications, but have relinquished the model when it comes to amendment applications.

Why is this so? Given that amendment by ordinary parliamentary majority exists only in a very small handful of states (Anckar & Karvonen 2002, 29-30), one line of explanation may state, quite simply, that the emphasis on full amendment flexibility to the disregard of rigidity makes the Westminster model even remarkable radical, different, and unique in the world. The Westminster model therefore stands out as a less obvious and inviting object for copying. The colonies have not, this would be the explanation, incorporated full flexibility because almost no-one else on the global scene has done so. However, upon reflection, a better, coherent, and logical explanation is near at hand. This explanation departs from notions of institutions as 'problem-solvers' (Laponce & Saint Jacques 1997), i.e. rational choice conceptions:

In parliaments elected by plurality, large majorities often represent much smaller popular majorities; moreover, the large majorities are often single-party majorities (Lijphart 1999, 219). These are everyday constellations in the political life of the former colonies. To give one out of a myriad of possible empirical examples: in elections in St Lucia in 1982, the United Workers Party with 56 per cent of the vote gained no less than 14 out of a total of 17 seats; in elections in the same country in 1997, St Lucia Labour Party with 61 per cent of the vote gained a corresponding 14 out of 17 seats (Hillebrands & Nohlen 2005, 588-92). This means that the prospects for fairly small popular majorities to dominate government and decide and implement even far-reaching constitutional amendments are quite good – as noted in the literature, Britain’s system of disproportional representation can manufacture a House of Common majority for a party with as little as 35 percent of the popular vote (Rose 2008, 188). Militating against consequences of such developments requires the introduction of veto-points and thresholds, and a large majority of the colonies have indeed confronted this dilemma. When from the calculations are left out a group of countries which because of authoritarian regimes or particular political conditions do not qualify as real test cases (namely: Brunei, Fiji, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), of the remaining 43 cases, an overwhelming majority of 36 cases (=84 per cent) have electoral systems which open the doors to under-sized popular majorities, and, therefore, call for an application of rigid amendment methods. Besides a great number of Single-Member Plurality cases, four countries which use the Single Non-Transferable Vote method and one country that represents Two-Ballot Majority (Kiribati) are included in this majority - data are from available expositions of electoral system choices, provided by Krister Lundell in world-wide listings (2005, 249-54, appendix II).

The predominance in the colonies of rigidity-inviting electoral methods is also evident from a comparison with electoral system choices in the world during the years 1945-2003 (Lundell 2005, 47). The comparison indicates that 55 per cent only of the overall choices and 34 per cent only of choices by other than former British colonies were in the same categories as those applied by the majority of former British colonies. Furthermore, of 85 democracies in the world in 1999 (Anckar & Karvonen 2002, 30), a minority of 29 had assumed plurality or majority electoral systems as against 56 cases with proportional, semi-proportional or mixed electoral systems; in this population of 85 there were 24 former British colonies, 20 of which maintained plurality or majority systems. Re-analyses of available data from this above listing (Anckar & Karvonen 2002, 30) also serve to confirm the



impression that differences in terms of electoral system choice make a difference in terms of amendment rigidity. Namely, of systems with plural or majority elections 43 per cent applied amendment methods that are less rigid in the sense that they require ordinary or qualified legislative decisions but do not involve referendum methods or other ratifying measures by the people; in contrast, of countries with other than plural and majority methods, a majority of 63 per cent applied such less rigid measures. In sum, then, one conceivable reason for the wide-spread use in the colonies of rigid amendments is that the colonies have opted clearly more than other states for electoral methods that almost by necessity rule out flexible amendment and parliamentary sovereignty.

This state of affairs in fact denotes a paradox in terms of Westminster diffusion: adherence to one specific Westminster-device, i.e. plurality elections, becomes a check on the possibilities to assume another Westminster-device, namely a parliamentary sovereignty-recognizing amendment method. The following summation of this essay dwells at some length on this paradox.

### Summation

It is since long an established fact in diffusion literature that similarities between individual countries go a long way to advance the diffusion from one country to another (e.g. Rogers & Shoemaker 1971, 14-15; Karvonen 1981, 61-79). In the interplay between Britain and her colonies this basic condition has not been fulfilled: marked by ethnic and social heterogeneity and imbued in several cases by challenges to the legitimacy of government, political life has in many colonies been different from that in the metropolitan power. Often enough, the differences have not converted into differences in political architecture and political style, as evident, in this study, from the disposition of colonies to follow the metropolitan lead in taking up a negative attitude towards direct democracy applications. And often enough, as likewise evident in this study, differences have indeed had politico-institutional differences in their wake, as the colonies have hesitated and even refrained from following the metropolitan lead in terms of amendment procedure.

The discrepancy is to some extent technical. The deviation from metropolitan rule is about constitutional amendments and the place of referendums in amendments; since amendments have in several colonies been rare and even non-existent, the actual deviations from metropolitan rule have been few and have not challenged the empirical rebuttal of direct democracy measures. However, and

this is evident also from materials that have been presented earlier in this essay, all this may change. According to a popular saying, constitutions are 'power maps' (Duchacek 1973) which prescribe the structure of government and the formal distribution of authority; the course of times and related developments will most probably call for changes and adjustments in power mappings and distributions of authority. Necessitating constitutional amendment, such changes and adjustments will have a greater use of direct democracy in their wake. Indeed, in the states of the world constitutional amendments are fairly frequent (e.g. Lutz 1994, 362-65); when and if this development brings forth greater manifestations among former British colonies, the use of direct democracy will increase and the attainment of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty will weaken.

The discrepancy in the colonies between the Westminster lead in the non-use of direct democracy and the repudiation of the Westminster model in amendment methods is illustrative also of the fact that explanations of institutional choice follow different logics, and therefore tend to penetrate each other, overlap each other, contradict each other, wipe out each other, and support each other. One school of thought takes the view that constitutional and institutional features reflect the cultural and historical contexts of which they are a part; the validity of this approach has been examined here. The finding, to repeat, is that the reasoning is correct as well as erroneous: diffusion has occurred and has not occurred. Another school of thought simply explains constitutional design by constitutional design, as in investigations of the extent to which certain constitutional elements tend to appear in connection with certain other constitutional elements (e.g. Suksi 1993, 161-80). In this line of reasoning constitutional choices are dependent on each other, the choice of one device following naturally from the choice of another device. For instance, as is well known, federal systems are as a rule characterized by a bicameral chamber structure (e.g. Money & Tsebelis 1992, 29); furthermore, electoral and governmental design tend to interact, so that the choice of one design matters to the choice of another design. This, in fact, is precisely what has happened in the cases at hand here, although in a negative sense, as the interaction between electoral and government formula has entered and in part jammed the diffusion relation between the metropolitan power and the colonies.

The transmission factor has originated from still a third explanation of institutional choice. This explanation, which was already touched upon, applies a rationalistic point of departure, this meaning that constitutions and institutions are designed to serve the particular needs of the societies over which they have legal and political authority. In the analysis at hand, the particular needs are the result

from still more diffusion, namely the assumption in the colonies of the metropolitan electoral system, which has carried in its wake prospects for sudden, imbalanced and insufficiently thought-out processes of constitutional amendment. To avoid such processes, rigid amendment has been introduced, which creates, again, a balance between constitutional elements, the one (plurality elections) promoting and in fact making necessary the other (rigidity). Or, in other words, the choice of rigid amendment methods, while in contrast to principles adopted by the metropolitan power, has been congruent to the choice of a plurality election method, i.e. a device which has emerged from metropolitan design. Westminster adherence has had Westminster non-adherence in store.

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## DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE THROUGH ADMINISTRATION<sup>1</sup>

*Marko Joas*

### Introduction

Societal change is, according to researchers, ever faster today. The development is clearly visible in most aspects of human life, also in the political sphere in at least developed societies. The societal change within the political sphere is caused by mainly two processes, by a very fast technological development, especially regarding communications, and by the changing preferences of the individuals.

These processes of change place extensive demands on the political institutions as we know them today. “There is growing evidence of public disillusionment with the institutions of advanced industrial democracies” states Graham Smith in his introduction to the path-breaking book on democratic innovations (Smith 2009, 4). Therefore – our most central political institutions – the representative democracy along with the bureaucratic administration are facing considerable challenges in order to cope with the citizens’ demands of the functionality of the system as well as regarding their own role within the system.

The citizens perceive more often than traditional politics has lost its way. If the political institutions are not renewed along with the pace of the society, by creating responsive and direct institutions to channel individual preferences, the citizen preferences will emerge in other forms, often via less or non-organized channels.

Much of the citizens’ discontent is manifested through protest voting, or via nonvoting, or even as citizen activity. The citizens want, in particular under certain circumstances, to influence the political process also beyond the political institutions provided by the existing political system – through elections and political parties.

A channel of growing interest for influencing decision-making is cooperation within and with the administration, i.e. democracy through bureaucracy. I will in this article highlight alternative channels of participation in the political process, especially those offered by the administration.

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## Democracy

Democracy has evolved during a very long period of time, with different aspects in the foreground over different periods of time. The contemporary academic literature emphasizes three ideals for democratic processes: Democracy can be seen (A) as electoral democracy where citizens act only by voting in elections, (B) as participatory democracy where the role of the citizens as active participants is accentuated, or (C) as deliberative democracy where the political debate is considered to be in the foreground (see for example Bengtsson 2008, 51).

The ideal that currently dominates, electoral democracy with certain variations, is characterized by authoritative decision-making made by elected politicians, i.e. elected representatives for the people. This ideal form of electoral democracy, which is usually materialized within a representative democratic system, offers the citizens a rather broad spectrum of various means to influence politics, but the political role of the administration is mainly seen as rather narrow, mostly to provide expert knowledge for the decision-making process.

The other two ideals of democracy can be traced back to the philosophical roots of democratic steering, but, in a predominantly representative, electoral democracy setting any movement towards these models can be seen as democratic innovations. These ideals underline, on the other hand, citizens' direct and active participation in the political process. Within participatory democracy the importance of citizens' active commitment and decision right also in details is emphasized whereas in deliberative democracy a well-reasoned consensus oriented political debate is seen as a goal, finally reaching consensus over the decision-alternatives (Joas 2008, 260; Bengtsson 2008, 51).

The debate concerning the correct character of democracy is also raised within the sphere of administration, even though the administration's role within democracy is disputed. The administration can either be perceived as supporting democracy or as an impediment for democracy, as Hamilton (2006, 3) states: "Democracies cannot survive without a strong, technically competent, effective, efficient, and responsive public service, but the existence of such a public service contradicts the democratic notion of government by the people." Politics and administration are mutually interdependent; they have to coexist within democracy in order to achieve a functional society.



## The Dilemma of Traditional Democratic Views

The society which was best suited to be governed by indirect representative democracy looked very different than the welfare society of today. All highly developed and most less developed democracies are characterised by good physical and non-physical communications, very high education levels and thus political skills of the people and extensive welfare giving resources and possibilities to act, if considered necessary by the individual.

Most choices we make can be and also are based on individual preferences rather than group preferences, individuals do identify themselves with multiple connections instead of single groups. Thus, this means that the political decision-making arena, created at the birth of the industrial society, with institutions based on conditions older than three, four generations, is exposed to pressure from various directions.

Supranational, national and sub-national fragmentation of politics exposes the political institutions to new and various demands from new political actors. The arena for decision-making has changed and the diversity of actors is more extensive than ever before. New actors represent various scales of government and also various non-governmental organisations; they have different levels of resources at their disposal, but always more than individual citizens have. These actors work, on one hand with and within the existing political system, through formal and also informal channels to the political power. On the other hand, this reduces in the long run the direct connection between the voters and the politicians; the responsiveness remains low and the political control is often absent (Pollak et al. 2009, 22).

In addition, as opinion extensive polls suggest, citizens of welfare societies do have to a higher extent an individual rather than a collective identity (see Inglehart 1999). Citizens are to high extent happy with how things are, they do not want be involved unless own core values are under threat. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) calls this development stealth democracy, politics should, according to indifferent citizens become visible only seldom, most things should be run as routines by, for example, a non-political administration. Citizens are, to some extent, content with their life and also with the society at large.

On one hand, election turnout has, as a long term trend, decreased, at the same time as also the legitimacy of politicians has decreased. Low election turnout can be seen as protest, as scepticism to our possibilities to influence or indifference to what politics bring along. Citizens do not trust politicians, they participate less

through traditional channels, but they are still happy with their lives in general, with the goods that our welfare societies provide us.

On the other hand, citizens' prerequisites to make their own decisions have increased considerably with higher knowledge and education levels, with better economical resources and improved communications. Citizens are today more capable to make their own independent decisions than when the representative democracy was introduced (Bengtsson & Mattila 2009, 1033; Dalton 2004).

It seems obvious that party politics is not attracting all people anymore, in fact, it never has attracted everybody, but the interest is gradually decreasing even more. This is a great challenge to representative democracy – to main stream democracy as we know it today.

Would it be possible for the political system to reshape its mode from big democracy to small democracy, at least regarding day-to-day decisions and empowerment of people in a small scale? To what degree is this possible to achieve through administrative action instead of representative politics? As Bengtsson says (2008, 163) it is a challenge for the political system and present democracy to make citizens “more integrated and committed when the traditional forms to participate via the political parties and via elections seems to attract fewer and fewer?”

## Alternative Forms of Democracy

The need for development as described above is actually happening all the time in representative democracies with well-functioning administrations. Several innovative modes of citizen participation have been brought forward in the debate regarding the weaknesses of the representative democracy. These innovations provide the society a possibility to cope with most obvious problems of the current political system (see for example Smith 2009 and also forthcoming Geissel & Joas 2012).

Geissel summarizes alternative and innovative forms of democracy along two central dimensions – the structure for opinion creation and level of decisive decision-making. Opinion creation can occur through aggregation or through deliberation; both strategies can be of decisive or consultative character, involve direct decisions or offer recommendations (Geissel 2009, 4).

Aggregation implies in normal cases direct democracy where citizens preferences are accumulated, for example via referendums. Referendums can be viewed as alternative forms of democracy, especially within political systems that

are based on representative democracy at all societal levels. Referendums are often of a consultative character and are in practice rather rare in political systems based on representation. The political and administrative level seems also to be of importance for the use of direct democratic measures – local levels of government do more often make use of referenda than national levels of government.

Deliberative forms of democracy highlight the quality rather than the quantity of political debate. Small-scale information brokerage processes can be viewed as deliberation, often via information meetings, hearings and common discussions regarding for example physical planning. In the most elaborated versions it is possible to find examples of structured or open, general decision meetings regarding common affairs on a local level. The deliberative processes are often of a consultative character and the opinions are perceived as recommendations to the traditional political and administrative process (Geissel 2009, 5; see also Röcke 2012).

The democracy as a whole is believed to be of higher quality through increased citizen participation. The literature emphasizes that participatory democracy has a number advantages in comparison to representative democracy (Michels 2011, 279; Beierle & Cayford 2002):

1. *Influence*: Participatory democracy gives citizens a say in the decision-making process - '*the will of the people*' can be seen in the decisions.
2. *Inclusion*: Citizens are provided a gateway to the policy process.
3. *Skills and Virtues*: Participatory democracy informs and educates the public in complicated issues and encourages the people to take part in the policy-process.
4. *Quality*: Participatory democracy improves the substantial quality of the decisions given that local knowledge reaches the decision-makers better.
5. *Consensus*: Participatory democracy leads to rational decisions based on reasoning and therefore reduces the risk for conflicts.
6. *Legitimacy*: Participatory democracy improves the general public's trust in the central political institutions.

The movement of power, knowledge and trust is a two-way street; it is as important to inform the politicians regarding the various opinions that exist in the society, develop both popular opinions, but also alternative solutions in addition to the politically and administratively prepared solutions. Hence, the direction is also often from citizens to decision-makers. The other direction, from decision-makers to

citizens is equally important, the main intention is to form a channel of information brokerage.

The practical conditions for societies to be able to introduce alternative democratic features are an active and operating representative democracy. For new channels to succeed in reality the society must fulfil the normal attributes of democracies. Democratic participatory features are thus implemented in an increasing number of countries.

Participatory elements are often introduced on a local level of government, often also utilized as experiments and this even in a number of non-democracies like Peoples Republic of China. Local government is often the first administrative level where these experiments are being conducted (Joas 2008).

Many of the alternative forms of democracy have the outspoken goal to increase co-operation between different actors – both organised and non-organised interests. Another goal is to increase the number of channels within the policy process. This multifaceted interaction between actors on various scales within and outside the traditional policy process is named *governance*, a phenomenon that is widespread and difficult to define. In practice, however, it is still the organised interests that do have an advantage of their broader resource base to participate in governance processes (Uhrwing 2001).

## Democracy and Administration

The traditional view of the relationship between politics and administration is straightforward: The “politicians shall make politics, civil servants shall administer, and the decisions taken by the politicians are implemented by the bureaucrats” (Aberbach et al. 1981, 4).

A blind faith in this division of labour, even in a theoretical perspective, disappeared as soon it was defined by Max Weber in his early and classical analysis of the being of bureaucracy.

Since the administration does not exist in a void, is it easy to realize that the interaction between various groups of actors often are more intensive than the traditional view allows. The administration is an integrated part of the political system. The linkages are strong and visible between the citizens, the voters and the elected, between the democratic political institutions and the administration, but also between the administration and the citizens (Olsen 2005, 3).

A further development of the simple dichotomy model has underlined the division of labour between the administration and the political system, an allocation between facts and technical efficiency in relation to interest and responsibility towards the voters. The politicians are expected to choose from a number of alternative solutions which are presented by the administration. The administration offers the frames within which the politicians can make decisions (Aberbach et al. 1981, 6-7).

An additional view emphasises the active interest of the administration to take part also in the decision-making process more explicitly: Politicians are considered to represent broad but often ambiguous common interests (of the people) while the administration is expected to consider and even intermediate between various narrow, focused and organised interests and even stakeholders (Aberbach et al. 1981, 9). This rather political role of the administration is reflected in the current discussion of various forms of multilevel governance in the society. The different roles of the administration and politics have become closer each other, both actors do have political agenda; both actors do represent different interests.

The study of public administration has for a long time been management oriented, underlined the technical delivery of services to the citizens, and to the customers of societal welfare services. However, public officials do not only provide customer service; they provide democracy to a higher extent (Denhardt & Denhardt 2006, ix).

### Participation through Administration

One of the political roles that the administration has to a greater extent undertaken is the role to be a channel for citizen and stakeholder opinion articulation within the political system. If the voice of the people does not reach political level through political channels, it still can reach decision-makers through administrative channels. Participatory democracy may as well be participatory administration.

Meadowcroft (2004, 169) emphasises three channels for participation democracy in general and especially through the administration. These are participation

- 1) through active *citizenship*,
- 2) through local *community*, and
- 3) through organized *stakeholders* and organizations.

Many of these explicit channels can be found within the frames of the local society, especially when the participation occurs through the administration, either in the preparation- or in the implementation phase of political decisions.

These three perspectives accentuate three various aspects of the citizen's role within the society:

The first channel – through active citizenship – accentuates the democratic and legal rights (and obligations) that we all as citizens and individuals have in developed societies. This perspective is a very legalistic approach to interpret participation, it is enough that this opportunity exists, whether it is utilized or not. Possible forms of participation is amongst others the right to influence the physical planning via remarks, information meetings or appeals. The role of the information is central and citizens should receive a more important role in relation to the political elites (see Bengtsson 2008, 56).

The second channel – the local community – highlights one of the classical problems of the democracy, the problem of subsidiarity. Politics and especially representative democracy is considered, in its traditional form, to be alienating citizens from decision-makers. Politics seems to be too distant from the daily lives of the citizens, people normally meet their representatives only prior to elections. By emphasizing the local citizenship, the scaled-downed community, the society can also to some extent handle the problem of subsidiarity. This implies that smaller units than the lowest political level should be given the right to influence matters that concern their local community. This could be handled for example in such a way that local governments render parts of the budget process to city district committees or village associations, with better knowledge of local needs. The representative political level would, thus, only decide about the frames for this local activity, but at the same time, be a guarantee for base level activity. Participatory budgeting experiments have become rather normal activity in many cities and local governments, many experiments are based on the path breaking Porto Allegre-model (see for example Smith 2009, 34).

One can also envision that the local community is comprised of something other than a geographical unity. One can visualize that for example minority groups, let them be language-based, religious or cultural groups, could handle part of their internal affairs themselves. This is already often reality in societies with extensive immigration where the attempts to integrate the new citizens into the society is conducted through their own communities. A political or an

administrative unit is therefore not required to be geographically defined, but can just as well follow a functional rationality (Hooghe & Marks 2003).

The third channel – influencing through organized stakeholders – could in many cases be viewed as a return to corporatism. Stakeholder and organized interest oriented participation emphasizes non-governmental organisations right to participate in decision-making processes both in preparation and in implementation and thus accentuating their explicit interests and specific competences in various matters. The organisations act also as opinion channels between the citizen on the one hand and the administration and decision-makers on the other hand.

Organisations with vast resources at their disposal have already held this position for a long time, especially on the national governmental level, in particular in income, tax and labour market related politics. The sphere of issues to be effected by corporative features is growing in society as the scope of regulation grows larger.

With the support of organizational and expert participation one can handle two of the challenges of the representative democracy, the problem of intensity and the problem of opinion representativity. Citizens consider various issues to be of varying importance; organised interests participate in those issues that they view as most central in their field of interest. From a normative perspective the quality of organisation based participation increases when opinion representation becomes wider and when the problem of intensity obtains an own channel to operate through (Joas 2008).

## Conclusion

The various forms of alternative and innovative democracy, the new forms of participation through the administration, improves several aspects of representative democracy, they address many of the weaknesses with contemporary democracy.

Naturally there are also problems that emerge with these, for us, new forms of political activity. Unfortunately, I am not able to study these in full detail within the scope of this article. These problems often remind of the shortcomings of the representative democracy: Lack of representativity, lack of resources and lack of interest to participate.

Today, nobody does anymore question central position of the administration within the political process. The public administrator, the public servant, has various roles within the different democratic institutions. He can act as

an independent participant, as an expert, as an administrator, as an authority, as a leader, as an interest broker and as a co-operation partner, and finally as a producer of service (see e.g. Krane 2006, 37).

The role of the administration is accentuated as a link between politics and citizens: “The politics/administration dichotomy no longer carries much weight, and administrators know that citizens are asking, even demanding, that they be involved in administrative decisions and processes. This is where the rubber meets the road for contemporary administrators of the public good, be they operating in public, private, or nonprofit organizations” (King 2006, 66).

This task should be highlighted both within the research of administration and political science. The administrator is a central part of the link between the citizen and the decision-maker, with an important duty to strengthen democracy with everyday life.

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## GLOBALIZATION OF THE WELFARE STATE

*Stein Kubnle*

### Introduction

What does globalization mean for the development of social policy? Is globalization a threat to social policy and welfare state development? Or is globalization something that makes social policy expansion and consolidation more likely? Does politics matter, or how does politics matter – at the national level as well as at the international or global level?

Let me first briefly elaborate on the meaning of the concept ‘globalization’, which during the last decade or so has become a global buzz-word. It is strange to remember that it is only about 20 years ago that the development of information technology opened internet and email opportunities for the public at large. A revolution in global communication was set in force, and this is now a fundamental basis for other kinds of globalization. Many different meanings and definitions of the concept circulate worldwide, and an overview is quickly and easily at hand through a few touches on your keyboard.

To me, the concept of globalization is dynamic, it implies a description of something which is changing, something which is becoming more global one way or other. The concept implies a process. This ‘something’ can be many different things. In broad terms it refers to a process through which the nation-state is becoming more open to influences that are supranational (Mishra 2004, 29) or trans-national. In broader terms, it can refer to all actors – national governments, non-governmental organizations, companies, and citizens – becoming more open to international influences, and relating and responding to and acting upon such influences. Globalization implies new opportunities for communication, trade, economic transactions, and political mobilization and actions – for better or worse – across national borders.

Globalization has many dimensions, and not all of them may be equally important across nation-states or regions of the world. With the help of selected examples from the literature on the topic, I shall indicate three major dimensions of the concept of globalization, economic, political and cultural globalization, and briefly list or discuss some indicators of each of these dimensions.

The title of this text furthermore points to a discussion of the relationship between aspects of globalization and the development of social policy and the welfare state, and interesting questions will be what impact globalization has had, in some meanings of the concept, on social policy development and what future impact can be expected? By social policy I assume that we have a general idea of policies which in various ways secure income maintenance for workers, employees or citizens in cases of loss, or lack, of income, and policies which provide health and care services, and other measures which make it possible for all citizens within nations to enjoy a reasonably decent standard of life, but of course what is reasonable and decent for some or all will always be contested by various actors at various times and in different economic, political and cultural contexts. Welfare problems and challenges are different in Sweden, USA, Botswana and China, and are perceived differently by citizens, authorities and other actors within different countries at different levels of social and economic development, and countries with different political histories and cultural traditions. Under each of the three dimensions – socio-economic, political and cultural – globalization is – or can be – perceived to affect development of social policy.

## Dimensions of Globalization and Impact on Social Policy

### *Economic globalization*

As far as development of social policy and the welfare state is concerned, research interest has focused on economic globalization, i.e. factors which facilitate economic relations and financial transactions across national borders and thus reducing national autonomy and – assumedly – putting policies for welfare and social protection under pressure. Normally, we have economic globalization in mind when talking about globalization. But this concept can refer to several aspects, each of which may not be of equal importance in terms of possibilities for maintaining or expanding social policy. According to Palier and Sykes (2001, 2-3), economic globalization may mean:

- internationalization of economic exchanges and production;
- internationalization of trade; foreign direct investments;
- international corporate networks;
- the abandonment of regulation on financial flows and trade which leads to increasing mobility of capital and ownership, goods, services and labour;

- different regime of free trade competition at a world-wide scale;
- global markets; new dislocation and relocation of economic activities in and between nations;
- increasing tax competition between countries.

There is no direct link between these indicators of economic globalization and social policy development at the national level. Nations have developed different institutions for social security and welfare. Institutional legacies differ among countries at similar levels of economic development, both among rich countries and poor countries. At the time when many aspects of economic globalization really accelerated, from the late 1980s, nations had created welfare regimes of different scope and types, thus one should not expect nations to react in identical ways to new economic challenges. Social policy responses to perceived problems and challenges differ for a number of reasons. Both politics and culture matter. It is empirically established that for example European governments have responded differently to perceived economic problems and challenges during the last 20 years. Values, interests and political preferences vary, for example as to how comprehensive the role of the state should be in social matters; what level of social security should be guaranteed; how much equality is desired. Opinions differ not only as to what policies to pursue given such and such values and interests, but often also as to the likely effects of different policies. Two countries, similarly integrated in the world economy, and at the same economic level of development, may for political and cultural reasons develop different social policies. The governments of the Nordic countries have chosen different paths from those of the USA and UK. Thailand has chosen differently from Hong Kong and both have chosen differently from South Korea and Taiwan. In the Nordic countries, which historically and currently are typically open economies, the public sector is big, taxation high, and social policies among the most comprehensive in the world in terms of needs covered and population coverage. The openness of the economy is indirectly probably one important factor explaining why voters and political representatives and governments have favoured extensive state social policies. Social policies reduce the risk of socially destructive effects of sudden external, international economic shocks. Finland and Sweden, for example, recovered relatively rapidly, and at low social cost, from their crises in the early 1990s, very much thanks to, I would argue, the comprehensive and universal social policies in place when the countries were hit by economic crises. The US, UK and Hong Kong have different tax regimes, varying degrees of economic openness, and

varying scope of social policy. South Korea has opted for a more active social policy role of the government than Hong Kong and Thailand. Comparatively speaking, South Korea responded with more active social policies to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997, and apparently benefited economically and politically from that political choice (Mishra et al. 2004).

We can observe that some of the most developed welfare states – with the biggest share of Gross Domestic Product spent on social and welfare purposes – developed historically in the more open (‘more global’) economies, such as in the smaller Scandinavian countries (Katzenstein 1985; Esping-Andersen 1996). Comprehensive social policies have been seen as a way to protect domestic labour markets and to protect citizens from the risk of exposure to a volatile international economy. Social policy has also been seen as a means to increase ‘human capital’, to invest in education and thus strengthen productive forces, and to contribute to social and economic stability conducive to foreign investment and economic growth in for example the Nordic countries (Kuhnle & Hort 2004). Other recent studies corroborate the finding that high levels of welfare expenditure are simply not incompatible with an open and competitive economy (Hay 2005). And Denmark is the best example of the possibility of combining economic growth and political stability with the world’s highest tax level, the world’s most equal income distribution and producing the world’s most happy people (OECD 2009; Forbes 2011).

### *Political globalization*

By political globalization we can refer to the growth of transnational political interactions – at the governmental level and among non-governmental organizations; we can think of many issues, ideas and institutions which become global, such as ideas and institutions of democracy and human rights; environmental protection; but also political issues and phenomena of an – for most people in the world – obvious negative character and implication, such as international crime, human trafficking, illegal spread of weapons and terrorism. In the politics of welfare, one can argue that social security and welfare policy – or ‘the welfare state’ – has gradually become globalized – more and more nations provide various kinds of state-legislated social insurance and health schemes of a limited or extensive nature. Almost all countries of the world have instituted some kind of pension policy for some population group or for all citizens, while unemployment insurance is least developed on a global scale.

Political globalization is often thought to imply a weakening of nation states (e.g. Gray 1998); their loss of social and political legitimacy, but also to imply attempts to re-create or establish (new) international political institutions (Palier & Sykes 2001, 3). International organizations, such as the World Bank, IMF, OECD, EU, ILO and others play in various ways a role in the global politics of welfare. Some of these organizations have for a long time encouraged a neo-liberal ideological global perspective – such as the World Bank, IMF and OECD – while others defend and promote a perspective of a more socially active state, such as the EU and ILO. Some events during the last 15 years seem to have weakened somewhat the neo-liberal perspective, perhaps most dramatically the global financial crisis as of September 2008, but also the financial crisis in Asia in 1997, and the SARS epidemic in the early 2000s. All events seem to have strengthened the position of those who favour strong state institutions and an important welfare role of national governments. Again, it should be stressed that experts and political actors, such as governments, political parties, and international organizations may for various reasons have different perspectives on the effects of various types of social policies for defined social, economic and political goals. Policies are the results of trade-offs between different values and interests, and anticipated outcomes. Neither economic nor political determinism is plausible.

Public welfare programs and social expenditures are often seen as a burden for a nationally competitive economy (e.g. many publications over many years from the OECD and the World Bank), while such programs and expenditures can clearly also be seen as part of a program for social investment, social justice, social security and equality, and as conducive to a more efficient and productive economy, with less social unrest and instability. It is perhaps justified to state that competing perspectives on the role and importance of social policy are increasingly played out in the global social policy discourse in academia and in international organizations.

### *Cultural globalization*

Finally, we can understand globalization as something associated with the free and instantaneous circulation of information and of knowledge about different ‘ways of life’ made possible by development of information technology, telecommunications and other kinds of transport and communications. Some refer to globalization as ‘westernization’ or even ‘americanization’ (Scholte 1996), since the US and ‘the West’ have had a technical and political advantage in spreading information, knowledge, ideas, institutions and products around the globe. Another way to look

at cultural globalization is to state that it implies at least homogenization of world cultures. But I think that we empirically can find many processes of change going on in different geographical directions, thus one would expect to find at least as many Chinese restaurants around the world as McDonalds and Pizza Huts. When 'sushi pizza' is being served in Japan, we have an illustration of local adaptation of global ideas and products giving rise to new products. Globalization can sometimes be understood as something which threatens traditional, local and national cultures to the extent we can say that such exist (Palier & Sykes 2001, 3); or that certain ideas, beliefs, perceptions, life styles, products and consumption patterns become global. Globalization can be understood both as homogenization and universalisation, but also as something which increases citizen exposure to a greater variety of ideas, institutions, products, and ways of life than had been possible ever before in history. The point about cultural globalization is that all people around the world are simultaneously exposed to the same variety of for example ideas and products, the world becomes less differentiated, but individuals may experience more variety than before. Cultural (and political) explanations may help us understand why European countries have historically developed much stronger welfare states than the USA, why there exists a concept of 'Social Europe' but not one of 'Social America', and whether the 2008 election of Obama – and possible re-election in 2012 – as President of the USA can modify this differential image remains to be seen. For many American voters European welfare states are perceived as socialist monsters. Some have argued (e.g. Rieger & Leibfried 2003) that history and cultural foundations of East Asian societies make it unlikely that these societies will actively develop comprehensive state social policies, on the other hand, we can observe that universal health systems and comprehensive pension plans have been introduced in for example South Korea and Taiwan (Wong 2004). It has also been shown that East and South East Asian countries introduced social insurance schemes of some kind or another at lower levels of industrialization and urbanization than what happened historically in West European countries (Hort & Kuhnle 2000). The observation that ideas more easily become global today than in former times does not imply that they necessarily will be accepted everywhere. Ideas will also inspire counter-ideas. Most likely 'cultural globalization' can – concomitant to economic and political globalization – be conducive to the development of global discourses also on social policy challenges and solutions. The outcome of discourses for social policy making and implementation will be mediated through regional, national and local political and cultural 'filters'.



## Globalization and Development of Social Policy in Perspective

Globalization and the development of social policy can be studied within the frame of any of the mentioned dimensions of globalization, but aspects of economic globalization have often been given most weight, assumedly putting nation-states in a more globally competitive world under greater pressure than before, but experience so far indicates that nations react differently to similar domestic and/or international challenges, suggesting political and cultural contextual resilience. Aspects of political and cultural globalization must also be taken into account in order to understand what happens to social policy development and reform activity in nations around the world.

Ever since the mid-1970s the crisis of the welfare state has been a topic in the Western countries of the OECD area. The OECD itself produced a book in 1981 called *The Welfare State in Crisis*, issuing stern warnings that the welfare state or social policies must be rolled back, and people take greater responsibility for their own welfare. This can be understood as some kind of reaction to two oil crises in the 1970s and their (actual or anticipated) effects on the national public economy, but the book came out before the current phase of economic globalization and the radical developments of communication technology. Since the early 1980s a neo-liberal ideology has swept the world, manifested through the Thatcher and Reagan years in power. The assaults on the British and American welfare states or social policy regimes were heralded as proof of a new era. Many theories predicted the end of the welfare state, but the welfare state turned out to be more resilient than expected (see e.g. van Kersbergen 2000; Sykes, Palier & Prior 2001; Yeates 2001; Rieger & Leibfried 2003; Kuhnle 2000). One paradox is that the strongest attacks on the extensive social policy role of the state came in the least comprehensive modern Western welfare states, not in the most comprehensive welfare states in Norden or on the European continent. This in itself is good proof that politics and ideology matter. Neo-liberalism has for some time been a potent ideological-political force sweeping the globalizing world, but it is not 'the only game in town', as many examples of social policy development around the world show. And changes in social policy may – and have indeed – come about as much – and more – for domestic reasons – for example demographic change – as for reasons of globalization in any dimension of the concept. Colin Hay (2005), for example, in a review of the comparative political economy of globalization and regionalization, strongly challenges the view that globalization is the proximate cause of welfare retrenchment in OECD countries.

Different perspectives on social policy exist, and will also exist in the era of globalization. Although economic conditions, performance and expectations are conducive to opinions and preferences about social policy, social policy is a matter of values, interests and political choice. The simple fact that scope of social policies vary significantly across countries at similar stages of economic development and wealth, and with similar degrees of openness, proves that social policies are results of political preferences and choices. The independent effect, or the size of an independent economic effect, of economic globalization on social policy development is contested (for overviews of studies and perspectives, see Palier & Sykes 2001; Yeates 2001; Hay 2005). Effects are hard to measure, but evidence is weak. The effects of political and cultural globalization may be more important, in the sense that certain perspectives on social policy gain hegemony in the global discourse, that certain global ideas on social policy are increasingly accepted by national governments and being transformed into national policies. Ideology is as important as – or more important than – economic global processes. Thus, to advance our understanding of social policy development it may be of great importance to study the global political discourse on globalization and social policy, as this discourse is framed and takes place in various dominant international or global institutions and organizations, and to study how such ideas are spread, referred to and accepted by governments and other actors at the national level around the world. Various national experiences with social policy development, and various responses to the presumed impact of globalization, should not only increase our empirical knowledge of social policy changes, but help improve our theoretical understanding of why certain policies are developed, and others not, and the effects of social policies under varying circumstances of globalization. One political effect of economic globalization may increasingly be more international, governmental cooperation on regulation in order to secure certain agreed upon social standards and avoid a so-called ‘race to the bottom’, i.e. that social policies are sacrificed in order to compete better in the international economy. The European Union may represent one example of a cross-national – even part supranational – regional institution which has the potential to regulate tax and social policy in ways inconsistent with the neo-liberal ideology. European developments, in Scandinavia in particular, during the last 20 years, indicate that neo-liberal thinking on social policy is not ‘the only game in town’. Thus, which perspectives on social policy gain dominance within global institutions and organizations is of great importance to study in order to understand future national developments of social policies. In such studies it will be of importance to gain greater understanding of the impact of

different national historical legacies for current politics of welfare. Apparently, for example, a significant political cultural difference between the USA and Europe (as a whole) exists in terms of state responsibility for income maintenance and welfare service provision, in terms of commitments to social rights, and in terms of people's expectations (Flora 1993; Ferrera 1993) as to what the state or government should do in the area of social policy. This means that political debates and the politics of welfare are framed differently. This contrast takes on a global political significance in a world where more and more countries are experiencing rapid economic development and democratization. Global political, economic and organizational integration is expanding and ideas and lessons are spread more rapidly across territorial boundaries than ever before. Some countries and regions of the world command substantially more economic, political-ideological and cultural power and leverage than others, and some welfare philosophies are thus more easily spread and transmitted than others. Thus, part of the challenge for any country in this globalized and globalizing world is to have some influence on global thinking about state and welfare. Who has the power to frame the debate on the politics of welfare, and what social policy perspective will dominate? What perspectives will emerging strong economic and political powers, such as China, India, and Brazil bring to the global debate on social policy? What role do international organizations play, organizations such as the OECD, European Union, World Bank, IMF, ILO and others? Some of these have been major players in encouraging a neo-liberal form of globalization, there has been an impact on national governments through developments of 'epistemic communities' promoting a neo-liberal ideological global perspective (Deacon 1999), and 'global ideas' appear to have played a significant role in the legitimation of welfare reforms.

## Conclusion

Studies of globalization and development of social policy have arrived at different conclusions, varying from the view that economic globalization has a significant impact upon welfare states and social policy through the perceived or observed increasing dominance of the market economy, to the view that globalization has relatively little impact on welfare states, to the 'middle view' that globalization has an effect upon welfare states and social policy development, but that these effects are mediated through (national) institutional structures and policy responses (for an overview of studies, see e.g. Palier & Sykes 2001). The last view is the one which is

closest to my own: that economic globalization counts, but global and/or national political and cultural factors decide (Kuhnle 2005).

It seems at least as important to study all aspects of political and cultural globalization as to study economic globalization in order to understand the development of social policies at the national level, and in order to understand the formation, spread and ascendancy of ideas on social policy and the role of the state in a more globalized world. Naturally, it will also be paramount to achieve a better understanding of to what extent processes of economic globalization and political and cultural globalization are – or are not – interdependent.

Lastly, let me say that it can be argued that the welfare state is an example of a ‘global public good’ in the meaning that the existence of developed, national welfare states – with universal education, social security and health systems – makes for less social inequality, more social stability, and less risk of spread of contagious diseases both within and beyond nation states. Especially in a world with increasing mobility national welfare states create positive externalities. The effects of anti-poverty policies and investment in universal public health care systems at a national level are positive for a wider international community. It makes a difference for the world whether Europe maintains and consolidates welfare states or not. Just as the development of a universal welfare system in China can imply strengthening of global public goods. Public goods are recognized as having benefits that cannot easily be confined to a single “buyer” (or set of “buyers”) (Kaul et al. 1999). The welfare state – social security, poverty elimination, health, education – has public good qualities just as e.g. financial stability, efficient markets, clean environment, peace and security, equity and justice. With globalization, externalities – the “extra” costs (and benefits) – are increasingly borne (or enjoyed) by people in other countries than one’s own. The benefits of developed welfare states reach across borders, and can thus be understood as a global public good. This perspective also implies that international cooperation and coordinated policy-making on broadly-defined social, health and welfare policies may be increasingly necessary in order to preserve and develop national welfare states and thus contribute to their character of global public goods. “Increased labour and capital mobility, climate change, the spread of contagious diseases, all these require wider international regulation, rules about rights to protection, to safety nets, to refugee status” (Glennerster 2010, 702). European provision of “limited social inequality” through the welfare state may be considered an example of a global public good. Europe – through the European Union – is moving beyond pure national responsibility for welfare, and in spite of substantial problems of creating common ‘European’ policy solutions in the spirit

of the ‘global public good’ perspective, one may say that a European process – or Europeanization process – has been initiated, which, if successful, may also offer an example or model for other regions of the world.

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## OF VICE AND MEN: BAD GOVERNMENT AND COLONIALISMS\*

*Ulf Lindström*

### Problem, Thesis, Approach

The seven countries that occupy the top positions on the 2011 UN Human Development Index are all former subject states of colonial powers. Still, received wisdom holds Europe's colonial rule responsible for entrenched poverty in Africa, the cause of bad government, endemic violence and ultimately state failure. This account of the legacy of colonialism makes the leadership of the rich countries laudable, that of the independent states of Africa expendable.

Obviously, agency is at work among African leadership: "...upon decolonization a clear majority of the former colonies enacted parliamentary institutions along British lines. A considerable number of the states later turned to presidential government. This was a step along a path which replaced multi-party systems with a system of one dominant party, abolishing democracy in the process" (Karvonen 2008b, 69, trsl. mine).

Among the crossroads at which African leadership took the turns that set the regimes onto different paths--productive, barren or ruinous for the countries--this paper focuses on the crossroad that was defined by the Cold War and what the end of the Cold War means to Africa.

The European colonial record--British, French, Belgian, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, German, Italian--certainly contains horrendous abuse of power and people. But it also brought some good things to Africa too, such as railroads and penicillium. In contrast, the Cold War (1948-1991) did invariable harm to the continent. Overlapping in time with the formative years of African independence and statehood, the Cold War interfered with the very foundation of sovereign rule: the Westphalian monopoly on violence. "Propped up by the forces unleashed by the Cold War, local elites in the developing world did not fear falling, should they become unpopular; nor, supported by transfers of aid from abroad, did they need to bargain with their citizens to secure public revenues. They therefore did not need to be responsive to their people or democratic in their politics, for want of the kinds of pressures that in the past had compelled governments to become democracies" (Bates 2001, 82).

However harmful, even repeated experiences of colonialism – among the colonized and colonizers alike – do not excuse leadership for bad governance in the present. The erosion of the Westphalian world system only makes it increasingly difficult to frustrate attempts at the state by vicious men.

### Original Colonialism: Repeat and Reflections

Europe stands accused of imposing alien formats of community and government onto, all while extracting assets out of, Africa (Wesseling 2006);

(i) by dividing the continent into dominions that cut through ethnic-linguistic communities while including communities with few if any commonalities with their neighbors, Europe created future states certain to experience ethnic tensions as independent states.

(ii) by imposing formats of government that under colonial supremacy ran roughshod over endogenous rule, Europe impaired the readiness of independent states to adopt universal democratic standards based on one person, one vote and representative government.

(iii) by randomly identifying primary commodities, ruthlessly exploiting the supply and unfairly appropriating the dividends of extraction, Europe left the new states in entrenched dependency on world trade regimes once independence was achieved in the 1960s.

Unless colonialism in Africa was *sui generis* – Africa irreparably damaged by the colonial yoke, impervious to reforms – European colonialism cannot be the principal cause of bad government in contemporary Africa. Again, the comparative approach bears this out.

With few if any exceptions, all of the c.193 independent states of today can blame foreign masters for the shortcomings of their society and government. Of the early and stable democracies in the world quite few were thoroughly homogeneous in ethnic and linguistic composition. More or less all of the independent states have had traditional formats of government that qualify systems based upon one person, one vote. Irrespective of territorial origin, assets such as plants and minerals are of no inherent value until extracted and put onto the market to be bartered or exchanged for something in return. Spices and silk, timber and tar: the British and Dutch merchant fleets probably paid an "unfair" price for the Nordic commodities too, as did Nordic middle-men for the labor extracting the products.



Labor in nineteenth-century Europe and Africa alike toiled under cruel regimes. African and European subjects were equally exposed to monotheist proselytizing at the time Christianity and Islam were the only ideologies around. Armed conflicts and random killings among different nations were not unknown in Africa before the Europeans came. An African partitioning of the continent along ethnic-linguistic criteria (resulting in 2,000 statelets) would not have prevented future violent conflicts among the states. While all states today are known to retain peculiarities of governance - undue respect for wealth, seniority, merits, even heritage by blood - the evolutionary format of government is based on equal rights. Recalled a French colonial official in the 1920s: "After the French Revolution we could not be expected to return to the Middle Ages" (Ferguson 2011, 172). Democracy obeys by the formula 'one person, one vote' in Africa too.

The correlates of European colonialism and contemporary status are too disparate to lend evidence to the thesis that this is the original cause of poverty and bad government in less developed countries. Of islands throughout the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans those that are poor today differ from the better-off by having been *off* the routes of the sailing merchant marines of the colonial powers. A century as a colony is worth a 40 per cent increase in today's GDP (Feyrer & Sacerdote 2009). Many former colonies are now richer than the countries of their masters. Five of the seven top-scorers on the 2011 UN Human Development Index used to be dependencies of the British Empire. Also Hong Kong and Singapore rank ahead of the United Kingdom, as does Finland of Russia.

Underwritten by the Christian West as well as the Islamic East, the slave trade in and out of Africa was condemned already in its time for racism and neglect of human decency (Ferro 2005, 115ff). Pope Eugene IV (1431-47) issued a bull excommunicating those who engaged in the slave trade. It is the ultimate stain on the colonial era, but colonialism as the root cause of poverty and bad government in contemporary Africa, as elsewhere, is anachronistic. The opposite of 'history written by the victors', it is equally fallacious.

Present-day states – across time, across the board – cannot be expected simultaneously to have fathered identical inventions that later became a means to equal opportunity for the distribution of power and wealth in the world economy. Copies of Watt's 1775 steam engine appeared in France in 1778, Germany 1784 and the U.S. 1803 (Ferguson 2011, 204). Furthermore, present-day states were not guaranteed future growth and prosperity for once having been the home-country of an epoch-changing invention such as navigation instruments, electricity, radio, etc.

"Even as late as 1788 British iron-production levels were still lower than those achieved in China in 1078" (Ibid., 28).

Opportunities have indeed been denied many countries, not least African, simply missed in most countries, but also--as amply exemplified by Chinese and Arab history--squandered. (Landes, 1998, chs. 21, 24; Ferguson, 2011, chs. 1, 2.)

### Overreactive Colonialism: the Cold War

Soon after independence in the course of the 1960s, African states were targeted as potential enemies and allies in the bipolar world conflict between the West and the East, NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Washington and Moscow posted field officers of the CIA and KGB in Africa where they alternated in stoking distrust and offering protection across the continent. A CIA-agent telegram of August 18, 1961 reports: "Congo experiencing classic communist effort takeover... whether or not Lumumba actual commie or playing commie game... there may be little time left in which to take action to avoid another Cuba" (Weiner 2008, 188). The KGB for its part routinely fabricated documents on imminent coups organized by the CIA: Guinea, 1964, alleged schemes to depose Sekou Touré; Mali, 1964, alleged schemes to depose Keita; Somalia, 1966, alleged schemes to depose Said Barre; Tanzania, 1966, alleged schemes to depose Nyerere. "For the remainder of the Cold War bogus CIA plots in Africa, frequently documented by Service A forgeries, were one of the staples of KGB active measures" (Andrew & Mitrokhin 2005, 432).

These cloak-and-dagger schemes did institutional damage to the regimes of the new states and likely affected neighboring states too by reaching out to engage liberation movements still fighting for independence. If and how alignment during the Cold War later brought about regime instability, civil war and ultimately state failure is to be documented below.

First on the agenda of every sovereign state, the Westphalian imperative, is the enforcement of law through the monopoly of violence across the territory. This means the raising of regulated forces for policing and armed defense, manpower as well as appropriations. Second on the agenda is the 'Hamiltonian passage', the creation of a central bank to assume public debt incurred to uphold sovereignty through the issuance of government bonds. These two steps in the state-formation process were botched in independent Africa for reasons that are partly general, partly unique in time and context.

Liberation movements, ideologues in exile and freedom fighters in the line of fire, wear down by the years of struggle. Often they split among themselves early on; rarely do they maintain unity upon victory. Once liberated, the founding fathers and mothers of the states naturally turn to basic concerns such as health-care and education rather than military reform and fiscal prudence.

As it happened, the new African states had before themselves an agenda that coincided with the security policy of the Cold War and the launching of grand-scale Western official development aid (ODA). A setting such as this suggests that African governments, in order also to obtain ODA, were encouraged to focus on urgent needs for utilities, health-care and education. "The Western and Eastern Blocs supported regimes and guerrillas in the developing world on ideological grounds in the bipolar world of the Cold War, and it is straightforward to see how aid served as an instrument in this ideological struggle" (Boschini & Olofsgård 2007, 623).

Meanwhile, the prospects of saving money on defense too by aligning their states with one of the two super-powers were too tempting to resist: advisers, ordnance, training, maintenance, upgrades. Also, at first sign of slowing flows of military aid the option of changing allegiance sent a clear message to Washington and Moscow. Having one (and occasionally both) of the super-powers pick up the cost of the armed forces meant that the country's military was exempt from regulation by elected government. Conscription could be substituted by paid soldiers. Promotions in the ranks were arbitrary at best, qualified by ethnic or other quota at risk, spending rarely audited and questioned as to the cost-benefit of the armed forces.

The end of the Cold War cut back military aid from the two super-powers, sweepingly by Moscow and, by Washington, redirected eastward for fighting terrorism and rouge regimes. Upgrades of ordnance ceased, maintenance was neglected, supplies depleted. Africa's armed forces became an item among many on the state budgets. Stingy funding for the military is well-known for provoking coup d'etat in fragile states.

Uniquely unfortunate, the end of the Cold War saw the world market in vice booming; the proliferation of drugs, small arms and similar commodities becoming part of global crime networks: "...the single most important global economic event of recent times—the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the former Soviet Union—continues to resound in the underworld" (IOC 2010, 31). "The collapse of the Soviet Union is the single most important cause of the exponential growth in organized crime that we have seen around the world in the

last two decades...By 1999 there were more than 11,500 registered 'private security firms', employing more than 800,000 people [in the former USSR]" (Glenny 2008, 66f, 77). "In developing countries, an estimated 60% of all urban residents have been victims of crime over the past five years [2005-2010], rising to 70% in Latin America and Africa" (TOC 2010, 33).

Cash-strapped African regiments under unscrupulous colonels saw options, readily draped in ideological outfits in a world now bereft of the northern proselytizing ideologies of the West and the East.

## The State of the States

Of the 53 states in Africa, two (Somalia and Chad) are classified as failed in *The Failed States Index 2011* (FSI). Six states (Sudan, Congo D.R., Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea) are on the verge of failing, fourteen in danger of breaking up.

The FSI-scores for each of the previous five years suggest systemic malfunction of government. The geographical pattern of instability, the east-central parts of the continent the epicenter, is spreading to include countries north of the Sahara. The 2011 Ibrahim Index of African Governance confirms the situation. Of the five highest ranked countries on good governance (Mauritius, Cape Verde, Botswana, Seychelles, Republic of South Africa) three are island states and two located in the southern cone. The lowest 29 places on the 2011 UN Human Development Index are all taken by African states.

Scores on the FSI correlate significantly with poverty and military spending, -.42 (purchasing power parity 2008) and -.47 (annual military spending 2001-9), respectively. Covariations of indeterminate causality to be expected in countries in deep distress, the proposition that already failed states and those in critical condition were the ones heavily exposed to the schemes of the two super-powers of the Cold War is weakly confirmed by empirical data.

Countries with higher national defense expenditure per capita in 1965 score lower on the risk of breaking up. The four cases in point are Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and the Republic of South Africa. Two comments are appropriate. North Africa, as part of the 'Arab Spring' of 2011 that so far has toppled the regimes of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, is now liable of facing state instability.

Sub-Saharan Africa provides little or no evidence of states drawing 'stability-dividends' from domestic funding of their military forces. For instance,

Ghana, Tanzania, and Zaire spent about the same proportion of their resources on the armed forces in 1965 without emerging as widely different in terms of state stability 45 years later. This finding should be qualified, however.

States that spent comparatively much on their defense in 1965 have cut back on military spending after the end of the Cold War while (until recently at least) upholding their stability scores. States that spent comparatively little on their defense in 1965 have increased military spending after the end of the Cold War and are now mired in instability.

At best, the linear approach of empirical testing of the thesis produces inconclusive results; scores on state stability today cannot be explained by variance in domestic spending on military forces upon independence. Non-linear analysis of the thesis is required.

### The Cold War in Africa: Who's War?

Upon independence, African states entered the security thinking of the two super-powers. But the early response from Washington and Moscow was marked by inertia, military and ideological, respectively. Eventually though, the two super-powers cordoned Africa off the map of the international community. "Except for some activity in the late 1940s, international organizations initiated few, and many years no, military interventions during the Cold War period" (Pickering & Kisangani 2009, 596). "Until 1989, missions in Africa accounted for only 8% of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs)" (Victor 2010, 219).

"The United States' security is [1969] considered not to be directly involved, and Africa itself poses no threat; nor does the pursuit of other world-wide U.S. objectives, now or in the foreseeable future, require a direct or substantial American presence in Africa." Consequently, "U.S. policy has been consistent in avoiding formal mutual security pacts with the new African states... Military assistance figures in independent Africa have also been severely restricted... likely to average less than \$25 million per year." Still, "seventeen countries at one time or another have received such aid" (Nielsen 1969, 366f).

As for the USSR, "As soon as Khrushchev had left the scene [1964], his more orthodox and conservative successors moved promptly to further scale down Soviet interest in Africa and to close some of the ideological breaches he had opened" (Ibid., 201). It was not until after the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa and the overthrow of Haile Selassie in Ethiopia that the USSR advanced its

positions in Africa. Yet, "The high hopes of the mid-1970s disintegrated over the next decade" (Andrew & Mitrokhin 2005, 429).

In contrast to Europe's division by the Iron Curtain, the security alignments across Africa were in constant flux, fed also by French, Chinese and Cuban meddling, the conflicts in South Africa and Rhodesia, and a plethora of proxy alliances between foreign powers and national liberations movements on and off the territories under conflict.

The actual penetration of African states and governments by foreign powers during the Cold War requires a Sisyphean search for an elusive scale (cf., similar documentation for neutral countries like Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland). A tentative dichotomy will have to do between (i) states refusing to align themselves with either of the two super-powers at any time during the Cold War, and (ii) states and liberations movements aligned or intermittently and conditionally cooperating with the super-powers or other partners in the course of the Cold War.

Britain (Washington likely doing Britain's bidding) took a low profile in independent Africa, limited to short military interventions in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria in the early 1960s. "It can be concluded, therefore, that the former British colonies in Africa by their own desire and by the terms of British policy are now [1969] militarily on their own" (Nielsen 1969, 64). Circumstantial evidence or not, of the ten African states that are listed as the *least* fragile on the 2011 FSI seven are members of the Commonwealth. Upon independence sixteen African states, of which eleven signed formal agreements, entered military cooperation with France. This allowed France to withdraw its troops in Africa from 300,000 to less than 10,000 between c. 1962 and 1965 (Ibid.) As for China, "In its military assistance, China has been willing to make limited offers to certain selected states: Guinea, Mali, Somalia, Zanzibar, and later Tanzania" (Ibid., 231).

To have been penetrated by the two super-powers soon after independence is not the implied necessary and sufficient condition for subsequent state failure. Among the states that are classified as not being in immediate danger of breaking up, four (Algeria, Morocco, Mali, and Ghana) were major recipients of military aid already in the early phase of Africa's experience of the Cold War. Nevertheless, Table 1 substantiates the conclusion that states that were immediately, deeply and multilaterally aligned with foreign powers, i.e., France too, are now likely to be listed as already failed or at the brink of failing. Only one Sub-Saharan country (Ghana) has performed a feat of 'boot-strap pulling' out of a past as aligned in the Cold War. Indirect support for the thesis is offered by the records

of a group of countries that were either part of the conflict over southern Africa or did not achieve independence until after the first wave of Africa's liberation from colonial rule.

### Failing States: Community Run Amok

"While the world as a whole experienced a peak in armed conflicts in 1992, just after the end of the Cold War, the conflict peak in Sub-Saharan Africa came some years later, in 1998, with 16 conflicts active...the number has now dropped for two consecutive years and with eight conflicts active in 2010, this is a decrease of 50% since the peak year" (Themnér & Wallensteen 2011, 530-31).

Peace and stability, jeopardized by frequent and incomplete transitions of regimes, is more than a matter of degree in Africa. Two out of three fragile countries, with dismal records of coups, caesarean or one-party government, do *not* see the rise of clans and warlords at the gates of power. In contrast, states repeatedly plagued by civil wars are vulnerable, "...to the point where 90 percent of conflicts initiated in the 21st century were in countries that had already had a civil war" (WDR 2011, 57). Whatever it is that prevents real and present danger to emerge in and destroy states only marginally behind the worst cases on ranking-lists such as the FSI, HDI and the Ibrahim Index, it is of immense human value and worth emulating across Africa.

'Follow the money' is standard procedure in crime-fighting. In addition to minerals, gem stones and drugs, a supplementary source of money is maritime piracy, "...estimated to have direct economic costs of between US\$5.7 billion and US\$11.2 billion, once ransoms, insurance, and rerouting of ships are included" (WDR 2011, 65). 'Follow the AK-47s that money buys' is the ultimate advise for pinning down why some states in Africa are in immediate danger of failing. States do not fail because position papers on public administration get lost in the mail, not even busts in the market of primary export commodities wreck them (Bates 2008, 10).

"Vigilantism may represent an actively chosen alternative form of social organization, rather than simply being the consequence of state weakness" (Veit et al. 2011, 20). Indeed, states fail when (young) men with guns as social regulator topple incumbent governments without installing a new regime. This is the operational definition of warlordism as distinguished from organized crime and liberation movements. "A doubling in the proportion [of young men] increases the

risk of conflict from around 5 percent over a five-year period to around 20 percent" (Collier 2009, 130).

Backtracking clans to their origins – grievances, military branch, through their coalition buildings, sources of cash, dealings, growth, connections to domestic powers-that-be and global high authorities – means research at the peril to the scholarly community. At safe distance synchronic comparative studies of, e.g., the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Boko Haram, Janjaweed and al-Shabaab are substituted by diachronic analyses of warlordism past and present (Marten 2007; Kok 2010). Therefore, unit of analysis remains the state, supplemented by intersections of states, areas in which clans and warlords are active: "The tri-border region between DRC, Sudan, and CAR share one predominant ethnic identity and language–Azande. This is the current operating area of the LRA and crosses over the national boundaries of the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda and Sudan" (Thomas 2011, 2f).

If need be – and sustained uprising needs a rational – ethnicity, plain or reinforced by language and religion or any combination of the three, is serving a culturalized cause behind mayhem in Africa. Why this is so is intelligible only through an institutional perspective from afar in space and time.

### Unwinding Westphalia, Rewinding Community

'Ethnicity,' being reducible ad infinitum, is one of several default options for establishing bonds among people. Ethnicity surges whenever ideologies are losing sway over the minds of people. Thus, a Toyota flatbed with a machine gun manned by four thugs and an accompanying acronym at times seats ethnicity at a peace conference called by the UN.

It started with *négritude*, evolved into African Socialism and reaped the Washington Consensus; none has been succeeded by a new modernist worldview to excite leadership in independent Africa too. Rather, what Western leadership is offering today in the face of lethal conflicts in Africa is procastration marked by leftovers corresponding to and blended by the wisdom and folly associated with Westphalia 1648, Berlin 1884-85, and Versailles 1919. More recently, Bethlehem 0 lost its guiding light in Europe.

Sovereignty applies to territory. *Cuius regio, eius religio*; territorial integrity can be maintained only if state and community fit (near) perfectly across space. This reopens Africa's case against original colonialism. The Berlin conference, the



formalization of the Scramble for Africa, carved up the continent into dominions that wreaked havoc on ethnic-linguistic boundaries. Next, the Versailles Treaty, the partitioning of post-imperial Europe according to ethnicity as master variable, ended in abysmal failure (except in Hungary and Finland). Also, with church attendance among Europeans at 9 percent once a week, 78 percent among sub-Saharan Africans (Ferguson 2011, 266), a retroactive burden of remorse hovers over Europe.

In effect, Europe, in particular the European Union, is underperforming as actor in aiding Africa. When considering African affairs, even common trade agreements, the EU runs the risk of being tarred with the neo-colonialist brush. Instead, individual member-countries of the EU are expected to assume roles in Africa based on, of all things, previous colonial status. Significant is the EU Military Operation in Congo D.R. The first EU military mission without NATO assistance, it was mandated by the UN, lasted for three months in 2003 under French command as "framework nation" and France as the main contributor of forces. The response of the EU to the North-African revolts of 2011 confirmed the habit of fingering members-states for assignments in Africa according to links from colonial times.

"A generation ago Brazil, Russia, India and China accounted for just 1% of African trade. Today they make up 20%..." (*The Economist* 401, 8762, 2011, 69). Staunch and touchy defenders of Westphalia, the BRICs are moving into Africa, extracting resources, building infrastructure with only a side-glance at human rights and environmental protection. State stability, compound stability at a minimum, is preferred over pluralist government. Inverted 'East India companies' of the 17th century are returning. Critical observations of the BRICs are rebutted as intervention in their internal affairs and those of their partner countries too. This mix of foreign altruism and foreign exploitation, a deadlock, is a potent cocktail for Africa.

Meanwhile, the West, its academic and political communities caught in the shackle of history, understands community-building as obligatory passage for African transitions. Patricide on modernity, if only left exclusively to community leadership an organic state- and nation-building process of Africa would have been completed or remains to be completed, once and for all, never to be altered down the road.

Failed, even fledgling, states may well be a state in name only, recognized perfunctory by the international community but sufficiently by the UN. Be that as it may, the issue of statehood bears on the Westphalia format of the international

community's policy on the ground in Africa. International law superseding human rights, the UN cannot freely move troops across state borders in pursuit of crimes against humanity. Returning to the tri-border region between DRC, Sudan, and CAR, the operations of the LRA and similar clans are made easier by the fact that the national armies of these states and UN peacekeepers based in DRC do not have a mandate to enter other countries (IWPR 2011).

While, for lack of mandate, the UN is barred from entering states in immediate danger of breaking up, the UN may dispatch troops from those countries to missions in other states breaking up. "One international interaction in Africa that...has increased markedly since the Cold War is international peacekeeping by African troops" (Victor 2010, 217). The peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are rarely outfitted by the rich states of the southern cone. "In fact, states with ongoing insurgencies, including Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda, have been reliable peacekeeping contributors" (Ibid., 227). More than anecdotal evidence is found for the conclusion: "States with lower horizontal legitimacy – those whose borders suffocate multiple ethnic groups into single states or dismember ethnic groups across different states – seem to both participate in more PKOs and make larger troop contributions to PKOs" (Ibid.).

Poor countries that wish to contribute to PKOs may first turn to private military and security companies (PMSCs). Paramount Group is one such company. It offers 'peacekeeping packages' tailored to help developing countries meet UN equipment, training and logistic requirements. "...Paramount Group covers a niche in the market which US PMSCs often overlook: UN troop-contributing countries which are eager to mount a battalion for UN deployment, sometimes motivated by the UN reimbursement system" (Østensen 2011, 13). Also undermining the state-centered Westphalia system is the UN contracting of PMSCs to provide services to the many missions in dangerous areas. UN agencies have occasionally hired security officers from PMSCs. The company Defence Systems Limited (DSL) supplied security officers to UNICEF in Sudan and Somalia, as well as to the World Food Program in Angola (Ibid., 14). Among NGOs that have contracted private security companies are CARE, CARITAS, GOAL, IRC, Save the Children, and Worldvision. Private security companies that have worked with humanitarians include ArmorGroup, Control Risks Group, Global Risk Strategies, Erinys, Hart Security, KROLL, Lifeguard, MPRI, Olive, RONCO, Southern Cross, and Triple Canopy. Estimates suggest that about 25 percent of 'high-end' security companies have had humanitarian organizations as clients (Spearin 2007, 5f).

Idiosyncrasy or not, African PKOs have drawn mixed reactions, not least Machiavellian. PKOs divert the attention of military leaders from problems at home, remove troops from the capital, check inter-branch and inter-ethnic rivalry, keep the presidential guard mollified and loyal, and are earning the state cash at \$1,000 per month per soldier. Meanwhile, the officers and troops on UN missions abroad are treated also to better logistics, ordnance and training than their peers serving at home. Once these units return home from the UN missions they may constitute a challenge to the regime and powers-that-be. The outcome of this challenge may be constructive, the UN veterans inspiring good conduct in government too, or destructive, the UN veterans forming the nucleus of or propping up another nondescript clan.

Inter-governmental bodies of law, interpreters of last resort of Westphalia against charters of human rights--leave politics in limbo. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is informed by the opinion that because the African states decided to retain the colonial boundaries they must comply with the practices of the region: revolts in the name of self-determination that implies compromise of territorial supremacy must be declared illegal (Herbst 2000, 109). The International Criminal Court (ICC), founded 1998 to try and convict perpetrators of crimes against humanity, is a supra-national body. Still, all 26 of the suspects indicted by the court so far have been African (*The Economist* 8761, 2011, 34). They are typically charged with crimes that relate to ethnic conflicts, rarely extra-territorial and outside the jurisdiction of the ICJ in scope. Commendable beyond reproach, the ICC is set to close the old option of the tyrant and his retinue: exit to London or a rouge country to waste away the remainder of their lives in exile, doling out the portions of the gold reserve that were loaded into the getaway vehicles. However, the ICC effectively closing off exits to safe heavens for tyrants may come at the price of prolonged civil wars, unless a successful coup comes to everybody's rescue.

"[C]oups have a role to play in maintaining decent governance, and the fact that they are getting less common is not necessarily good news" (Collier 2009, 154). One out of three African states now seems saddled with the choice of coups or clans rather than coups or liberation; one supreme patron or rivaling warlords, the former partially and latter primarily financed by trade in illegitimate wares.

Down the road, as the politico-cultural coalitions behind the founding fathers of independence further disintegrate with the third generation of leadership, regimes will still be changed incompletely. Available options of governance, none of which can ignore the question of ethnicity-blindness and/or ethnic quota, will be imperfectly implemented. Inclusion and exclusion qualified by territory and

function will continue to breed disharmony in society. While ethnicity is not the only cause behind violence and state failure (Gurr 2010), genocide resorts to ethnicity as the discriminant for wanton killings. It is a petty academic point whether "...ethnic diversity does not cause violence; rather, ethnicity and violence are joint products of state failure" (Bates 2008, 8f). Equally of small comfort, but the implosion of ideological millenarism in 1989-91 is reducing the risk of murderous sprees based on left-right conflicts.

"Ethnic exclusion significantly reduces the likelihood that members of a group will successfully execute a coup, but at the cost of increasing the risk of societal rebellion and civil war" (Roessler 2011, 302). In other words, violent transitions of government, which used to be a life-threatening concern chiefly among the powers-that-be and the challengers, have expanded to expose and mobilize citizens far beyond the capital and its cliques fighting for positions and spoils. African rulers are four times more likely to purge their coconspirators than other power holders--at the cost of increasing the risk of group rebellion more than fifteenfold over the next three years (Ibid., 302f). Why do rulers calculate that this distant threat from society is preferable to an existential one from inside their regimes? Recalling their own path to power, they leave the rest to denial, especially the easy access to firearms that the global market in vice offers the rebellious (Collier 2009, 114-19).

The Darwinist cut on Westphalia is that prolonged civil wars in the end allows the winner to be declared victorious. This leaves the victorious also to define the national narrative; the necessary myth that cements all nation-states, defines right from wrong, rationalizes sacrifice and projects the past onto a glorious future. Last man standing may be a world of heroes, albeit sparsely populated, one in which politics is voided by the continuation of war with any means.

## Summary and Proposition

"The contrast between the lives led by those who live in rich countries and poor people in Africa is the greatest scandal of our age" (The Commission for Africa 2005, 7). Equally true is the contrast between the lives led by those who lived in China twenty-five years ago and the average Chinese today: it is the greatest economic transformation in recorded history. Thus, Pax Britannica, the Hispanidad, *la Francophonie*, Luso Tropicalismo, Pax Americana, Pax Sovietica and similar legacies of world domination in accounting for global distribution of wealth

and poverty are carrying less and less explanatory power. Of real meaning to ordinary people is that, in order to enjoy progress in living conditions, one must be able to move throughout the country and across borders without fear of harm to life and limb. In 22 out of 53 countries in Africa it is not possible.

European colonialism left independent Africa with unwieldy areas for state-building, much like those of Europe itself prior to the rise of the absolutist state after the Peace Treaties of Westphalia. Not solely of Europe's doing, the ethno-cultural makeup of today's Africa is not an 'understandable' source of violent conflicts, death-tolls in the millions or single casualties. Celebrating cultural pluralism at home, the nullification of Berlin and Versailles, Western leadership prevaricates about bad government in Africa. Reactions from African leadership, fear of cancelled export-orders to China and kowtowing to self-serving purveyors of Africana at home discourage European initiatives.

"In 1989 only seven out of forty-five states south of the Sahara were politically pluralistic" (Veit et al. 2011, 18). "As of the mid-1990s, the fate of democracy on the sub-Saharan continent continued to rest in the hands of men with guns" (Bratton & van de Walle 1997, 217). This now applies north of the Sahara also. Ominous, to have been penetrated by the Cold War (1948-1991) was *not* the one and single factor that differentiated the trajectory of African states and regimes between independence and the end of the Cold War. True, countries that were left alone by the two super-powers and France, even more so if linked to the British Commonwealth, have had a better chance of forestalling state failure. But, then, it is hard to believe that the CIA and KGB agreed to absent themselves from these theaters.

The state of 22 African states pushes priorities to the forefront. Alas, the 2011 World Development Report bears the mark of the *Zeitgeist*: "First is the need to *restore confidence* in collective action before embarking on wider institutional transformation" (WDR 2011, 11, it. in original). Africa sees no dearth of collective action, especially since lack of confidence is checked by the epidemic spread of guns in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Still, at the end of the day, it is not about guns. The question is who is in charge of legitimate ordnance regulated by a state ruled by law, who is wielding illegal firearms paid for by ill-gotten cash, and how to find the institutional mechanism that puts a stop to exchanges of manpower and weapons between the two armed spheres.

Africa needs a reinvented Westphalian moment, of its own making and implementation. For the world moved on after 1991. It left the Westphalia that was compromised in Africa by foreign as well as domestic powers to be qualified by

new concepts (and acronyms in abundance) for government, interstate conduct and interventions by the international community.

A bold proposition that may violate even the peace theory but reinforce peace in practice: It is better that states in Africa go to brinks-of-wars against each other, i.e., democracies too, than several states mired in low-intensity wars against themselves. Brinks call upon attention, twilights blur the issues. Brinks identify actors, twilights feed discourse. Brinks end in outcomes, twilights in concepts. War is the continuation of politics with other means; brinks of interstate war require leadership to trust citizens-under-arms. Musters drawn on public revenues wean government off the confiscation and looting typical of predatory economies. Rolls – muster rolls of soldiers, censuses of taxpayers, lists of voters, public registries of most everything – have a proven record of cross-breeding. Rolls and records in and of themselves have accompanied states to crossroads, at which they more often than not embark on a path to robust foundation of democratic government.

Yanked along by recent economic growth, perhaps the African-Westphalian moment is already off and running: "If it is true that the neighbourhood effect plays a big role for the future of dictatorship one would therefore expect democracy to advance [not only] in the southern half of Africa..." (Karvonen 2008a, 100, trsl. and insert mine).

\*Data from The Failed States Index ([www.fundforpeace.org](http://www.fundforpeace.org)), The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive ([www.databanksinternational.com](http://www.databanksinternational.com)) and World dataBank (<http://datatbank.worldbank.org>). Dataset by Dr Svante Ersson, University of Umeå, Sweden. Student input on several occasions, i.a., "STV-3019 Comparative Political Economy," University of Tromsø, Norway, also acknowledged. Remaining shortcomings author's responsibility.

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## WHY DID IT TAKE SO LONG? THE BREAKTHROUGH OF POLITICAL TV ADS: FINLAND EIGHTEEN YEARS AHEAD OF SWEDEN

*Lars Nord*

‘On behalf of the Nordic delegations’, is a proud phrase often heard in the UN General Assembly or at other international conferences (Karvonen 1999). For most outsiders, the small Nordic countries sometimes appear to be rather similar and are thus simply referred to as one single country. To some extent, this may be reasonable. The Nordic area is since long time one custom zone and passports are not required for Nordic citizens travelling to a neighbouring country. To a large extent, the Nordic countries also share a common history, with Norway being in unions with both Denmark (1400-1814) and Sweden (1814-1905) and Finland belonging to Sweden until 1809.

In social sciences, the Nordic countries are also often referred to as almost ideal cases for systematic comparative research. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden share many common distinctive features: small and homogenous populations, a political culture rooted in consensus and rational legal authority, multiparty political systems, market economy with some state interventions, a strong welfare state, corporatist societal structures and a historically strong position for Social Democracy. Consequently, social sciences literature in general, and political science studies in particular, are rich of Nordic comparisons on state level with considerable explanatory value (Elvander 1980; Kuhnle 1990; Karvonen & Ljungberg 1997).

At the same time, it is obvious that Nordic differences sometimes are more articulated than Nordic similarities. This is particularly evident when international relations and commitments of the Nordic countries are analyzed and compared. In the period after the Second World War the Nordic neighbours have failed to cooperate in such basic areas as defence policy and economic integration. Denmark, Iceland and Norway all joined the Western defence alliance Nato after the Second World War. Finland and Sweden remained, formally, as non-allied countries. Denmark was the first country to join the European Union (then the European Community) in 1972, followed by Finland and Sweden in 1995. Finland joined the euro zone in 1999, while Denmark and Sweden have kept their national currencies. Iceland and Norway are not members of the union.

## Same, but Different Contexts of Political Communication

Still, the common and sometimes intertwined Nordic history makes it relevant to discuss the importance of possible policy influences between the Nordic states, and study why such influences may occur or not. Are the Nordic countries instantly copying 'good examples' from each other, or do national policies and political structures develop regardless of successful experiences from neighbouring countries?

There is certainly no single and simple answer to this question, as it may depend on which dimensions of the political system that are analyzed. One example, previously observed, is the fact that the development of public administration in Finland has generally been influenced by the diffusion of ideas from public administrative culture in Sweden (Karvonen 1981, 222). Government structures and public administration seem to have much in common in Finland and Sweden and these similarities are based on a shared political history and the perception of Sweden as a role model for policy making in this area. Generally speaking, Finland and Sweden are in many ways similar Nordic welfare state democracies that also share some common cultural elements.

However, if the analytical focus is shifted from the 'output' to the 'input'-side of the political processes, Finland and Sweden may have less in common. Despite the fact that both countries are multiparty democracies, the electoral systems differ in basic aspects. The Finnish electoral cycle is more complex as the four-year cycles of local and national elections do not coincide. Therefore, there are also more campaigns in Finland. In Sweden, the electoral process is still very party-centred, while the system in Finland is candidate-centred. Broad government coalitions are common in Finland, while party politics in Sweden is generally more polarized and conflict-oriented. The election system in Finland is open as opposed to the closed 'list voting' of the Swedish model, meaning that in Finland the ranking order of a candidate representing a party is directly determined by the number of votes cast for that candidate. Unlike Sweden, where a four per cent national threshold is applied, Finland has no formal threshold requirement for a party to gain seats in parliament. Furthermore, the Finnish election campaigns are hardly constrained by any regulations (Moring et al. 2011).

The differences between Finland and Sweden may be even more articulated when the national media systems – and more specifically political communication sub-systems – are compared. On a general level, the two countries are similar in some basic media areas; both are among the countries with the

highest newspaper penetration in the world; both share a relatively strong market position for public service broadcasting, and both take a global lead when Internet access and use are compared. Professionalism is widely spread as a journalistic ideal and the general model of the media system can be characterized as a democratic corporatist model with regard to media and politics relations (Hallin & Mancini 2004; Trappel et al. 2011).

### Diverging Views on Political Advertising

However, one distinctive feature of the Finnish media system is the early introduction of commercial television and financing based on advertising. When television was introduced in Finland in 1958, advertising blocs were allowed in the public service channel (YLE). The founding of the commercial television company MTV, operating alongside public service TV as in the British BBC/ITV model, was a unique model in the Nordic media systems at this time (Rappe 2004, 55).

Political advertising in television stands out as a good example as one of the main media differences between the two countries. Ads in television have been allowed, within a specific regulatory framework, since the Local Elections in Finland in 1992. Regulations of the public service broadcaster's political programs during election campaigns were lifted in the early 1990s simultaneously with the decision to allow political advertising on commercial television channels (Rappe 2004, 58-59). Together with a new role for television during elections this marked somewhat of a new era of political campaigning in Finland (Carlson 2000, 94). As a consequence, televised political advertising is not constrained by spending limits, time limits, or content limits, and politicians frequently appear in talk shows and entertainment programs also during election campaigns, something which had earlier been prohibited (Moring & Himmelstein 1993; Rappe 2004, 176-82). Studies of the content of political TV ads in Finland in 1995 and 1999 indicated that they had a catch-all approach, trying to reach large segments of the electorate, focusing on party image-building and positive messages, far away from the American style of negative campaigning. When such elements appeared they were very implicit and cautiously formulated (Carlson 2000, 200).

In neighbouring Sweden, all kinds of advertising in television were prohibited until the deregulation of the broadcasting system in 1991. The introduction of political advertising in Swedish election campaigns came almost two decades later. All political parties were using political TV ads for the first time in

the latest national election in 2010. Thus, one of the most distinctive features of modern political campaigns has no tradition in Sweden. Furthermore, no free broadcasting time is made available to the political parties on either television or radio during election campaigns. The fact that not even public service companies allow such political party presentations is unique to Sweden. Instead, the tradition in public service media is to have journalist-led questioning and special programs with party leaders during the final weeks before the elections and a final debate between the party leaders two days before Election Day. Similar programs are also a tradition in Finland.

Against this background, this chapter discusses the implementation of political advertising in television in Sweden and the processes that were most influential when explaining the debate on this new campaign element in Sweden. The most important political actors and the most essential events in the debate on televised political advertising are analyzed during the period 1970-2010. By mapping this process carefully, possible explanations for the gradual public acceptance of political TV ads may be offered. Furthermore, this chapter discusses the possible diffusion of Finnish ideas of political TV ads and whether these ideas influenced the Swedish debate or not.

The chapter is structured around the following sections: first follows an overview of current research perspectives in political communication with regard to political advertising in television. The next section maps the gradual introduction of such ads in recent Swedish election campaigns. In the following sections media policy factors and political conditions are analyzed in order to identify driving forces, and restrictive circumstances, in the processes of political TV ads introduction in Sweden.

## Approaches to Studies of Political TV Ads

In most countries in the world, political advertising in general has become “a staple of communication in democracies in the world” (Kaid 2004, 155). Due to this important communicative role, research in this field is also one of the most significant components of contemporary political communication studies. The increase in countries with political advertising in television is explained by deregulation of media systems and dualistic competition between public and commercial channels (Norris 2000, 152). Furthermore, controversial messages in televised spots are often at the centre of public and media discourses in the

intensive weeks before Election Day. Finally, a considerable share of candidate and political party campaign budgets is generally spent on efforts to produce as effective and persuasive ads as possible, with the intention to catch voter attention and influence voting decisions in desired directions (Plasser & Plasser 2002; Sanders 2009). However, televised political advertising has to be analysed within different national political communication contexts. Most of the previous research has been conducted in the U.S. and conditions in Europe differ in many ways: most political systems are multiparty based, election campaigns are shorter and public service media have a stronger position in the television markets, just to mention some examples.

Thus, in all studies of political communication contexts it is reasonable to consider national characteristics in terms of political system, electoral system, media system, political culture and public opinion (Hallin & Mancini 2004). Most countries in Europe allow political advertising in television, but restrictions with regard to the number of permissible spots, or the appearance in public service broadcast media, vary greatly (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha 1995; Plasser & Plasser 2002). Generally speaking, the candidate-oriented campaigning of American elections has gradually become more common also in a European context (Mughan 2000; Kaid 2004).

Political communication research on televised political advertising has mainly focused on two different aspects: the content and the effects (Kaid 2004; Johnston 2006). Content analyses of political advertising in television have traditionally been dominated by studies comparing issue information and image information in the spots. Widespread beliefs that political advertising emphasizes emotions and images at the expense of rational information have not been completely supported by previous research, which suggests that issue ads dominate election campaigns in many countries, even if content is often blended in a subtle way in modern spots (Johnston & Kaid 2002). In recent decades, more research has been focused on 'negative ads', opponent-focused spots that attempt to describe the other candidate in an unfavourable way with regard to issue positions, personal character or the political agenda (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha 2006; Iyengar & McGrady 2007).

To conclude, previous research on televised political advertising confirms that such spots are a major force in many political communication systems. The unique possibility for parties and candidates to control mass disseminated messages remains the great advantage compared to mediated campaign communications. Spots may influence voter learning and candidate evaluation, but it important to

note that effects may vary in relation to political culture factors. Thus, the impact of televised political advertising also depends on public perceptions of and attitudes towards such advertising. This is particularly true because political advertising has a persuasive intent that casts doubt on its credibility (Grusell & Nord 2010). This interplay between the potential control of the message for the sender and the likely reception of the message among the audience is used as an analytical framework for the following sections, describing the gradual introduction of political advertising in television as an element of Swedish political communication.

### No Country for TV Ads

Generally speaking, the political majority in the Swedish parliament has historically perceived televised political advertising as a negative element in campaign communications. Over the years, members of parliament have expressed fears that such ads would jeopardize the quality of public discourse in election campaigns by offering overwhelmingly emotional, personal and negative messages without substance. Both left wing and centre right-wing politicians in the parliament have supported the critical standpoint on political advertising in broadcast media, basically by arguing that such advertising have proved to be associated with dirty campaigning, especially in an American context, and that political TV ads are at odd with the existing political culture during election campaigns in Sweden (Gustafsson 2005; Nord 2008).

This dominating climate of opinion is hardly possible to discuss without taking into account the important role played by late Prime Minister Olof Palme, who for decades openly declared a very strong and critical attitude to advertising in broadcast media in general. One typical example is his key note speech at the Social Democratic Party Congress in Stockholm in 1968:

"During recent years we have strongly criticized the efforts from conservatives, liberals and capitalists to implement commercial television, where advertisers finally decide TV programming. In this battle, we have won. But I will sincerely emphasize that this is a real and an ongoing cultural struggle. We should never be soft in our defence against the big commercial interests and our political opponents trying to introduce commercial and private-owned television in Sweden."

When analyzing this early Social Democratic resistance towards advertising in television it is important to note that the policy standpoint was more based on a fear for the societal consequences of commercial television than an ideological opposition of ads in broadcast media. This party, dominating Swedish politics for decades, believed that a commercial competitor to public service television would share interests with big business, thus endangering the Social Democrats' well-established power positions in the Swedish society. Consequently, the political issue of free media was more essential than the political issue of advertising in TV, which was merely perceived as a prerequisite for free media (Schein 1990; Ewertsson 2005; Nord 2008).

Accordingly, media policy in Sweden was for a long time dominated by the perspective that advertising in television was a tool that could be useful for fulfilling other objectives in a constantly and rapidly changing media landscape. The single most important of the structural media development changes taking place was when commercial TV channels based outside Sweden started to offer programmes in Swedish that reached Swedish households by cable and satellite TV. This trend started with the London-based private television company TV 3 in 1987 and since then a couple of similar private channels have operated under comparable conditions (Engblom & Wormbs 2007).

This explains why the Social Democrats gradually changed their media policy position on advertising in television. In 1990, the Party Congress supported a proposal with a mixed financing model for the public broadcaster SVT, combining licence fees with advertising. This was of course not because the party suddenly had started to like TV ads, but more as a consequence of the emerging introduction of commercial TV channels from abroad. By allowing ads in the main public service leading Social Democrats hoped to 'drain the market' for unavoidable new private media competitors. However, in the complex political processes that followed the non-socialist coalition victory in 1991, another broad compromise was reached where the new 'hybrid' channel TV4 was financed by advertisements and offered in the analogue terrestrial television net to every household in Sweden, alongside the former two public service TV channels (Hadenius 1998; Ewertsson 2005; Nord 2008).

As long as TV4 had these public service-alike obligations political advertising was not allowed in the channel. The other main commercial channels in Sweden, TV3 and Kanal 5, were both London-based and not allowed to send political ads as in accordance with British media regulations. Thus, there was no real market for political advertising in Sweden and one of the most distinctive features

of modern political campaigns and most effective direct channels of communication with citizens was for long time completely absent from the context of elections.

### Three Elections with More and More Political TV Ads

This situation changed to some extent in the Swedish National Election campaign in 2006. Due to the planned switch-off of the analogue television broadcast system in 2007 a majority of Swedish households – now equipped with digital boxes, cable and satellite TV – were offered a huge number of digitally distributed television channels in 2006. Some of these channels were not regulated within the existing Radio and TV Act with regard to political “neutrality”. Consequently, small domestic ‘niche’ channels could send political spots. Some of them were basically entertainment-oriented, while others offered mainly current affairs programmes, documentaries and international news. Therefore, political advertising in Swedish terrestrial television could appear for the first time during the elections in 2006. However, political ads were only produced by some political parties and appeared in a restricted number of TV channels. Three political parties – The Christ Democrats, The Liberals and The Moderates – produced political TV ads during the campaign in TV channels such as TV4 Plus, TV4 Fakta, TV4 Film and TV400 (Grusell & Nord 2010).

Accordingly, the National Elections in 2006 may be described as a very careful and small-scale introduction of political advertising in television in Sweden. Being introduced many years after political advertising in the average Western democracies, including neighbouring Finland, political ads in television 2006 played a minor role in campaign communication in Sweden compared to political ads in newspapers, magazines, cinema and outdoor posters, and compared to mediated communication in terms of political news and political debates in TV. As the first very few political ads appeared in marginal channels they did not provoke any big ideological debates, neither among politicians nor among the public (ibid.).

In contrast, the next elections in Sweden to the EU parliament in 2009 offered a completely new situation in this aspect. The main commercial channel TV4 was now for the first time able to offer the political parties advertising options. As the digitalization process was completed, TV4 no longer had a privileged distribution position. The channel was now one of many commercial channels and with no remaining public service obligations. Within this new framework, there



were no restrictions expressed towards political ads and the channel saw the forthcoming EU election campaign as a window of opportunity in offering the political parties the possibility to send out their political messages in TV. Officially, TV4 underlined non-commercial arguments in the negotiations with the parties and claimed that the new communication channel would improve public discourse. The channel also offered the parties considerable discounts when buying airtime for the first time.

The political parties remained sceptical to the idea from the very beginning, even the parties usually positive to advertising in media in general. However, after a couple of weeks of internal discussion all four non-socialist parties in the governing Alliance accepted the offer and decided to produce TV ads. The political opposition – Social Democrats, The Left Party and the Green Party – all remained strongly critical to the idea and decided to refrain from participating. For the first time ever in Sweden, an intense public debate on this issue emerged in spring 2009. The Party Secretary of the Social Democrats at that time, Ibrahim Baylan, explained his party position in an interview:

"Our policy standpoint is principal. I would rather have seen that this had not been a part of political culture in Sweden. Now we will have political TV ads. I regret this. I don't buy the argument that this is good for electoral turnout. Tell me the single country where political TV ads are dominating and electoral turnout is higher than in Sweden. On the contrary, I think the correlation is negative in this aspect. In countries where political TV ads are established, they very often become negative in nature, and this demobilizes the electorate" (Grusell & Nord 2009, 26).

The opposite position in the debate was taken by The Moderates and The Liberal Party, as both claimed that there was no need for special restrictions on political advertising in television, as all kind of ads were allowed and accepted on other media platforms and in public spaces. The Party Secretary of the Liberal Party at that time, Erik Ullenhag, argued that the dangers with the new communication channel were exaggerated:

"I can't understand why political TV ads are perceived as a problem. Why should such ads in Sweden result in dirty campaigning in the same way as in the US? The basic advantage with TV ads is that the party can talk more than in a newspaper ad or on a poster. Regarding the risk of dirty campaigning, this is really up to the political parties in Sweden. It is our own choice. TV ads may more easily encourage

negative messages, but this is not because of the medium, but because of the party" (Grusell & Nord 2009, 27).

After the EU parliamentary elections it was obvious that the controversial political TV ads had been somewhat of a success, at least if public exposure to such ads was considered. Exit polls indicated that two of three voters in the elections had been exposed to political TV ads, while only 15 % of the electorate had been visiting the web site of any political party during the last three weeks of the campaign (Dagens Nyheter 2010-06-22).

Finally, all political parties declared they would use political TV ads in TV4 in the national campaign in 2010. The former critical opposition parties were still to some extent negative to the use of ads, but admitted that the experiences from the EU elections were slightly better than they expected. As more was at stake in a national election, no party seemed to dare to neglect this channel of direct communication with voters. When the political parties were asked about the perceived importance of different direct communication channels before the election campaign they also claimed that political advertising in television was the single most important channel in this aspect (DEMICOM Election Studies 2010).

An interesting observation is that the political parties in general overestimated the importance of political TV ads. Before the election campaign, this channel was perceived as the single most important one. However, political TV ads ranked remarkable lower after Election Day, and a similar trend was noted regarding canvassing (DEMICOM Election Studies 2010). On the contrary, direct mail and temporary downtown campaign offices were perceived as much more important after the elections than they were before (DEMICOM Election Studies 2010). When asked about the influence of political TV ads in the 2010 National Elections the current Party Secretary of The Liberal Party, Erik Ullenhag, declared:

"We decided to be very issue-oriented in our ads with focus on education and health care and I think that is the way to work with TV ads in Sweden. We spent considerable resources on TV ads in this campaign and I think that was a good decision" (DEMICOM Election Studies 2010).

However the campaign manager of the The Social Democrats in 2010, Bo Krogvig, declared a complete opposite opinion in this matter:

"TV ads were extremely expensive and absolutely unimportant in this campaign. We had to produce them as everybody else did. But it was not a dominant communication channel as in the US, but a marginal and too expensive campaign tool. I think there are very good reasons to ask how much money that should be spent on TV ads in forthcoming campaigns" (DEMICOM Election Studies 2010).

To sum up, the last three elections in Sweden have seen an increasing amount of political advertising in television. But the introduction of this campaign communication channel has not been straightforward. The political parties have been generally low-profiled in this issue, with the critical parties more intense in their argumentation than the more supportive parties. The introduction of political TV ads has never been on top of the political agenda for any political party in Sweden. The main explanation appears to have been the risk of being associated with a more or less US influenced campaign culture and rhetorical style far away from a common, more idealistic image building of Swedish democracy.

On the other hand, the slow introduction of political advertising in television seems to have been developing randomly and as a more or less logical consequence of diverse structural media system changes. The digitalization process of television had the objective to provide Swedish households with more TV channels with better quality and with cheaper distribution costs. It was all about money. However, domestic TV companies quickly saw the new possibilities when previous restrictions were lifted and soon offered airtime to political parties. Not because they were caring about the efficiency of Swedish democracy, but strictly for business purposes. Swedish policy makers could probably have foreseen this development and imposed new laws and regulations regarding political advertising in television. But they didn't. One explanation may be that they already had resigned regarding the implementation of effective ways of stopping this kind of ads in the long run. Another reason was possibly that they did not find this battle politically worth to fight for anymore. No matter what was the truth in this case, political TV ads gradually and randomly became a part of Swedish election campaigns as a combined result of technology-driven media developments and the media policy walk over.

## The Media Commercialization Factor

In the field of political communication there is a common wisdom that current international campaign trends are instantly intermingled with national distinctive features of campaigning. Sometimes this interplay between global and domestic influences are characterized as Americanization or modernization processes, sometimes as 'hybridization' processes where the most intriguing question are which trends prevail in this interplay and why they do so (Plasser & Plasser 2002; Esser & Pfetsch 2004; Hallin & Mancini 2004; Nord 2006).

This review of the development of political TV advertising in Sweden could be perceived as a typical case where a global campaign communication channel gradually is adapted in a specific national context as a result of a more homogenous way of campaigning in modern democracies. However, the story about political advertising in Sweden has very few similarities with such cases. On the contrary, this adaptation of an international campaign trend seems not at all to be explained by external political communication processes, but mainly by internal media system developments leaving political parties without any other options than to slowly accept the campaign innovation.

There are also other interesting observations to be drawn from this Swedish example. As this chapter started with a discussion about Nordic policy diffusion or imitation of political practises it is worth to note that the fact that political advertising had been a part of the political culture in Finland for many years never left any visible tracks in the Swedish political discussion. Examples from dirty campaigning in the US were frequent in public debate, but no reference was ever made to the situation in neighbouring Finland. (As a curiosity, it may be mentioned that when the author in media interviews faced Swedish journalists with the fact the political advertising in television in Finland both was allowed and had existed for many years this was perceived as more or less of a joke until facts were actually checked – and surprisingly confirmed).

Thus, one main conclusion from this review of the development of political advertising in Sweden is that differences between Nordic countries may sometimes be much more significant than the similarities that may be expected due to common political history and shared democratic values, at least in specific areas. One such specific area seems to be the commercialization of media, which has generally been more accepted in Finland than in Sweden. As a consequence, the introduction of political advertising in Finland was hardly controversial, while the same topic in Sweden fuelled ideological battles and political worries for a long

time. The Finnish example was never used in the Swedish debate, as it was not coherent with existing values on media commercialization. Instead of raising this issue on the political agenda and reach a big compromise in the 'good old Swedish way', politicians abdicated from policy making and left to media market developments to decide when Sweden should be a country with political TV ads.

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## COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT ACCORDING TO HERBERT TINGSTEN

*Olof Petersson*

Herbert Tingsten had the privilege of living three different lives (Westerståhl 1992, 204). His first life included a brief encounter with the diplomatic world but he soon devoted himself to an academic career. Herbert Tingsten became the first holder of the Lars Johan Hierta chair in political science at Stockholms högskola, now Stockholm University. At the age of 50 Tingsten accepted an offer to become the editor-in-chief of *Dagens Nyheter*, the leading newspaper in Sweden at the time. In this second life, lasting from 1946 to 1959, he was a strong voice in the public debate, a staunch supporter of NATO and an unforgiving anti-communist. Tingsten's third life began with the writing of his memoirs in the early 1960's, followed by a series of books based on personal reflections. This gave the reading public an intimate view of Herbert Tingsten's inner life, his feelings of insecurity, his struggle against blindness and his fear of death.

In one sense Herbert Tingsten remained a political scientist all of his life. He never stopped monitoring current events and analyzing, questioning and criticizing false or incoherent statements. His last major work, a study of school book propaganda, was published only four years before his death in 1973 (Tingsten 1969). A prolific author, his research covered many different fields, such as political ideology, constitutional law, political behavior and parliamentary government, not to mention his innovative dissertation on referendums.<sup>1</sup>

Herbert Tingsten's methodology does not fit into one particular category. Nevertheless, a recurrent theme is his comparative approach to political life. Herbert Tingsten's study of referendums is a comparative analysis of American states (Tingsten 1923). His huge volume about democracy's victory and crisis is based on information from a large number of countries between 1880 and 1930 (Tingsten 1933). His book on fascist ideology compares Italy, Germany and Austria (Tingsten 1936) and his study of federalism is focused on the United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia and South Africa (Tingsten 1942). Even his project on school book propaganda combines comparative and historical approaches (Tingsten 1969). Tingsten often used information about Scandinavian neighbors to shed light on the intricacies of Swedish politics.

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<sup>1</sup> Herbert Tingsten as a political scientist is the subject of my forthcoming book.

Although the subject matters varied through the years, the comparative method applied by Herbert Tingsten has some distinctive traits. In certain respects Herbert Tingsten's approach differs from some of the methods commonly utilized today. He was, for instance, very cautious when it came to drawing causal conclusions from comparative observations, and he rejected quantitative data analysis as a tool in comparative research.

This might seem less surprising taking into account that Herbert Tingsten was born in the 19th century and received his academic training in an intellectual environment dominated by old, historically oriented professors. He was 25 years old when James Bryce published a monumental study of modern democracies (Bryce 1921). In his preface Bryce pointed out that he had written the book chiefly 'from personal observations made in the countries visited' and that the book was 'not meant to propound theories'. Completely void of tables, charts, statistics and other types of analytical devices the text is written in a historical narrative style.

It would be wrong, however, to place Herbert Tingsten in this old-style research tradition. While he certainly had the necessary broad knowledge and linguistic skills required to write in this essayistic style, he also grasped the modern research techniques such as systematic data collection and statistical inference from quantitative data. In fact, it was Herbert Tingsten who in Sweden introduced the seminal study of quantitative methods in political science written by Stuart Rice (1928). Tingsten complained that political scientists had too long neglected the use of statistical and quantitative methods. He recommended Rice's book as an introduction to the rapidly growing, primarily American, research tradition based on quantitative analysis with source material mainly from electoral statistics and experiments among university students. Tingsten agreed with Rice that quantitative methods could shed new light on phenomena such as political attitudes and voting behavior (Tingsten 1934).

Herbert Tingsten was not late to explore the research avenues which were opened up by the quantitative method. His path-breaking book *Political Behavior* contained studies of electoral participation, the political attitudes of women, age groups in politics, compulsory voting and the role of occupation and social status in elections (Tingsten 1937). He did not hesitate to generalize from his findings. In fact, he even dared to formulate his conclusion in law-like terms. For example, he found that socio-economic differences in regard to electoral participation were smaller the higher the level of general participation. This pattern indicated the existence of a rule which he termed 'the law of dispersion' (Tingsten 1937, 230). The expression 'political behavior' had certainly been in use for some time but

according to Robert Dahl it was Herbert Tingsten who rescued the term for political science. This is why Herbert Tingsten is considered as one of the founding fathers of the scientific study of political behavior (Dahl 1961, 763).

It is puzzling that Herbert Tingsten, one of the pioneers in quantitative political science, refrained from using these methods in comparative government research. It turns out that Tingsten, who actively advocated the use of statistical methods in political research, was also acutely aware their limitations. He could have used quantitative techniques on several occasions but he decided not to. For example, he never counted the frequencies of certain words or expressions in his study of political ideas. His analysis of the Swedish foreign policy debate between the two world wars is also completely non-quantitative. His explanation for not giving ‘a quantitative estimate of opinion’ appears in the introduction of the book and is worth quoting in full:

“I have not said, for example, that 32 Conservative newspapers took one line and 19 another. For one thing, such an estimate would have to be absolutely complete, which would necessitate a disproportionate amount of labor. For another, the result would be uncertain and misleading: the shades of transition from one view to another are difficult to determine, some newspapers are far more important than others, one may conduct a vigorous campaign on a certain question while another will refer to it only in a few minor leading articles. In practice, the figures arrived at would not have the same definite statistical value as an election or vote” (Tingsten 1949, 6).<sup>2</sup>

Herbert Tingsten obviously thought that quantitative methods were useful only in certain areas of study, such as elections and political behavior. In many other cases, he believed that the problems of validity, reliability and the weighting of cases were insurmountable. Therefore, the researcher had to find other methods to grasp the nuances and subtle ‘shades of transition’. But such non-quantitative methods also had pitfalls. For instance, although Tingsten used newspaper editorials as a source for his study of the foreign policy debate, he maintained that it was not possible to quote several dozens of newspaper in support and that the only viable alternative was to give some typical examples rather than a complete documentation. “I am fully aware that this method encourages distortion,” he admitted and added that the reader “can only accept my assurances that every care has been taken to prevent such errors of judgment” (Tingsten 1949, 6).

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<sup>2</sup> This quotation is cited from the English translation of Tingsten (1944).

Herbert Tingsten abstained from the obvious benefits of quantitative analysis and chose other methods with their own drawbacks. He had to struggle with problems such as selection bias, subjectivity, distortion and errors of judgment. However, what he gained was an in-depth understanding of the political process. The central concept of his comparative studies was *författningspolitik*, which he gave a slightly broader definition than the German equivalent *Verfassungspolitik* or the English 'constitutional politics'. The term *författningspolitik* referred not only to constitutional rules, legal statutes and judicial practice, but also the power struggle around the central government of the state, such as these forms actually took place. Tingsten particularly stressed that political science should be devoted to current affairs and should be concrete. This type of realistic study of politics ought to be typifying and hence comparative (Tingsten 1933, vii; Tingsten 1935, 45).

Herbert Tingsten had already applied these principles in his doctoral dissertation. When he arrived in the United States in 1921 he could observe the results of the attempts to fight corruption through institutional reforms. Many state legislatures had been captured by big corporations and powerful lobbyists. Bribes and mutual favors had become integral part of the legislative process. Democracy itself was at peril as money, not popular will, determined politics. The reform movement tried to limit the power of legislatures by strengthening the executive and judicial branches of government, such as governors and courts. One important reform strategy was to introduce referendums as a way to assure better correspondence between citizen opinions and policy decisions. Herbert Tingsten decided to study what the referendums meant for practical political life and for the democratic system itself.

He found that there were different types of referendums. An older form of referendum was used in many states to ratify constitutional amendments. Inspired by Switzerland two new forms of referendum had been introduced. The 'facultative referendum' gave the people the right to vote on a law passed by the legislature. The 'popular initiative' made it possible for a certain number of voters to propose a law for popular vote. Almost all of the American referendums were decisive.

At that time referendums had been introduced in half of the American states, most of them in the Western part of the union. Tingsten tried to explain this geographical pattern, not by using his data for statistical analysis, but by reasoning about possible conditions. He stressed that the legislatures had been particularly corrupt in the Western states and that politics in California was in fact dominated by one powerful company, the Southern Pacific railroad. Tingsten added another explanation: popular psychology. The population in the new states out West had a

pioneering spirit and was more prone to accept new ideas and reforms. He also asked why referendums were less frequent in the Southern states and answered that the white population feared that they would give political influence to African Americans (Tingsten 1923, 76, 84). But however plausible these factors might seem, the reader is still left wondering exactly how they were selected and which alternative explanations were omitted.

Tingsten collected data on all 850 referendums held so far in the United States. He was particularly interested in the participation rates. Even though the exact calculations are not reported in his book, he offers the conclusion that participation was lowest in the old form of constitutional referendums and highest in popular initiatives and that the turnout level also varied with the type of issue, the number of referendums at stake and the existence of simultaneous elections (Tingsten 1923, 194, 206).

The American referendum reforms were accompanied by a lively debate in newspapers, debates, speeches and pamphlets. Tingsten used these documents for a systematic analysis of ideas and found that the argument for the referendum reforms followed two different lines, one practical and one principled. It was the practical reasons, namely the need to find new instruments as the cure for corruption and other ills, which dominated the public debate. But there was also a principled and radical argument to the effect that the direct popular government was superior to representative democracy. Opponents of referendums, however, argued that the representative system was a better form of politics than direct democracy. Tingsten added that the opposition to referendums also stemmed from a fear that the people's direct legislative power would lead to radical reforms.

Tingsten used these arguments to formulate hypotheses for his investigation of the actual results of referendums. He concentrated his analysis on 'certain typical states'. One was Oregon, a state with many referendums, and another was Ohio, which represented states with relatively few referendums. Tingsten reached the conclusion that both expectations and fears regarding the consequences for politics had been exaggerated. 'The proponents' hope that referendums would lead to a complete political regeneration process had no more been realized than the opponents' fear that referendums would result in a revolutionary socialist experiment. Certainly one could find some examples of how popular initiatives had led to minority domination, class selfishness and technically flawed laws, but the same could be said about the legislative branch of government. It is important to note that Tingsten did not choose an ideal norm as his basis for the evaluation of the effects of referendums. Instead he compared referendums to

the only realistic alternative, which was the existing kind of representative system (Tingsten 1923, 258 ff).

The American referendum study became an introduction to the problems of federal government. Herbert Tingsten later returned to the problems of federalism and wrote an entire book on the subject (Tingsten 1943). This volume shows how he applied a comparative perspective on democratic government. Before he drew his general conclusions he studied half a dozen federal countries. Each country was analyzed in detail and Tingsten demonstrates his skills in summarizing a vast material in a succinct way. The reader learns about the background and origins of the federal system, ideological conflicts, historical development, legal bases, the division of powers between the federal and state government and their methods of conflict resolution. These country-by-country chapters cover almost the entire book. Only the last nine pages are devoted to concluding observations.

In the conclusion, Herbert Tingsten first concentrated on the similarities between the federal states. He noted that, in contrast to the top-down structure of unitary states, the federal states were organized from a bottom-up perspective. They had been formed by a number of independent states which decided to form a larger political union. But the birth of the federation had rarely been harmonious. The federal unions had been formed only after long conflicts and hard negotiations. It had taken quite some time before the new federation became generally accepted. Tingsten developed this observation into more a general discussion of the conditions for fundamental change in political institutions. Before the federation was formed, the special interests favored status quo because they viewed the benefits of a merger as vague and difficult to estimate. Tingsten found that opinion formation and individual efforts were essential in the creation of a federation. However, he also recognized that conditions such as natural boundaries, foreign policy and economic interests had to be taken into account.

Then Tingsten turned to the differences among federations. In some cases the federation had been initiated by the government, in other countries popular movements were vital. Some federations had been approved by special elections or referendums but there were also examples of federal constitutions drafted by ad hoc assemblies or closed conventions. He found, moreover, that the federative principle proved to be compatible with the widest range of government form. A federation could be a republic or a monarchy, a parliamentary system or a presidential system and might be combined with either strong or weak separation of powers. Even a dictatorship, the Soviet Union, had accepted the federalist

principle, but Tingsten added that the vertical separation of powers in this particular case had become more fiction than reality (Tingsten 1943, 174ff).

Herbert Tingsten devoted considerable attention to the question of how to solve conflicts between the federation and the states. He noted that most federal countries relied on judicial procedures to resolve such disputes. The courts not only had the right to invalidate state laws that violated the powers of the federal government but could also stop federal laws that violated states' rights. Tingsten believed that this kind of legal arrangement was of crucial importance and maintained that the problems of separating the federal and state government in Switzerland was due to the lack of judicial review of federal legislation. Conversely, he attributed the relative stability of the United States, Canada and Australia to the role of the courts. His book on federalism ended with a recognition of the importance of constitutional rules. Thus, despite his scholarly interest in political ideas and the social preconditions of politics, Herbert Tingsten was also keenly aware of the constitutional basis of democratic governance.

The concepts of constitution and democracy were central for his survey of government between 1880 and 1930, summarized in the 700 pages long book on democracy's victory and crisis (1933). This is another example of Tingsten primarily relying on a country-by-country account. Long chapters are devoted to France, England, the United States, and Germany. Other nations, such as Italy, Russia, the Nordic countries and a dozen of other cases, are also treated separately. The book does not even have a concluding chapter but ends abruptly with a brief remark on the Chinese constitution of 1931. Nevertheless, this book should be regarded as a genuinely comparative study. The research hypothesis is spelled out already in the title of the book: *Democracy's Victory and Crisis*. The reader is taken on a journey through all relevant nations with the informed and pedagogic guide constantly asking one fundamental question: 'Can democracy survive?'

Crucial to Tingsten's way of presenting his research results on the different countries was his long introductory section on democracy and dictatorship. In these pages he discussed the meaning of democracy, the forms of democracy, political parties, socialism and the crisis of democracy. Then he presented an analytical overview of current political thinking with particularly emphasis on anti-intellectualism, corporatism, monarchism and the theory of political integration. Also important for the subsequent story is an introduction to the ideologies of dictatorship. Already in 1933 he saw parallels between communism, fascism, and national socialism. Some years later he would elaborate this theme and he was one

of the first commentators to use the term 'totalitarian' to characterize the similarities between these modern forms of dictatorships (Tingsten 1933, 1939).

The strength of Tingsten's book on democracy's victory and crisis is his ability to combine different types of approaches. This book is not only a study of contemporary political ideas, a historical narrative of political power struggles over a period of half a century, a series of incisive portraits of leading thinkers and politicians or a study of constitutional law. It is a combination of all of them, integrated into one single analysis written in a clear and crisp prose. But Tingsten also formulated some limitations about his work. In the preface he declared that he could have written more about the social, economic, and cultural background to the political conflicts but abstained from doing so because these topics would be dealt with by other authors in accompanying volumes. More importantly, he stated that he wanted to avoid normative evaluations and theoretical constructions. He also abstained from vague generalizations about "national characters" and 'the spirit of the times'. General historical perspectives were also to be left out. He was, moreover, careful about formulating causal statements. He said clearly that he limited himself to comparatively tangible causal connections (Tingsten 1933, vii f).

At the time of writing this monumental volume, Herbert Tingsten had already published a book on the rise of fascism in Italy (Tingsten 1930). A few years later he would compare Italy, Germany and Austria in a book about the modern forms of national dictatorship (Tingsten 1936). The reader is fully informed about the peculiarities of each of these countries but the concluding chapter on fascist ideology stressed their similarities.

What united the fascist movements was national unity. While in Austria religious and cultural affinity was discerned as important, German national socialism emphasized race and people, and Italian fascism referred to the state as superior to the individual. According to Tingsten it was obvious that the existing state was seen as the essential bond holding society together. The exaltation of the state in fascism was, therefore, coupled with a demand for obedience to the group that dominated the state. Thus, in practice national unity meant submission to fascism (Tingsten 1936, 251 ff).

This book is one of Herbert Tingsten's important and lasting contributions to the field of comparative government. He early discovered the totalitarian threats to contemporary democracy and he devoted much of his career as a political scientist to exploring and explaining the rise of communism, fascism, and national socialism. In this sense he not only contributed to the understanding the problems of democracy but also the meaning of dictatorship. This is the message that has



been carried to younger generations of political scientists. To understand freedom one must understand the lack of freedom (Karvonen 2008).

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## BEWARE OF DELIBERATIONS: STRATEGIC ASPECTS

*Matti Wiberg*

**Son**

What is a traitor?

**LADY MACDUFF**

Why, one that swears and lies.

**Son**

And be all traitors that do so?

**LADY MACDUFF**

Every one that does so is a traitor, and must be hanged.

**Son**

And must they all be hanged that swear and lie?

**LADY MACDUFF**

Every one.

**Son**

Who must hang them?

**LADY MACDUFF**

Why, the honest men.

**Son**

Then the liars and swearers are fools,  
for there are liars and swearers enow to beat  
the honest men and hang up them.

Macbeth II.5

## Introduction

Deliberations seem to have achieved the status of all cure snake oil for modern decision making. It is propagated with eager for many kinds of settings as complementary or even as a replacement to the standard representative political process. True democrats, beware!

The aim of this shamefully modest note is to remind that deliberations by citizen panels are by no means a faultless way of improving collective decision

making compared to established forms of representative decision making where elected representatives do form the collective judgment. We question the following thesis:

Thesis 1:

*Deliberations produce better decisions in the sense of wiser judgments.*

The point of the paper is not to argue against the usefulness of deliberations *in toto*, but just to highlight some of difficulties, problems, constraints any deliberation by definition will face – facts that are all too often totally neglected in the sometimes way too optimistic and enthusiastic scientific literature on deliberations (for a representative sample of this type of literature see Bessette (1980; 1994), Cohen (1989), Elster (1998), Gutmann & Thompson (2004). To radically question deliberation *per se*, would, to put it mildly, self-defeating. Any rational decision making process entails deliberation of some sort, at least by one individual. We cannot do without at least individual deliberation. The alternative to deliberation is anarchy and chaos.

Our conjecture is that while some deliberations are useful in the sense that they produce wiser judgments than some alternative ways of arriving at decisions, *some* deliberations clearly are not. Deliberations are not foolproof. Deliberations might also produce worse decisions in the sense of bad judgments. Neither are deliberations strategy-proof. It is not the case that any deliberation is to be preferred to any non-deliberative way of arriving at collective judgments. Deliberations are to a remarkable degree products of choice architects' makings. They are by no mean neutral ways of producing quality decisions.

The paper is organized as follows. First we present preliminaries of what deliberations are all about. Secondly we take a critical look at the process of deliberation. Then we highlight some pitfalls of deliberations. The paper ends with a few warnings against overzealous use of deliberations.

## Preliminaries

The following extracts from two dictionaries give us a useful explication of what deliberations are about: *Careful consideration, discussion and consideration of all sides of an issue, an exchange of views on some topic, planning something carefully and intentionally.* (The Free Dictionary)

Definition of deliberation: *any discussion or consideration by a group of persons (as a jury or legislature) of the reasons for and against a measure.* (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

An advocate of the use of deliberation in politics describes deliberation as follows (Herne 2008; my translation).<sup>1</sup>

”A deliberation refers to a situation where a group of volunteering citizens gets information, listen to experts and discuss a certain issue in small groups. Impartiality and listening to the other side’s opinions and respect them is sought for so that all views might come into the open. One of the central goals of the deliberation is to enhance the participants’ impartial judgment in decision making. At the end of the discussion the participants vote, participate in an opinion survey or create a joint end statement. The enlightened opinion produced by the deliberation can be used to support decision making, the goal of the deliberation is not to form a proper, binding decision. The aim of the deliberation is to reveal the participants’ concerned and motivated opinions. It is the case that opinions may be formed quickly in standard opinion polls and their results vary usually even much according to the timing of the poll and according to the formulation of questions.”

Some, not all, but some of the advocates of deliberations seem to make the following mistake in comparing deliberation to other ways of achieving collective judgment: they compare the *ideal* of deliberation not with the ideal of non-deliberation, but with the (admittedly dirty) *reality* of non-deliberative collective

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<sup>1</sup> The original version for the pedants: ”Kansalaiskeskustelulla tarkoitetaan tilaisuutta, jossa joukko vapaaehtoisia kansalaisia saa tietoa, kuulee asiantuntijoita ja keskustelee pienryhmissä jostain tietystä asiakokonaisuudesta.

Keskustelussa pyritään noudattamaan tasapuolisuutta, samoin kuin kuuntelemaan ja kunnioittamaan toisten mielipiteitä, jotta kaikki näkökohdat tulisivat esille. Kansalaiskeskustelun yhtenä keskeisenä tavoitteena on lisätä osallistujien puolueetonta harkintaa päätöksenteossa.

Keskustelun lopuksi osallistujat äänestävät, osallistuvat mielipidemittaukseen tai laativat yhteisen loppulauselman. Kansalaiskeskustelun avulla selvitettyä valistunutta kansalaismielipidettä voidaan käyttää päätöksenteon tukena, varsinaista sitovaa päätöstä ei kansalaiskeskustelulla haeta.

Kansalaiskeskustelun tavoitteena on saada selville osallistujien harkitut ja perustellut mielipiteet. Tavallisissa mielipidemittauksissahan mielipiteet saattavat olla nopeasti muodostettuja ja niiden tulokset vaihtelevat tavallisesti paljonkin kyselyn ajankohdan ja kysymysten muotoilujen mukaan” (Herne 2008, 2).

judgment formation, i.e. compare 1 to 4 in Table 1. But this is an unfair comparison! The ideal of deliberation (1) should be compared with the ideal of non-deliberative judgment formation (2) and the real deliberative judgment formation (3) with the real non-deliberative judgment formation (4). Neither ideal case should be compared to the real case, if we want to get a result of the usefulness of deliberations and non-deliberations. It would not be a lesser mistake to compare the ideal non-deliberative (2) to the real (3) deliberative judgment formation process.

Table 1. Modes of collective judgment formation

	Deliberative	Non-deliberative
Ideal	1	2
Real	3	4

The remaining of this paper compares real deliberations to real non-deliberative collective judgment formation processes with few remarks on the cross type comparisons.

### The Process of Deliberation

The sequence of events in a deliberation process seems to be the following:

- a. Deliberators deliberate a certain issue after they have received expert information
- b. Deliberators form a collective judgment and announce it
- c. Some decision makers finally either ignore the deliberation or let it have an impact on their operations

In fact, this is a way too narrow picture of what really takes place. The deliberators do not just pop up from nowhere. The issue is not just there to be deliberated. The experts do not stand in a queue to be heard. It is not guaranteed that the ultimate decision makers are even aware of the deliberation.

Perhaps the following list provides a more realistic understanding of the different phases:

1. Selection of deliberators
2. Selection of an issue
3. Information to participants
4. Talk among participants i.e. the deliberation proper
5. Vote or some other formation of a joint opinion
6. Interpretation of the result of the deliberation
7. Impact of the deliberation

Before discussing each stage in turn a few general points might be worthwhile.

The general thesis of this paper is that all phases in the process are vulnerable to strategic maneuvers and open to many human mistakes. In fact, they suffer from the same kind of difficulties as any form of collective decision making.

It is practically impossible that the actors have identical goals and that they know exactly the same things in any kind of interaction situation. On the contrary, it is typical that two features hold:

1. The preferences of the actors are heterogeneous
2. The information of the actors is asymmetric.

Both features can have a crucial impact on the result of the interaction. In quite large part of the literature on deliberations it is assumed that the actors have almost identical preferences and that they share their information freely with each other. These assumptions should not be made without qualifications. It might well be that the relevant actors have far from identical preferences and they might be unwilling to share all their information with the other players. Some of the advocates of deliberations underestimate the relevant players' advancement of their own goals and overestimate their fondness of playing a co-operative strategy. From the fact that someone is willing to participate in a deliberation, one should not naively conclude that the actor simultaneously has committed herself to the goals formulated by the organizers of the deliberation. Instead of committing herself to advance the goals of the group she could cynically and instrumentally just try to use the deliberation to advance her own agenda. That might very well stand in

contradiction to the goals of the organizers. Assume that an individual participating in a deliberator as a deliberator realizes sometime during the process that her view seems to be in the minority. She might very well have a strong incentive to try to see to it that the deliberators would not end up with a joint recommendation. She could have a strong incentive to exercise her eventual veto power in order to block the common final product, *contra* what the majority of the deliberators would like to achieve.

Deliberation is by no means an automatic or autonomous process. Things do not just happen by themselves and produce a balanced, wise collective opinion. The process has to be designed by someone, one or more players. One should not take it for granted that the end-users or the organizers are unanimous among themselves on all aspects of the process. It might very well be that there is some sort of disagreement among these players concerning any aspect of the process. There is no guarantee that these actors are unbiased or objective in any meaningful sense, even if they apply majority rule in their decision making.

There are many players in the deliberation game, not just deliberators and experts. Every phase in this process needs to be organized somehow. Choices must be made. Someone has to make these choices. These choices really do matter. Each step in the process might have a crucial impact on the end result of the deliberation. Deliberation that takes place in some unorganized, unframed primeval soup is chaotic, at best and perhaps accidental or manipulated at worst.

The role of organizers should be highlighted. Some organizers are perhaps not unbiased. They might have something at stake in the process. This stake does not need to be the end result of the deliberation. It could also be, for instance, just the fact that the deliberation takes place so that they can sell their, say, logistical expertise to the deliberators. Organizing deliberators might be a business idea for some players in the field. Their incentives might not be the same as the deliberators' or the users of deliberators.

We should not assume without any proof or evidence that the goals of the organizers or the end-users of the deliberation are identical with the goals of the deliberators or the experts. Goal congruence among these players is not automatic. Quite the contrary: we should expect it to be rare. The players might have heterogeneous preferences not only over the possible end results but even over the alternative ways of organizing the deliberation process, starting with the selection of the deliberators and the issues to be deliberated as well as on the quality and amount as well as on the timing of the information input from experts to deliberators.



It should not be forgotten that the deliberation process might also be used instrumentally in order to advance the secret and true goals of the organizers or some other relevant player like, for instance, the ultimate decision maker, who perhaps ordered the citizen deliberation in the first place. It is noteworthy that the ultimate decision makers are not necessarily the ones that ordered the deliberation. The deliberation might be called for by an interest organization or a private lobby, players which, by definition, have private interests not necessarily congruent with the goals of the ultimate decision makers. It is by no means self-evident that the goals of the deliberators, the organizers or the ultimate decision makers are identical with some social good. All relevant players might in the first place be interested in maximizing some private goal instead of some collective good.

Some participants might impose pressure on one another, leading to a consensus on falsehood rather than truth. The pro-deliberations camp should come up with convincing counter-arguments to the well-known research results of, for instance, Ash and Sherif. Ash (1995[1951]) demonstrated that when asked to decide on their own, without seeing judgments from others, people almost never erred, but when everyone else gave an incorrect answer, people erred more than one-third of the time. Sherif (1937) demonstrated that when polled individually, subjects did not agree with one another, but he found big conformity effects when people were asked to act in small groups and make their estimates in public. In the latter cases, the individual judgments converged and a group norm, establishing the consensus, quickly developed. Deliberation is no superior method to stop busybodies of all sorts hijacking the whole effort of achieving collective judgements or decisions.

One should not in a naïve fashion ask for more deliberations without bringing in mind that the Establishment, political nomenclature, elites etc. might also indicate a willingness to cynically and instrumentally use even deliberations to advance their own goals. Deliberations could be used as a Potemkin village, an impressive façade or show designed to hide an undesirable fact or condition of brute use of power. People could be fooled to believe that the deliberation was non-biased and objective even when it was not.

### Some Pitfalls of Deliberations

Let us now proceed to discuss each stage in the process of real deliberations in turn in order to present evidence against the Thesis 1.

1. *Selection of deliberators.* It does matter how the deliberators are selected. A random draw from the population might produce different set of deliberators than some other method. Does the deliberation process guarantee that the best deliberators are selected? This is by no means self-evident as even the criteria for what constitutes a good deliberator has not been spelled out in sufficient detail. What should we expect from a deliberator? Are all deliberators equally fit for the job? What can we expect from a selector? Are all selectors equally fit for the job? All selectors might not be equally qualified for the task, and some might be more honest than others in performing their duty.

The selection of deliberators does by no means necessarily produce a representative sample of the relevant players in any meaningful statistical sense. The choosing and recruitment of the deliberators could in itself be a source for bias. Even if we assume that the selectors wanted to get a representative sample, they might fail in this, for many reasons: they could make a serious mistake, for instance. Especially if the sample is constructed using some self-selection many problems could rise: the sample could be biased as the extremists might be more interested in participating than the more moderate players.

Some people do not wish nor feel compelled to participate in public discussions. Would it not be wrong to force these individuals to participate in public deliberations with which they do not feel comfortable? There is a hint of Rousseauan totalitarianism in forcing individuals to participate in a deliberation against their own volition. There is no fool-proof way of recruiting the deliberators so as to produce a representative or even otherwise desirable sample of the relevant population.

Can it be guaranteed that the chosen ones want to maximize the same thing as the organizers or end-users of the deliberation? Clearly not. If that would be a guarantee of this, the deliberators would not be free agents but puppets, which would turn the whole process into a travesty.

Some of the deliberators might not be interested in maximizing the probability of the in some relevant social or collective sense best output. Some of the deliberators might have a private agenda and try to manipulate the end result in their favor. Deliberations as such are by no means strategy-proof filters against this kind of strategic behavior. It is not only the actors who ordered the deliberation or the agents who organized the deliberation that might act strategically. Even the deliberators might be acting in a manipulative way.

It should also be pointed out that the division of the deliberators into small groups is by no means without problems. By which criteria are the deliberators

allocated to the different partitions of the group of deliberators? The advocates of deliberations interestingly seem to keep quiet on this rather important issue. Some of these divisions may be fairer than others. Some might seriously damage the process. There is no obvious way as to how to construct the small groups or even their agendas. This might have an impact on the remaining parts of the process.

**Observation 1.** Deliberations do not necessarily produce better players than any imaginable other way of selecting relevant players into the decision making or opinion formation process.

2. *Issue selection.* Which issue should be selected for deliberation? This is by no means a self-evident issue itself. Whose affair is it to select the issue to be deliberated upon? There is a lot of power to be used here. Why deliberate issue X instead of issue Y? The framing of issues is not to be ignored as the mere formulation of the issue might have a crucial impact on the process. The problem formulation clearly constrain the process to a remarkable degree. It is another thing to have someone else to select an issue for a deliberation than to have the deliberators themselves to pick their issue by themselves. The formulation of alternatives is one important, perhaps even decisive source of power (Riker 1996).

**Observation 2.** Deliberations do not necessarily select better issues to be decided upon than any imaginable other way of providing issues to relevant players of the decision making or opinion formation process.

3. *Information to participants.* What information should the deliberators get? By whom? Which are legitimate sources of information?

A distinction concerning the information given to the deliberators should be made. There are at least information sets of two different types: 1) information provided to the deliberators by the organizers themselves and 2) by some experts the organizers have commissioned for this task. Both information inputs could be biased, either by design or by mistake. It is noteworthy that the information inputs might even contradict each others. They might be incompatible. The organizers or the experts might both try to manipulate the deliberators – and succeed in this, if that is the right word here. It could also be the case that both the organizers and the experts might give their (true) information in such a way that the deliberators

would be misled, even when this was not the goal of the information providers.<sup>2</sup> It is not a rare fact that the deliberators might misinterpret the information they receive, especially if they are not experts. Again two options arise: the deliberators might be misled either deliberately or by mistake. No-one is willing to deny this could have serious consequences.

If the information provided to the deliberators by either the organizers or the experts is all the deliberators get, how does one secure that they get enough information in order to be able to produce a truly informed judgment? What guarantees that the deliberators are not kept in the dark of some of the relevant aspects of the issue? Nothing, it would seem.

There does not seem to be anything in the deliberation process to see to it that the deliberators are not fed with unsubstantiated claims. Moreover, the organizers and the experts may present to the deliberators only that information that is consistent with their own misjudgments, predispositions and beliefs.

In deliberative setting emotions rather than facts can produce the final judgment. There is no guarantee that the end-users or organizers are here any more objective or successful than we should assume that they were at the stage of selecting the deliberators or the issue to be deliberated. What guarantees that the information given to the deliberators is not dis-information, ie. false information deliberately spread in order to influence public opinion or obscure the truth? The growing literature on the strategic use of information reminds us of the vast potentiality of deception, manipulation by information input and impact of information on decision making and opinion formation. How does we judge an expert? Which criteria apply? Not all experts are equally good. Some experts are better than others. How is this accounted for? Why should we assume that the experts do not have an own agenda? One is not paranoid only because one takes into account the fact that the experts might try to manipulate the end result closer to the experts' ideal points.

Even if the deliberators were fed with identical information, this is not identically processed among the targets. The deliberators make different use of the informational input they get, given their background information, reasoning skills, memory etc.

Recent research on the brain indicates that the brain does not simply gather and stockpile information as a computer's hard disk does. Every time we recall some piece of information, our brain writes it down again, and during this re-storage, it is also reprocessed. This is not a faultless process.

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<sup>2</sup> *Lies as an eyewitness*, was one of the useful phrases used by Josif Stalin.

The organizers' of the deliberation might exploit the defects of the human brain by spreading useful misinformation. It is, for instance, a fact that if the original information is initially memorable, its impression will persist long after it is debunked.

**Observation 3.** Deliberations do not necessarily produce better informed players than any imaginable other way of providing information to relevant players of the decision making or opinion formation process.

4. *Talk among participants* i.e. the deliberation proper. All individuals in the choice set are not equally competent<sup>3</sup> in making good judgments or signal their preferences or information in general.<sup>4</sup> Some are better in expressing themselves than others, some know less about certain things than others and some might know more than they are able to credibly communicate to others.

It is rather safe to assume that there is no lower limit to the ignorance and stupidity of individuals. No matter how ignorant a person is, there is always someone, who is more handicapped than him by, for instance owing a poorer memory than the first

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<sup>3</sup> In a great deal of the scientific literature on the Condorcet Jury Theorem there is an interesting bias. The theorem was first (informally) expressed by the Marquis de Condorcet in his 1785 work *Essai sur l'application de l'analyse a la probabillite des decisions rendues a la pluralite des voix* [Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Majority Decisions]. The theorem states, informally, that the relative probability of a given group of individuals arriving at a correct decision in a binary choice situation depends on two items: the quality of the individual voters as voters and their number. Each individual has a probability  $p$  to make the correct judgment. The theorem says that (1) If  $p$  is greater or precisely  $1/2$  (each voter is more likely than not to vote correctly), then adding more voters increases the probability that the majority decision is correct. In the limit, the probability that the majority votes correctly approaches 1 as the number of voters increases. What is all too often forgotten (or not presented) is the complement of the theorem: (2) If  $p$  is less than  $1/2$  (each voter is more likely than not to vote incorrectly), then adding more voters makes things worse: In the limit, the probability that the majority votes incorrectly approaches 1 as the number of voters increases.

<sup>4</sup> It is true that some individuals do not share this proposition. There are even scholars who think that there are no meaningful or relevant differences in the competences of individuals in decision making. It is, however, rather difficult to see, how one seriously could deny the empirical fact that some are more competent than others in terms of information on the current issue, reasoning capabilities, judgment formation abilities, general intelligence, credibility and so on. All individuals are not *Dummkopfs*, but some, perhaps fortunately, are. No amount of deliberation cannot even this out. In the famous words of Larry Summers "THERE ARE IDIOTS. Look around." (Fox 2009, 199)

poor fellow. One poor individual is, in the end, the worst. This surely must have some impact on the collective judgment.

What, precisely, should the deliberators do when they deliberate? This is not self-evident. There is talk and talk. Some of it may be relevant, but some might not. There is even *cheap talk*. Does something in the deliberation guarantee that the deliberators focus merely on the issue they should deliberate about? Does something guarantee that the deliberators signal only unbiased truths? One can surely hope that the deliberators keep focused and talk only established or verifiable truths, but is there a guarantee that they will? If the deliberators are interested in the collective judgment, they, by definition, have an obvious motivation to bluff or deceive each other in order to achieve a particular, for them good result. If it pays either to bluff or deceive the others, why would the deliberators not engage these activities? We should not assume that the deliberators are disinterested angels any more than we should assume that the process of deliberation would be a Habermasian *Herrschaftsfreier diskurs* (Habermas 1981). There might be a variety of Herren practicing power during the discussions.

It is a well-known fact that individuals differ in their propensity to talk. Some are more talkative than others. What impact does the amount of individual talk have on the final judgment of the group? Do we know this? Why should we believe that everything said during the deliberation is relevant to the issue at hand? Is there a way to guarantee that no one in the group distract the attention to the core issue to be dealt with? Clearly not. As the deliberators must enjoy free speech<sup>5</sup> there is no guarantee that the talk will be even remotely relevant. What guarantees that the deliberators do not lie to each others? The growing number of research on strategic information revelation should make us critical. Some agents might signal falsehoods, either by design or by mistake.

One should not assume that the impact of every individual in a constant. If the impact of individuals differs, this might be a source of concern from the viewpoint of the equal treatment of every individual. How does one guarantee that the individuals have an impact on the final judgment according to their merit? What guarantees that the best individuals or the best arguments or the best evidence have the greatest impact? Nothing. It could be the case that the worst individuals, the less competent ones have the largest impact on the final product. The wise steps always aside and give way, goes the proverb – and this is the source to the global rule by idiots. [Viisas väistää aina ja tähän perustuu idioottien maailmanherruus]

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<sup>5</sup> Assume the opposite, i.e. that the deliberators do not enjoy free speech. What would then guarantee that even the relevant points would be raised? Nothing.

Some of the group members do not disclose what they know, sometimes due to social pressure or downright attempt to manipulate the end result. Some agent might even believe, wrongfully, that the others know more than she – and keep quiet for that reason, thus lowering the quality of the final judgment.

It is obvious that deliberations are not incentive compatible ways of achieving collective judgments as some individual, perhaps all of them, have something to be gained from strategic behavior, i.e. presenting non-truthful inputs into the discussions of the group in order to achieve end-results that are closer to *her* ideal point. A deliberation is typically a prisoner's dilemma –kind of situation in which the dominant strategy for every participant is to play the un-co-operative strategy. No amount of talk can change this.

The possibility of *groupthink* is always present in a deliberative setting, perhaps more so than in an atomistic, isolated, non-communicative collective decision making environment. It is an empirical fact that groups of people who deliberate together "tend to maintain *esprit de corps* by unconsciously developing a number of shared illusions and related norms that interfere with critical thinking and reality testing" (Irving 1982, 35). What does guarantee that the groupthink effect does not bias the collective judgment of the group of deliberators? Nothing. Sunstein (2006, 76) reminds us of a recent important case of groupthink: the 2004 report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which explicitly accuses the Central Intelligence Agency of groupthink. According to the committee, the CIA's predisposition to find a serious threat from Iraq led to its failure to explore alternative possibilities or to obtain and use the information it actually held (<http://intelligence.senate.gov>).

Behavioural economics as well as a growing tradition of social psychological research on conformity experiments show many different difficulties stemming from social pressures within a decision making group (see for instance Thaler & Sunstein 2008, 56-). Peer pressure and the desire of many not to face the disapproval of the group can in a deliberative setting actually lead to worse, not better decisions. Individual judgment can converge and a group norm producing a consensus can emerge, but this does not necessarily improve the quality of the decision.

Groupthink might hit the deliberators as well as any other group of decision makers. Cosy camaraderie of group members is very enticing. *Herd*

*mentality*<sup>6</sup> is certainly a fact of life. Is it more probable in a deliberative group than in a representative body?

False consensus might emerge. A pseudoconsensus is a false consensus, reached when members of a group feel they are expected to go along with the majority decision, as when the voting basis is a large supermajority and a deadlock is achieved unless some of the members of the minority acquiesce. A requirement of unanimity or near unanimity can become a form of tyranny in itself.

Collective bodies frequently take action contrary to the desires of their members, and thereby defeat the very purpose they set out to achieve. This occurs because many people feel they might be isolated, censured or ridiculed if they voice objections. This often leads groups to act on inappropriate goals and is a setup for organizational failure. Mismanaged agreement might be a product of a deliberation gone wrong. The Abilene paradox might realize itself in which case a group of people collectively decide on a course of action that is counter to the preferences of any of the individuals in the group (Harvey 1974). This might be the result in situations where each member mistakenly believes that their own preferences are counter to the group's and, therefore, does not raise objections (see also Harvey, Novicevic, Buckley & Halbesleben 2004).

Compare, for instance, a deliberation of ill-informed amateurs to a standard parliamentary debate. Is it really to be believed, without any further evidence, that the amateurs produce more wise judgments on a contested issue than experienced parliamentarians who have free access to any kind of existing evidence they might wish for? And enough *time* to acquire even contra-evidence to what the perhaps manipulative experts have been willing to present.

Is the deliberative talk public? This is by no means a requirement that would always be followed. Some deliberations might be open to anyone to follow during the process, some might be open afterwards and some might be secret even after the completion of the decision making process. The level and intensity of secrecy might have some impact on the quality of talk. Sometimes secrecy helps the process, sometimes it makes it more difficult. It all depends on a number of issues. Secrecy might sometimes facilitate the process, sometimes it hurts the process. Meritocracy is not completely without merit.

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<sup>6</sup> By the way: a term (Herde-Mentalität) coined and explicated foremostly by Friedrich Nietzsche in his *Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen*, 1883–1885.



**Observation 4.** Deliberations do not necessarily produce better talk than any imaginable other way of providing information to relevant players of the decision making or opinion formation process.

An additional point might be worth stating here. According to Aumann's agreement theorem (Aumann 1976), if two players are genuine Bayesians with common priors, and if they each have common knowledge of their individual posteriors, then their posteriors must be equal. This, of course, requires that the players are honest, i.e. that they signal their posteriors truthfully. There is no guarantee that we can make this assumption in the field of politics, where it sometimes pays not to be honest.

5. *Vote or some other formation of a joint opinion.* There is no error-proof causal link that ties the presented talk to the final vote. Talk does not in a linear way add up to a collective judgment. Good reasons, perfect evidence and the like might be ignored in the final verdict by the group. One could present his or her final signal for the judgment *despite* the deliberation.

The formulation of the alternatives for the voting entails quite some reservoir of power, no matter what was said during the discussions. The aggregation of the collective preference does not necessarily reflect the preferences of the individuals in any fair or even straight way. Deliberation in itself does not determine voting outcomes. The final vote might well be a result of devious manipulation. The final vote of a deliberation does not reflect the individual preferences any better than any collective choice type of setting without talk would. All the difficulties, problems of social choice are present even after with and after talk. No amount of talk would filter away the Arrovian nightmare with preference cycles, to put it somewhat poetically.

There is no way deliberation always produces more responsive results than traditional decision making in a representative system.

**Observation 5.** Deliberations do not necessarily produce better voting results than any imaginable other way of providing information to relevant players of the decision making or opinion formation process.

6. *Interpretation of the result of the deliberation.* How should the result of the deliberation be interpreted? By whom? This, again, is not self-evident. The interpretations of the

different segments of the relevant players might deviate from each other. The deliberators might have one interpretation, the organizers another. The end-users might have a third and the general public might have a fourth. Whose interpretation is the best? It is not clear what the “best” here stands for.

**Observation 6.** Deliberations do not necessarily produce better interpretations than any imaginable other way of providing information to relevant players of the decision making or opinion formation process.

7. *Impact of the deliberation.* What is the impact of the deliberation? To whom? This is not self-evident. One result might be that the deliberation makes everyone happier than what would have been achievable without deliberation. But this is does not follow necessarily. The deliberation process could likewise be a frustrating experience to all relevant players, not only the end-users, the organizers, but also to the deliberators and the spectators. Deliberation in itself does not necessarily enhance our belief in the democratic process. Especially if it revealed during the process or *post festum* that the deliberation was manipulated, people could get angry, not happy.

**Observation 7.** Deliberations do not necessarily produce better impacts than any imaginable other way of providing information to relevant players of the decision making or opinion formation process.

## Conclusion

Deliberation may suffer from most, if not all, defects of collective judgment formation. Deliberations do not automatically or necessarily produce wiser judgments. Sometimes deliberations fail to produce wise judgments.

Thus

1. Selection of deliberators might be biased and manipulated
2. Selection of an issue might be biased and manipulated
3. Information to participants might be biased and manipulated
4. Talk among participants i.e. the deliberation proper might be biased and manipulated

5. Vote or some other formation of a joint opinion might be biased and manipulated
6. Interpretation of the result of the deliberation might be biased and manipulated
7. Impact of the deliberation might be biased and manipulated.

If the deliberators, their issue, their information are selected by manipulation, no one should be surprised if also the deliberators' talk, vote and the interpretation and impact of their vote were manipulated.

In fact, the manipulation of any single phase in the process could suffice to bias the result. There are many potential manipulators: in fact, all relevant players i.e. the designers of the deliberation, the external experts or information givers, the deliberators and the users of the deliberation might try to manipulate the setting or its outcome. Some of them might even succeed in their efforts.

It could, luckily perhaps, be the case that two biases might cancel each others out or somehow otherwise neutralize their negative impact on the process. Manipulations might backfire. It is not the case that all attempts to manipulate fulfill the objectives of the manipulators. Sometimes people can respond effectively and save the process back to honest business. But there are no guarantees, of course.

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## **REGIMES**



## WHICH COUNTRIES ARE SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL?

*Carsten Anckar*

Regime types can be classified and subclassified in a number of ways. Among the democracies of the world we usually distinguish between countries with a presidential form of government and countries with a parliamentary form of government. In addition, there are a number of democratic countries which have forms of governments that combine features of presidentialism and parliamentarism. This category of hybrid systems is rather heterogeneous but a common denominator for many of these systems is that the executive power is divided between a president and a prime minister, who must enjoy the confidence of the legislature. Such systems are generally referred to as semi-presidential forms of government. In the present chapter my ambition is to propose a definition of semi-presidentialism and to identify the population of countries which presently make use of this constitutional arrangement.

### Presidentialism

Before we can take upon ourselves the task of defining semi-presidentialism we need to know what presidentialism and parliamentarism stand for. Regarding presidentialism, we note that there is a rather strong consensus on the central dimensions of the concept in question. Most authors agree that at least the following three criteria should be met (e.g. Shugart & Carey 1992, 19; Sartori 1997, 83-84).

- 1) The president (or rather the chief executive) is elected by popular vote
- 2) The government cannot be dismissed by a parliamentary vote of no confidence.
- 3) The president appoints and directs the government.

Although scholars seem to agree on the three criteria mentioned above, they tend to disagree on additional criteria. Many authors also argue that in a presidential system it is necessary that the position of head of state and head of government coincide, but this argument is elegantly refuted by Lijphart (1992, 4-5), who argues

that the existence of a mere ceremonial head of state does not make a system something else than presidential if all the other criteria of presidentialism are met (also Sartori 1997, 84). Shugart and Carey (1992, 19), on their part, argue that it is necessary to introduce the criterion that "the president has some constitutionally granted lawmaking authority". Their argument is that otherwise "[chief executives] execute laws the creation of which they had no way of influencing." Sartori (1997, 97), however, omits this criterion, arguing that it is vague and unnecessary; the fact that the president heads and directs the government by necessity implies that he or she (hereafter he) has some lawmaking authority. In contrast to Shugart and Carey I do not think that granting the president lawmaking authority constitutes a necessary condition of presidentialism. Quite to the contrary, as Shugart and Carey (1992, 18) point out themselves, "the central defining characteristic of presidentialism has been the separation of legislative from executive powers." Granting the president law-making authority blurs the difference between the legislative and the executive sphere and law-making powers of the president should therefore not be included among the defining characteristics of presidentialism.

Another difference between Shugart and Carey, on the one hand, and Sartori, on the other, is that the former authors argue that the second criterion, that the chief executive cannot be dismissed by parliament, is insufficient. Instead, they claim that "the terms of the chief executive and assembly...are not contingent on *mutual* confidence" (Shugart & Carey 1992, 19, my italics). Sartori (1997, 87) again takes a different stand and does not consider the power to dissolve parliament a factor that alone would transform a presidential system into something else. However, in agreement with Karvonen (2003, 52), I view the requirement that the president is unable to dissolve the legislature as a defining element of presidentialism. As pointed out earlier, presidentialism is based on the doctrine of separation of powers; the executive sphere is to be separated from the legislative sphere and it is therefore essential that none of the spheres have the power to eliminate the other.

## Parliamentarism

Although definitions of presidentialism are abundant, definitions of parliamentarism are more difficult to come across. Implicitly, we often regard parliamentarism as the opposite of presidentialism; democratic countries lacking the features of presidentialism are accordingly assumed to have a parliamentary form of



government. According to Verney (1959) a parliamentary form of government is characterized by the following criteria:

*The assembly becomes a parliament;*

*The executive is divided into two parts;*

*The head of state appoints the head of government;*

*The head of government appoints the ministry;*

*The ministry (or government) is a collective body;*

*Ministers are usually members of parliament;*

*The government is politically responsible to the assembly;*

*The head of government may advise the head of state to dissolve parliament;*

*Parliament as a whole is supreme over its constituent parts, government and assembly, neither of which may dominate the other;*

*The government as a whole is only indirectly responsible to the electorate;*

*Parliament is the focus of power in the political system*

Clearly, as Verney himself admits, all of these characteristics are not essential for a parliamentary form of government and some of these should be regarded as characteristics of British parliamentarism and not parliamentarism *per se* (Lijphart 1992, 5). The third criterion, for instance, can hardly be regarded as a defining criterion of parliamentarism; it really does not matter who formally appoints the chief of the executive, the head of state or someone else. Accordingly, Lijphart (1992, 2-4) suggests that parliamentarism encompasses only three central characteristics:

*The head of government...and his or her cabinet are dependent on the confidence of the legislature and can be dismissed from office by a legislative vote of no confidence or censure;*

*[P]rime ministers are selected by the legislature;*

*[P]arliamentary systems have collective or collegial executives*

Another important defining characteristic was suggested by Budge et al. (1997, 238), namely that there is “no popularly elected president with real political powers”. Concerning this fourth criterion I would, however, omit the two words ‘popularly elected’, since the relations between the executive and the legislature will be affected by any powerful ‘third actor’ regardless of how this actor was (s)lected (by popular vote, by parliament, by heritage etc.).

## Semi-Presidential Forms of Government

Let us then turn to the category of interest for the present study. A minimal definition of semi-presidentialism stipulates that executive powers are shared by a president and a prime minister, who is responsible to parliament. It is noteworthy that most authors also add the requirement that the president is popularly elected, directly or indirectly (e.g. Duverger 1980, 166; Shugart & Carey 1992, 23-27; Suleiman 1994; Pasquino 1997, 130; Sartori 1997, 131; Hague et al. 1998, 212; Sedelius 2006, 36; Elgie 2011, 3).

There have also been attempts to introduce other defining characteristics into the concept of semi-presidentialism. Accordingly, Sartori (1997, 131) has suggested that in order for a system to be semi-presidential there should also be a "dual authority structure", which "allows for different balances and also for shifting prevalences of power within the executive, under the strict condition that the 'autonomy potential' of each component unit of the executive does subsist". This criterion, however, is somewhat ambiguous; I would consider different balances and shifting prevalences to be natural consequences of executive power sharing rather than defining elements of semi-presidentialism. In fact, different balances and shifting prevalences are possible in any parliamentary system with coalition governments, where the prime minister must cooperate with leaders of the coalition partners.

I should also say that in line with D. Anckar (1999, 256-57) I do not share the view that in order for a system to be semi-presidential (or, for that matter, as we shall see momentarily, presidential), the president must be elected by popular vote. Whether the president is elected by parliament, by an electoral college or by popular vote is irrelevant; the crucial aspect is that the president cannot be brought down by parliament. It would indeed be strange to regard the earlier semi-presidential Finnish form of government as parliamentary for all periods where presidents have been elected by parliament.<sup>1</sup> For instance, in 1974, president Urho Kekkonen's term as president was extended for a period of four years by a parliamentary law of exception. During the following four years, the Finnish president was in complete control of the executive sphere and the government was changed on no less than four occasions. Let me nevertheless emphasize, that although I do not think that

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<sup>1</sup> The following Finnish presidents have been elected by parliament: K. J. Ståhlberg, 1919-1925, C.G.E. Mannerheim, 1944-1946 (elected by a parliamentary law of exception), J. K. Paasikivi, 1946-1951, U. Kekkonen, 1974-1978 (elected by a parliamentary law of exception). Furthermore, R. Ryti, 1939-1944 was never indirectly elected by popular vote since the electoral college of 1937 elected the president in 1940 and 1943.

the popular election of the president constitutes a necessary condition of semi-presidentialism, I do concur with the view that a popular election makes the president stronger since it enhances his popular legitimacy.

Shugart and Carey (1992, 23-25) split semi-presidential systems into two categories, premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. Both systems meet the criteria included in the minimal definition of semi-presidentialism; the differences between the systems lie in the power balance between the prime minister and the president. The former category implicates 'the primacy of the premier' whereas the latter 'the primacy of the president' (Shugart & Carey 1992, 24), the crucial thing being that in the latter category, the president appoints and dismisses members of cabinet (Shugart & Carey 1992, 24).

Alan Siaroff (2003, 305-09) has gone as far as suggesting that the concept of semi-presidentialism should be rejected altogether. Instead, he argues, we should stick to the categories presidentialism and parliamentarism, where the latter category is split up into the following subcategories: *parliamentary systems with presidential dominance*, *parliamentary systems with a presidential corrective*, *parliamentary systems with figurehead presidents* and *parliamentary systems with figurehead monarchs*. His main reason for this is the fact that the presidential powers vary to a very high extent among the countries which meet the generally accepted criteria of semi-presidentialism.

Is the category of semi-presidentialism really unnecessary? This is highly dependent on whether or not we have clearly defined and well established criteria by which the category can be separated from presidentialism and parliamentarism. In relation to presidentialism, this is clearly the case. In a presidential system, the government cannot be brought down by the legislature. In contrast, the accountability of the prime minister to parliament is inherent in all minimal definitions of semi-presidentialism. However, things get more complicated when we attempt to separate semi-presidentialism from parliamentarism. The principle of accountability of government to parliament not only separates semi-presidentialism from presidentialism but also parliamentarism from presidentialism. What separates semi-presidential systems from parliamentary systems is essentially the fact that executive power is shared by two persons, a president and a prime minister. But what do we mean by 'shared'? In his famous definition of semi-presidentialism, Duverger (1980, 166) declared that the president should have 'quite considerable powers', but this, of course, does not tell us much. Clearly, power does not have to be shared in equal proportions but the concept of sharing does imply that none of the two actors should be more or less powerless in relation to the other.

It is evident that the lack of consensus regarding which countries should be classified as semi-presidential has to do with *how much* power the president should have in relation to the prime minister. The simplest way to overcome this problem is to apply the strategy adopted by Elgie (2011, 3), who defines semi-presidentialism as “the situation where there is both a directly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible to the legislature”. By this definition, the extent to which power is shared becomes irrelevant; the interesting point is that there is a popularly elected president and a prime minister accountable to parliament. The problem with Elgie’s definition is that it blurs the distinction between parliamentary systems and semi-presidential ones. Does it really make sense to separate two democratic forms of government from each other simply on the basis on how a powerless head of state is selected? Elgie (2011, 18-19) finds no less than 51 countries which meet his requirements for semi-presidentialism – a number which stands in sharp contrast to many other compilations and particularly the one proposed by Stepan and Skach (1993, 5, 9), which encompassed, at the time of their writing, only two countries, namely France and Portugal.

Elgie’s list of semi-presidential countries include states such as Austria, Iceland and Slovenia, where the president is elected by popular vote but has very limited powers. These countries are rarely included among the semi-presidential countries due to the fact that the role of the president is merely ceremonial; the leader of the executive branch is without any doubt the prime minister. Elgie’s criteria of inclusion in the category of semi-presidentialism are too wide and we therefore cannot escape the well established demand that the president should be more than a ceremonial figurehead. The tricky question we need to answer is therefore how much power a president must possess in relation to the prime minister in order for a system to be classified as semi-presidential. Let me, however, for the moment leave this question aside and start the empirical task of establishing the population of semi-presidential regimes by applying the more easily applicable criteria of semi-presidentialism.

### Identifying the Semi-Presidential Countries of the World

A first necessary criterion of semi-presidentialism is a democratic form of government. As we have seen, power sharing is an essential feature of semi-presidentialism and the system cannot operate in an autocracy, where "power is

concentrated, uncontrolled, indefinite, and unlimited" (Sartori 1973, 152). From our population of potential semi-presidential systems we can therefore exclude all countries which are not democratic.

As is widely known, the organization *Freedom House* (<http://freedomhouse.org>) classifies the countries of the world into three categories on a yearly basis, namely 'Free', 'Partly Free' and 'Not Free'. The conclusion, that countries situated within the first category are democratic, whereas countries found in the third category are autocratic, is probably not controversial. The category 'partly free' is trickier. It consists of countries which score six to ten points when adding the values for the dimensions 'political rights' and 'civil liberties'. According to *Freedom House*, some of the countries situated within this category qualify as 'electoral democracies' and it could consequently be argued that the threshold for inclusion in this category should constitute a natural criterion for the identification of the democracies of the world.

However, some of the countries included in the category 'electoral democracies' score a combined value of eight on the political rights and civil liberties dimensions, which indicates that the criteria for inclusion in the category 'electoral democracies' seem to be quite generous. Indeed, a closer look at the category, reveals that countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine and Zambia all qualify as 'electoral democracies', despite the fact that their democratic status is either questionable or highly unstable. I have therefore chosen to apply a more restrictive strategy for inclusion in the population of democracies, namely to include only those countries which score a combined value of six or less on *Freedom House's* dimensions 'political rights' and 'civil liberties'. In the year 2011, a total of 102 countries met this criterion.

The next step in the elimination process is to exclude all countries where the position as head of state is hereditary. This criterion, too, is essentially a demand that the system is democratic. True, a number of democratic countries are constitutional monarchies, where the position as head of state is hereditary. This is perfectly in line with democratic principles but only as long as the role of the head of state is purely ceremonial. If the head of state is to share executive powers with the prime minister, we cannot ignore the demand for democratic legitimacy. To qualify as a semi-presidential state, then, the head of state must come to power by democratic means and he cannot occupy the position as head of state for life. This leaves us with the following 74 countries: Albania, Argentina, Austria, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia,

Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kiribati, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, (Federated States of) Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Suriname, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Uruguay, USA, and Vanuatu.

The next step in the process is to exclude all countries which meet the widely applied criteria of presidentialism, i.e. that the president is popularly elected, functions as the sole leader of the executive and cannot be brought down by parliament. Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ghana, Guyana, Indonesia, Mexico, Palau, Panama, Philippines, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Korea, Uruguay and the USA are clearly presidential. The fact that the constitutions<sup>2</sup> of Guyana and South Korea also recognize the office of prime minister does not alter their position in the group of presidential countries, since the prime minister merely functions as an assistant to the president and cannot be dismissed by the legislature (Siaroff 2003, 295).

The cases of Micronesia and Suriname need further consideration. In the scheme of classification of political regimes suggested by Siaroff (2003, 295, 298), the countries are included in category 4. The countries included in this category have a president who functions as the sole leader of the executive, cannot be brought down by the legislature and does not dispose of powers to dissolve parliament. However, they fail to meet another common criterion of presidentialism, namely that the president is popularly elected. In the countries mentioned above, the president is not elected by popular vote but by the legislature. Above, I have argued against the claim that the popular election of the president constitutes a necessary criterion of semi-presidentialism. The same line of reasoning applies to presidentialism as well. The popular election of the president enhances the position of the president, since it gives him more democratic legitimacy but the lack of such an election does not in itself turn a system from presidentialism into something else.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Here and henceforward, references to constitutional provisions are based on Blaustein & Flanz, various issues.

<sup>3</sup> And if the countries in question are not presidential, what are they? Do we really need another category of hybrid systems?

The United States, which is often regarded as the prototype of presidentialism, is illustrative in this respect. The constitution provides for an indirect election of the president. However, when this indirect popular election fails to return an unequivocal outcome, i.e. none of the candidates receive the support of a majority of the electors, the president is elected by the House of Representatives. The provision is not a dead letter in the constitution; the president has been chosen by the House of Representatives twice, in 1800 and 1824. Certainly, it would make little sense to regard the American form of government as something else than presidential in cases where the president was elected by the House of Representative rather than by the electors. The aforesaid is also of high relevance with regard to Bolivia's earlier constitution, which met all other criteria of presidentialism but where the president was often elected by parliament, since article 90 of the constitution prescribed that in cases where none of the candidates received a majority of the votes, the parliament elected the president among the two top candidates in the popular vote. In line with my argumentation above, I find that the previous form of government of Bolivia met the criteria of presidentialism (see also Siaroff 2003, 295).

The cases of Botswana, Marshall Islands, Nauru, and South Africa are also odd in a comparative perspective. They are all situated in category 3 in Siaroff's (2003, 295, 298; 2009, 152) scheme. In these countries, the president is the sole leader of the executive branch but elected by parliament, and, *nota bene*, dependent on the confidence of the parliament. These countries should be considered parliamentary rather than presidential or semi-presidential, since they differ from 'pure' parliamentary systems only in the respect that they combine the offices of head of state and head of government.

Let us then turn to the cases of Kiribati, San Marino and Switzerland. In Kiribati (which forms a category of its own in Siaroff's scheme), the president is elected by popular vote, leads and directs his cabinet but must enjoy the support of parliament. The system resembles a parliamentary system with an elected prime minister and is more parliamentary than presidential (but certainly not semi-presidential, since the executive is not divided).

It is notoriously difficult to categorize Switzerland's form of government. Siaroff (2003, 295, 298) includes it in category 4, along with the Federated States of Micronesia and Suriname. The position of Switzerland is slightly different from the other two countries in the respect that the Swiss president does not control the executive. Articles 176 and 177 of the Swiss constitution explicitly state, that the length of the presidency is one year and that the executive is a collective body.

Even though executive power is dispersed among several political figures the Swiss system is certainly not semi-presidential, since the legislature does not have the power to bring down the executive. The same conclusion is reached for San Marino, which has two leaders of the executive, titled *capitani reggenti*, who are elected by the legislature for a period of six months, and cannot be brought down by parliament (Siaroff 2009, 152).

The list of potential candidates for semi-presidential systems has now shrunk to the following 42 countries: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominica, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Taiwan, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, and Vanuatu.

Each of these countries has separate heads of state and heads of governments. The heads of state (which all bare the title 'president') are either popularly elected or elected by the legislature. Furthermore, in all of the above mentioned countries the prime ministers and the governments can be removed from office by a parliamentary vote of no confidence. In order to sort out the semi-presidential systems from the parliamentary ones we are now referred to our last and most difficult criterion of semi-presidentialism, namely that the president shares executive powers with the prime minister. If the powers of the president are too weak, then the system is parliamentary, not semi-presidential.

We must also ask ourselves what happens in situations where the powers of the president are very broad in comparison with the powers of the prime minister. Does this turn a semi-presidential system into a presidential? I would answer in the negative. As long as there is a prime minister and a government which can be removed from office by a parliamentary vote of no confidence we have not crossed the line between semi-presidentialism and presidentialism. As we have seen, what characterizes presidentialism is not only a powerful president but also a strict application of the separation of powers doctrine; in a presidential system the legislature cannot bring down the government, and the government cannot dissolve the legislature. Once we give the legislature the power to bring down the government, the system is no longer presidential. As long as the political system is democratic and the prime minister and the other ministers of the government are dependent on the confidence of the parliament, the system is semi-presidential even in cases where the prime minister has very little powers in relation to the president.



It is evident that measuring presidential powers is a difficult task. In Elgie's (2011, 3) words: "[i]f the concept of semi-presidentialism is based on a subjective judgment about the power of the president and/or prime minister, then each scholar has free rein to decide what constitutes a fairly powerful president". Related to this is the question whether we should measure presidential powers as defined by the constitution or by practice. According to the Icelandic constitution, the president of Iceland is a powerful political figure; Shugart & Carey (1992, 155-56) even find that the president of Iceland has more legislative and nonlegislative powers than the president of France. However, throughout Iceland's history as an independent state executive power has in practice been vested in the prime minister, not the president and in reality the president has merely ceremonial powers, comparable to those of Scandinavian monarchs (Petersson 2000, 83-84). When measuring presidential powers we should therefore pay regard not only to constitutional provisions but also, as far as possible, to political practice.

Throughout the years, authors have measured presidential powers along several dimensions (Duverger 1978, 22; Shugart & Carey 1992, 148-58; Frye 1997). Within the framework of the present contribution I have chosen to make use of Alan Siaroff's (2003, 303-05) strategy, where presidential powers are assessed along nine dimensions. Siaroff thus makes use of a fairly limited number of indicators of presidential power. The reason for this is to obtain parsimony and put focus on the 'key powers' (Siaroff 2003, 303). Although Siaroff's index is primarily based on constitutional provisions it has the advantage of also being derived from 'actual political practice' (Siaroff 2003, 303). Siaroff's (2003, 303-05) index of presidential power encompasses the following nine dimensions:

*popularly elected [president];*  
*concurrent election of president and legislature;*  
*discretionary appointment by the president of some key individuals such as the prime minister, other cabinet ministers, high court judges, senior military figures and/or central bankers);*  
*ability of the president to chair formal cabinet meetings;*  
*power of the president to veto legislation;*  
*broad emergency or decree powers for national disorder and/or economic matters...effectively valid for an unlimited time;*  
*central role ... in foreign policy;*  
*central role in forming the government [where]government formation refers to the ability to select, remove and/or keep from office a given individual as prime minister and/or a given party as part of the cabinet);*

*ability of the president to dissolve the legislature at will*

For each of these dimensions Siaroff (2003, 303-05) uses a dichotomous scale; countries where the presidential prerogative exists receive the value 1 and countries where it does not exist the value 0. Thereby an index of presidential powers, ranging from 0 to 9 is obtained, where low values indicate that the powers of the president are weak and high values that they are strong.

For the purpose of the present study, the tricky question is of course to establish how much power a president must have in order for the system to be classified as semi-presidential. A reasonable strategy is to establish a threshold on Siaroff's scale and consider all countries which are situated above this threshold as semi-presidential and countries below it as parliamentary. However, such a course of action is based on the assumption that all prerogatives are equally important when distinguishing semi-presidentialism from parliamentarism. As we recall, one of the crucial issues when determining whether a country is semi-presidential or parliamentary is the extent to which presidents share *executive* powers with the prime minister. Now, being popularly elected is not having executive powers and the power to veto legislation is a legislative power, not an executive one. In determining whether or not a country is to be considered semi-presidential a guiding requirement is therefore that the president must also be in possession of important explicit executive powers, meaning that at least one of the following of Siaroff's criteria should be met: the president has the power to chair cabinet meetings, is in charge of foreign policy or has a central role in government formation.

Let us then continue by taking a look at the powers of the presidents in countries that meet the relevant criteria of presidentialism. These are the countries included in category 2 in Siaroff's classification scheme, i.e. *Countries with a single popularly elected head of state and government, not accountable to the legislature*. Within this category the variation in terms of presidential powers is very limited indeed, varying from six (Benin, Cyprus, El Salvador and Venezuela) to eight (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Ecuador). It is therefore evident that a country with a dual executive should be considered semi-presidential if the powers of the president are equal to those of a president in a pure presidential system. From Siaroff's (2003, 299-302) compilation we note this is indeed the case in Cape Verde (6), France (7), Mali (7), and São Tomé and Príncipe (8). In all of the countries in question the president also has explicit executive powers and the countries are therefore without any doubt semi-presidential.

To this list we can add the countries that did not meet the criteria of democracy at the time of Siaroff's study but has since surpassed the threshold of democracy and have dual executives with strong presidents. Among these, Peru is the only Latin American democracy where a president shares power with a prime minister accountable to the legislature. The powers of the Peruvian president are clearly more pronounced than those of the prime minister and applying Siaroff's index to Peru yields the value seven (Elgie 2011, 18). This, of course, leads to the inevitable conclusion that Peru is a semi-presidential state.

In three newly established democracies in Africa, namely Namibia, Senegal and Tanzania, the president disposes of wide-ranging powers and the countries in question all receive the value seven on Siaroff's index (Elgie 2011, 18-19). According to Article 27(2) of the Namibian constitution, "[t]he executive power of the Republic of Namibia shall vest in the President and the Cabinet" whereas articles 36 and 41 clearly stipulate that the position of the prime minister is subordinate to that of the president. The president appoints the prime minister and individual cabinet members but they, in turn, must enjoy the confidence of parliament. The president has far-reaching appointment powers and can veto legislation (art. 56). In sum, then, the president of Namibia is much more than a figurehead leader and possesses far more powers than the prime minister. Namibia is therefore classified as a semi-presidential state.

Tanzania shows many resemblances with Namibia and consequently meets all requirements of a semi-presidential form of government. The president is the undisputed leader of the executive branch and the position of the prime minister is clearly subordinate to the president (e.g. articles 52(3); 53(1)). The president also has strong veto powers (art. 97) and can dissolve parliament, although this action automatically results in the termination of his own term of office (art. 38, 90). Finally, Senegal fits in nicely among the African semi-presidential systems with a strong president. The prime minister is responsible both to parliament and the president (art. 53). The president has emergency powers (art. 52) and can also veto legislation and dissolve parliament (Moestrup 2011, 152).

Moving on, we can with no further consideration exclude from the group of semi-presidential systems countries which score zero in terms of presidential powers. Siaroff (2003, 299-302) notes that this is the case in Germany, Greece, Malta, and Vanuatu. We can also safely conclude that all countries which score the value one on the presidential powers index should be considered parliamentary and not semi-presidential. In this category, Austria, Iceland and Slovenia are exceptional in the sense that the president is elected by popular vote but scores zero on all of

Siaroff's (2003, 299-300) other dimensions. The other countries included in this category are Czech Republic, Dominica, Hungary, Israel, Latvia, and Trinidad & Tobago and in none of the aforementioned countries does the president dispose of explicit executive powers.

Nine countries, namely, Albania, Estonia, Finland, India, Ireland<sup>4</sup>, Italy, Mauritius, Moldova, and Slovakia receive the value two on Siaroff's index. These countries too, can safely be classified as parliamentary countries. In each of these countries the powers of the president are very limited in comparison with the powers of the prime minister and in all but one of the countries, Slovakia, the president is powerless with regard to the three explicit executive power dimensions. In Slovakia, the president chairs cabinet meetings but this in itself does not make the Slovakian system semi-presidential since, on the whole, "executive power remains in the hands of the prime minister and the cabinet" (Sedelius 2006, 90). To the list of parliamentary countries we can also add two countries that did not exist at the time of Siaroff's study and have presidents with very limited powers, namely Montenegro and Slovakia. In Elgie's (2011, 18) recalculation they both receive the value two on Siaroff's index. The Serbian president is elected by popular vote but in virtually all other aspects he is powerless (except for a weak power to veto legislation) and article 122 of the constitution explicitly grants executive powers to the government (which does not include the president). The powers of the president of Montenegro are very similar to the ones exercised by the Serbian president (e.g. art. 94, 96, 102 of Montenegro's constitution).

We are then left with Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Taiwan, and Turkey. In two of these countries, namely Romania and Taiwan, the powers of the president amount to five on Siaroff's (2003, 299-300) index. This figure is comparable to the powers of the presidents in Bolivia and the Federated States of Micronesia, which, as we have seen, were considered presidential in all other respects than with regard to the election of the president. We also note that in both Romania and Taiwan, the president has explicit executive powers. Adding to this, the historical cases of Finland (1919) and Weimar Germany, often referred to as the oldest examples of semi-presidential systems, scored five in terms of presidential power prerogatives (Siaroff 2003, 299). It is therefore reasonable to include Romania and Taiwan among the semi-presidential systems.

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<sup>4</sup> Siaroff (2003, 299) gives the value three to Ireland. However, the correct value is two, since the president of Ireland does not dispose of veto powers (Elgie 2011, 86, 96).

The rest of the countries score either three (Bulgaria, Poland, Portugal) or four (Croatia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, and Turkey<sup>5</sup>) on Siaroff's (2003, 299-302) index. If we start by taking a closer look at the first mentioned category we note that the powers of the presidents of Bulgaria and Poland are very similar indeed. In both of the countries the president is elected by popular vote. Furthermore, the presidents have some appointment- and veto powers. However, neither the Bulgarian nor the Polish president has any explicit executive powers and the countries should therefore be considered parliamentary, not semi-presidential.

Portugal, too, scores zero on all of these three crucial dimensions but is a far more complicated case. Article 182 of the Portuguese constitution states that "[t]he Government is the organ for the conduct of the general policy of the country and the superior organ of public administration." Article 183(1) then states that "[t]he Government comprises the Prime Minister, the Ministers, the Secretaries and the Under-Secretaries of State." The Portuguese president has veto powers but they are limited; he can only ask that the legislature reconsiders a statute or send laws for constitutional review (Jalali 2011, 168-89). The president also has the power to refuse referenda which have been proposed by members of the legislature or by the cabinet (Neto & Lobo 2009, 240). The most impressive prerogative at the disposal of the Portuguese president is nevertheless the power to dissolve the legislature and Portuguese presidents have done so on four occasions since 1982 (Jalali 2011, 167). The power of dissolution constitutes a strong weapon with regard to the government, since a dissolved legislature means that the government must resign. Thus, by threatening to dissolve the legislature a president can have strong influence over the government's decision and the history of Portugal does indeed show that the power of dissolution is not only a dead letter in the constitution (Jalali 2011, 166-68).

The Portuguese president also disposes of another, more direct, executive prerogative. According to art. 195(2) of the constitution, "[t]he President of the Republic may, after consulting the council of State, dismiss the Government when it is necessary to safeguard the proper functioning of the democratic institutions". Shugart and Carey (1992, 153) point out that "... presidents need not to be very creative to find a 'threat' to democracy when they dislike the policies of some ministry..." but they also note that "such a move in times of no obvious threat to

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<sup>5</sup> Turkey currently receives the value 3, but a constitutional amendment adopted in 2007 stipulates that future presidents of Turkey shall be elected by popular vote, thus raising Turkey's value to four.

the country could be subject to judicial review and may entail political costs" (Shugart & Carey 1992, 153).

Indirectly, or under special circumstances, then, Portuguese presidents can dispose of quite far-reaching executive prerogatives. On the other hand, under 'normal' circumstances the Portuguese president does not have any explicit executive powers and, therefore it would be wrong to conclude that executive powers are shared between the president and the prime minister. All in all, there are arguments that support the classification of Portugal as both a semi-presidential and a parliamentary state. I therefore see no other alternative than to refer Portugal to a gray area between semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism (for a more thorough discussion on Portugal and semi-presidentialism, see Neto & Lobo 2009).

We are left with Croatia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia and Turkey, all of which score four on Siaroff's scale. In all of these countries the president is elected by popular vote and possesses appointment powers. Furthermore, in all of the countries, the president is in possession of explicit executive powers; the presidents of Lithuania, Macedonia, and Mongolia are in charge with the foreign policy whereas the presidents of Croatia and Turkey have agenda setting power since they have the power to chair cabinet meetings. All the countries can therefore be regarded as semi-presidential.

## Conclusion

Based on the exercise conducted above, we reach the conclusion that there are currently fifteen or sixteen semi-presidential countries in the world (listed in Table 1). A closer look at these countries reveals a number of interesting patterns. A first observation is that semi-presidentialism tends to be geographically concentrated to Eastern Europe and Africa south of the Sahara. Furthermore, semi-presidentialism is popular in newly established democracies; in fact, France is the only existing semi-presidential country with an uninterrupted democratic record exceeding forty years. The strong prevalence of semi-presidentialism in Eastern Europe has been explained by the communist heritage. In the Eastern European countries, power resided with the Secretary General of the communist party but there was also a government led by a prime minister who, in theory at least, was responsible to parliament. When democracy was introduced it was therefore natural to adopt a constitution which, on the one hand, hailed the principle of (real) parliamentarism

and, on the other hand, allowed for a clearly identifiable political leader (Wu 2011, 26-27).

Table 1. Semi-presidential countries in the world by geographic region

<b>Africa</b>	<b>Americas</b>	<b>Asia</b>	<b>Europe</b>
Cape Verde Mali Namibia São Tomé and Príncipe Senegal Tanzania	Peru	Mongolia Taiwan Turkey	Croatia France Lithuania Macedonia (Portugal) Romania

It is also evident that diffusion plays a very important role in explaining semi-presidentialism. The Portuguese model explains why its former colonies Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe have chosen semi-presidential forms of government. Indeed, semi-presidential systems have at some point been introduced in all of the former Portuguese colonies except Brazil (Neto & Lobo 2010, 1). In a similar vein, the French prototype has spread to France's ex-colonies Mali and Senegal, but also to other francophone countries which currently do not meet the requirements of democracy applied in this study (Wu 2011, 22-24).

A final remark has to do with the definition of semi-presidentialism applied in the context of the present study. My definition differed from many other conventional definitions of semi-presidentialism in the respect that I did not consider the popular election of the president to be a defining characteristic of semi-presidentialism. As it turned out, however, disregarding this criterion did not alter the result of the study since my list of semi-presidential countries does not include any country with a president elected by the legislature. In other words, in countries where the president is elected by the legislature, executive powers reside with the prime minister, not the president.

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## MAKING SENSE OF HYBRID REGIMES

*Sten Berglund*

Comparative politics still largely revolves around principles of classification and typologies. This is yet another contribution to this discourse. Generally speaking, this paper is about the difficult art of classifying political regimes. More specifically, it focuses on the concept of hybrid regimes (Wigell 2008; Boogards 2009; Ekman 2009).

A hybrid regime is currently seen as a cross-over, a mixture between democratic and authoritarian regimes. It is in a sense a product of the transition paradigm and the realisation that all countries that embark on the bumpy road towards democracy do not necessarily end up as consolidated democracies. Many of them get locked in transition and find themselves stuck somewhere between democracy and authoritarianism; and some presumably get stuck in this fuzzy state of affairs long enough to constitute a stable regime type (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Morlino 2009). The Soviet successor states count a number of countries, including Russia, which might qualify as hybrid regimes (McFaul 2002). Somewhat paradoxically though, hybrid regimes are frequently also seen as inherently more unstable than other regime types. Their Janus-faced character makes them prone to change – prone to slide back into authoritarianism or to take yet another leap towards democracy. Explicitly defining Putin's Russia as a hybrid regime in 2001, Lilia Shevtsova argues:

"In sum, Russia has a hybrid regime, founded on the principle of weakly structured government and relying on both personalistic leadership and democratic legitimation. This combination of incompatible principles enables the regime to develop simultaneously in various directions: toward oligarchy, toward authoritarianism, and toward democracy as well. Yet such a regime can hardly be consolidated; its contradictory tendencies are a sure recipe for instability" (Shevtsova 2001, 67).

As noted by Diamond (2002), this type of semi-democratic/semi-authoritarian regime is by no means new. Historical examples include Singapore, Malaysia, South Africa and Mexico, and a number of countries in Latin America (Schmitter 1994; Karl 1995). The interwar (1919–1939) multi-party electoral regimes of Central and

Eastern Europe would also seem to fit into this picture (Schöpflin 1993).

The real breakthrough for the concept of hybrid regimes was in 2002 when the *Journal of Democracy* published a topical issue on elections without democracy, including Diamond's often cited piece 'Thinking About Hybrid Regimes'. The same issue included Levitsky and Way's 'The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism', thus suggesting another buzzword. Still, the label hybrid regime – meaning competitive or electoral authoritarianism – seems to have stuck, as it is short, simple and snappy. In recent years, we have seen work on hybrid regimes in Southeast Asia (Case 2005; Alexander 2008; Wang 2009), in the Middle East (Ryan & Schwedler 2004), in the Caucasus (Wheatley & Zürcher 2008), and in Africa and South America (Ekman 2009). In 2006–2007, the *Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy* included the 'hybrid regime' into its classification of regimes in the world. Furthermore, we have seen more general attempts to map out hybrid regimes in the world (Wigell 2008; Boogards 2009; Ekman 2009). As for monographs, Schedler's edited volume on *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* and the book by Levitsky and Way on *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* are among the best currently on the market (Schedler 2006; Levitsky & Way 2010).

There are as yet only rather few works that explicitly address the issue of stability. In particular, there is a lack of actual empirical assessments of the stability and performance of hybrid regimes. One notable exception is Morlino's recent article where he makes the point that surprisingly many hybrid regimes have shown a great potential when it comes to persistence of the 'hybrid' political order (Morlino 2009). Analysing continuity and change among hybrid regimes during the time period 1989–2007, he found no less than 26 regimes that he classified as 'stable hybrid regimes', i.e. regimes that had been 'partially free' for 15 years or more, and nine cases of 'less persisting hybrid regimes' where the regime had survived for more than ten years without any change of regime. Among the 35 hybrid regimes identified, only ten made transitions; to democracy (7) or authoritarianism (3). Thus, although recent studies show that hybrid regimes that employ more or less competitive elections are more likely to make transitions than other regimes (Howard & Roessler 2006; Hadenius & Teorell 2007; Roessler & Howard 2009), it should be clear that hybrid regimes are by no means necessarily transitional regimes. As noted by Merkel, hybrid regimes, or 'defective democracies' as he labels them, are able to form stable links to their environment and are often accepted by elites and people in general as working solutions to the manifold problems that are present in post-authoritarian societies (Merkel 2004; Hale 2005).

The questions about hybrid regimes raised here are fundamental. Is the concept helpful? Or does it merely add to our confusion? Or as Morlino (2009) puts it: Are there hybrid regimes? Or are they just an optical illusion? The stability or transient character of hybrid regimes is clearly a crucial topic in this context. But so is the ideological heritage of a hybrid regime. It is by definition partly democratic and partly authoritarian. These are also our reference points. Most hybrid regimes have their roots in authoritarianism and this is where we begin our journey. We then proceed to democracy and its characteristics, as a prelude to an analysis of hybrid regimes in a post-communist setting.

### Authoritarian Rule

The most frequently cited definition of authoritarianism is that of Juan Linz (1964) in an article on Spain under Franco. Spain was at the time clearly a non-democratic regime but fundamentally different from Soviet- or Nazi-style totalitarianism on four key dimensions – pluralism, ideology, leadership and mobilisation. Linz defines authoritarian regimes as

"political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones" (Linz 1964, 297; Linz & Stepan 1996, 38).

In a totalitarian regime, however, political pluralism is anathema to the ruling elite and the government does what it can to combat it. Ideology plays a prominent role and provides a platform for mass mobilisation and political recruitment. Totalitarian rule is subject to few, if any, constitutional constraints; it is open to sudden twists and turns and has more than a touch of unpredictability to it.

Authoritarian regimes come in many shapes and forms. Here we find the pre-democratic constitutional monarchies of Northern Europe; traditional kingdoms like contemporary Saudi-Arabia, a number of military dictatorships in Europe, Asia and Latin America, and several instances of strongman rule, past and present, worldwide. Here we also find countries gradually sliding out of totalitarianism such as Poland and Hungary in the late 1980s; and it may be noted

that Linz describes the authoritarian regime as a halfway house or 'hybrid' between democracy and totalitarianism (Linz 1964, 336-37). It derives its legitimacy from tradition and charismatic leadership and it remains safe as long as political pluralism does not carry over into democratisation.

The notion of popular sovereignty and its companion general elections thus constitute a threat to authoritarian regimes. Yet, in this day and age, few non-democratic regimes can afford to carry on without even the semblance of popular support. Elections have therefore become a permanent fixture in most non-democratic regimes. But non-democratic states generally hold non-democratic elections with little or no competition. The Soviet Union – a one-party totalitarian state – held regular elections to its parliamentary body, the Supreme Soviet, but these elections were not contested. Some of Russia's Cold War allies in Eastern Europe had more parties than one, but this formal political pluralism was not combined with rivalry between the political parties. The non-socialist parties invariably formed an electoral alliance with the leading Marxist-Leninist party; and the final distribution of seats was determined in negotiations well ahead of the elections. Polish sociologist Jerzy Wiatr (1964) describes this kind of arrangement as a hegemonic party system. Along with one-party systems, it operates in an environment without political opposition and without competition (Wiatr 1964, 284).

Elections in authoritarian regimes are by no means free and fair. Authoritarian regimes frequently constrain the opposition in various ways. Some parties and candidates may be barred from running. The flow of information to the voters may be heavily tilted in favour of the party or group of parties in power; and the electoral process may be tampered with. But there is genuine and not just formal pluralism and the political opposition matters. The ruling party or group of parties sets out to win the elections using all their comparative advantages, including the right to impose self-serving changes of the rules of the game; and the opposition therefore fights an uphill battle. But the opposition could theoretically win and the widespread belief that the election was 'stolen' may be enough to destabilise an already fragile equilibrium and initiate a process of democratisation.

Political pluralism is a challenge to authoritarian rule; but competitive pluralism is potentially destructive. The communist regime in Poland gradually broke out of the totalitarian mould, accepted political pluralism and opened up for partially free elections in June 1989. Anticipating that they would not carry a majority, the communists reserved 65 per cent of the seats in the *Sejm* for themselves and their longstanding allies. When it turned out that the opposition

took all the contested seats in the *Sejm* and all but one of the seats in the Senate, the position of the communist party became untenable.<sup>1</sup> Having been rejected by the people, the communist party could no longer lay claim to the ‘leading role’ ascribed to the ‘vanguard of the proletariat’ by Marxist–Leninist theory (Grzybowski 1994, 57–58).

## Democratic Rule

There are many definitions of democratic rule, but in the final analysis they revolve around the notion of free and fair elections. Robert Dahl (1971) reserves the term democracy for the unachievable utopian form of government where the preferences of all citizens are taken into account and carry the same weight, and coins the term *polyarchy* for really existing democratic regimes such as the United States and its European allies after the Second World War. They all have at least seven common denominators:

- Elected officials
- Free and fair elections
- Inclusive suffrage
- Rights to run for office
- Freedom of expression
- Alternative sources of information
- Associational autonomy

The first four of the seven polyarchy criteria are directly related to elections and the electoral process. The political leaders of a polyarchy should be elected in free and fair elections; and the right to vote and to run for office should be extended to all citizens who fulfil the eligibility criteria. The last three points revolve around civil rights and freedoms – the freedom of expression, the freedom of the press, and the freedom of assembly and association. At least one point is missing from this largely inductive set of democracy criteria – namely the rule of law without which civil rights and freedoms cannot be upheld. It is presumably implicitly implied, and the basic problem is not that the list is too short. It is rather too long. The various

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<sup>1</sup> It may be noted that the communists did not win the remaining Senate seat. It went to an independent candidate campaigning on a liberal platform (Grzybowski 1994).

items on Dahl's list overlap to such an extent that polyarchy could be defined as free and fair election with all which that entails.

Operating within the transition paradigm, Linz and Stepan offer an even shorter and snappier definition of full, complete or consolidated democracy. This stage of development materialises, when democracy has become the 'only game in town' (Linz & Stepan 1996, 5). This seemingly flippant definition of democracy gets substance from the explicit proviso that the rules of the game must be accepted on the behavioural, attitudinal as well as the constitutional level. Behaviourally, a democratic regime is consolidated when no significant actors try to achieve their objectives by creating a non-democratic state, resorting to violence or calling for foreign intervention. Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and where support for anti-system alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces. Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and non-governmental forces alike become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflicts within specific laws, procedures and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process (Linz & Stepan 1996, 6).

The definition gets additional substance – and complexity – from the introduction of the five reinforcing and partially overlapping institutions or arenas needed to back up a consolidated democracy (Linz & Stepan 1996, 6):

- Civil society
- Autonomous political society
- Rule of law
- Effective state bureaucracy
- Institutionalised economic society

The notion of a free and lively civil society as a prerequisite of democracy has been part of the discourse ever since Alexis de Tocqueville published his report on *Democracy in America* in 1835. But the relationship between civil society and democracy is actually quite complex; and it would clearly be naive to attribute only positive qualities to civil society actors. Some of the many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) making up a civil society may be 'uncivil' as well as 'undemocratic'. Yet, few would dispute the importance of a free and lively civil society for democracy. The political society is closely intertwined with the civil



society. Here we find political civil society organisations also known as political parties playing the ‘only game in town’. The rule of law is cast as a guarantee for civil rights and freedoms; and the state bureaucracy and the institutionalisation of economic life are portrayed as pre-conditions for effective governance.

Linz and Stepan provide a definition of a democratic regime that revolves around the same core as the definition implied by Dahl’s polyarchy criteria. When democracy has become the ‘only game in town’, we also have free and fair elections with all which that entails. But the definition they offer is broader. They apply a developmental perspective; they build popular support into their definition of a democratic regime; and they pay tribute to the complex web of factors that somehow makes democracy work. But they do not quite do justice to the full complexity. Wolfgang Merkel’s concept of embedded democracy, its dimensions and partial regimes, takes us a bit further (see Table 1).

Table 1. Merkel’s criteria of embedded democracy

1. Dimensions of vertical legitimacy	2. Dimensions of liberal constitutionalism and rule of law	3. Dimension of effective agenda control
<p><b>A. Electoral regime</b></p> <p>(1) Elected officials</p> <p>(2) Inclusive suffrage</p> <p>(3) Right to candidacy</p> <p>(4) Correctly organised, free and fair elections</p>	<p><b>C. Civil rights</b></p> <p>(7) Individual liberties from violations of own rights by state/private agents</p> <p>(8) Equality before the law</p>	<p><b>E. Effective power to rule</b></p> <p>(10) Elected officials with the effective right to rule</p>
<p><b>B. Political rights</b></p> <p>(5) Press freedom</p> <p>(6) Freedom of association</p>	<p><b>D. Horizontal accountability</b></p> <p>(9) Horizontal separation of powers</p>	

*Source:* Merkel (2004, 42)

The first dimension is that of vertical legitimacy and includes two partial regimes – the electoral (A) and political rights regimes (B); the second dimension revolves around liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law and counts two partial regimes – civil rights (C) and horizontal accountability (D); the third dimension draws attention to agenda control and includes one partial regime – effective power to rule (E). The five partial regimes are specified in terms of distinct criteria. The electoral regime (A) is thus defined in terms of four criteria – elected officials, inclusive suffrage, right to candidacy and correctly organised, free and fair elections; the political rights regime (B) in terms of freedom of the press and freedom of association; and the civil rights regime (C) in terms of individual liberties and equality before the law.

Dahl focuses almost exclusively on vertical legitimacy (A and B). Linz and Stepan explicitly add the rule of law as a guarantee for civil rights and freedoms and cover at least the first three partial regimes (A–C). Merkel adds horizontal accountability (D) and effective power to rule (E) as prerequisites of embedded democracy. The former is yet another derivative of constitutionalism and the rule of law and serves as a warning against the abuse of power (see Table 1); the latter is part of the dimension of effective agenda control and serves as a warning against reserved domains, state capture and other external constraints on a democratically elected government.

The inclusion of these two partial regimes (D–E) is an important contribution to the understanding of democratic regimes, but horizontal legitimacy and support for the political community are conspicuously missing (cf. Rustow 1970). It may be argued that support for the political community is primarily of relevance for state and nation building, and not for democracy. But democracy is a form of governance of a state, and it is therefore not immaterial how the citizens of the state relate to it:

[T]he inexistence of a state or such an intense lack of identification with the state that large groups of individuals in the territory want to join a different state or create an independent state raises fundamental and often unsolvable problems (Linz & Stepan 1996, 7).

States with such ‘stateness’ problems run the risk of ending up as ‘ethnic democracies’ furthering the interests of the dominant ethnic group at the expense of ethnic minorities (Smooha & Järve 2005) – a kind of ‘defective’ democracy not foreseen by Merkel. The model, furthermore, conveys the spurious impression that all partial regimes carry the same weight, but this clearly is not the case. A country can default on horizontal accountability or agenda control without ceasing to be a

democracy. But the same country would definitely cease to be a democracy if it cannot offer its citizens ‘correctly organised, free and fair elections’ any more. The electoral regime (A) and its correlates (B–C) are therefore of primary importance.

## Hybrid Regimes

Hybrid regimes are in a way a by-product of the worldwide democracy rankings now readily available on the Internet. Countries that do not qualify as democracies or as outright autocracies are simply lumped together as hybrid regimes of sorts. For some countries this is likely to be a temporary state of affairs; for others it might look like a final destination.


Morlino’s approach to the study of hybrid regimes is global; our approach is somewhat narrower. Drawing on Linde and Ekman (2011), we will focus on post-communist regimes with their legacies of Soviet and Russian domination. The operationalisation of political regimes is straightforward and relies on secondary data provided by the *Freedom House* ratings of civil liberties and political rights. Freedom House rates countries on a scale from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free) on both dimensions. The two scores are added and divided by two in order to come up with a mean rating including both civil liberties and political rights for each country and year. Countries with a score between 1 and 2 are classified as ‘democracies’. Countries with scores from 2.5 to 5 are labelled ‘hybrid regimes’ and countries with scores of 5.5 or higher are referred to as ‘autocratic’. This operationalisation corresponds well with one of the most cited theoretical definitions of hybrid regimes, provided by Levitsky and Way (2010, 5–6). According to Levitsky and Way, competitive authoritarian regimes (which is the label they use) are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents. Competition is thus real but unfair (Levitsky and Way 2010, 7).

Hybrid regimes have competitive elections, but the abuse of state resources by incumbents violates at least one of three defining attributes of democracy: free and fair elections, respect for civil liberties and political rights, and a level political playing field (Levitsky & Way 2010, 7). These attributes also constitute the

foundation of the ‘political rights’ and ‘civil liberties’ ratings by Freedom House.

Included in the Linde/Ekman study are all political regimes in 29 post-communist countries. It covers the sixteen-year period from 1992 through 2007. The unit of analysis is the type of political regime in any given country and year. The total number of cases is 460. Thus, applying the classification described above – democracies, hybrid regimes, and autocracies – the authors end up with 460 instances of post-communist regimes (country-years).

Figure 1. Post-communist regimes (1992–2008)



Source: Linde & Ekman 2011

Figure 1 illustrates the development of post-communist regimes over time. As we can see, most countries embarked on their post-communist journey as hybrid regimes. Due to the relatively rapid democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe, the number of hybrid regimes decreased substantially during the 1990s. By the beginning of the new millennium, the democracies outnumbered the hybrid regimes as well as the autocracies in the region, but together the two latter outnumbered the democracies. This pattern has since stabilised, but there is tendency for the hybrid regimes to take in on the democratic regimes towards the end of the period under investigation.

Democracy suffered a setback in 2004–2005 accompanied by a short upward surge within the authoritarian camp, but both curves went back to normal shortly thereafter. Though democracy has made impressive inroads into the region, it is by no means unchallenged. Autocracy seems to have lost momentum, but the hybrid regime type remains a serious alternative.

Figure 1 depicts the situation on the aggregated level. What about regime trajectories in single countries? Although not displayed in Figure 1, it may be noted that only the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia have been democracies throughout the whole period. Six countries – Armenia, Albania, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova and Ukraine – have an unbroken record as hybrid regimes, while the Central Asian republics of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan remain autocracies throughout the entire period.

Taking a closer look at the time-series data, we see that regime transitions have taken place 21 times in 15 countries between 1992 and 2008. These instances of regime change are presented below (Table 2). The most common direction of regime change is democratisation of a hybrid regime (ten times in eight countries). Six out of ten transitions to democracy took place in the 1990s. The first decade of the 2000s saw only four instances of transition from hybrid regime to democracy, and two of these happened in 2000–2001.

It should be kept in mind that Table 2 depicts the situation from 1992 and onwards. The successful democratisation processes in Central Europe in 1989–1991 are thus not included in the table. All the same, it would seem that democratisation of post-communist regimes, even after 1991, has been a regional phenomenon. Transitions from a hybrid to a democratic regime are found in the Baltic Sea region and in the Balkans, two corners of Europe with close ties to the West and the European Union. Using a more generous cut-off than Linde and Ekman (2011), Freedom House proclaimed Ukraine ‘free’ in the aftermath of its Orange Revolution in 2004. Ukraine defended its freedom score of 2.5 until 2010 and was frequently held out as an example of successful democratisation within the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (Hale 2010). In this setting, Ukraine was indeed an outlier. But the process of democratisation was challenged from the very beginning, and was definitely halted in 2010. Freedom House has since rated Ukraine as ‘partly free’. In the final analysis, none of the so-called coloured revolutions – the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 – did fundamentally change the post-Soviet record of authoritarianism.

Table 2. Instances of post-communist regime changes (1992–2008)

Change H to D	Change H to A	Change A to H	Change D to H
Bulgaria 1992-93	Azerbaijan 1992-93	Bosnia 1995-96	Bulgaria 1995-96
Lithuania 1992-93	Kazakhstan 1993-94	Azerbaijan 1996-97	Romania 2003-04
Estonia 1994-95	Belarus 1995-96	Serbia-Mont. 1998-99	
Latvia 1994-95	Azerbaijan 1999-2000	Kyrgyzstan 2004-05	
Romania 1996-97	Kyrgyzstan 1999-2000		
Slovakia 1997-98	Russia 2003-04		
Croatia 2000-01			
Bulgaria 2000-01			
Romania 2004-05			

*Key:* A – autocracy; D – democracy; H – hybrid regime

*Source:* Linde & Ekman 2011.

The second column of Table 2 lends substance to the notion that hybrid regimes should not be seen as transitional regimes heading towards democracy. In the period covered by the study we have seen regime changes from a hybrid regime to autocracy six times (in five countries). Here a regional pattern is also present, since all regime changes to authoritarianism have taken place in former Soviet republics, and most frequently during the 1990s. There has been in total six instances of regime change *to* hybrid regimes; in four cases in the form of a liberalisation of autocratic regimes and in two cases in the form of a transition from democracy to hybrid regimes.

At first glance, post-communist hybrid regimes thus seem to be relatively unstable political entities. But for six of the 29 post-communist states in the Linde/Ekman study the hybrid regime type was a quasi-permanent option. Ukraine, Armenia, Albania, Georgia, Macedonia, and Moldova remain hybrid regimes from 1992 through 2007 (Linde & Ekman 2011). Morlino takes the Freedom House ratings at face value and does not include Ukraine in his investigation of stable hybrid regimes, but the five latter are part of his global sample of 35 more or less persisting hybrid regimes. He classifies Albania, Georgia, Macedonia, and Moldova as ‘quasi- democracies’ because of their low scores across three empirically defined

dimensions or components.<sup>2</sup> The first dimension revolves around Dahl's polyarchy criteria and Merkel's first two partial regimes (A and B); the second dimension is defined by items tapping the rule of law, and the third dimension is defined by one single item (state functioning) reminiscent of Merkel's last partial regime E (see Table 1). All in all, 15 of the 35 more or less stable hybrid regimes in Morlino's study are defined as 'quasi democracies'. Armenia is to be found in a group of ten, mostly African, countries weak on the second and third dimensions labelled 'democracies without state'. A geographically heterogeneous group of ten countries weak on the first dimension, described as 'limited democracies' completes the typology.

### The Difficult Art of Classifying Regimes

The Morlino study ends in 2007 and the Linde Ekman study the following year. In Table 3 we have summarised the most recent country rankings provided by Freedom House to give a snapshot of the situation today in post-communist Eurasia. Using the same cut-offs as Linde and Ekman, we can identify twelve democracies; seven clear-cut autocracies, and a group of ten countries in the grey zone between democracy and autocracy. Among the democracies we find the ten EU enlargement countries of 2004–2007 and neighbouring Croatia and Serbia. More than two thirds of them qualify for democracy with a strong Freedom House score of 1, indicated within parenthesis in the table; the remaining five democracies qualify with a weaker Freedom House rating of 2. Most of them are recent or very recent (Serbia in 2011) arrivals to democracy; but with scores between 1 and 2, Latvia has been a stable democracy since 1995 (cf. Table 3).

The seven autocracies listed in the third column of the table also break down into two distinct sub-groups – hardcore autocracies such as Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan versus a somewhat softer kind of authoritarianism in countries such as Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. The three former have political regimes close to or on a par with that of North Korea, one of the most repressive political regimes ever and a straight 7 in the Freedom House ratings from 1972 and onwards. With freedom scores of 5.5, the four latter may be

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<sup>2</sup> Morlino's factor analysis is not based on the frequently cited ratings by Freedom House, but on the regime relevant indicators underlying the global freedom ratings, including the rule of law, the electoral process, the functioning of the government, political pluralism and participation, freedom of expression and beliefs, freedom of association and organisation, personal autonomy and individual freedom (Morlino 2009, 290).

seen as bordering on the hybrid regimes. Azerbaijan crossed this border thrice between 1992 and 2000 (see Table 2), and may cross it again. Others might follow suit, including Russia with its relatively recent past as ‘partly free’.

Table 3. Democracies, hybrid regimes and autocracies in Eastern Europe, 2011

Democracies (Scores: 1-2)	Hybrid regimes (Scores: 2.5–5)	Autocracies (Scores: 5.5–7)
Bulgaria (2)	Albania (3)	Azerbaijan (5.5)
Croatia (2)	Armenia (5)	Belarus (6.5)
Czech Republic (1)	Bosnia Herzegovina (3.5)	Kazakhstan (5.5)
Estonia (1)	Georgia (3.5)	Russia (5.5)
Hungary (1)	Kosovo (4.5)	Tajikistan (5.5)
Latvia (2)	Kyrgyzstan (5)	Turkmenistan (7)
Lithuania (1)	Macedonia (3)	Uzbekistan (7)
Poland (1)	Moldova (3)	
Romania (2)	Montenegro (2.5)	
Serbia (2)	Ukraine (3)	
Slovakia (1)		
Slovenia (1)		

*Notes:* The classification in Table 3 is based on Freedom House ratings of the countries of the world on a seven-point scale running from strongly democratic (1) to strongly autocratic (7) with cut-offs between regime types as defined by Linde and Ekman (2011). Country scores are reported within parenthesis.

*Source:* Freedom House (2011), *Freedom in the World*.

No less than ten of the 29 post-communist countries turn up as hybrid regimes in 2011. This is also a heterogeneous group but less so than the authoritarian regimes. Seven out of ten countries in this group have scores hovering around 3, including Montenegro with a score of 2.5 and Bosnia and Georgia both scoring 3.5. In this setting, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kosovo with scores in the range of 4.5–5 are the deviant cases, perhaps suggesting that it might be advisable to count countries scoring 5 as autocracies and change the cut-off between hybrid and autocratic regimes accordingly. Or better still, maybe we should consider returning to the simple typology used by Juan Linz in his seminal contribution on authoritarianism of 1964? Countries with political regimes close to or even on a par with that of North Korea he would have dismissed as totalitarian. Other non-democratic regimes (with freedom scores between 2.5 and 5.5) he would have lumped together



as ‘authoritarian’ – a ‘hybrid’ between democracy and totalitarianism with two alternative exit options.

### Concluding Remarks

The Freedom House democracy ratings are often criticised for being minimalist and drawing too heavily on Dahl’s definition of democracy. It only covers the first two, possibly the first three, of the five partial regimes included in Merkel’s definition of full, complete, consolidated or embedded democracy (see Table 1); and it is likely to include a number of regimes that do not qualify as consolidated democracies. But this is hardly a major problem, if the objective is to separate democratic from non-democratic regimes. Besides, as noted above, we do not think that Merkel’s model of embedded democracy is exhaustive.

So what about the hybrid regimes? It is obviously a handy label for countries in the grey zone between democratic and non-democratic regimes; many scholars use it; and it has no doubt come here to stay. The term is usually reserved for authoritarian regimes experimenting with pluralism and genuine political competition. This is a relatively recent form of authoritarianism, presumably more prone to change than the traditional kind. But as we have seen, some hybrid regimes have a record of stability on a par with that of many of new democracies.

Even so, there is something profoundly disturbing about the use of the concept. Hybrid regimes are not democracies; they are non-democratic or authoritarian regimes. Yet, they almost invariably result in the identification of new democracies with adjectives (cf. Collier & Levitsky 1997). Morlino’s classification of 35 hybrid or non-democratic regimes as quasi-democracies, limited democracies and democracies without states is a case in point. The ten countries listed as limited democracies qualify for this distinction by scoring low on the very essence of democracy, i.e. on a dimension basically tapping Dahl’s polyarchy criteria; and democracies without states would seem to be a contradiction in terms.

Levitsky and Way (2002; 2010) and Schedler (2006) are therefore on the right track, when approaching hybrid regimes from the authoritarian side of the fence and referring to them as cases of competitive or electoral authoritarianism. This approach also highlights the potentially destructive force of competitive pluralism in an authoritarian setting (Linz 1964).

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## SECESSION – THE WAY FROM OR TOWARD DEMOCRACY?

*Thomas Denk*

## Introduction

Democratization of political regimes and state fragmentation resulting in more independent states are two major developments on global level.<sup>1</sup> According to an international database (Democracy and Dictatorship), there were 70 internationally recognized states in the year 1946. Almost 60 years later (2008), the number of internationally recognized states had increased to 192 states. During the same period, the number of democracies also increased, from 34 to 118 democratic states. Related to the number of states, the share of democratic states increased from 48.6% to 61.8%. As illustrated by Figure 1, there is a strong correlation between the number of states and the number of democracies since 1946. The relationship between the number of states and the number of democracies is not linear. Instead, the relation is better expressed as a quadratic pattern (the degree of determination ( $R^2$ ) = 0.946).<sup>2</sup>

As also shown in Figure 1, the developments of more states and democratic regimes were accelerated in the 1990s. New states were created when Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia dissolved. Since 1990, most states have been created by secession, as a part (region) of a state has emancipated and established a new independent state. At the same time, democratic regimes have been established in both new and old states, and created a peak in the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991).

The connection between these two processes—state-formation through secession and democratization—has not received any extensive focus in political science. However, there has been some theoretical discussion on whether secession is caused by democratization or if democratization is favored by secession. The theoretical discussion has eventually been supported by cases, but not by a


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<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank Sarah Lehtinen (Åbo Akademi University) for valuable comments and discussions.

<sup>2</sup> The quadratic equation is  $\hat{Y}_i = 164.386 - 2.465x_i + 0.011x_i^2$ , which provides a degree of determination ( $R^2$ ) of 0.946.

systematic comparison. This chapter will therefore present the theoretical alternatives and test them empirically through a comparison of a set of cases.

Figure 1. Number of states and democracies since 1946



### Secession as Concept and Phenomena

Secession occurs when a new state is created whose territory and population previously was part of an existing state (Denk 2003; Pavković 2010; Wood 1981). For example, when Singapore was created as an independent state in 1965, its territory and population were previously part of the Federation of Malaysia. Secession is a specific form of state formation, which is distinctive from other forms of state formation. When two existing states are united into one new state, it is not a case of secession, but state integration. In modern times, few states are created by state integration. Two exceptions are Germany and Yemen, which were created by the unification of two previous states. However, from a historical perspective, state integration has been an important process in the creation of states (Rokkan 1999; Tilly 1990).

Secession is also different from another form of state building, which has been prominent during recent centuries: decolonization. During the 19th century,

several of the present states on the American continent were created by decolonization: Paraguay (1815), Argentina (1816), Chile (1818), Colombia (1819), Mexico (1821), Brazil (1822), Peru (1824), Bolivia (1825), Uruguay (1828), Educator (1830), Venezuela (1830), Costa Rica (1838), Honduras (1838), Nicaragua (1838), Guatemala (1839), El Salvador (1841), the Dominican Republic (1844), and Canada (1865). Later, in the 20th century, colonies in mostly Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean were decolonized and became independent states. Since the end of the Second World War, 95 new states—73% of all new states—were created by decolonization. As colonies, these states were highly dependent and ruled by a colonial power. However, they were not an integrated part of the colonial state, which secession states are in the host states. This is an essential difference between states created through secession and states created through decolonization (Denk 2003; Pavković 2010). For example, when Pakistan was recognized as an independent state in 1946, it was a case of decolonization from Great Britain. However, when Pakistan was divided in 1972, which created Bangladesh as a new state, it was a case of secession (Pavković 2010; Sisson & Rose 1990).

Before the 1990s, secession was quite an unusual form of state formation. Of the 96 states created during the Cold War (1946–1989), almost all received their independence through decolonization. Only seven states were created without decolonization: East Germany, Israel, Malta, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, and West Germany. After the Cold War, the situation has been reversed. Most new states created since 1990 have not been colonies at the time of independence. Instead they have been previous regions within existing states. The main question for this chapter is *whether secession is a cause or effect of democratization*. There are at least four different answers to this question, which are presented in the next sections.

## Democracy as Cause of Secession

In their classic article ‘On the Number and Size of Nations’, Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore (1997) formulate a hypothesis based on rational theory about the relationship between democracy and secession: the number of states in the non-democratic world are expected to be fewer than in the democratic world. This implies a positive relationship between democracy and secession. The probability for secession is higher in democratic states than in non-democratic states. According to Alesina and Spolaore, the number of states is based on a complex tradeoff between the benefits of large political units and the costs of heterogeneity

in large populations. When the benefits of large units (e.g., large markets, possibilities to distribute the cost of collective goods, high tax revenues, and cost of uninsurable shocks) is below the costs of population heterogeneity (e.g., cost of coordination, problems satisfying different groups, and costs of conflicts), democratic institutions provide opportunities for majorities in regions to express their demand for their own state through referenda or elections, which affects decisions on the future of the host state. In non-democratic states, the regional majorities lack these opportunities, as the ruling elite discriminates or suppresses any opposition toward the political regime or the host state as a political community.

Alesina and Spolaore's article has been regarded as an important contribution to discussions on economic conditions and state formation.<sup>3</sup> Before Alesina and Spolaore, only a few economists had developed theoretical models of state formation. However, there are exceptions. For example, the connections between taxation and state formation have been discussed. According to Friedman (1977) states are formed by political elites in order to maximize potential tax revenues in relation to the net of collection costs. Later, Buchanan and Faith (1987) argued that the option of secession restricts the tax burden that a majority can impose on a minority. From another perspective, studies have claimed that economic integration promotes political integration, which decreases the probability of secession (Casella 1992; Casella & Feinstein 1990; Wei 1992a; Wei 1992b). Economic studies have also presented arguments for why secession occurs, even if the cost of secession is high. According to a model presented by Bolton and Roland (1997), a majority might support a demand for secession in a regional referendum if the median voter expects that the benefits from an expected change in redistribution after the secession more than compensate for the costs of secession. The major contribution from Alesina and Spolaore was to integrate the importance of political regimes with axioms based on rational theory to explain the occurrence of secession. From their theoretical discussions, the hypothesis is that *cases of secession are expected to a greater extent to come from previous parts of democratic states than non-democratic states.*

An opposite hypothesis is developed by Stéphane Dion (1996). It claims that secession is more unlikely in democratic states than in non-democratic states. This hypothesis is based on the assumptions that fear of the current state and the confidence of future secession affect the probability of secession. Additionally,

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<sup>3</sup> One indicator of this is that the article is one of the most quoted articles about secession and state building, according to the *Social Sciences Citation Index*.



Dion assumes that these two conditions are unlikely to exist simultaneously at a high level of intensity in democratic states. In democratic states regional groups are not predicted to expect that their situation will deteriorate within the existing state (dimension of fear) and at the same time expect that the group can perform better within its own state (dimension of confidence). It means that also this hypothesis is based on the assumption that actors calculate costs (fear) and benefits (confidence) before making decisions that affect the occurrences of secession.

According to Dion, the probability of secession can be calculated if the two dimensions are combined. As illustrated in Table 1, secession is expected to be impossible when fear and confidence are low. Additionally, secession is possible, but unlikely, if fear is high but confidence is low. The same outcome is expected when the fear is low and confidence is high. However, secession is likely to occur if the group fears for its future inside the current state and has strong confidence that its own state will benefit its population. Dion assumes that these conditions are most unlikely to be present in democratic states. Most importantly, minority groups are not assumed feel fear about their future in democratic states, as the democratic institutions provide freedom and rights to individuals as well as to groups. The freedom and rights provided by democratic institutions concern three aspects of nationalism that are used to motivate demands for secession: cultural autonomy, economic well-being, and political inclusion. For example, minority groups may seek secession if they believe that they will be culturally assimilated, economically discriminated against, or political marginalize in the present state, while their own state would provide cultural autonomy, economic welfare, and political independence. This discussion leads to the hypothesis that *cases of secession are only as exceptions expected to be previous part of democratic states.*

Table 1. Conditions affecting the likelihood of secession

	<i>Confidence inspired by secession</i>	
<i>Fear inspired by union</i>	Low	High
High	Secession unlikely	Secession likely
Low	Secession impossible	Secession unlikely

Even if they formulate empirical hypotheses, neither Alesina and Spolaore nor Dion presents empirical tests of the hypotheses. Alesina and Spolaore present

deductive arguments for their hypotheses, but no empirical arguments. Dion is less formal, but derives also hypotheses from theoretical assumptions. Certainly, Dion applies the framework on the case of Quebec. However, Quebec is not a case of secession, but an attempt at secession. Additionally, Dion does not explicitly test the hypotheses. Instead, Dion uses the framework to explain why Quebec is a non-case of secession. Therefore, in this chapter the two hypotheses will be empirical tested. If the first hypothesis is correct, the cases of secession will have previously been part of democratic states. Alternatively, if the second hypothesis is correct, the cases of secession will have previously been a part of non-democratic states. To test the two hypotheses, the backgrounds of a set of secession states need to be investigated. The empirical analysis in this chapter will investigate the background of all states created by secession during the period 1989–2010.

### Secession as a Cause of Democracy

An alternative to regarding democracy as a condition for secession is to claim the opposite, that secession is a cause of democracy. The idea that secession increases the probability of democracy is presented in a number of theoretical discussions (Buchanan 1998; Moore 1998; 2001; Wellman 2005). According to these discussions, secession and democracy have the same basic principle: self-determination. Secession is motivated by arguments that people have the right to self-determination within a territory that is part of an existing state. At the same time, democracy is a mode of government that is based on the self-determination of *demos* (people). If democracy is popular sovereignty (government by the people), secession is regarded as the effort of various people to govern themselves. As both processes are based on the same principle, it creates an expectation that secession and democratization are connected. If a secession movement legitimizes their demand for an independent state that allows for self-determination and succeeds in creating a new state, the political regimes in the new state are expected to be based on self-determination (democracy) (Copp 1997; 1998; Philpott 1995; 1998). In sum, *the hypothesis is that new states created by secession are expected to establish democratic regimes.*

The alternative hypothesis is not that secession increases the probability of a non-democratic regime. Instead, the alternative hypothesis claims that secession has no impact on which type of regime is established at the time for independence. Studies on new states have concluded that new states establish different kinds of political regime when they receive their independence. For example, Rost and

Booth (2008) conclude that new states tend to establish different kinds of political regimes. Their study indicates also that new states are less democratic than established states. Additionally, Rost and Booth claim that political regimes in new states are affected by factors other than the fact that they have received independence. For example, economic welfare, religious majority, conflicts, and political background (e.g., a former colony or Soviet state) impact the political regimes in new states. However, Rost and Booth (2008) investigate new states without consideration of whether the new states were created by secession or other state-formation processes.


In his seminal discussion on conditions for democratic systems (polyarchy), Robert Dahl (1971) mentions the process of inauguration as an important condition. According to Dahl, stable democratic systems are more likely the outcome of slow evolutionary processes than revolutionary overthrows. This implies that the reception of independence is not a determinant of democratization. Instead, the path toward independence is more significant. Additionally, Dahl has claimed that it is essential for democratic systems that the state is not dominated by foreign states. Independent states are more or less dependent on other states, but if the dependence is developed into domination or subordination the conditions that favor a democratic regime are critically weakened. The capacity of self-government is lost. According to this argument, to receive recognition as an independent state is not sufficient. The road toward independence and the degree of independence are more critical for democratic regimes in new states. In sum, *the hypothesis is that secession has no impact on the political regime in new states.*

## Framework and Research Design

When the four hypotheses that are presented in the previous sections are integrated, two causal relationships are of concern. The first relationship is between political regimes in host states and secession. The question is whether a democratic regime in the host state increases the probability of secession. The second relationship is between secession and a democratic regime in the new state. The question is whether secession increases the probability of a democratic regime in the new state. These two relationships are illustrated in Figure 2. As illustrated in this figure, there is a time dimension that structures the two factors in relation to secession. As a consequence, the relationships may not exclude each other. It is possible that democratic regimes increase the probability for secession and that

secession increase the probability for democratic regime in the new states. The time-dimension also invites for analyses of the relationship between the political regime in host-states and new states. Is the political regime in new states a heritage from the host-state?

Figure 2. Democratic regimes and secession: Two relationships



In this study, the two relationships in Figure 1 are comparatively investigated. To examine the relationships and empirically test the four hypotheses, this chapter investigates if the host states had democratic or non-democratic regimes at the time of secession and if the new states inaugurated democratic or non-democratic regimes. These two dimensions are studied in 26 cases of secession that occurred during the period 1989–2010. Information about the dimensions and cases are collected from international databases, such as *Democracy & Dictatorship* and *Polity IV*, but also from studies on secession and democratization in new states.

### Empirical Analysis

Most of the cases were created as independent states after the dissolution of Soviet Union: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Additionally, states have also been created after the Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro (1992), and Slovenia. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia resulted in two new states (Czech Republic and Slovakia). In sum, most of the cases of secession in this study have been created after the dissolution of three previous communist federations. Only four cases—East Timor, Eritrea, Montenegro, and Serbia—were created in other settings. This implies that there is a high degree of interdependence between the

cases, which reduces the extension and generality of the analyses (Franzese & Hays 2008; Wellhofer 1989).

As presented in Table 2, most cases of secessions have backgrounds in non-democratic states. There are only four cases that were created from states that were regarded as democratic at the time of secession: Czech Republic, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovakia. These states were created by bilateral secession, which divided one state into two new states. The majority of the states (85%) have non-democratic backgrounds, which means that the host state was considered non-democratic at the time of secession. There is one case—East Timor—that has a special background. The host state (Indonesian) was regarded as democratic at the time of secession. However, the process of secession was conducted in the context of conflict and oppression (Denk 2003; Gurr 1993; Martin 2001; Rolls 2003). The background for East Timor is therefore categorized as non-democratic. In sum, the empirical overview provides arguments for the conclusion that secession is most frequent in states with non-democratic regimes. Secession from democratic states is unusual.

Table 2 also presents which kind of political regime was established in the new states at the time of independence. The classification of the political regimes is built on materials from the *Polity IV* dataset. Democratic states were regarded by the database as democratic or fully democratic at the time of independence. All other states are classified as non-democratic. This classification is also supported by materials from the database *Democracy and Dictatorship*. As presented in Table 2, half of the new states established democratic regimes at the time of independence. The other half of states established non-democratic regimes. This provides empirical arguments for the conclusion that secession has no significant impact on the probability of democratic regimes in the new states.

On top of the conclusions about secession and political regimes, there is a pattern between the two factors in the basic model. There is relatively strong correlation between the regime background for secession and political regime in new states.<sup>4</sup> If the background is non-democratic, the new state tends to establish a non-democratic regime. Additionally, if the background is democratic, the state tends to establish a democratic regime. This connection between regime background and political regime in new states is rarely noticed in discussions about political regimes in new states (Denk 2010; Rost & Booth 2008). Instead, most studies on political regimes in new states have focused on conditions after

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<sup>4</sup> Expressed with a statistical coefficient, the correlation is indicated by tau-b = 0.426, which is a significant correlation (approximate t-value=0.033).

independence, not on conditions beforehand. As indicated by the simple analysis of the cases presented in Table 2, there are reasons to include conditions before independence in the analysis of political regimes in new states.

Table 2. Regime background in host state and political regimes in secession states

<i>Political regime when independent</i>	<i>Regime background in host-state</i>		<i>Total</i>
	Non-democratic background	Democratic background	
Democratic regime	Armenia Belarus East Timor Estonia Georgia Latvia Lithuania Macedonia Slovenia  (n=9)	Czech Republic Montenegro Serbia Slovakia  (n=4)	n = 13 (50%)
Non-democratic regime	Azerbaijan Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia Eritrea Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Moldova Russian Federation Serbia and Montenegro Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan  (n=13)		n = 13 (50%)
<i>Total</i>	n = 22 (85%)	n = 4 (15%)	n = 26

Another interesting pattern is that no new state with a democratic background has established a non-democratic regime. In Table 2, the cell combining democratic background with non-democratic regime is empty. However, there are actually too few cases with democratic backgrounds to conclude that democratic backgrounds before independence imply democratic regimes in new states. There is a tendency toward a pattern, but we need more cases and especially cases that are not interdependent with historical backgrounds, as the cases with democratic backgrounds are derived from two bilateral secessions.

## Conclusion

Is secession the road from democracy or toward democracy? Secession occurs in different contexts. Both democratic and non-democratic systems have been divided by secessions. However, the overwhelming majority of secessions have occurred in non-democratic systems, which provides empirical support for the hypothesis formulated by Dion (1996). This hypothesis is also supported by the fact that no secessions have taken place in consolidated democratic systems. Additionally, in line with results claimed by previous studies (Denk 2010; Rost & Booth 2008), new states established different kinds of political regimes. For some new states, secession may be regarded as part of their democratization, but for just as many other states secession is not part of democratization. This provides empirical support for the hypotheses formulated by previous studies (e.g., Dahl 1971, Denk 2010, Rost & Booth 2008): independence is not a sufficient condition for democratization. In conclusion, secession can scarcely be regarded as the way from or toward democracy.

Even if secession is not necessarily synchronized with democratization, the connection between the increasing number of states and democracy may be explained by the recent wave of secession. Since 1990, three previous communist federations have been replaced with 22 new states, which increased the number of states. Approximate half of these states established democratic regimes when they received their independence, which increased the number of democracies. At the same time, existing states have been democratized, which means that the third wave of democratization has been a mix of democratization in old and new states.

The connection between political regimes in host states and secession states, which was indicated by Table 2, may specify a path-dependence that is worth paying more attention to. A question for future research is to investigate what

kinds of path-dependence processes are indicated. According to theories on path-dependence, there are at least three alternatives: a) self-reproduction of political institutions, b) lock-in capture, and c) institutional layering (Mahoney & Villegas 2007; Pierson 2004). Political structures may survive secessions and be reproduced in the new states, but political structures in host states may also be important constraints on the institutional options in secession states. Additionally, political institutions may have the capacity for transformation, which can bring institutions in line with changed conditions (e.g., secession). Another question for future research to investigate is under which conditions secession states tend to emancipate from previous structures in host states. In some cases, the secession state establishes another kind of political regime than what existed in the host state. What conditions favor this liberation is quite unknown. In sum, there are reasons for future studies to return to questions about the connection between secession and democratization.

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### ***Main Data Source***

*Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited* available at  
[https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/cheibub/www/DD\\_page.html](https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/cheibub/www/DD_page.html)  
*Polity IV Project* available at  
<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>

## PUBLIC OR PRIVATE? GLOBAL NETWORKS AND PARTNERSHIP

*Christer Jönsson*

The distinction between a public and a private sphere is essential to politics. The public sphere is commonly associated with the state, whereas the private sphere encompasses markets and civil society. Political power and state sovereignty rest on “a set of institutionalized authority claims” (Thomson 1994, 14). The sovereign state’s authority claims over its population imparts it with ‘meta-political’ authority (Thomson 1995, 214). That is, the governing bodies of states claim to have, and are recognized as having, the authority to define what is public – and thus political – and what is private – and thus beyond political authority. The range of activities over which political bodies can legitimately exercise authority may vary over time and between states. For instance, the authority claims of modern welfare states are far more extensive than those of medieval or nineteenth-century states, as formerly ‘private’ aspects of people’s lives have become included in the public realm.

The public-private distinction can be seen as one of the ‘grand dichotomies’ of Western thought, subsuming a wide range of other distinctions shaping our understanding and organization of social life. Rather than essential and categorically separable, the terms of this formative distinction are relational, and their interpretation has varied over time. The establishment of a distinction between a public and a private sphere is the result of a prolonged and often conflictual historical process (Bexell & Mörth 2010b, 11). For example, warfare and diplomacy – which we today unquestionably include in the public sphere – were ‘marketized and internationalized’ well into the nineteenth century. For several centuries, mercenaries were the foundation of European military power. For instance, less than 10 percent of Gustavus Adolphus’s army was Swedish in 1632. Until the early nineteenth century diplomacy was an aristocratic pursuit, and diplomats had a sense of belonging to a single ‘cosmopolitan fraternity’ or ‘aristocratic international’ (cf. Anderson 1993, 21; Hamilton & Langhorne 1995, 104). Diplomats could easily change from one monarchic employer to another.

Simplified understandings of the distinction between public and private neglect the range of variable interpretations and alternative implications of these concepts. And in today’s globalized world the borderline between the public and the private sphere is becoming increasingly diffuse. Domestically as well as internationally, private actors become politicized and public actors become

marketized – “the public goes private and the private goes public” (Bexell & Mörth 2010a, 218). In this essay, I shall focus on new global governance arrangements involving public as well as private actors.

The past quarter of a century has witnessed a ‘transnational turn’ in global governance, a gradual transformation in the dominant mode of political organization at the international level, from interstate cooperation, negotiated and managed by national governments, to more complex forms of cooperation, involving transnational civil society and business actors. Increasingly, states and international institutions are engaging NGOs (non-governmental organizations), foundations and corporations as policy experts, service providers, compliance watchdogs, and stakeholder representatives (cf. Tallberg & Jönsson 2010). Whereas the term ‘multilateralism’ is traditionally associated with interstate relations, today it involves more actors than states. Different labels have been suggested to capture these new realities: ‘multiple multilateralisms’ (Weiss et al. 2009, 204), ‘new multilateralism’ (Schechter 1999), ‘complex multilateralism’ (O’Brien et al. 2000), ‘polylateralism’ (Wiseman 1999), and ‘plurilateralism’ (Czerny 1993). In the end, the concept of global governance has become the favored umbrella term of both social scientists and policy-makers for denoting these complex patterns of authority in world politics, involving a variety of actors and networks along with states and international institutions (Rosenau & Czempiel 1992; Held & McGrew 2002).

Two different modes of organizing this complex multilateralism will be discussed in the following: networks and public-private partnerships. Whereas networks represent informal, loose and temporarily limited arrangements, partnerships tend to be more formal, firm and permanent structures. Both bring together representatives of public and private spheres.

## Networks

Networks are commonly understood as “loosely linked collectives of organizations and individuals that hold common values, exchange information about shared interests, and engage in a common discourse about critical issues” (Batliwala & Brown 2006, 7). Networks represent a mode of organization that is characterized as *informal*, *non-hierarchical* and *non-territorial*. As such, networks have been discussed by organization theorists focusing on interorganizational relations since the 1960s (cf. Aldrich & Whetten 1981). More recently, Manuel Castells (1996) has characterized the contemporary reconfiguration of social and political space on the macro level as

‘the rise of the network society’. His conception draws attention to the fact that many of society’s major functions are increasingly organized as networks. “Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power and culture” (Castells 1996, 469).

Political scientists have long studied ‘policy networks’ in Western democracies. These studies have focused on the informal patterns of contacts and structures that link segments of the state – ministries and public agencies – with various interest organizations within the same sector. More recently transnational, issue-based networks have caught the attention of researchers.

Networks constitute informal constellations without official status. The nodes are typically individual representatives of organizations, and a crucial feature of these networks is that interorganizational relations are strengthened by interpersonal links. Informal networks often emerge in the shadow of, and tend to be useful complements to, formal structures. The European Union is a case in point. Encouraged by the Treaty of Rome, informal transnational links have been triggered by the extraordinarily complex and cumbersome formal organizational apparatus of the EU. Moreover, the Commission is known to frequently pursue a deliberate networking strategy, actively encouraging informal sectoral links and empowering, or building coalitions with, transnational and subnational groups. The European Union has thus been labelled a ‘hothouse’ for networks (Peterson 1995, 69), and thousands of special interest groups have set up offices in Brussels, making the number of lobbyists in the city roughly equal to the number of Commission officials. Students of the European Union claim that informal EU networks allow for wide and flexible participation, reduce frictions and produce results that the formal system would not be able to achieve (Middlemas 1995, xvi; cf. Elgström & Jönsson 2005).

Similarly, the UN has given rise to informal networks, albeit less apparent. UN observers speak of a ‘third UN’, comprising NGOs, academics, consultants, experts independent commissions, and other groups of individuals who routinely engage with the first and the second UN (member states and the Secretariat, respectively). Networking is facilitated by the fact that many individuals move between UN appointments, jobs within their home governments and positions in the private sector, universities and NGOs (cf. Weiss et al. 2009).

Networks tend to be issue-specific, linking actors who have a special interest in, and possess policy-relevant resources (such as expertise) concerning, a certain political sector or issue. In technically complex issue-areas, such as civil

aviation, nuclear energy and finance, transnational networks typically play a significant role in the shadow of formal international organizations. Sometimes transnational networks are formed around one specific issue. The campaign for improving access to HIV/AIDS drugs in the late 1990s is an example of emerging network links in an extended global process that eventually resulted in policy change. Beginning in 1996, Health Action International (HAI) developed a campaign against the effects of the 1994 TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement on limiting access to patented medicines. This campaign was supported by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Oxfam and several other NGOs. The access campaign involved, first, inducing pharmaceutical companies to lower the price of patented medicine; second, promoting the production and sale of generic drugs entering the market in 2000. Having mobilized support from key international organizations, such as the World Bank, UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and WHO (World Health Organization), the campaign eventually succeeded in making HIV/AIDS drugs more available and affordable in poor countries (cf. Sell & Prakash 2004).

Some networks display a high degree of commonality, consistency of values and permanence. In issue-areas that require interaction between politics and science ‘epistemic communities’ often emerge. These are networks of ‘professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas 1992, 3). Climate change, with the influential network built around the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), is a case in point.

Whereas most formal organizations are based on vertical, hierarchical authority, networks represent a more horizontal, ‘flat’, non-hierarchical mode of organization. They rely on *interactive governance* (Kooiman 2005, 5). To be sure, the degree of hierarchy or non-hierarchy may vary in networks, but basically they rest on loose links between interdependent actors. In sum, organization in networks combines structure with flexibility. Networks represent more than fleeting encounters, but less than permanent institutions.

What, then, are the potential advantages of organizing in networks? Whereas formal channels tend to be ineffective when information is sensitive or politically charged, informal channels facilitate the free flow of information. Problems of representation are inescapable facts of formal structures that inevitably limit the number of organizations represented, while informal coordination among multiple independent, partly overlapping organizations provide more points of access to the decision-making process. Informality engenders mutual trust, which

makes it possible for one agent to make the first move with reasonable expectations of being repaid in the future (cf. Chisholm 1989). Informal networks, in short, often prove to be useful complements to formal structures.

## Public-Private Partnerships

The proliferation in recent decades of partnerships spanning the public-private divide in such areas as human rights, public health, environmental protection and development is another manifestation of increasing fragmentation of political authority in the global arena. Partnerships are cooperative initiatives that expand the political authority of non-state actors, whether for-profit businesses or non-profit foundations and civil society organizations. While relatively new in the international setting, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have longer historical roots in the domestic context (cf. Bexell & Mörth, 2010b, 6-7). PPPs combine resources from various sectors of society toward common, collective goals, thus drawing on a rationale that relates to resource dependency theory (Peters & Pierre 2010, 42-43). Collaboration in partnerships is commonly regarded to represent win-win situations; it can further both public and private interests.

While differing in degree of institutionalization, PPPs represent more formalized cooperation than networks. They have varying geographical scope and time frames, and operate in a wide range of issue-areas. This means that it is difficult to provide a precise definition of PPPs. Existing attempts at defining PPPs in the international arena usually include the following characteristics: (1) they are voluntary cooperative arrangements, (2) engaging actors from two or more societal spheres (state, market and civil society), (3) who share a common goal; (4) they are based on sheared resources and responsibilities, (5) make decisions through a non-hierarchical process, and (6) address a public policy issue (cf. Bexell & Mörth 2010b, 6-7). Within the United Nations system, for example, a PPP is understood as

"...a voluntary and collaborative agreement between one or more parts of the United Nations system and non-State actors, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies and benefits" (Nelson 2002, 46).

The 1990s and early 2000s witnessed an unprecedented willingness among international organizations to enter into PPPs. They were perceived as instrumental in renewing the UN system and contributing to the achievement of ambitious goals (Bull & McNeill 2010, 103). The urge to enter into collaborative arrangements with the business community represented a marked break with earlier UN history. The UN Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) was inaugurated in 1974, at a time when giant transnational corporations (TNCs) were seen as a threat to state authority. It was organized as a permanent intergovernmental forum to keep check on TNC activity, especially in the developing world. Two decades later, TNCs were seen as partners rather than threats. The first important step in that direction was taken at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, when Maurice Strong, in his capacity as the conference's Secretary-General, invited the newly formed World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) to write the recommendations on industry and sustainable development, replacing recommendations provided earlier by the UNCTC (Bull & McNeill 2010, 109-110).

This new trend was reinforced at various subsequent summits. Soon after assuming office in 1997, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan spoke to the World Economic Forum in Davos about "a new universal understanding that market forces are essential for sustainable development" (Bull & McNeill 2010, 108). In a series of speeches in the following years he repeatedly emphasized that the challenges faced by the UN could not be tackled without close cooperation with the private sector. Ted Turner's historic one billion dollar gift to the UN in 1998 was another important stepping-stone in the push for partnerships. Leading to the establishment of the United Nations Foundation (UNF), it also prompted the establishment of the UN Office for International Partnerships (UNFIP) (Bull & McNeill 2010, 109).

These initiatives had repercussions throughout the UN system. WHO, under the new Director General, Gro Harlem Brundtland, took an active part in organizing PPPs concentrating on specific targets. Within a few years around the turn of the millennium, some 70 'global health partnerships' were established. Philanthropic foundations often took the lead in the creation of partnerships, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation became a significant player, granting billions of dollars to prevent or eliminate diseases in poor countries (cf. Matlin 2006; Brown et al. 2006, 70; Bull & McNeill 2007, 76-77). Around the same time, the World Bank began to link PPPs to its broader approach to sustainable development and global health governance (Harman 2012, 77). The United Nations Environment



Programme (UNEP) is another example. In the late 1990s its new Executive Director, Klaus Töpfer, opened up UNEP for greater involvement of private actors with initiatives such as the Partnership for Clean Fuel and Vehicles (Bauer & Andresen 2010, 23).

The UN Millennium Declaration, adopted by the General Assembly in 2000 (resolution 55/2), included a pledge “to develop strong partnerships with the private sector and with civil society organizations in pursuit of development and poverty eradication”, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in September 2002 resulted in the launch of more than 200 partnerships. By then, partnership had become the new mantra in UN discourses on global governance (cf. Bäckstrand 2010, 145).

Why, then, have PPPs become so popular and prevalent in the international arena? No doubt, growing disillusionment with traditional international organizations, including the UN and its agencies, created fertile ground for new organizational forms. Partnerships to deal with specific and limited issues were seen as a way to surmount the overlapping mandates and interagency competition in the UN family. Furthermore, by engaging in partnerships with the private sector international organizations might regain authority and legitimacy in an increasingly market-oriented environment. Donors, who had imposed a policy of real zero growth in UN budgets, preferred voluntary and earmarked funding through PPPs. Some observers saw PPPs as a move away from the ‘big plans’ of traditional international agencies toward ‘visible piecemeal steps’ (Kickbusch 2005, 970).

The socioeconomic changes associated with globalization constitute another background factor. For private-sector actors, globalization provided incentives to enter into partnerships with international organizations. Whereas the rules of the game for the market economy were previously laid down by national governments, now they had to be applied globally to be effective. Governments, on the other hand, recognized that companies had become important providers of public goods and services, increasingly influencing rule-making and acting as standard setters. Business actors had become as dependent on political resources as political actors on corporate ones. Globalization thus urged states and international organizations as well as companies to mobilize all sorts of resources to remain competitive. The notion that partnerships based on mutual enlightened self-interest might remedy inequities produced by globalization processes and contribute to the fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals gained ground among public and private actors alike.

In short, PPPs can be seen as vehicles for collective action overcoming both political failures and market failures (cf. Peters & Pierre 2010, 44). For international organizations they solve problems of scarce resources and eroding legitimacy; for international business actors they identify and legitimize investments and pledges they would not venture to make without assurances from the public sector.

There were also important ideational factors contributing to the PPP trend around the turn of the millennium. The New Public Management (NPM) model of administrative reform, which had gained wide currency worldwide, blurred the borderline between public and private. It fundamentally changed the public sector into becoming more dependent on corporate ideas and resources. Market values and norms entered public governance, and the modified management discourse emphasized efficiency, competition and customer-tailored service delivery. The marketization of the public sphere opened up for corporate actors to gain inroads into, and influence in, sectors that traditionally had belonged to the state.

At the same time as the state and the public sphere came to focus more on efficiency and market management, private firms became increasingly aware of, and active in, human rights, environmental issues and other public policy fields. This implied paying more attention to other goals than profit maximization, focusing more on stakeholders than shareholders. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) became a new private management trend and emerged as a regulatory framework placing new demands on corporations. Business firms, especially those acting on a global scale, were being held accountable for an ever wider range of issues and came to play more political roles. Thus, CSR served to mobilize corporate actors to assist states and international organizations in efforts to attain the Millennium Goals (cf. Sahlin-Andersson 2006).

By pointing in the same direction of blurred borders between public and private, the NPM and CSR frameworks paved the way for PPPs as embodiments of intertwined and collaborating spheres. While becoming a popular buzzword, 'partnership' has proved to be a flexible concept. PPPs can take many different forms and serve varying functions. For instance, PPPs may deal with advocacy, research and development, rule-setting and policy implementation.

Advocacy partnerships are designed to draw attention to a policy problem more effectively by joining forces. One example is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), launched in 2002, comprising partners from governments, companies, industry groups, international organizations, investors and NGOs. Its awareness-raising campaigns target both extractive industries and

governments of host countries. By means of conferences, workshops and publications, EITI attempts to forge an agreement on a set of principles furthering transparency (Steets & Blattner 2010, 65). The Global AIDS Alliance is another example of an advocacy partnership, seeking to activate groups that have not been engaged in HIV/AIDS but work on related issues. Its partners include a broad array of civil society actors, including faith-based organizations and humanitarian and relief agencies (Jönsson 2010, 175).

In the field of global public health several research and development partnerships have been formed. For example, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), founded in 1996, is 'a global not-for-profit, public-private partnership working to accelerate the development of a vaccine to prevent HIV infection and AIDS' ([www.iavi.org](http://www.iavi.org)). It engages in research, policy analysis, partnering with developing countries and advocacy. Policy advocacy partners include WHO and UNAIDS as well as the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS; and scientific collaborators include British, Indian, and South African Medical Research Councils as well as the US National Institutes of Health. Yet another PPP has been established in the same area. The Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise is an alliance of researchers, funders and advocates committed to accelerating the development of an HIV vaccine. Based on an initiative from researchers in 2003, the Enterprise is modelled in part on the Human Genome project, the alliance of scientific organizations that successfully mapped the human genetic code ([www.hivvaccineenterprise.org](http://www.hivvaccineenterprise.org)).

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a prominent example of a PPP engaged in rule-setting and regulation. By regulating the technical elements of the Internet's domain name system, it preserves the operational stability of the system. ICANN engages governments, international organizations, businesses and individuals as partners. As for implementation PPPs, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has positioned itself as a nodal point in the management of global partnerships for service delivery.

The UN Global Compact and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria are two prominent examples of global PPPs. Dissimilar in many respects, they epitomize the potentials as well as the problems associated with partnerships. The Global Compact is a UN-based partnership with businesses in key roles; the Global Fund is an implementation PPP outside the UN family funding public health projects in developing countries.

## The UN Global Compact

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched the idea of a Global Compact at the World Economic Forum in Davos in February 1999 as a frame of reference to stimulate best practices among TNCs and to facilitate convergence around universally shared values. The idea received broad support, and the UN Global Compact was established half a year later directly under the Secretary-General. By becoming members, businesses commit themselves to aligning their operations and strategies with ten principles in the areas of human rights, labor standards, environmental protection and anti-corruption. The Global Compact is at the center of an evolving soft regulatory framework based on the notion of Corporate Social Responsibility. It is voluntary, has no legal sanctions against those who fail to comply, and is formulated in such general terms as to provide considerable leeway in interpretation.

Today over 8,700 businesses and other stakeholders from over 130 countries participate in the Global Compact. Its governance framework is loose and non-bureaucratic. The twenty-member Global Compact Board is comprised of four constituency groups — business, civil society, labor and the UN. Meeting annually, the Board is supported by a small Global Compact Office headed by an Executive Director. The Global Compact Leaders Summit is a triennial gathering of the top executives of all Global Compact participants and other stakeholders (the next one will be held in 2013). Local networks are the backbone of the PPP, playing important roles in rooting the Global Compact within different national, cultural and linguistic contexts, and in helping to manage the organizational consequences of rapid expansion. At the annual Local Networks Forum they can share experiences, review and compare progress, identify best practices, and adopt recommendations ([www.unglobalcompact.org](http://www.unglobalcompact.org)).

The main architects behind the initiative, John Ruggie and Georg Kell, saw the Global Compact as an effort to restore social legitimacy to global markets (Bull & McNeill 2010, 109). Critics argue that it is without teeth and represents an effort by large businesses to forestall legal regulation rather than safeguarding responsible business behaviour (Bexell & Mörth 2010b, 14). The Global Compact is then seen as contributing to development discourses and practices that shield neoliberalism and allow business interests to define how market expansion can coincide with poverty reduction (cf. Gregoratti 2010). From a UN perspective, the Global Compact can be viewed as a way to restore legitimacy to a weakened multilateral system (cf. Bull & McNeill 2007). At any rate, the Global Compact is a highly

visible PPP, has grown rapidly, and remains the largest voluntary corporate responsibility initiative in the world.

### The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis

In June 2001 the UN General Assembly held a special session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS), the first time such a session had been convened to discuss a health issue. UNGASS concluded with a commitment to set up a global trust fund, as suggested by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at an African summit on HIV/AIDS in Abuja, Nigeria, in April 2001. While the idea originated with the economist Jeffrey Sachs and WHO civil servants, Annan “used his high-profile position to campaign for its creation and to solicit initial donations” (Patterson 2007, 216). At their summit in Genoa in July, all G8 heads of state affirmed their support for the global fund and expressed their determination to make it operational as soon as possible. Malaria and tuberculosis were added to the mandate of the grant-making organization as a result of pressure from the EU (Bull & McNeill 2007, 79).

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was established in January 2002 as a grant-making organization with its secretariat in Geneva. It functions in a similar way as research councils or foundations in the academic realm, insofar as proposals are subjected to peer review, grants are awarded to a fraction of the applicants for a limited period of time, and renewed grants are contingent on documented performance. At the insistence of some G8 countries, especially the US and Japan, it was to stand apart from and operate outside the UN system that was considered inefficient and bureaucratic (Bartsch 2007, 149; Lisk 2008, 149). In formal terms, the Global Fund is an independent foundation registered under Swiss law. Yet it enjoys unique status as an international legal personality with privileges and immunities similar to those granted to IGOs. The World Bank serves as its trustee, responsible for the collection, investment and management of funds, disbursement of funds to recipient countries and programs, and financial reporting (Panos 2003, 31).

The hybrid character of the Fund is reflected in the composition of its board. It consists of five types of constituencies: donor states, recipient states, civil society, private sector, and bilateral/multilateral agencies. These are sorted into two voting groups – a donor group and a recipient group – as well as one non-voting group. Eight representatives from industrialized states and two representatives

from the private sector (one company, one foundation) constitute the donor group. In the recipient group are seven representatives from developing states and three civil society representatives (one north, one south, one affected communities). The non-voting group consists of three IGO representatives from WHO, UNAIDS and the World Bank, as well as a Swiss member. Whereas government seats in the donor group are allocated on the basis of pledges to the Fund, the selection of other members is left to their respective regionally defined constituencies. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is a major contributor to, and has a seat on the board of, the Global Fund.

Initially associations of affected communities belonged to the non-voting group, but eventually succeeded in their quest for voting status. To restore the balance between the two voting groups, the number of donor state seats then increased from seven to eight, thereby reducing the relative weight of developing states. The power imbalance is underlined by the fact that the two most important committees preparing board meetings, the Policy and Strategy Committee and the Finance and Audit Committee, are chaired by donor group representatives. The board normally operates by consensus; if this fails, a double majority, in absolute terms and within each voting group, is required (Bartsch 2007, 152). In addition to board meetings, the Global Fund convenes a biennial Partnership Forum, which includes a broader group of diverse stakeholders. The Fund's secretariat is relatively small, counting less than 300 regular staff, with no presence in the countries where it operates (Lisk 2010, 99).

As a global PPP, the Fund strives to encourage similar consensus-building and dialogues between civil society, the private sector and government representatives in applicant countries. To apply for grants, a country must set up a Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM), composed of representatives from governments, NGOs, multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, and business (Patterson 2007, 215-16). The CCM is regarded as an essential structure of the Fund's architecture, designed to reflect its commitment to local ownership, recipient-driven strategies and broad participation (Panos 2003, 30; Lisk 2008, 149; Brown 2009, 172-74).

While taking different forms in recipient states, CCM structures have typically run into a number of problems. They tend to be government-dominated, with token civil society representation. Even when formal representation is given to civil society organizations, practical constraints often inhibit their full participation. The role of CCMs is well defined in the preparation of a proposal, but is more ambiguous in the implementation phase after a grant is given (Bartsch 2007, 156).

Because of limited resources and capacities, many CCMs seek outside assistance from international organizations, such as WHO, UNAIDS and the World Bank, in developing and writing proposals to the Fund (Panos 2003, 31; Bartsch & Kohlmorgen 2007, 132; Lisk 2010, 100), which tends to dilute notions of local initiative and ownership.

The 35-member Technical Review Panel (TRP), the health and development experts reviewing grant applications, is another important body that has been accused of Western bias. African experts may be underrepresented in proportion to the level of funding going to African states, but the Board tries to strike a balance of gender, regional representation and multisectoral experience in appointing TRP members. “Although the empirical facts do not seem to support the claim of TRP bias, what is interesting is that there are a large number of stakeholders who believe that political and cultural bias is involved in the evaluation process” (Barnes & Brown 2009, 9). One recent study indicates that the TRP experts act mainly as ‘gatekeepers’ determining whether an application is recommended for funding, whereas absolute and relative grant size is significantly affected by the preferences of the Fund’s six largest donor states (Theiner 2011).

## Networks and Partnerships: Problems and Prospects

How legitimate are networks and PPPs in a world where multilateralism has traditionally been equated with interstate cooperation? There are basically two ways of legitimizing networks and PPPs: in terms of either effectiveness or stakeholder democracy (cf. Bull & McNeill 2010). The first type of legitimacy claim rests on the assumptions that most global problems require coordinated action, that interstate cooperation is insufficient, and that networks or PPPs can achieve the needed coordination among a variety of relevant actors. The other legitimacy claim is that the inclusion of a broad range of stakeholders in networks and PPPs contributes to diminishing the ‘democratic deficit’, by making the governance of global issues more representative and accountable.

Whereas networks and PPPs, as we have seen, are most commonly rationalized in terms of effectiveness and performance, they raise fundamental questions concerning democratic values. In other words, they may enjoy ‘output legitimacy’ in the sense that they contribute to solving problems and achieving goals that most people consider important (governance *for* the people). The question is whether they also can attain ‘input legitimacy’ by means of democratic decision

processes (governance *by* the people) (cf. Scharpf 1999). Does the broadened participation beyond states in networks and PPPs represent a step in the direction of ‘stakeholder democracy’? Such central democratic values as representation, accountability and transparency become problematic in network or PPP governance.

The inclusion of civil society and private sector delegates in networks and PPPs raises the question of how representative these can be. In the absence of any inclusive NGO or business forum selecting representatives in global networks and partnerships, there seems to be no realistic alternative to co-optation processes of some kind. One problem in existing global networks and partnerships is that NGOs from the developed countries are overrepresented. While they often claim to speak on behalf of the voiceless and powerless without any explicit mandate, the limited participation by civil society and the private sector from the global South remains a major problem. Networks and partnerships tend to reproduce existing participatory inequalities in the world by being dominated by Northern stakeholders with strong political and economic resources. Representation, in short, constitutes a knotty problem, for which there is no immediate solution.

To whom are networks and partnerships accountable? Both the public and the private sector have well-established mechanisms of accountability. In the public sector, civil servants are accountable to governments which, in turn, are accountable to voters in democracies. In the private sector, management is accountable to shareholders. Internationally, accountability becomes less straightforward. IGOs are formally accountable to member states. But the question “accountable to whom?” has no unequivocal answer when applied to NGOs, networks or PPPs. Are they accountable to those who are affected by their action, as NGO partners typically argue, or to those entrusting them with power, as donor governments and other partners tend to propose? Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane (2005) refer to this differentiation as a ‘participation’ and ‘delegation’ model, respectively. While NGOs typically claim that their participation in networks and PPPs ensures that the voices of affected populations are heard and their needs reflected in global policies, they are often more accountable to donors than to affected communities. The limited accountability of NGOs themselves contributes to weak accountability and sanctions mechanisms of global networks and partnerships. In sum, “there is a gap between the transnational reconfiguration of the state, civil society, and the for-profit sector on the one hand, and the traditional democratic accountability, on the other” (Bexell & Mörth 2010a, 215).



Transparency is a precondition for accountability. Decision-making processes in networks, in particular, but also in many PPPs are often highly complex and/or informal and thus not open to public scrutiny. To be sure, some PPPs, such as the Global Fund, have fairly democratic decision processes and informational websites; but the blurring of the boundary between public and private has not contributed to increased transparency in general.

In summary, network and partnership processes in global governance demonstrate trade-offs between democratic and other values. While we may wish for strengthened democratic legitimacy, the justification of networks and PPPs will probably remain based on effectiveness and goal achievement. There seems to be a firm belief among policy-makers that these hybrid governance structures are good at delivering. This belief may result in an ‘expectations-capacities gap’ as expectations rise beyond the capacity to deliver (cf. Bexell & Mörth 2010a, 217). The issue-areas these alternatives to traditional multilateralism are set to address – such as sustainable development, global health and the environmental – are of such a magnitude that effective solutions are hardly in sight in the foreseeable future. Failure to deliver will no doubt affect the legitimacy of networks and partnerships.

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DETERMINANTS OF DICTATORSHIP:  
A COMPARISON OF ENDURING AND FORMER AUTOCRACIES

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Introduction

Much of our theoretical knowledge of dictatorship is derived from the literature on democratization and democracies. Factors that are conducive to democracy are assumed to be absent or at least weaker in non-democracies. Nevertheless, the most common explanation of the persistence of autocracies is that they have always been authoritarian. From a historical point of view, it may be a satisfactory explanation. However, if we take an interest in autocracies of the contemporary world, we should pay attention to which conditions maintain authoritarianism, how authoritarian rule may be brought to an end, and how a process of democratization may begin.

The purpose of the study is to examine the determinants of dictatorship, and, thereby, conditions that are conducive to democratization as well. Still, the chapter is not concerned with what makes a state democratic – there is already a plethora of literature on that matter. Focus is on the transition from compact autocratic rule to less authoritarian forms of government. To be sure, several of the former autocracies in the study are now liberal democracies, yet many of them have become some kind of hybrid regimes between authoritarianism and democracy. The aim is to determine which conditions make autocracies endure, and the conditions under which autocratic rule is likely not to survive. To this end, enduring autocracies are compared to former autocracies, and comparisons take place at the autocratic stage.

One of the most well-known and examined theories in political science concerns the relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy: countries with a high level of socioeconomic development tend to be democratic. The modernization theory constitutes therefore a natural point of departure for the empirical analysis. However, we know that there are exceptions to the rule: several affluent states are undemocratic, whereas many poor countries have a democratic form of government. In particular, there are several authoritarian states in the Middle East that are wealthy because of profuse oil resources. These countries are based on a rentier economy, which is expected to uphold authoritarianism. The

association between size and democracy was dealt with already in ancient Greece by Plato and Aristotle. They both argued that in small entities, citizens share a common base of interest and density, which is a prerequisite of a democratic form of government. Hence, the size of autocracies, and a specific physical characteristic, namely islandness, are included among the determinants.

There are different kinds of autocratic regimes. They vary, for instance, with regard to historical background, ideology and the degree of control of society. In addition to variations on 'how autocracies are ruled', autocratic regimes can be classified according to the question of 'who rules?' We may assume that particular kinds of dictatorships are more sustainable than others. The influence of religion on democracy and democratization has received much scholarly attention since Samuel P. Huntington, in *The Third Wave* (1991), concluded that religion has played a crucial role in the spread of democracy during the 'third wave of democratization'. In short, Islam is said to be incompatible with democracy, whereas Christianity, and Protestantism in particular, is said to be conducive to a democratic form of government. The beginning of the 'third wave of democratization' in 1974 up to the present constitutes the observed time period in this study.

## Democracy and Autocracy

Needless to say, there are numerous definitions of democracy. Joseph Schumpeter's formulation of democracy is one of the most frequently cited: the central procedure of democracy is the selection of leaders in competitive elections by the people that they govern (Schumpeter 1942). In Robert Dahl's terminology, systems that include these two dimensions – contestation and participation – are called polyarchies. These regimes are relatively but incompletely democratic. A responsive democracy presupposes at least eight institutional guarantees: freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to compete for support, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies dependent on votes and other expressions of trust (Dahl 1971, 3). In an ambitious study of democracy and development, Przeworski and his research team maintain that the standard way of thinking about democracy follows Dahl's perception (Przeworski et al. 2000, 33). In many respects, autocracy can be described as the opposite of democracy. If democracy implies extensive political, civil and human



rights, impartial judiciaries and state institutions, and free and fair elections, autocracy means that these elements are very weak or totally absent.

During the last few decades the world has witnessed a democratic triumph, and most of the research on political regimes has focused on democracies, causes of democratization, and democratic consolidation. Remarkably little systematic research has been conducted on the emergence and persistence of non-democratic regimes (Levitsky & Way 2002, 63). However, there are many reasons to systematically pay attention to autocratic regimes as well. One reason is that a continuing democratic advance cannot be taken for granted. In fact, the world has experienced waves of democratization as well as setbacks when communism, fascism, military dictatorships and other non-democratic forms of government have displaced democratic regimes. There may be new reverse waves of democratization, and therefore we have to be forewarned and forearmed by past experiences of how and why autocracies emerge. Another reason is that dictatorship is the most common form of government in a historical perspective. Autocracies have played an important role in the development of politics and government. Despite the strong democratic advance in recent times, a large part of the world is still under autocratic rule. Still another reason is that most of the theory-building in political science is based on experiences from and conditions in established Western democracies. We may say that political science suffers from a 'democratic wryness'. When conclusions on power, influence and political behavior are made, we often take for granted that the political system works according to democratic principles. Accordingly, politics in non-democracies become something different to what the established theories claim. Power is also exercised in autocracies, and in addition to being an interesting phenomenon in itself, the study of non-democracies offers a comparative perspective on democracy (Brooker 2000, 1-2; Karvonen 2008, 10-12).

There are different kinds of autocracies, and the extent to which the democratic elements mentioned above are absent varies. Autocracies also vary with respect to historical background, durability, ideology and organization. A common distinction is made between totalitarian and authoritarian states (Linz 2000); Stalin's communist regime and Hitler's Nazi regime are examples of the former (e.g. Arendt 1951), whereas Franco's dictatorship in Spain was a typical authoritarian regime (e.g. Linz 1970). However, definitions of authoritarianism have been accused of being too widely applicable, including many diverse cases (Brooker 2000, 21-22). Franz Neumann (1957, 235) introduced a typology with three categories – simple, caesaristic and totalitarian dictatorship – which is still a common basis of classification in the literature. A simple dictatorship is one where the leader controls

the traditional powers, i.e. the military, the police, the administration and the judiciary. Several military regimes in Latin America in the 1970s fall into the first category. In a caesaristic dictatorship, the leader needs to create popular mass mobilization, whereas a totalitarian regime controls all parts of society including citizens' private lives. In a reworking of Neumann's classic typology, Giovanni Sartori (1993) calls the intermediate category authoritarian.

Another kind of classification focuses on who holds absolute power. We may distinguish between autocracies governed by a monarch, sheik or sultan, autocracies led by a political party or a political movement, military dictatorships and theocracies. Many oil-producing countries in the Middle East represent the first type of autocracy. Party dictatorships were common during the Cold War; the foremost example today is China. As of the revolution in 1979, Iran has been a theocracy, the Ayatollah being the undisputed political leader. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, there were plenty of military dictatorships in Latin America and Africa, whereas Burma represents a typical military autocracy today. In the present study, all forms of non-democracies are called autocracies.

Some former autocracies have developed into democracies rather quickly (e.g. Mongolia), others have gone through a slow process of democratization (e.g. Mexico), whereas some have become durable semi-democracies or semi-autocracies (e.g. Paraguay). Earlier, the last mentioned ones were treated as transitional forms of democracy as it was expected that they were developing into democracies. At the turn of the millennium, however, it became evident that they should be regarded as a category of their own. "They inhabit the wide and foggy zone between liberal democracy and closed authoritarianism" (Schedler 2002, 37). There is a variety of labels for these hybrid regimes; Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (2002, 51-65) use the term 'competitive authoritarianism', the main features being a combination of democratic rules and authoritarian governance. The main purpose of holding elections is to legitimize the regime and to maintain a semblance of democracy. There may be constraints on the capacities of individuals to choose, on the range of choices, and on the degree to which elections determine who holds power (Markoff 1996, 104). Formal democratic institutions are seen as the principal means for the regime of obtaining and exercising political authority; elections are a means of regulating societal discontent and confining the opposition (Brownlee 2007, 8).

Two sets of non-democracies are compared: enduring and former autocracies.<sup>1</sup> The purpose is to explain why some states remain authoritarian,

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<sup>1</sup> For practical reasons, the term 'former autocracies' is used for countries that are about to begin a transition from authoritarian to less authoritarian forms of government. They are

whereas others leave the authoritarian stage and move toward higher levels of democracy. Focus is on the autocratic stage; i.e. we want to know in what respect autocracies that are soon about to begin a transition differ from those that are permanently authoritarian. In this regard, the study differs from studies of determinants of democracy. We are not interested in what makes a country democratic – rather, the critical questions are: (1) what are the determinants of dictatorship, and (2) what sets soon-to-be former autocracies apart from enduring autocracies?

### Selecting the Research Population

The observed time period is as of the beginning of the ‘third wave of democratization’ up to the present. The end of the dictatorship in Portugal in 1974 launched a wave of transitions to democracy around the world. The periodization of transitions to democracy originates from Samuel Huntington (1991, 16), according to whom the first wave of democratization lasted from 1828 to 1926 and the second wave occurred between 1943 and 1962. Both waves were followed by ‘reverse waves’ when several democracies reverted to autocratic rule. Huntington has described the dramatic growth of democracy during the third wave as “one of the most spectacular and important political changes in human history” (1997, 4). In 1973, according to Huntington’s estimate, there were 30 democratic regimes and 92 non-democratic regimes among countries with a population of more than one million. In 1990, the number of democracies had increased to 59, whereas 71 countries were under non-democratic rule (1991, 26). According to another estimate that includes all countries of the world, there were 40 democracies in 1975, 70 democracies in 1990, and 89 democracies in 2005 (Karvonen 2008, 78).

Freedom House has rated all countries in the world since 1972 along two dimensions: political rights and civil liberties. These two general sets of characteristics constitute the overall concept of freedom in the world. In addition to evaluating countries on a seven-grade scale for both dimensions, a three-grade classification is applied. Countries that are classified as ‘not free’ seriously and systematically violate human rights and liberties, and the people are effectively excluded from the political process, whereas the ‘partly free’ category represents

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certainly former autocracies by now (at the end of 2011), but observations are made during the last year of authoritarian rule. Oil-export is an exception to this rule, because data was only available for 2009-2011.

various forms of hybrid regimes between freedom and repression. Countries that are rated as 'free' are democratic (Freedom House). The Freedom House data is generally regarded as reliable among political scientists, and these ratings are applied here in identifying autocracies. Accordingly, countries that are classified as 'not free' are regarded as autocracies. The most recent ratings concern the situation in 2011.

However, we need some further criteria for establishing, first, when a country that is rated as 'not free' should be considered a permanent autocracy and, second, when a country that is no longer classified as 'not free' has really left the autocratic stage. To elucidate, in order to be considered a former or a stable autocracy, some durability is required. For instance, Guyana was classified as 'not free' for only one year – 1974 – and is not regarded as an autocracy during the analyzed time period. On this point, it is required that a country has been rated as 'not free' for at least four successive years in order to be classified as an autocracy. A very short-lived autocratic regime hardly set any deep mark in society. The same applies to countries that have recently left the autocratic stage: a minimum of four years of 'partly free' or 'free' ratings is required in order to establish that the country in question really is a former autocracy. On the basis of these criteria, a research sample of 40 former and 40 enduring autocracies is obtained. Almost half of the states in the latter category have been authoritarian throughout the observed time period.

## Independent Variables

### *Modernization*

Seymour Martin Lipset's essay 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', first published in the *American Political Science Review* in 1959, marked the starting point for political science research on the relationship between the level of economic development and democracy, generally known as 'the modernization theory'. During the following decades, it became the greatest and most dominating theory of the prerequisites of democracy. In the article, Lipset puts forward the following thesis: "The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy" (Lipset 1959, 75). Why should economic development and modernization lead to a higher level of democracy? For one thing, there is a mutual relationship between economic development and education. Increased welfare provides better opportunities for educating the people;

at the same time, increasing levels of education contributes to economic efficiency. Education also brings about more tolerance as well as a more rational attitude towards politics and society; thus, economic development promotes a democratic culture. Economic development also leads to a variety of economic interests, which, in combination with more spare time for the people, form a breeding ground for different kinds of voluntary organizations (Karvonen 1997, 29-39; 2008, 46-47).

Considering that the research population in this essay mainly consists of developing countries, Axel Hadenius study of the determinants of democracy in 132 third world countries, entitled *Democracy and Development* (1992), is worth mentioning. Hence, the rich and democratic countries in the developed world are excluded from the analysis. Notwithstanding, various aspects of socioeconomic development are among the foremost factors that bring about a high level of democracy (Hadenius 1992, 77-91). In this study, the Human Development Index (HDI) is used as a measure of socioeconomic development. The index consists of three dimensions: living standards, education and health. HDI is widely held as an appropriate measure of the level of socioeconomic development in the countries of the world. The UNDP has observed the level of human development since 1975 which makes it even more appropriate for this study. The index runs from 0 to 1 with higher values denoting a higher level of development (Human Development Reports).

Since the support for the modernization theory over the last half century is so convincing, there is good reason to explore whether it might explain why some autocracies leave the authoritarian stage, whereas others remain authoritarian. Since socioeconomic development precedes democratization, there should be a difference between permanent and soon-to-be former autocracies already at the authoritarian stage. As mentioned earlier, former autocracies are observed during the last year with a 'not free' rating. At what point in time should the permanent autocracies be observed? Many of them have been authoritarian since the beginning of the analyzed time period. In practically each autocracy, some degree of socioeconomic development has occurred. However, they are still autocratic – increased level of development has not brought about democratization. Therefore, it would be misleading to use data from the first autocratic year during the analyzed period. Albeit not a perfect procedure, I find the mean of each autocracy's lowest and highest values during the time period to be an appropriate solution in this regard.

*Rentier economy*

There are several high-income states in the Arab Middle East, which are under authoritarian rule. These states have another thing in common: their prosperity originates from abundant oil resources. Accordingly, does high income generated through oil impede democratization and foster authoritarianism? The key to understanding this relationship is the political incentives produced by external 'rents' – i.e. the extraordinary profits, not only from the extraction of oil but other minerals as well, which flow directly to the central government without the need of a structured tax bureaucracy or the involvement of the domestic sphere. The extraction of these resources takes place within the context of an export-oriented industry without any strong connection to other productive processes (Hirschman 1977). The rest of the political economy is affected mainly through the influence of resource rent on revenue-generating and spending. Resource rents that flow directly to the central government replaces bureaucratic forms of revenue such as income taxation. The state becomes the primary source of revenue in the domestic economy through which public expenditure programs are carried through. Since no or very little taxes are collected, citizens tend to be less demanding in terms of political participation (Beblawi 1987, 53-54). Also, since the masses are not involved in generating the income, the government feels no need to give the people political influence or to be accountable to the public.

Michael Ross (2001) has explored the question whether oil and other minerals have antidemocratic effects. Three possible explanations of the causal mechanism are provided: a rentier effect, a repression effect and a modernization effect. The first one concerns low tax rates and high spending in order to dampen pressures for democracy and accountability. The repression effect implies that resource wealth enables governments to build up their internal security forces to ward off democratic pressures. The modernization effect holds that growth based on the export of oil and minerals does not bring about social and cultural development, which plays a crucial role in democratic development. First of all, the oil-impedes-democracy thesis is empirically verified. Second, the damaging effect is not restricted to the Middle East; neither is it restricted to oil but valid to non-fuel mineral resources as well. The empirical analysis provides support for all three causal mechanisms that relate oil to authoritarianism, while the relationship between mineral wealth and autocracy is more elusive (Ross 2001, 325-61). Therefore I shall focus on the former. A vital point regarding the rentier economy is that the oil resources generate extraordinary profits mainly through external rent.

Consequently, the total oil export of countries will be observed, exploiting data from The World Factbook (barrels per day). Only data from 2009-2011 are available.

### *Physical characteristics*

During the last few decades, the impact of physical characteristics on politics has gained renewed interest. The foremost work in this field of research is Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte's *Size and Democracy* (1973). There are arguments both in favour of the view that small size is conducive to democracy and the opposing view that small units are vulnerable to the tyranny of the majority (e.g. Hamilton et al. 1961, 83-84). Dahl and Tufte presented arguments and found evidence of both views – however, a great majority of the empirical studies of the association between size and democracy support the view that smallness is a breeding ground for democracy (e.g. Hadenius 1992, 126-27; Diamond 1999, 117-19; Anckar 2008). Large distances presuppose stricter control over the territory, which may infringe on the civil liberties. Smaller states, on the other hand, provide better prerequisites of a spirit of cooperativeness, unity and accommodation, which is conducive to democracy. Small countries also tend to be more vulnerable to external threat, which offers incentives for solidarity (Lijphart 1977). In small units, the communication between leaders and citizens is reciprocal, which entails symmetrical relationships by contrast with asymmetrical relationships in large units (Dahl & Tufte 1973, 66-88).

First of all, the total land area of countries is observed. However, there is an interesting pattern with regard to population size; Dag Anckar (2002, 377-78), among others, has observed that a great majority of all countries with less than one million people, so called microstates, are democracies, whereas only about one third of the other countries have democratic forms of government. Therefore, in addition to total land area, a variable that distinguishes microstates from other entities is included in the analysis. The conventional cut-off point of one million people is applied. It is assumed, first, that former autocracies are on average considerably smaller than permanent autocracies, and, second, that autocratic microstates have gone through a transition from authoritarian to democratic or at least semi-autocratic rule.

Islandness is another physical characteristic that is said to foster and maintain democracy. Many island states are characterized by remoteness, which enhances cohesion. They all share the particular problems that are caused by isolation and remoteness, which often are more important than ideological,

economic and ethnic cleavages that are common for a large part of the countries of the world. The fact that the political unit is isolated and remote from other countries has a unifying impact, and creates a spirit of solidarity and mutual understanding among the people, which is also reflected in the decision-making mechanisms (Anckar 2002, 386; Anckar & Anckar, 1995). The distance between the elite and the masses is shortened when the polity is small; this tendency is probably further accentuated if the unit is an island (e.g. Anckar 2002; Anckar 2008, 436-37). In a study of 146 countries, Clague et al. (2001) conclude that smallness in itself does not foster democracy, but there is an association between islandness and a democratic form of government. The author team argues that the fixed boundary of the island state limits the possibility to expand and reduces external threat, which, in turn, weakens the position of the military, decentralizes power among the contenders, and makes it likely that an agreement on rules of contention will arise (2001, 22-23). Hadenius has found that among Third World countries, islandness correlates stronger than population and area with the level of democracy (1992, 125). In an analysis of all countries of the world at three points in time, Anckar (2008) reports that islandness is positively related to the degree of democracy in non-Christian settings, even though these island states do not necessarily develop into liberal democracies. In fact, nearly all small island states that are democracies are either Protestant or Catholic. It is assumed that most of the island states in the research population have become former autocracies.

### *Regime type*

Are certain authoritarian regimes more likely to persist than some other forms of authoritarian rule? The classical theories of non-democratic regimes were based on the distinction between totalitarianism and authoritarianism. However, this classification soon became inexpedient, since very few regimes fit the totalitarian type, while the latter category was too broad. Several refined typologies have later on been created. In a study that covers the postwar period, Barbara Geddes (1999, 115-44) distinguishes personalist, military and single-party regimes as well as hybrids of these three types. Military regimes turn out to be the most short-lived, whereas one-party states have the longest lifespan. However, her analysis does not tell anything about whether authoritarian rule is brought to an end or whether the autocratic regime is followed by another form of dictatorship.

In a similar study that covers the period from 1972 to 2003, Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell (2007, 143-56) takes democratic development into account.



Furthermore, they include monarchies and different kinds of ‘electoral’ autocracies in their analysis. Derived from a more detailed typology (Hadenius & Teorell 2006), they differentiate five autocratic regime types: monarchic, military, no-party, one-party and limited multiparty regimes. The distinguishing feature of monarchies is hereditary succession of head of state in accordance with the constitution or accepted practice. In addition, the monarch must exercise real political power. Military regimes are states in which political power is exercised by military officers by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force. Three broad types of electoral autocracies are identified. First, there are no-party regimes in which political parties are prohibited. Second, in one-party regimes, there is only one legal party; all other parties, if they are even allowed to formally exist, are forbidden from contesting elections. Third, in limited multiparty regimes, at least some opposition candidates and/or parties are able to take part in elections. However, elections are not free and fair but manipulated, in one way or another, by the regime (Hadenius & Teorell 2007, 146-47). As much as 77 percent of all regime transitions have resulted in another authoritarian regime. Monarchies and one-party regimes are most often succeeded by other forms of authoritarian rule. A more detailed classification of autocracies is applied when the remaining 23 percent are analyzed. Military/multiparty regimes are most frequently followed by a democratic form of government. Their most important finding is that limited multiparty autocracies are most likely to make a transition to democracy (2007, 152-54).

The classification of regime type is based on Hadenius and Teorell’s (2006) detailed typology. It consists of 11 different types of autocracies, which are here transformed into four broad categories: monarchic, military, non-competitive and limited competitive regimes. These categories are similar to Hadenius and Teorell’s broad typology, with one exception: no-party and one-party electoral regimes are combined into a single category of non-competitive autocracies. Moreover, the label ‘limited competitive’ is preferred to ‘limited multiparty’, because there are cases (e.g. Maldives in 2007) where oppositional candidates may contest elections but no parties are allowed. Concerning personalist regimes, I agree with Hadenius and Teorell that personalism is a feature that may be more or less present in any regime (2007, 149), by contrast with Geddes (1999) who classifies personalism as a regime type of its own. Since their classification extends only to 2003, country reports by Freedom House are used as additional sources. As for permanent autocracies, the current regime type is observed.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> A few countries cannot be classified according to the typology because of civil war (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sudan), and lack of governing authority (Somalia). Hadenius and

## *Religion*

Several studies have reported a strong relationship between religion and democracy (e.g. Hadenius 1992; Lundell 2004; Anckar 2008). In a recently published volume on religion and democracy, Carsten Anckar concludes, on the basis of observations made in 2009, that religion has now surpassed socioeconomic development as the most important determinant of the level of democracy (2011, 135). Christianity is said to foster democracy, whereas Islam is associated with non-democratic forms of government. Moreover, there is a difference between Protestantism and Catholicism; practically all countries in the world with a Protestant majority are democratic. Accordingly, no Protestant nation is represented in this study – a large majority of the research population is dominated by either Catholicism or Islam. For a long time, the Catholic Church counteracted democracy and encouraged its followers to accept the prevailing political conditions. Gradually, the attitude towards democracy changed, the threat of communism being one important factor, and as of the second Vatican Council (1962-65) the church has promoted democracy. The successful process of democratization in Latin America during the third wave has, to a large extent, been credited to the Catholic Church (Anckar 2011, 42).

Islam, by contrast, has been regarded as incompatible with democracy. A primary reason is that the political and the religious spheres are fused; the state is one with the *umma*, the community of believers. The all-embracing character, involving strict rules for social, economic, cultural, political and religious organization, entails a strong hierarchical order with an almighty God possessing absolute power. The judicial system is also intertwined with the religious sphere. In comparison with Christianity, Islam is more like a religious law than a faith, and it contains principles that regulate the relationship between man and God, the relationship between individuals, and to society as a whole (Lundell 2000, 59-61). The point of departure is that all existence shall be based on religious values (Karvonen 2008, 53). In such circumstances, it is difficult for democratic values, principles and procedures to gain a foothold. Accordingly, it is assumed that Islam

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Teorell (2006) classify Portugal as one-party traditional 1960-73, military in 1974, multiparty traditional in 1975, and as a democracy from 1976 onwards. I classify Portugal as a non-competitive regime prior to democratization, because the military period was largely a pro-democracy transitional phase. Hadenius and Teorell (2006) classify Algeria as military multiparty up to 2003. Since president Bouteflika shortly thereafter distanced himself from the military (Freedom House), I classify Algeria as a limited competitive regime.

is a condition that upholds authoritarianism, whereas Catholicism fosters democratization. However, Anckar puts forward that the relationship between Islam and autocracy is by no means deterministic; there are some democratic countries and several semi-democracies in the Muslim world today (2011, 136).

### Empirical Analysis

To begin with, the regional dispersion of enduring and former autocracies is outlined. We know that the continents differ from each other with regard to the level of democracy and development. Europe has been the most successful region in consolidating democracy, and the third wave of democratization affected almost the entire Latin America, whereas it has been much more difficult for democratic ideas and procedures to gain a foothold in Africa and Asia. Therefore it is of interest to see whether enduring and former autocracies follow a similar pattern. Regional diffusion means that countries tend to imitate other countries that are geographically proximate and/or those with a similar culture. When some states begin a process of democratization, other nearby states may follow. Likewise, if all or most of the states in a region are authoritarian, they are more likely to remain that way. Huntington uses the term ‘demonstration effect’ for this phenomenon: democratization in one country encourages democratization in other countries (1991, 100).

Table 1. Continent and number of autocracies

	<b>Africa</b>	<b>Asia</b>	<b>Europe</b>	<b>Latin America</b>
<b>Enduring autocracies</b>	<b>17</b> (42,5)	<b>20</b> (50,0)	<b>2</b> (5,0)	<b>1</b> (2,5)
<b>Former autocracies</b>	<b>17</b> (42,5)	<b>6</b> (15,0)	<b>10</b> (25,0)	<b>7</b> (17,5)
<b>All cases</b>	<b>34</b> (42,5)	<b>26</b> (32,5)	<b>12</b> (15,0)	<b>8</b> (10,0)

*Note:* Percentages in parenthesis

In Table 1, the continental affiliation of permanent and former autocracies is presented. The total research sample is spread over four continents; there are no cases in North America and Oceania. More than 40 per cent of the cases are located in Africa, one third is in Asia, whereas Europe and Latin America are represented by 12 and 8 cases, respectively. In Africa, there are as many permanent autocracies as former ones. Half of all autocracies today are located in Asia. By contrast, most European cases are former autocracies; only Belarus and Russia are still (or in the latter case: again) authoritarian. All autocracies in Latin America have become democracies or hybrids, except for Cuba.

Table 2. Socioeconomic development, oil export and autocracy

	<b>Socioeconomic development (human development index)</b>	<b>Oil-export (log of barrels/day)</b>
<b>Enduring autocracies</b>	<b>0.545</b> (38)	<b>1.89</b> (40)
<b>Former autocracies</b>	<b>0.512</b> (40)	<b>0.86</b> (40)
<b>All cases</b>	<b>0.528</b> (78)	<b>1.38</b> (80)

*Notes:* Mean value analysis, N in parenthesis

Oil export:  $F = 15.4$ , sig. 0.000

*Sources:* Human Development Reports; the World Factbook

Results for the economic variables are given in Table 2. Rather surprisingly, enduring autocracies have on average a higher level of socioeconomic development than former ones, yet the difference is small and insignificant. A closer look at the latest UNDP ranking and division of countries into high, medium and low human development shows that the permanent autocracies are spread rather evenly across all three categories. Oil export reveals a completely different pattern: the enduring autocracies export on average almost ten times more barrels per day than the former autocracies do. Many of the present autocracies are among the largest oil exporters in the world. Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates are at the top of the list and another five enduring autocracies are in the top twenty of

the largest oil exporters in the world. By contrast, only one former autocracy (Nigeria) is in the same league.

Table 3. Area, microstates, islandness and autocracy

	<b>Area (log)</b>	<b>Microstate Yes</b>	<b>Microstate No</b>	<b>Island Yes</b>	<b>Island No</b>
<b>Enduring autocracies</b>	<b>5.56</b>	<b>2</b> (5,0)	<b>38</b> (95,0)	<b>1</b> (2,5)	<b>39</b> (97,5)
<b>Former autocracies</b>	<b>5.05</b>	<b>8</b> (20,0)	<b>32</b> (80,0)	<b>7</b> (17,5)	<b>33</b> (82,5)
<b>All cases</b>	<b>5.31</b>	<b>10</b> (12,5)	<b>70</b> (87,5)	<b>8</b> (10,0)	<b>72</b> (90,0)

*Notes:* Mean value analysis (area) and cross-tabulation, N, percentages in parenthesis

Area:  $F = 6.7$ , sig. 0.012

Microstates: Chi-Square = 4.1, sig. 0.043

Islands: Chi-Square = 5.0, sig. 0.025

*Source:* The World Factbook

Next, we turn to the relationship between autocracies and their physical size. Results for area (log), microstates and islandness are presented in Table 3. In accordance with the assumption, former autocracies cover a much smaller area than permanent autocracies: the latter are on average almost three times larger. Eight of the former autocracies are microstates. By contrast, there are only two microstates – Brunei and Qatar – left among the enduring autocracies. We find a similar relationship when looking at island states. There are eight islands in the research sample; only Cuba is left in the authoritarian camp.

The dispersion of enduring and former autocracies among different regime types is given in Table 4. All monarchies in the research population, except for Bhutan, are permanent autocracies. The opposite pattern prevails among military regimes: only one (Burma) of 16 has endured. Both former and present autocracies are frequent in the non-competitive category, whereas a great majority of the limited competitive regimes are durable autocracies. In fact, almost half of all contemporary autocracies provides for limited political competition.

Table 4. Regime type and autocracy

	<b>Monarchy</b>	<b>Military</b>	<b>Non-comp.</b>	<b>Limited comp.</b>	<b>Unclassifiable</b>
<b>Enduring autocracies</b>	<b>6</b> (15,0)	<b>1</b> (2,5)	<b>12</b> (30,0)	<b>19</b> (47,5)	<b>2</b> (5,0)
<b>Former autocracies</b>	<b>1</b> (2,5)	<b>15</b> (37,5)	<b>18</b> (45,0)	<b>5</b> (12,5)	<b>1</b> (2,5)
<b>All cases</b>	<b>7</b> (8,8)	<b>16</b> (20,0)	<b>30</b> (37,5)	<b>24</b> (30,0)	<b>3</b> (3,8)

*Notes:* Cross-tabulation, N, percentages in parenthesis

Monarchy: Chi-Square = 3.9, sig. 0.048

Military: Chi-Square = 15.3, sig. 0.000

Limited competitive = 11.7, sig. 0.001

*Sources:* Hadenius & Teorell (2006); Freedom House

Table 5. Religion and autocracy

	<b>Catholism</b>	<b>Islam</b>	<b>Orthodox</b>	<b>Buddhist</b>	<b>Other / No dominant</b>
<b>Enduring autocracies</b>	<b>4</b> (10,0)	<b>21</b> (52,5)	<b>1</b> (2,5)	<b>3</b> (7,5)	<b>11</b> (27,5)
<b>Former autocracies</b>	<b>14</b> (35,0)	<b>11</b> (27,5)	<b>3</b> (7,5)	<b>2</b> (5,0)	<b>10</b> (25,0)
<b>All cases</b>	<b>18</b> (22,5)	<b>32</b> (40,0)	<b>4</b> (5,0)	<b>5</b> (6,2)	<b>21</b> (26,3)

*Notes:* Cross-tabulation, N, percentages in parenthesis

Catholicism: Chi-Square = 7.2, sig. 0.007

Islam: Chi-Square = 5.2, sig. 0.022

*Source:* The World Factbook

Table 5 shows the frequency of dominating religion in permanent and former autocracies. More than half of all enduring autocracies are dominated by Islam – however, there is also a fair share of Muslim countries among those that have left the authoritarian stage. Catholicism shows the opposite pattern; most of the

Catholic states in the research sample are among the former autocracies. The authoritarian ones are Congo-Kinshasa, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea and Rwanda.

Table 6. Determinants of enduring and former autocracies

	Model 1				Model 2			
	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.
<b>Oil export (log)</b>	.659	.283	5.417	*	.815	.251	10.553	***
<b>Islandness</b>	-1.60	1.316	1.471					
<b>Monarchy</b>	1.552	1.316	1.392					
<b>Military</b>	-2.69	1.184	5.166	*	-2.871	1.131	6.437	*
<b>Limited competitive Catholicism</b>	1.727	.720	5.753	*	1.477	.663	4.965	*
<b>Islam</b>	-.572	.876	.426					
<b>Constant</b>	.966	.722	1.791					
<b>Chi-Square</b>	-1.18	.617	3.686					
<b>Nagelk. R sq.</b>		45.1				36.4		
<b>N</b>		.574				.488		
		80				80		

*Notes:* Binary logistic regression, \* = sig. < 0.05; \*\*\* = sig. < 0.001; coding of the dependent variable: 1 = enduring autocracy, 0 = former autocracy; all variables, except for oil export, are dummy variables

Finally, in Table 6, multivariate patterns are analyzed by means of binary logistic regression. In the bivariate analysis, nine determinants were significantly associated with the dependent variable. However, all three physical characteristics are interrelated – on the basis of a collinearity test, islandness is selected for the multivariate analysis. Accordingly, seven independent variables are included in the first model. Oil export and limited competitive regime are positively associated with

dictatorship, whereas military regime is significantly related to former autocracies. Despite strong bivariate associations between Catholicism and former autocracies as well as between Islam and enduring autocracies, the effects become insignificant when other determinants are controlled for. The same is true of monarchy and islandness, yet it should be observed that only a small share of the autocracies have these characteristics. All three significant determinants have an equally strong impact on the dependent variable. However, in the second regression, representing the most parsimonious model, oil export appears as the strongest determinant of enduring/former autocracies, clearly surpassing military and limited competitive regimes.

## Conclusion

The chapter has explored which conditions maintain autocratic rule, and, similarly, which conditions provide fertile soil for democratic advancement in an autocratic setting. In a research sample of 40 enduring and 40 former autocracies, no actual difference was detected with regard to modernization. If modernization precedes democracy, one would expect a difference already at the authoritarian stage. This is not the case here, however. Enduring autocracies have a somewhat higher degree of socioeconomic development than former ones, yet there is a large variation in both groups. Apparently, part of the explanation is that the maintenance of authoritarianism often presupposes some degree of industrial development. In fact, the least developed countries have rarely been solid autocracies. The results suggest that differences with regard to socioeconomic development mainly appear at higher levels of democratization. By contrast, oil – measured as total oil export – is a main determinant of dictatorship. The analysis lends strong support to the oil-impedes-democracy thesis (Ross 2001), or, preferably, the oil-maintains-autocracy thesis. In oil-based economies, revenues flow straight to the central government from the outside world without any strong connection to other productive processes and with little involvement of the citizens, which, in combination with modest or no income taxation at all, puts little pressure on the regime to introduce democratic reforms.

The analysis provides evidence for the proposition that it is easier to introduce democracy in small entities than in large ones. The total land area covered by former autocracies is three times smaller than that of the enduring autocracies. Several former autocracies are microstates, which are said to be



particularly auspicious to a democratic form of government. To be sure, half of those microstates that were authoritarian at the beginning of the ‘third wave of democratization’ are semi-autocratic or semi-democratic today. Nevertheless, the study clearly shows that it is difficult to maintain autocratic rule in small entities. This is particularly so if the microstate is an island: all countries that share these characteristics in the research population – Cape Verde, Comoros, Maldives, Sao Tome & Principe and Seychelles – have left the authoritarian stage. Today, Cuba is the only island, and Brunei and Qatar the only microstates, left in the authoritarian league.

Catholic and Muslim countries are frequent in the research sample. Previous research has shown that Christianity is positively associated with democracy, whereas Islam is related to non-democratic forms of government. At first glance, it really seems like Islam is one of the main reasons for the persistence of authoritarianism in the contemporary world, because more than half of the permanent autocracies are dominated by Islam. However, more than one fourth of the former autocracies are also Muslim countries. Islam is not a very prominent factor in determining what distinguishes enduring autocracies from former ones. A great majority of the Catholic countries are among the former autocracies, most of which are located in Latin America. Yet, when other determinants are taken into account, the positive impact disappears.

These Latin American countries are not only Catholic; they are former military regimes as well. Former military regimes that have been replaced by more democratic forms of government are also found elsewhere – Ghana and Mali in Africa are two cases in point. Regime type overshadows Catholicism in this regard, and military regime appears as a main determinant of transition from authoritarian to semi-autocratic/democratic rule. Why are the prospects of democratization better under a military form of dictatorship than under any other form? First of all, they are relatively short-lived compared to other autocratic regime types, because of tensions between different branches, command levels and cohorts. Moreover, a military regime often suffers from a lack of competence. It may succeed in maintaining order but when it comes to running state affairs and the society, the regime is likely to fall short. Sooner or later it will also face a legitimacy problem. A king may refer to the hereditary tradition and a civil dictator may enjoy some form of popular legitimacy. A military regime, by contrast, will inevitably face popular resistance (Karvonen 2008, 59-60).

Limited competitive authoritarianism has become the most common form of dictatorship. By conducting periodic elections in which some opposition parties

and/or candidates are allowed to participate, autocratic regimes try to maintain a façade of democracy, thereby hoping to satisfy the citizens as well as external actors. Still, elections are under such tight authoritarian control that the ruling party is not seriously challenged (Schedler 2002, 36-37). At the same time, the regime is playing a risky game in comparison with more totalitarian regimes. Monarchic dictatorships usually face less challenge than electoral ones, because they are based on hereditary succession. All monarchies in the study, except for Bhutan, are enduring autocracies. Most of the monarchies are also wealthy oil producers, which further strengthens the foundations of authoritarianism.

Some distinct regional patterns were discerned. Almost all permanent autocracies in the contemporary world are located in Asia and Africa, yet the African continent is inhabited by many former autocracies as well. A considerable share of former autocracies also exists in Europe and Latin America. Hence, the global pattern of democracy is to a great extent reflected here. Several explanations for these tendencies have been given. The former autocracies in Latin America are Catholic and they have a military past, many of the former autocracies in Africa were also ruled by military regimes, whereas several of the enduring autocracies in Asia are rich oil-states, Muslim or hereditary monarchies. Many of them share all three characteristics. However, an element of diffusion has certainly been present as well. Huntington (1991, 100-04) maintains that diffusion was much more common during the 'third wave of democratization' than during the previous two. The breakdown of military rule in one Latin American country probably had some impact on the course of events in neighbouring countries. The United States also played a major role by supporting Latin American military regimes in order to counteract the Communist influence in the region. In the 1980s, however, the Soviet Union was not seen as a threat anymore, and the basic motive for supporting the juntas vanished.

The Communist regimes in Eastern and central Europe were a consequence of external coercion. When the Soviet Union broke down, the Communist regimes in the satellite states were soon replaced by democratically elected governments. Former democratic experience and proximity to the established democracies in Western Europe also had a positive influence in this respect. It seems like democracy through diffusion becomes more stable if it takes place in a culturally and geographically cohesive region. The countries in the Arabian Peninsula are in glaring contrast to those in Eastern and central Europe. The prospects of democratization are probably weakest in this part of the world, partly because of the rentier effect, partly due to culture and tradition. Authoritarian

breakdown is more likely in limited competitive regimes and one-party states, because the democratic façade is inevitably marred by some fragility which in combination with poverty and unemployment constitutes a breeding ground for popular discontent.

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## APPENDIX

*Enduring autocracies:*

Afghanistan (autocratic since 2008), Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan (2003), Belarus (1996), Brunei (1988), Burma, Cambodia (1995), Cameroon (1976), Chad, China, Congo-Brazzaville (2006), Congo-Kinshasa, Cuba, Egypt (1993), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea (1999), Iran (1988), Iraq, Ivory Coast (2002), Kazakhstan (1994), Laos (1975), Libya, Mauritania (2008), North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Russia (2004), Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan (1989), Swaziland (1993), Syria (1980), Tajikistan (1992), Turkmenistan (1992), United Arab Emirates (1993), Uzbekistan (1992), Vietnam (1976), Zimbabwe (2001)

Note: Countries with no year in parenthesis have been autocratic throughout the observed time period.

*Former autocracies:*

Albania (1990), Argentina (1980), Benin (1989), Bhutan (2007), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995), Bulgaria (1989), Burkina Faso (1991), Burundi (2002), Cape Verde (1989), Chile (1978), Comoros (1989), Czechoslovakia (1989), Ethiopia (1994), Ghana (1991), Greece (1973), Guinea-Bissau (1990), Haiti (2005), Hungary (1983), Indonesia (1997), Kenya (2001), Lebanon (2004), Malawi (1993), Maldives (2007), Mali (1990), Mongolia (1989), Mozambique (1993), Nigeria (1997), Pakistan (2007), Panama (1989), Peru (1974), Poland (1977), Portugal (1973), Romania (1990), Sao Tome & Principe (1989), Senegal (1974), Seychelles (1991), Spain (1973), Suriname (1986), Tanzania (1994), Uruguay (1979)

Note: Last autocratic year in parenthesis.

## ASYMMETRIC FEDERALISM IN A UNITARY STATE: AUTONOMOUS ÅLAND AND FINLAND

*Jan Sundberg*

### Introduction

As a part of Finland the Åland islands were an integrated part of the Swedish kingdom from the Middle Ages until 1808 – 1809, when the eastern part of Sweden was occupied by the Russians. Although the resistance against the Russian occupants was strong in the islands, Åland became like mainland Finland an autonomous Grand Duchy under Russian rule from 1809 to 1917. The strategic location of the Åland islands close to the Swedish capital Stockholm was an incentive for the Russian emperor to fortify the islands to defend Russian interests and in order also to create a threat against the former enemy Sweden. However, the Crimean War in the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century turned out disastrous for Russia, but also served to bring out the role and status of the Åland islands.

The Russian fort Bomarsund was captured and destroyed by English and French marine troops. As a result the islands were demilitarised after the Crimean War in 1856. That year the Paris Peace Treaty was signed between Britain, France and defeated Russia. Russia was forbidden to construct fortifications or to maintain naval and other military bases on the strategic islands close to Stockholm (Ahlström 2007, 41-56), and Åland was proclaimed “free under the protection of the Western powers” (Jansson 2007, 1-7). The Russian Empire regarded the imposition of a demilitarisation of Åland as an intolerable limitation on Russia’s sovereignty. People in Åland welcomed the new order although they had no role in the formulation of the peace treaty.

World War I brought Åland back on the agenda. Russia fortified Åland thus violating the treaty of demilitarisation, the revolution started in Russia, and Finland declared her independence in December 1917. Soon afterwards the Finnish civil war broke out. Swedish troops landed in Åland to protect the population from a red invasion and were soon followed by German troops. Strong feelings of uncertainty spread among the people in Åland, and a plea for a reunion with Sweden, supported by the Åland population, was sent to the Swedish King. The Finnish government reacted and the ensuing conflict with Sweden - who supported the white government during the civil war – remained unsolved. As a result the case

was brought before the League of Nations in 1921 and Åland was then guaranteed protection of her Swedish language, culture, demilitarisation and sovereignty as a separate territorial region of Finland.

The implication of the League of Nations decision was that Åland was given autonomy against the outspoken will of the population. Although the decision sent shock waves through the Åland people, they refrained from violent protest and soon “state-making” and “nation-building” processes started to develop in the microstate community. Since that time, latent and sometimes manifest conflicts have prevailed between the national Finnish government and the government of autonomous Åland. The newly independent Finnish state established a federacy, in which all mainland districts were treated in accordance with a unitary state model, while Åland was treated as a deviant case that enjoyed a status as a part in an asymmetric federation. Finland, then, accepted a multicultural solution on a territorial basis; admittedly, the decision was made under international pressure.

However, the electoral rules that apply to national elections were not adapted to the new situation and remained unchanged. Åland did not become a constituency of its own and was not guaranteed any seat in Parliament. The only new provision about elections was made in the act of autonomy on how the members of the regional legislative assembly are elected (FFS 124/1920). Not until the election in 1948 was Åland guaranteed a seat in Parliament. In presidential elections Åland is included in the national single constituency since 1994 when the first direct two-round elections of the president were introduced. When Finland became in 1995 a full EU member, Åland was included in one sole national constituency for the EU Parliament elections.

Whereas the unitary state on mainland Finland strives by means of electoral laws for political integration, Åland strives for an expanded self rule. It is the aim of this chapter to analyse how the efforts for promoting a national political integration has failed in the case of the Åland islands.

## Nation-building in Homogenous and Plural Societies

States have territorially defined populations which recognise a common organ of government. Decisions are implemented by civil servants and the territories are protected by the military. These are the core elements of state-making. Nation-building takes place when the inhabitants of the state form a community which is



marked by a *Gemeinschaft*-feeling, where members distribute and share benefits (Finer 1975, 85-86). Loyalty and commitment to the nation is more likely to develop in homogeneous populations. This, in turn, promotes a centralised politics and a control which yields high returns to the government from a relatively uniform subject population (Tilly 1975, 78-80). Thus, homogeneity fuels effective government.

Nation states have developed a range of agencies of unification and standardisation which penetrate the local culture, and the gradual widening of governmental activities has occasioned a more complex system of alignments. Territorial oppositions and waves of counter mobilisation threaten the unity of the nation and set limits to nation-building (Rokkan 1970, 101). Democratic consolidation may be more difficult in multinational or multicultural states (Linz & Stepan 1996, 29-30), since in democracies the magnitude and intensity of territorial opposition challenge a standardisation that is based on national institutions and laws. The implicit objective of a homogeneous state is unification and a standardisation of the nation, and deviations in terms of institutional arrangements and/or legislation are thwarted.

According to Lijphart one may distinguish between homogenous and plural societies. In homogeneous societies, increased contacts are likely to lead to mutual understanding and homogenisation, whereas in plural societies, close contacts might lead to strain and hostility (Lijphart 1977, 88-89). To deal with such problems in a democratic manner two solutions are available. A nation state can respond to demands for secession by reducing or eliminating ethnic differences (assimilation) from the majority national order. Such actions tend, however, to generate an opposite effect. Plural democracies tend to introduce some form of federal or confederal system rather than to incorporate the differences. According to Easton "in systems of multiple nationalities, if the relevant members feel that each group recognizes respect, and is willing to consider seriously the major need and demands of others, the probability of eliciting support for a common community is increased" (Easton 1965, 250). If ethnic and geographic diversity is being recognized, this contributes to the development of a stable democracy. Kymlicka has argued that the best way to ensure loyalty of national minorities against secession has been to accept rather than to attack their distinct nationality (Kymlicka 2000, 183-212; 2010, 97-112). However, multi-nation federations can fail if the feelings between the groups are tinged with resentment and annoyance, or if the majority population feel that the minority group is ungrateful and has unreasonable expectations that are impossible to satisfy (Kymlicka 2002, 7-16).

Finland is not a homogenous state, even when Åland is excluded. Finland is according to the constitution a bilingual country, but only in the Southern and Western coastal areas is Swedish in practice a visible (and audible) language option in daily life. The electoral system does not confer any special rights upon the Swedish electorate, and the Swedish People's Party competes for votes and seats in elections in the same manner as other contesting parties. Thus, Finland does not recognize ethnic differences in the electoral law, and the electoral system is in reality engineered for national homogenisation. Although Finland gives room for ethnic diversity, the electoral systems have in fact managed to transform the Swedish-speaking population into loyal nationalists. Åland differs in this respect, as the insular population has developed a strong and separate nationalism.

Homogeneity in terms of people and territory were key elements of nation-building in Finland, and attempts at creating territorial units with an ethnic group that differs from the nation were certainly not in line with this ideal of a unitary state. All proposals from the Swedish population in Finland to introduce Swedish cantons along the west and south coast of Finland were rejected by the majority of Finnish parliamentarians during the 1920s (von Bonsdorff 1950, 257-322). The constitution and the electoral system of Finland were engineered in accordance with this logic, and it was dramatic events as World War I, the civil war in Finland and a conflict between Finland and Sweden which broke the principles of unitary state. In consequence of these events, the Finnish constitution had to be amended to give room for a territorial autonomy for the Åland Islands, and this meant that the islands became not only a *de facto* but a *de jure* region as well. The first term refers to practice and the second to legal processes, where units of the state are treated different before law (Burgess 2006, 215-17). States with autonomous regions are located in a zone between a unitary and a federal state, a zone which may be named "asymmetrical federalism". The term covers both *de facto* and *de jure* regions, but is probably best suited to cases of autonomous regions (i.e. *de jure* regions).

## Managing Differences

The process of nation-building departs from the ideal of a homogeneous people within the territory of a unitary state, and only reluctantly are deviations in this respect accepted by the unitary state. Rokkan named this the conflict between a central nation-building culture and ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct

subject populations in the provinces and peripheries (Rokkan 1970, 102). Totalitarian regimes have frequently managed such conflicts by violent means, including even genocide and ethnic cleansing. Assimilation is another method for conflict elimination; usually, however, democracies have tried to manage differences rather than to eliminate them. In the peripheral, ethnically distinct and internationally protected region of Åland, assimilation was not really a realistic option, given the position of the Swedish minority on the mainland, where no distinct regions are assigned to the minority populations.

A more efficient method is the management of differences, which can be achieved in various ways. According to John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (1953, 4-25), the most common method for managing ethnic conflict is that of hegemonic control. If democracy is understood as majority rule it can take the form an instrument of hegemonic control, but strong powers do not guarantee freedom and fair treatment to ethnic minorities, when and if an ethnic community wishes to belong to an external nation-state. In such cases the need for a system of control by the majority tends to increase. The concept of hegemonic control is best applied to Åland before a close to full autonomy was obtained. It is also applicable to the Swedish minorities in Finland, connecting, obviously, to efforts of assimilation and/or political integration.

Full hegemonic control collapsed prior to the introduction of autonomy. For a unitary nation a management of differences is clearly preferable to an open secession from the state. Recognizing this, unitary democratic states have often preferred *cantonisation* to third party interventions or power sharing. Cantonisation implies a devolution which is organised on ethno-territorial basis and also encompasses low degree of sovereignty as well as an asymmetrical relation to the central government (McGarry & O'Leary 1993, 30-31). Mini-sovereignty includes as a necessary element the devolution of state power to the regions. However, the sovereignty remains partial as only clearly specified spheres of state power are devolved. Autonomous regions also have a regional parliament which is elected by those eligible to vote within the borders of the territorial region.

However, those elements of state power, which are not devolved, are still the responsibility of the national parliament. A maximum state power prevails, when the regions do not have access to the national parliament and are denied sovereignty. This power is reduced when the regions are offered sovereignty with or without electoral guarantees of representation in the national parliament. In the Åland case the islands were offered autonomy with unchanged electoral laws which did not guarantee representation. A next step of power reduction occurs when and

if the sovereignty of the region is enlarged considerably, and representation in the national parliament is guaranteed, if not already implemented. A still better way to manage differences is to smoothly transmit sovereignty and open access to parliamentary representation in a manner which integrates the citizens of the territorial region into relevant electoral and political processes. To sum up, then, a national government that tries to retain hegemonic control in autonomous *de facto* and *de jure* regions has three options at disposal:

1. Exclusion from national representation with no sovereignty transference;
2. Autonomy enacted in law with or without guarantees of national representation, or
3. Large scale autonomy including special electoral rules of national representation enacted for the autonomous region.

All three alternatives have consequences for the relationship between the national and the regional governments. Autonomous regions are not federal units and are therefore not guaranteed representation and political decision-making power according to a mutual agreement – in consequence, the national government/parliament can decide either with or without regional approval/acceptance. The consequences of the three alternatives are:

1. Declining autonomy and exclusion from national representation increases the amount of distrust between the two parts and tends to lead to national disintegration;
2. Unilateral decisions by the state (the parliament) do not enhance the mutual confidence between the national government and the autonomous region;
3. Special measures by the government that aim at securing (or at least contributing to) national unity; however, the gradual transfer of sovereignty (including guarantees of representation in national parliament) indicates that these corrective measures constantly lag behind.

None of the actions taken by the national government – be it in an authoritarian or a less harsh way – seems to enhance the unity of a unitary state. On the contrary, it seems more likely that the more a unitary state turns to asymmetric federalism, the stronger are the incentives for a distinct ethnic autonomy to act on behalf of its own people rather than the nation as a whole entity. Thus, one may well challenge David Easton's suggestion that the probability of eliciting support for a common

community is increased, when the minority is given respect and when its demands are considered. It is more likely that the support for a common community emanates from a minority preoccupation with the territorially defined community of the minority itself.

### Asymmetrical Federalism in Finland

Daniel Elazar claims that the world is presently in the midst of a paradigm shift from a world of states to a world of diminished state sovereignty and increased interstate linkages of a constitutional federal character. Parallel to such federations are numerous asymmetric federal arrangements in which the federate power connects constitutionally with smaller federate units, and does so from a basis that differs from what is ordinarily to be found in federal states between central and state governments (Elazar 1996, 417-29). Federations are deliberate creations where legal sovereignty is shared between the national (federal) government and the state (province) government. The legal function of the federal government usually extends to the management of external relations and also to some domestic areas, as the currency. The state functions often include education, local government, and law enforcement. In almost all federations, states have a guaranteed and equal representation in the upper federal chamber.

A definition in the same vein features asymmetric federalism in multicultural federal systems and implies that nationality-based units *de jure* enjoy more rights than regional-based units and also maintain a differentiated relationship to the centre (Kymlicka 1998, 111-50). Elazar's and Kymlicka's definitions are engineered to fit multicultural federations and do not fully consider asymmetry in unitary states which devolve sovereignty only to certain ethnically distinct territories. The asymmetry of an autonomous region in a unitary state is probably more important than what we see in relation to any distinct *de jure* region in a federal state. Given that the degree of asymmetry counts, one may certainly agree with Zuber, who states that we still lack an analytical understanding of whether or not an asymmetric federalism can contribute to the stability of multinational states (Zuber 2011, 546-71). This is certainly true if unitary states are forced by external pressures to tolerate within their borders a territorially based ethnic sovereignty.

The asymmetric federation of Finland does not have an upper chamber to balance the voice of the territorial unit Åland. The state is organised as a unitary state, and this rule has one exception only, namely the sole autonomous region of

the country. Before autonomy was introduced the centralised power did not have to take formal notice of the *de facto* regions. In contrast to the situation in federal states, the creation of autonomous regions was not at the outset an outcome of deliberative processes, as Finland was more or less forced to accept territorial autonomy within her borders. The MP elected from the autonomous region represented a tiny minority in Parliament with few if any chances to manage a conflict with the majority. The situation was therefore clearly asymmetric - the autonomous region differed in terms of sovereignty from other regions, but still had only a modest influence in national decision-making.

The ultimate aim of Åland has been and is to make use of whatever level of sovereignty that has been obtained to transfer still more power from the national legislature to the regional assembly. As the rules for elections to the national Parliament remained unchanged when autonomy was introduced, a tension has constantly prevailed between the national and regional government, both parties utilizing parliamentary influence and power to reject or support expansions of the regional sovereignty.

In the case at hand sovereignty was framed in insular terms and was combined to an ethnic diversity as compared to the national majority population. These two traits have certainly reinforced in the islands a sense of a regional *Gemeinschaft*. The following sections of this review examine the process of inclusion of legislators from the autonomous region, and describe how demands for an enlarged sovereignty were handled by the national government. What electoral system changes did the Finnish Parliament introduce to banish or include the region in the national decision making? What was the response from the electorate in the autonomous region in terms of turnout in national elections? How was party life organised on the autonomous islands, which political parties did Åland representatives collaborate with in the national Parliament, and with what effect in terms of increased sovereignty? What is currently the most manifest demands from the autonomous region *vis-à-vis* the national parliament? And finally: what conclusions can be drawn from this review of a specific case of asymmetric federalism? Does the case illustrate a successful process of management or does it rather picture a stepping stone on a road to more separatism?

## National Elections in Åland

Universal suffrage was introduced in the Grand Duchy of Finland in 1906. During the period from 1907 to 1917 no less than eight elections were conducted. In accordance with law Finland was divided into 16 constituencies, and in 15 of these constituencies proportional elections were applied which followed the d'Hondt system in the transfer of votes to 199 seats (Kommittébetänkande 1906, 12; Vallag för storfurstendömet Finland 26/1906). Åland was then merged with the Åbo South County constituency which had 17 seats and Åland had the status of a jurisdictional district together with five other such districts in the constituency. Of those eligible to vote in the constituency, 10.5 per cent were residents on Åland, this entailing, in theory, close to two seats for Åland.

In the rather complicated process for autonomy, no attention was paid to the existing electoral law. The Finnish national government had no interest in enacting separate rules for Åland, and the all-absorbing interest of the Åland people was how to cut the ties to Finland and merge with Sweden. Thus, the electoral law from 1906 remained in force in the new Republic of Finland (1917) with its constitution from 1919 (Törnudd 1968, 41-62). Åland remained a part of the Åbo South County constituency in the 1919 elections and continued to be a part of the constituency after 1921. This entailed severe consequences as autonomous Åland lacked any guarantee of representation in the Finnish Parliament. Hence, Åland could be left without any representation or could win more than one seat.

Whether Åland at that time could have secured guarantees of representation is an issue open to speculation. The unsuccessful attempt at a merger with Sweden had in its wake feelings of disappointment in the islands of such a magnitude, that the issue of a representation in the Finnish Parliament was given little if any importance in the early days of autonomy. Åland was formally an integrated part of independent Finland in the 1919 election. However, due to the conflict with Finland no candidates were nominated from Åland. The boycott continued in the 1922 election when autonomy had been forced upon Åland. However, as Åland was dependent on national legislation and finances, candidates from Åland were nominated in the subsequent elections.

The reform prior to the 1948 election was made in conjuncture with the preparation of a new self-government law that was implemented in 1951. Prior to this, however, Åland and Finland faced dramatic events. Soviet Union made demands in the autumn 1944 which aimed at establishing a military base at Porkkala outside Helsinki. The Finnish Government panicked, and in the ensuing

negotiations Cape Hangö and Åland were mentioned as alternative concessions. The information leaked to Åland, and once again preparations were made in the islands to promote a merger with Sweden (Spiliopoulou Åkermark 2007, 20-33). While the Finnish Government certainly denied any attempts to sacrifice the islands, it now offered the islands an extended law of self-government. Without these dramatic events a separation of Åland to a single member constituency would probably not have been possible. Now Åland was for the first time separated from the Åbo South county constituency which had 15 seats in the 1945 election. The size of the Åland population corresponded to a share of one deputy in parliament, and one mandate was now guaranteed.

By-elections were not foreseen in the existing legislation (Vallag 1906), for the simple reason that by-elections do not constitute a problem in constituencies with proportional elections. However, after two elections the system was changed and from the 1954 election throughout the last plurality election in 1983 all candidates on the list had a deputy candidate. The 1975 election and the year after that election put the validity of the electoral system to a test as the elected candidate died and his deputy was appointed MP. This stirred discussion, and the leading argument was that the support in the electorate for the deputy candidate was never actually measured. This created a problem, so the argument went, since the main candidate and her/his deputy candidate do not form a collective, but rather are two individual candidates. Anyhow, in the case at hand the support for the deputy in 1975 was finally measured in 1979, when he was elected by the largest minority.

The reform committee that was appointed to look into the matter concluded that the nomination procedure was heavily influenced by compromises between factions in the relatively unstructured party field, while voters had little if any influence. Different solutions to this problem were discussed and in the end the reform committee favoured a proportional system for the election of the single Åland member to parliament (PM 1977). No demands were raised to increase the number of members elected from the constituency. However, the very essence of proportional systems is that votes are translated to seats in a proportional way; proportional systems therefore require multi-member constituencies. Proportional elections in single member districts are unheard of in the electoral systems literature (Sartori 1997, 7-10; Farrell 2001, 68-96). In Åland, however, dominating political interests did not pay much notice to such arguments at that time and nor do they today.

In the preparatory work for the government bill in 1985 three arguments were raised to support a change of the electoral rules on Åland: 1) the number of



candidates will increase; 2) voting turnout will increase; and 3) the electoral support of the deputy member will be measured (Tarasti 1998, 407-08). Nothing was said about disproportionality and electoral threshold matters. The reform had an in-built discrepancy as the constitution stated that if local conditions justify a deviation from proportionality, one or two single member districts might be established (Riksdagsordningen 1928/7). According to the provision in the new constitution all members of Parliament were to be elected in proportional elections. Åland was mentioned as the sole constituency with a proportionally elected MP in a single member district (Finlands grundlag 1999/731).

As already mentioned Åland boycotted the first two elections after independence by not nominating candidates. Åland was formally an integrated part of Finland in 1919, but due to the lack of Åland candidates turnout dropped considerably (19.7 per cent) when compared to the previous election. The outcome of the first election during the era of unwelcomed autonomy was even worse, as now less than 24 per cent of the entitled population voted. From 1924 and onwards candidates from Åland were nominated, but voter activity remained low. Not until the last election before World War II did turnout exceed the national figure.

During the decades after World War II voting turnout rose in Finland to a level unheard since. However, the development on Åland was quite different. Turnout sank dramatically - the difference in comparison to Finland at large grew to almost 47 per cent in 1954. After the 1954 election, participation in elections increased. In the 1975 elections the right to vote was given to Finnish citizens abroad who were not registered for census purposes in Finland. The reform had a negative impact on the overall level of electoral participation in the country and mostly so in Åland. Of the enfranchised Finnish citizens 8.2 per cent were not registered in Finland, whereas the corresponding Åland share was 32.5 per cent. Most non-voters were residents in Sweden who lacked the motivation to vote. The turnout among residents in Åland was 58.5 per cent in 1975, the difference as compared to the national average now being 18.7 per cent.

First and foremost, proportional voting has had little impact on turnout. The difference between mainland Finland and Åland has decreased, but this is mainly due to a diminishing electoral activity in Finland. Voters not registered at Åland have increased their electoral activity from 0.9 per cent in 1987 to 5 per cent in 2007; still, this group of voters are passive and are not really involved in Finnish political life. If this group is excluded from calculations, turnout among those living on Åland oscillates between 50.8 per cent in 1991 and 60.3 per cent in 2003. All in all, it seems evident that the electoral reforms have not had any significant effect on

mobilising the population in Åland to the polls in national elections. The turnout in the regional Lagting elections, on the other hand, has since 1999 shifted from 65.9 per cent to 67.8 per cent, which is close to the national average in Finnish parliament elections.

## Parties and Party Systems

The Swedish People's Party (SFP, *Svenska folkpartiet*) was founded in May 1906. The main aim of the party was to secure all Swedish votes along the Swedish speaking coast and archipelago. SFP managed to organise Swedish white collar communities in cities as well as the coastal population in the periphery; however, the party failed to integrate parts of the working class which already in 1899 founded the *Finlands svenska arbetarförbund* (Finland's Swedish Labour Union). The union later in 1906 joined the Social Democratic Party to become an autonomous Swedish unit.

In August 1906 the first five local SFP branches were founded on Åland and soon 16 municipalities on Åland hosted a SFP local association. In comparison to the mainland, the Åland activists were among the first to organise. The response for SFP in the 1907 election was overwhelming, and Åland now became a stronghold for the party (Sundberg 1985, 121-25). The support for SFP varied from 91.4 per cent in 1916 to 95 per cent in the 1911 and the 1913 elections. However, all organisational ties with SFP were broken from 1919, as SFP then tried to offer autonomy to Åland according to the cantonial principle which was not accepted in Åland. The rift between SFP and Åland resulted in a political vacuum as only the weak Social Democrats and the Communists replaced SFP in terms of party activity on the local or the regional level.

The first internal *Åland Landsting* (later named *Lagting*) election was held in 1922. According to estimates, turnout was 13 per cent at its lowest in 1925 and 60 per cent at its highest in 1945 (Wrede 1981, 17-18). The Landsting's main function was to manage internal affairs and the relations to the Finnish mainland. In 1924 Åland came to terms with its constitutional status and nominated candidates to the national parliamentary election. However, the official statistics did still not separate the votes cast for Åland candidates on SFP lists. This was the case also in the 1930 and the 1939 elections when candidates joined the separate *Ålands valförbund*. The resulting misleading data are the official basis for the claim that SFP won between 95 and 84 per cent of the vote. All MPs from Åland joined the Swedish

Parliamentary Party. With the exception of the Communists which received 11 per cent of the vote in 1945, no other parties could challenge this dominance.

In the first election to the Landsting *Ålands svenska valförbund* won 29 of 30 seats. The dominating issues in the subsequent Landsting elections were about the autonomy and the Åland relation to Finland and Sweden (Wrede 1976, 27-28). An open politicisation of elections started in late 1960s; still in the Landsting election in 1967, however, no other groups than the Communists used party labels (Wrede 1976, 51-63). An unstable period followed with internal conflicts; since 1979, however, a relatively stable four party system has existed on Åland (Söderlund 2008, 131-34). Two more parties are now represented in the *Lagting*. Of these, *Ålands Framtid* (The Future of Åland) is the sole party to openly demand independence. It seems evident that the expansion of internal party life and competition has enhanced the political participation in *Lagting* elections. The issue of a merger with Sweden is no longer on the carpet, but all parties advocate more sovereignty, although the Social Democrats contribute only modestly. *Åländsk Samling* was established in 1957 and soon assumed obligations as an umbrella organization for various unorganised groups in elections. It has forfeited importance in *lands-/lagting* elections, but prevails in parliament elections.

### Current Regional Demands

The legislative authority of the *Lagting* was not defined in the 1920 Act of Autonomy. A brief reference was included to the general authority of the state, while the remainder was in principle left to the *Lagting* to enact. However, new national laws relevant to Åland were not to enter into force unless approved by the *Lagting*. From this unspecified division of labour numerous questions of interpretation emanated, in addition, in the wake of the modernisation of society new activities have emerged which call legal authorization. Therefore, a new act of autonomy was prepared after World War II to specify and clarify the division of legal authority between Finland and Åland. However, many items defied specification and a rest category was left to be managed by means of reciprocal interpretation (Suksi 2005, 171-75). In 1991 a new Law of Autonomy came into force which enlarged the Åland legal authority and added specifications to the list.

However, the government of Åland is not satisfied with the present legislative division of labour between the national parliament and the *Lagting*. The law from 1991 is considered obsolete in structure and content; moreover, the law is

considered asymmetric as it is the Finnish parliament who decides whereas the *Lagting* is reduced to the role of a follower. A better balance is needed and according to a recent proposal items to be decided by the national government should be listed, whereas the rest should be left to the *Lagting* to decide. In addition, any changes in the Finnish constitution that imply limitations on the sovereignty of Åland are to be approved by the *Lagting*.

Taxation on the regional level is a national fiscal matter which has occasioned depreciatory comments among nationalist Finns as well as dissatisfaction on Åland. According to the prevailing system taxpayers' money from Åland is collected on a national basis; following an adjustment a certain amount is sent back to the islands. Finnish nationalist see this as unfair as Åland, so the argument goes, gets more support than other regions. In reality Åland is mostly a net payer and this of course causes disapproval on the islands. To cope with the problem a committee was appointed on Åland in May 2010, which concluded that the authority of taxation should be shifted from Finland to Åland (Åländsk utredningsserie 2010). The proposal has not been well-received in the Ministry of Finance out of fear that business on Åland (shipowners) can secure special and advantageous treatment. It is unlikely that the issue will be solved in the near future.

Furthermore, Finland entered the European Union in 1995. The membership was approved in a referendum in Finland and later on in a referendum in Åland. In the membership negotiations Åland secured a special status as tax free goods could still be sold on ships which landed on Åland on their way to or from Sweden. However, Åland did not get a representation of her own in the European Parliament. Originally Finland was represented by 16 MEPs; in the wake of the EU-enlargement in terms of member states, the representation has been reduced to current 13. Although candidates have been nominated, Åland has never succeeded in winning representation in the European Parliament. Finland, including Åland, is one single constituency, and this arrangement makes it in practice impossible for a candidate from Åland to be elected. If the issue of the representation of autonomous regions cannot be solved on EU level, the Åland situation will certainly remain the same. In Åland the lack of representation in the European Parliament fuels frustration – obviously, the ongoing transfer of authority from national governments to the EU forms a threat to the islands' sovereignty.

## Conclusion: Failing Political Integration

The introduction of a single member constituency which secured one seat in parliament was never a big issue in the islands. Instead, the focus has been on issues that concern an enlargement of autonomy and the transfer of more legislative power to the Åland lagting. Åland voters are more concerned with *Lagting* elections than with national elections which have never during the era of autonomy mobilized vast majorities to the polls. The sole MP from Åland is a member of the Swedish parliamentary party and can get support from that party. Still s/he is a lonely rider, who needs interpretation service to be able to follow the parliamentary debates which are conducted almost exclusively in the Finnish language. Although her/his parliamentary influence is almost non-existent, information that is important to Åland is gathered and exchanged, also with the support of the Åland “Embassy” (*Ålands kontoret*) in Helsinki. Matters of conflict caused by different legislative interpretations are handled by a special commission.

The conclusion that follows from this review is that the management of hegemonic control via electoral systems has not succeeded. The method to settle conflicts by allowing ethnic diversity on a territorial basis and by offering seats in parliament and transferring sovereignty has in fact resulted in an increased divergence. Asymmetric federalism may be relevant in the short run as an instrument for solving problems in multicultural states such as Finland, but has not promoted, at least not in the Åland case, the settlement of interest conflicts in the long run. As noted, interest conflicts are handled by a commission, which, including state representatives and representatives of autonomous Åland, acts like an interest organization in a corporatist manner. In addition, the territorial unit strives for more sovereignty while the most radical elements in the union endeavor to achieve independence.

The former president of Finland and Nobel peace laureate from 2009 Martti Ahtisaari visited Åland in November 1998 to celebrate the opening of the Lagting. In his speech at that occasion he warned Åland against the consequences of secession. In case of independence for Åland the international stability would suffer, all international agreements including those with EU had to be renegotiated, economic vulnerability would increase, and the Swedish language guarantees would be at risk (Anckar 2000, 7-16). Instead, Ahtisaari made a plea for an enlarged autonomy within the borders of Finland. When the revision of the Åland autonomy was prepared in a committee from 1946, the committee was instructed by the Finnish government to respect that Åland is an integrated part of Finland

(Kommittébetänkande 1946); such directives by the Finnish government during the past decades have not frightened the peaceful population of Åland. Instead the Åland people have continued to defend and to stepwise enlarge their sovereignty and to build robust and competent institutions to that effect. Admittedly, however, the EU membership has to a certain degree complicated the autonomy status of Åland.

Those seeking independence in the islands are inspired by an ideological mission, whereas those who work for an enlarged sovereignty are led by pragmatic considerations on finances, security, and other first-range issues. No organized interests in the islands work for a closer integration with the nation state. Various institutional arrangements and the self-rule administration of the territorial units have enhanced feelings of an ethnic distance to the nation state and have bolstered a territorial identity in the homogenous islands. For some, being named a Finn might even imply a violation of the person's national identity. In fact, the development towards an identity which is separate from the nation state has been reinforced by the various attempts at an institutional "nation-building", which have been promoted also by the introduction of visible symbols like an own flag, representation in Nordic Council, and own radio and TV channels. This ongoing development of an identity which is separate from the nation state was certainly never intended, when the *de jure* autonomy was first discussed. Finland has resisted or at least neglected aspirations of Åland to become a member of the Nordic Council and to get access to Swedish TV broadcastings instead of Finnish programs only. However, the aspirations were instead much promoted by the entry of the Faroe Islands to the Nordic Council and by a decision of the Swedish government to transmit TV broadcasts to Åland (Eriksson 1996, 59-70). In addition, autonomy as an institutional arrangement works as well in the opposite direction. Deeply rooted in the population, the enlarged autonomy has contributed to the disappearance from the public agenda of all attempts to merge with Sweden. Sovereignty counts not only in regards to the nation state but also in regards to the affined neighbor state.

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## **ELECTIONS**



## NORMS OF CITIZENSHIP – VIEWS ON ‘GOOD CITIZENSHIP’ IN SCANDINAVIA

*Åsa Bengtsson*

### Introduction

What does it mean to be a ‘good citizen’ from a Scandinavian perspective? In a seminal study, Helga Maria Hernes (1988) describes Scandinavian citizenship as a *social democratic model of citizenship*, pertaining to all areas of social life, and characterized by being activist, participatory, and egalitarian (1988, 200). Hernes, who introduced the concept of citizenship in the Scandinavian debate in the late 1980s<sup>1</sup>, builds her argument for a distinct model of citizenship on the strong social democratic legacy, and corporative model of democracy with a historical basis in waves of social movements based on mass-participation, such as the labour movement and temperance movement (1988, 200). According to Hernes, the model encompasses a norm of participation at different levels in society, not least in voluntary associations and social movements. It has also, due to its basis on group formation and group consciousness, transformed into a strong sense of solidarity among citizens (1988, 201; see also Skjeie & Siim 2000). The social democratic model of citizenship found in Scandinavia is thus, according to Hernes, a model that emphasize not only the bonds between state and individual citizens, but also to large extent rests on the relationship between individual members of society (1988, 202). The study by Helga Maria Hernes has had substantial impact on the Scandinavian academic debate on citizenship. Not all have accepted the model presented by Hernes, but a common understanding of the strong emphasis on participation at various levels appears to exist (Andersen & Hoff 2001).

Like large shares of the international literature, Scandinavian scholarship has shown only a limited interest in the views held by the citizens themselves. However, recent trends in the international scholarly debate do point toward an emerging interest in citizens’ own views on citizenship (see for example Dalton 2008b; Denters et al. 2007). This interest can be attributed to changes in western societies, and in particular, to a general transformation in the political behaviour and attitudes of citizens. Decreasing levels of turnout, party membership as well as

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<sup>1</sup> Citizenship is originally a legal concept. Since the 1950s it has however been used as a sociological concept as well (see for example Marshall 1950).

activity in civil associations has given rise to speculations about weakening civic norms in western democratic societies; trends that have dominated the Scandinavian debate as well (Amnå et al. 2007).

This study contributes to this trend of an altered perspective by focusing on the way in which citizens in Scandinavia perceive of the norms of good citizenship. The aim of the study is twofold. The first is to map norms of citizenship in three Scandinavian countries. Here, interest lies on the distribution of attitudes as well as their internal consistency, i.e. if there are logical patterns in the values held by the public. The second aim is to present the correlates of these norms. Are there systematic differences in the way different groups in society define good citizenship and by what are they determined? In line with Dalton, citizenship is defined as a 'shared set of expectations about the citizen's role in politics' (Dalton 2008b, 21). The data analysed is from the citizenship module of the *International Social Survey Program* (ISSP) in 2004 and covers ten different aspects of good citizenship. Included in the study are the three Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

## Norms of Citizenship

### *Evolving norms of citizenship?*

In the general discussion about the negative trends in turnout, party membership and political trust in advanced democracies, it is common to put the blame on citizen's values and norms (Dalton 2008a). It is often claimed that citizens of today, in particular the younger generations, are out of touch with society and democracy and that they are becoming increasingly individualized in their values. The feeling of belonging in society, the will to stand up for common interests and to contribute to the needs of others, is perceived as weakening over time. It has even been described as 'the extinction of good citizenship' (Denters et al. 2007, 89); or as Putnam describes the disappearance of the 'civic generation' among the American public: nowadays they bowl alone, or spend time in front of the TV or computer, instead of interacting with others in the community in civil organisations (Putnam 2002). Seen from this perspective, decreasing turnout rates and lower interest in joining political parties originate from a weaker willingness for collective work as well as lower sense of duty concerning common public interests, such as politics.

This pessimistic view on citizens' capacity and will to contribute has however, been challenged by those who maintain that the public is still active and politically interested, but that expectations on citizens are developing, as is the way people engage in politics. Instead of voting in elections and being active in long term, overarching, strictly organised and continuous activities, such as party activity or social organisations, engagement appears to be more focused on specific goals and short-term actions (Togeby et al. 2003; Selle et al. 2006). As a result of societal modernisation citizens are claimed to be more capable of defining their own place and role in democracy – a role that might not look the same as before.

Russell Dalton who, in his study *The Good Citizen* (2008b) studies civic-mindedness among Americans supports the view of changing, rather than decreasing norms of citizenship. The overarching theme of the study is that norms of citizenship are evolving and that the civic virtues emphasized look different from one generation to another. One of Dalton's finding is that that young Americans of today define civic-mindedness and citizenship differently from their predecessors, which implies that democracy as such, as constituted by its members, is changing. Rather than losing touch with democratic values and norms, the younger generation is developing their own sense of good citizenship as a result of modernization in society, the educational revolution, and changing value priorities. This view on citizenship puts greater emphasis on engagement; for example, being active in societal and political activities that are less tied to the state, being empathetic towards and helping others, and trying to influence society through consumer actions (Dalton 2008b, 27ff).<sup>2</sup>

Interestingly enough, the redefinition of citizenship as suggested by Dalton, have common traits with the values emphasized by Hernes (1988) in the Social democratic model of citizenship. Dalton presents recent changes in society as creating “independent, assertive citizens, concerned with others” (2008b, 4). Hernes

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<sup>2</sup> Apart from the American study by Dalton there is not much research that focus solely on views of good citizenship. A study from the European context by Denters, Gabriel and Torcal (2007) covers the topic, but with a slightly different focus. The study that is published in an anthology on participation and social capital, emphasizes the relationship between norms of citizenship and social interaction and trust rather than focusing on the more general question of what constitutes good citizenship in the eyes of European voters. The results presented do however, show that European citizenship is constituted by three dimensions of citizenship: solidarity, critical and deliberative principles and law-abidingness, all of which are widely endorsed in all of the European countries that are included in their study (2007, 95), in particular in Western Europe. The study utilizes comparative survey data from 12 European countries gathered in the project ‘Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy’ (CID).

on the other hand sees the social democratic legacy and the historical importance of the different waves of social movement resulting in "...widespread feelings of solidarity, in other words communal bonds toward one's fellow citizens rather than the state or the nation" (1988, 202). From different starting points, with radically different argumentation, as well as ideological predispositions, they both present a norm of citizenship based on engagement in civil society and a willingness to stand up for their fellow citizens.

If we turn to empirical studies in the Scandinavian context, we find that a common feature of the studies of citizenship performed in the arena is that they emphasize citizens behaviour, attitudes towards politics and most notably the aspect of participation, rather than what good citizenship entails in the eyes of the public (Rose & Pettersen 2002).<sup>3</sup> The few empirical studies of voter's views on citizenship that exist have been performed in Sweden and Norway only provides us with a fragmented and insufficient picture of citizens' perceptions of good citizenship.

The design of the Swedish citizenship-studies, carried out in three waves (1987, 1998 and 2002), have had substantial influence on later empirical studies on the views of citizenship from a comparative perspective (Denters et al. 2007; Dalton 2008b). Nonetheless, the Swedish data that has been gathered does not appear to have been explored to a great extent (see for example Petersson et al. 1989; Petersson et al. 1998) a fact that makes it hard to draw solid conclusions about the trends over time, as well as the main correlates of attitudes. It does, however, appear as if Swedes in general emphasize being law-abiding, forming independent opinions, as well as voting in elections, and that a slight overall decrease in the extent to which different norms are perceived as important has taken place over time (Petersson et al. 1998, 130).

Opinion data on norms of citizenship has been collected during the last two decades in the Norwegian context. They have also been analysed in greater

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<sup>3</sup> Decreasing participation rates, a greater scepticism towards politics, and over all changed prerequisites for democracy, are all themes that have been scrutinized in Nordic research. Recent examples are the audits of power, set up by the governments of Norway, Denmark and Sweden in the end of the 1990s in order to review the conditions of democracy (Amnå 2007, 62). Although, not studying voters own view of citizenship, they all dealt with the changed participation patterns in the three countries and concluded that the Scandinavian model of strong participatory is evolving (Denmark), eroding (Norway) or something in-between (Sweden) (ibid., 62-3). Other examples of studies of citizenship, that choose to emphasize actual participation and ignoring voters expectations civic virtues are *Medborgerskab* (Andersen et al. 1993) and *Democracy and Citizenship in Scandinavia* (Andersen & Hoff 2001).

detail than the corresponding Swedish studies (see for example Rose & Pettersen 2002; Rose 2005; Rose & Heidar 2007). The results indicate that a slight increase in support for civic virtues in terms of engagement has taken place over time among Norwegians, which is in line with the arguments made by Dalton (2008b). Virtues dealing with respect for the law have dropped marginally and have a stronger support among women, older generations and citizens with lower education (Rose & Heidar 2007).

Despite the above-mentioned studies, the overall impression is that our collective knowledge about norms of citizenship in the Scandinavian context, as well as their correlates and effects, leaves a lot to be desired. From a comparative perspective, the sparse research on voter's views of civic virtues gives the impression that norms of citizenship are not eroding among a majority of the public. In all democracies normative considerations about solidarity, obeying laws, autonomy and electoral participation are widely endorsed. Nevertheless, it also appears as if support for participation in voluntary associations, or being politically active is not being considered as the most important features of good citizenship (for more examples: Gross 1997; Theiss-Morse & Hibbing 2005), and that there might be a change taking place over time with regard to what types of norms that are emphasized (Dalton 2008b).

### *The concept of citizenship*

Citizenship deals with the relationship between individual citizens and the state. Perceptions of 'good citizenship' involve what can be expected from the members of a state in terms of behaviour and attitudes. Even though no consensus about the full model of good citizenship can be found, there is a common understanding of its essence, in terms of two basic components: equality in terms of value and membership in society, and acknowledgement of both rights and duties (Petersson 1998, 10).

The recognition that citizenship is constituted by both rights and duties concerning such features of life as legality, politics, social aspects, and participation (Janoski 1998), does not, however, solve the fact that different aspects are emphasized by different democratic traditions or theories. Liberals focus on autonomy and freedom of choice, social democrats on equality and social rights, republicans on participation, and communitarian views of citizenship stress social integration and the building of social capital through participation and cooperation as well as deliberation (Andersen & Hoff 2001, 2).

Yet another widely accepted view is that a democracy relies on both private and public engagement among its citizens (van Deth 2007, 404), this is often described as a distinction between vertical and horizontal citizenship (Andersen & Hoff 2001, 4). The distinction is made explicit by Conover et al. (1991), who describe citizenship as constituted by two relationships: the relationship between citizens and other members of society (horizontal dimension) and the relationship between the citizen and government (the vertical dimension). Citizenship thus defines the way these two relationships should function in order for a good democratic society to be realised.

### *Dimensions of citizenship*

In the relatively few attempts to link normative theories of citizenship with empirical research, a common procedure to distinguish between four different sub-dimensions of civic values or orientations has developed. This strategy is based on a classification introduced by the Swedish citizenship study in the 1980s (Pettersson et al. 1998, 129-30) and the four dimensions are; solidarity, participation, law obeying, and autonomy. The few studies that have measured norms of citizenship from a comparative perspective (ISSP, ESS, CID)<sup>4</sup> have used the same four dimensions as the Swedish study, although with a considerably lower number of items for each dimension (van Deth 2007, 409).

Many consider the first dimension – *participation* – as the heart of good citizenship. Participation is central to the philosophical literature on democracy and conceived as a primary criterion when defining the democratic citizen and the role of citizens in the democratic process. The view of participation as an important part of citizenship has been emphasized by the influential political theorists Carol Pateman (1970), Benjamin Barber (1984) and Jane Mansbridge (1980), and has been considered as an important part of Scandinavian citizenship (Andersen & Hoff 2001). In practice, political participation can involve different types of actions, and the pluralism is particularly evident among those proclaiming participatory democracy. Activity in civil society, for example in social or political organisations, was by Hernes (1988) presented as a cornerstone in the Scandinavian citizenship model, not the least due to its corporate-pluralist character (Rokkan 1987).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> ISSP = International Social Survey Program, ESS = European Social Survey, CID = Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy

<sup>5</sup> In Denmark corporatism in the political-administrative structures has been less strong than in Sweden and Norway. From a wider comparative perspective it can however still be considered as far stronger than in many other countries (Skjeie & Siim 2000, 348).



Nonetheless, in general it is turnout in an election that is perceived as the most important form of participation.

The second dimension is labelled *autonomy*. Autonomy implies that good citizens should be able to form independent opinions, critically evaluate arguments, debate political matters, and whilst also taking into account and understanding the opinions of others. Autonomy can also be labelled *critical rationalism* (Petersson et al. 1998). Key features of this dimension is the democratic ideal that has been very topical during the last two decades, namely deliberation including respect and understanding for the opinions held by others (Cohen 1989; Elster 1998). Autonomy was also one part of the model that Almond and Verba describe in *Civic Culture* (1963). In order to meet the requirements of democratic politics, citizens should be trusting and deferential but on the other hand, if they are too loyal, the risk of abuse from politicians becomes much higher. A critical sense, interest and activism are thus needed in order to keep check on political power.

*Social order* is the third dimension and deals with the acceptance of state authority as a part of citizenship. A good citizen is a person who values highly social order, who puts weight on obeying laws, and does not cheat with regard to state subsidies or taxes, and, it might also include, is willing to serve in the military. Indirectly this dimension also deals with the matter of whether a citizen is entitled to break the law in connection with the demands of his/her own conscience (Petersson 1998, 130).

The fourth and last dimension of citizenship is *solidarity*. This dimension clearly deals with the relationship between citizens in a community or between citizens in other parts of the world and is often emphasized by communitarians, but also by those proclaiming the participatory view of democracy (Denter et al. 2007, 92) and in the social democratic model of citizenship (Hernes 1988). The communitarian view stresses the importance of active citizenship and social activity for the good of society (Kymlicka & Norman 1995). The virtues that are considered as valuable within this dimension are unselfishness, hence to care for others rather than oneself and to prioritize the need of others before any personal benefits. In the social democratic view of citizenship as described by Hernes (1988), solidarity and egalitarianism are values that emanate from activism and group consciousness.

The four dimensions of civic virtues stressed in the literature, and the most important expectations concerning the behaviour of citizens that these involve are presented according to the distinction between vertical and horizontal aspects of citizenship in table 1. The vertical aspect of citizenship, which refers to the relationship between citizens and the government, is found in three out of four

dimensions. Turnout (participation), critical evaluation of the actions of government (autonomy) and law-abidingness as well as the duty to serve in the military (social order) all deal with the relationship between the state and its individual members. Associational involvement and consumption awareness (participation), the understanding of the reasoning by others (autonomy), and to help others (solidarity) are on the other hand examples of the horizontal aspect, also present in three out of the four dimensions. The scheme presented will be used in the empirical section later on in order to evaluate the values held by citizens in a comprehensible manner.

Table 1. Dimensions of good citizenship

	<b>Participation</b>	<b>Autonomy</b>	<b>Social Order</b>	<b>Solidarity</b>
<b>Vertical</b>	Turnout	Critically evaluate government actions	Law-abidingness Military service	
<b>Horizontal</b>	Associational involvement Aware consumption	Respect for the arguments of others		Help to others

## Empirical Design

This study is one of the few empirical attempts to study norms of citizenship empirically, and does so by focusing on attitudes towards civic virtues in Scandinavia, a region often described as consisting of strong democracies with high levels of public support and participation (Amnå et al. 2007, 61). The first aim of the study is descriptive of nature and involves two questions. The first question is what kind of civic virtues that are included in the concept of good citizenship, as formulated by the citizens themselves, and to what extent voters' ideals are coherent with the ideals presented by normative theorists. Yet another question of interest is whether, as Russell Dalton (2008b) claims, different dimensions of good citizenship exist, i.e. that there are systematic patterns in the way people comprehend different types of civic virtues. The second aim is to identify the socio demographic and political correlates of attitudes held by citizens. While the

question of deviating patterns among the Scandinavian countries and the source of this variation is a truly interesting one, it will be dealt with elsewhere.

The data utilised is from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) from 2004, with approximately 3,885 respondents in three Scandinavian countries. Each country is represented by a varying amount of respondents (Denmark 1,186, Sweden 1,295, Norway 1,404), but in the analyses they are weighted equally. The norms of citizenship are grasped by ten questions concerning ‘what it takes to be a good citizen’, and are thus generally phrased rather than asking specifically about individual behaviour.

The empirical analyses begin with a descriptive presentation of the support for different types of civic virtues. In the next step, the consistency of citizen’s views on good citizenship will be studied using principal component analysis. This is done in order to find out if there are well-founded dimensions in the way people perceive good citizenship. The third and last section of the empirical analysis will study the correlates of the different dimensions of citizenship, using factor scores extracted from the principal component analysis as dependent variables and three different sets of independent variables (socio-demographics, political attitudes, country dummies) introduced block-wised into the regression (OLS). In the analyses presented, all independent variables are recoded on a scale of 0 to 1. More detailed information concerning operationalisations is to be found in the appendix.

## Empirical Analyses

### *Norms of citizenship in the Nordic sphere*

The first step is to map the support for the ten different civic virtues that are included in the ISSP. Support for different aspects are measured on a scale of one to seven and presented in Table 2, both for each country separately and all the three countries jointly. The share of respondents reporting that the item is very important (6 or 7) is displayed alongside the mean score for each item. Clearly, there are distinct differences in the way in which voters value the different virtues. Some are by an overwhelming majority considered as a very important part of good citizenship, while others are regarded as very important by less than a third. Overall, it appears as if the ranking of the different virtues follows the same pattern in all countries, with only slight deviations.

The participatory aspect of Scandinavian citizenship, as emphasized by many Scandinavian scholars, does indeed appear to be deeply rooted among citizens as well. Voting in elections is considered as the most important feature of good citizenship, strongly supported by between 75 to 87 percent of the population in the three countries. Interestingly enough, the ranking closely follows that of real turnout rates. Denmark displays the highest levels of turnout in parliamentary elections, followed by Sweden and Norway.

Table 2. What it takes to be a good citizen, percentages and means.

	All three countries		Norway		Sweden		Denmark	
	%	mean	%	mean	%	mean	%	mean
Vote in elections	81	<b>6.3</b>	75	<b>6.1</b>	82	<b>6.3</b>	87	<b>6.5</b>
Obey laws	73	<b>6.1</b>	70	<b>6.0</b>	71	<b>6.0</b>	79	<b>6.2</b>
Not evade taxes	66	<b>5.8</b>	64	<b>5.7</b>	64	<b>5.7</b>	69	<b>5.9</b>
Try to understand opinions of others	63	<b>5.7</b>	62	<b>5.7</b>	62	<b>5.7</b>	66	<b>5.8</b>
Keep watch on actions of government	58	<b>5.6</b>	53	<b>5.5</b>	68	<b>5.9</b>	52	<b>5.5</b>
Help worse in own country	53	<b>5.4</b>	55	<b>5.5</b>	46	<b>5.1</b>	58	<b>5.6</b>
Help worse in the rest of the world	39	<b>4.9</b>	36	<b>4.8</b>	38	<b>4.8</b>	43	<b>5.0</b>
Willing to serve in military	38	<b>4.5</b>	40	<b>4.7</b>	3.5	<b>4.3</b>	40	<b>4.6</b>
Consume ethically	30	<b>4.4</b>	22	<b>4.1</b>	33	<b>4.5</b>	35	<b>4.6</b>
Be active in associations	16	<b>3.8</b>	21	<b>4.1</b>	11	<b>3.4</b>	15	<b>3.8</b>

*Note:* Displayed percentages depict the share of respondents who classify each of the items as an important part of good citizenship, i.e. ranking the item as high as 6-7 on a scale 1-7.

*Data:* ISSP

The horizontal aspect of participation, that is, activity in associations, presented by Hernes (1988) as a cornerstone of Scandinavian participatory tradition, does not, however, have the same strong support among the general public as voting in

elections. In fact, it is considered the least important part of good citizenship in all three countries. The virtues of a vivid civil society, and its effects on the wellbeing of democratic societies, so often proclaimed by social scientists, or ‘the independent eye of civil society’ as Tocqueville puts it (cited by Hernes 1988, 4), is obviously not widely recognised by the Scandinavian public. This conclusion is found in the previous literature as well (Petersson 1998; Rose 2005). The second horizontal aspect of participation included in the study; to use your consumption patterns in order to make a political statement or in order to influence the environment is valued slightly higher. About 30 percent considered these kinds of activities as a very important part of being a good citizen.

The second most important aspect of civic-mindedness has, according to the results in Table 2 to do with social order, which in turn deals with the vertical dimension of citizenship. To obey laws is regarded as very important by more than 70 percent of all citizens, closely followed by ‘not evading taxes’. According to these figures, support is strong for the common rules, and it is recognized that the functioning of the state depends on the willingness of citizens to obey laws and contribute to the financing of the general welfare state.

Yet another aspect stressed in the literature is critical rationalism or autonomy. If the previous aspect focused on the willingness to follow the rules, this aspect, in turn, involves the critical assessment of the actions of the government and an ability to understand the opinions of others; one of the key features of deliberation. The values of critical rationalism appear to enjoy wide support in the Scandinavian context, although the horizontal part of the concept is valued marginally higher than the vertical one. In most countries, it is thus, seen as more important to make an effort to understand the opinions held by others, than to critically assess the actions of the government in order to be a responsible citizen. The second aspect that is considered as a crucial part of the social democratic model of citizenship is solidarity. Indeed, just above fifty percent regard it as a very important part of good citizenship to show solidarity and help those who are less privileged in their own country. Solidarity does appear, however, to have rather distinct geographical boundaries. The corresponding figure for helping people in other parts of the world is notably lower.

A general interpretation of the results presented in Table 2 is that Scandinavian citizens greatly appreciate the traditional and vertical aspects of citizenship. Traditional values in relation to the state, such as voting in elections, obeying laws and not evading taxes are still regarded as the most important of civic virtues. Activities and values that are more strongly directed towards the horizontal

dimension of citizenship, and thus deal with the relationships between citizens, or society at large, is seen as less vital. In order to be a good citizen in the eyes of the general Scandinavian public it is thus far more important to cast a ballot on Election day and to pay taxes, than to be engaged in the surrounding society, show solidarity or to be a politically or ethically aware consumer.

### *Dimensions of citizenship*

The next task is to explore whether the attitudes presented above represent a well-structured set of values. That is, whether they are well founded or purely random in character. A common critique of public opinion research is that it measures snap shots of shallow attitudes, rather than stable and well thought thru opinions, especially when dealing with complex themes (Zaller & Feldman 1992). However, according to previous research people tend answer questions concerning good citizenship in line with logical and consistent dimensions (Rose & Pettersen 2002; Denters et al. 2007; Dalton 2008b), which indicates that the problem of randomness is likely not to be overwhelming. Yet another interesting question that can be answered by studying patterns among the questions is whether voters' views on civic virtues are consistent with the aspects that are discussed in the normative discussion.

The dimensions found in previous empirical research have varied, partly due to different methodological approaches but also because the amount and type of questions used to grasp good citizenship differ from one study to another. While Dalton's study (2008b), after testing several alternative procedures among the American public resulted in two dimensions, Rose and Pettersen (2002) found no less than five attitudinal dimensions among Norwegians, while at the European level, Denters et al. (2007) found three distinct dimensions. Since the data material (ISSP) used in this study is the same as in the study by Dalton, his study appears to be the most natural comparison.

In order to identify the existing patterns in citizens' expectations on good citizenship principal component analysis with oblimin rotation is used in order to extract dimensions with *eigenvalues* above 1.0.<sup>6</sup> Variables with loadings above 0.5 are

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<sup>6</sup> The choice to use the oblique method direct oblimin rather than the more commonly found orthogonal method of varimax rotations is motivated by the fact that there is no *a priori* reason to expect the dimensions of civic virtues to be uncorrelated as assumed by the Varimax rotation. The procedure chosen is inline with the one used by Denters et al. (2007), but different than the strategy used by Dalton (2008a) who uses varimax rotation and chooses to extract only two dimensions rather than using a certain *eigenvalue* as cut-point.

considered as loading strongly onto a dimension, and are marked in bold. Loadings above 0.4 are marked by italics.

Table 3. Dimensions of democratic citizenship, principal component analysis (pattern matrix with oblimin rotation)

	Dimensions of good citizenship											
	ALL COUNTRIES			NORWAY			SWEDEN			DENMARK		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Vote in elections	0.04	0.28	<b>0.54</b>	0.09	<i>0.43</i>	<i>0.40</i>	-0.03	0.19	<b>0.67</b>	0.05	0.20	<b>0.55</b>
Keep watch on actions of government	0.11	0.28	<b>0.50</b>	0.21	0.33	<i>0.41</i>	-0.02	0.25	<b>0.67</b>	0.20	0.32	<i>0.41</i>
Be willing to serve in military	-0.06	-0.18	<b>0.75</b>	-0.05	-0.10	<b>0.82</b>	0.01	-0.22	<b>0.58</b>	-0.13	-0.10	<b>0.78</b>
Not evade taxes	0.08	<b>0.85</b>	-0.08	0.08	<b>0.82</b>	-0.22	0.13	<b>0.84</b>	0.04	0.05	<b>0.85</b>	-0.08
Obeys laws	-0.08	<b>0.87</b>	0.07	-0.10	<b>0.86</b>	0.05	-0.04	<b>0.87</b>	0.08	-0.09	<b>0.87</b>	0.08
Be active social / pol. associations	<i>0.46</i>	0.03	0.38	<b>0.54</b>	0.20	0.10	0.32	0.09	<b>0.52</b>	<b>0.52</b>	-0.12	<i>0.43</i>
Try to understand others opinions	<b>0.62</b>	-0.09	0.18	<b>0.56</b>	-0.07	0.30	<b>0.58</b>	-0.12	0.23	<b>0.67</b>	-0.03	0.05
Consume ethical, environm., pol.	<b>0.69</b>	0.00	-0.01	<b>0.77</b>	0.03	-0.13	<b>0.67</b>	-0.06	0.11	<b>0.65</b>	-0.02	-0.01
Help worse of in own country	<b>0.77</b>	0.04	-0.05	<b>0.69</b>	-0.04	0.11	<b>0.82</b>	0.13	-0.09	<b>0.78</b>	0.05	-0.06
Help worse of in rest of the world	<b>0.85</b>	0.03	-0.18	<b>0.84</b>	-0.04	-0.20	<b>0.89</b>	0.08	-0.17	<b>0.80</b>	0.05	-0.13
Eigenvalues	3.15	1.38	1.04	3.24	1.27	1.05	3.32	1.40	1.13	2.95	1.52	1.02
Variance (%)	31.47	13.76	10.38	32.40	12.74	10.46	33.24	13.95	11.25	29.46	15.19	10.19
Correlation	Dimension											
1		0.26	0.27		0.32	0.23		0.20	0.32		0.20	0.24
2			0.19			0.18			0.15			0.20

*Notes:* Dimension 1: horizontal norms of citizenship. Dimension 2: norms of social order. Dimension 3: Traditional norms of citizenship. Variables are coded on a scale of 0 to 1. 1= 'very important', 0 'not important at all'. Don't knows are coded as 0.5.

*Data:* ISSP

Results from the principal component analyses are presented in Table 3, including results for all three countries and for each country separately. In all of the four analyses, three different dimensions are extracted. The first and most stable dimension corresponds well with what Dalton (2008a; 2008b) describes as engaged citizenship and comprises of all items that involve horizontal civic virtues. The items that strongly loads onto this dimension are thus to show solidarity with others, both in the citizen's own country and in the rest of the world, participation in terms of political consumerism (Stolle et al. 2005) and associational involvement as well as autonomy in terms of trying to understand the opinions of others. A plainer version of this dimension, including only two items, by Denters et al. (2007, 94) was found to be stable in most European countries as well.

The second dimension that is extracted can be labelled social order and appears the same in all cases (jointly for all four countries, and for each of the countries separately), but with notably lower *eigenvalues*. This dimension is restricted to law-abiding behaviour and involves the two items of 'not evading taxes' and

‘obeying laws’, both of which load strongly onto the dimension. A corresponding dimension is found to exist at the European level by Denters et al. (2007, 94) as well as by Rose and Pettersen (2002) in Norway, and it can be considered as logically consistent. According to this result, paying taxes and obeying laws hence constitutes an important and independent dimension of good citizenship.

The third and last dimension found, labelled ‘traditional norms of citizenship’, is slightly less consistent than the two previous. In the analysis that includes all countries, it consists of three items; voting in elections, keep watch on the actions of government, and serving in the military. Apart for the item of military duty, this dimension deals with political activity that is directed towards the arena of representative democracy – to vote in elections and to keep watch on government actions – which in the debate is often presented as a diminishing activity and as part of the civic virtues that are losing support among the general public.

One of the ten items included in the analyses provides us with an inconsistent pattern in the cross-country comparison, namely associational activity. In the analysis for Sweden, this item loads more strongly onto the third and traditional dimension, while it in Norway and in Denmark it fits better with the first dimension, dominated by horizontal values of citizenship. A closer look at the way this particular item is phrased does however reveal an answer to the puzzle. The statement consists of two distinct types of organisations, namely ‘social and political organisations’. Depending on the interpretation by the respondent, it might be seen as a part of the traditional spheres of politics with emphasis on involvement in political parties, or as a wider concept of associational activities in the social sphere in general. The potential problem with different interpretations is likely to cause the unstable pattern.

On an overarching level, the principal component analyses reveal a pattern that appears as both rather stable, and logical. It is also relatively coherent with theories of good citizenship. Among the Scandinavian public there hence appears to be three different comprehensions of citizenship, marked in Table 4. One is more or less identical to the one found by Dalton (2008b) in the United States and consists of all the horizontal virtues that deals with engagements of a private character, irrespective of the four dimensions of participation, autonomy, social order and solidarity. Contrary to Dalton’s one-dimensional results concerning the vertical virtues, the result found in the Scandinavian context is divided into two



distinct dimensions – one consisting of social order and one that combines the three aspects of participation, social order, and autonomy.<sup>7</sup>

**Table 4.** Dimensions of good citizenship

	<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>AUTONOMY</b>	<b>SOCIAL ORDER</b>	<b>SOLIDARITY</b>
<b>VERTICAL</b>	1. Turnout	5. Critically evaluate government actions	2,3. Law-abidingness 8. Military service	
<b>HORIZONTAL</b>	9. Associational involvement 10. Aware consumption	4. Respect for the arguments of others		6,7. Help others

As can be witnessed from the ranking of each of the ten items included in the study, also presented in Table 4, there is an obvious tendency among Scandinavians to give higher priority to virtues that deal with the interaction between citizens and government (vertical). While some citizens put emphasis on social order, others call attention to a traditional and politically active citizenry. It also stands clear that a distinct part of the public regards horizontal aspects of citizenship as very important.

<sup>7</sup> Further investigations do however reveal that the deviation is a result of different methodological approaches. If we choose to extract only two dimensions using varimax rotation in the Nordic sphere, we will find the same pattern as Dalton, i.e. a clear distinction in one engaged and one duty-based dimensions, where the last is a combination of the dimensions of social order and traditional norms that we find in the second and third dimensions presented in Table 3.

*The determinants of norms of citizenship*

The next step in the empirical section is to analyse the correlates of the three dimensions of good citizenship found in the principal component analyses above. The dependent variables analysed are factor scores extracted from the analysis in table four, i.e. norms of citizenship that are based around horizontal or traditional aspects of citizenship, and values related to social order. Previous research points to some common traits concerning what effects civiness (see for ex. Petersson et al. 1989; 1998; Rose & Pettersen 2002; Denters et al. 2007; Rose & Heidar 2007; Dalton 2008b). The importance of age is stressed by Dalton (2008a; 2008b), but apart from age, also gender, education, religiosity, political interest and ideology have proven to influence the norms held by citizens. In the analyses, the independent variables included are structured in three groups that are introduced block-wise into the regression analysis.

The first set of independent variables consists of factors related to the socio-demographic background of citizens. This involves age, gender, marital status, education, as well as religiosity, factors that nearly all empirical studies of political behaviour and attitudes rely on as explanations. According to Dalton (2008a; 2008b) age is a key variable that allows us to differentiate between different types of civic norms, where the younger generations are more inclined to stress values of engagement rather than duty. Moreover, previous studies from Norway and Sweden indicate that there are differences in the extent to which certain norms are endorsed according to age, gender, and education (Petersson et al. 1998; Rose & Pettersen 2002). A general pattern appears to be that support for most norms increase with age and religiosity. Other tendencies are that women endorse norms of engagement more strongly than men do, i.e. norms dealing with the horizontal aspect of citizenship, and that social order is emphasized by citizens with lower levels of education (Rose & Heidar 2007).

The second set of variables deals with citizen's political preferences and their relation towards the political arena. It seems reasonable to assume that the general attitudes towards politics can influence the norms of citizenship held by individuals. Not the least since it often is taken for granted that changes in society, as well as at the political arena are causing change in the way norms of citizenship are regarded. Not surprisingly, previous research indicates that ideology and political interest play an important role. In line with Hernes' (1988) claim regarding a social democratic model of citizenship based on participation, egalitarianism and solidarity, more recent studies have shown that left-wing sympathisers are more

inclined to support horizontal norms of engagement (Rose & Pettersen 2002; Dalton 2008b). According to Petersson et al. (1998), political interested citizens are more inclined to stress values related to autonomy as well as participation.

However, the relationship that people have towards the political arena might involve much more than mere interest and ideological preferences. In order to obtain a broader picture three additional variables, which grasp the way people relate to the political arena will be included. The first two cover political efficacy, that is, the subjective feeling that citizens have the possibility to influence politics. Political efficacy involves two different components; internal efficacy, which refers to beliefs about one's own competence to understand and participate effectively in political matters, and external efficacy, which concerns beliefs about the responsiveness of governmental authorities to the demands of citizens (Niemi et al. 1991, 1407-08). It is also likely that the general attitude towards the democratic system have an impact on peoples' expectations on a good citizen. A more negative sense towards the general system, as well as how it works and how understandable it is, can be expected to bring about a generally lower level of expectations.

As was stated in the section on empirical design, the analysis concentrates on the general patterns, rather than breaking down the results into each of the three countries examined. In order to control for different attitudinal predispositions among the countries included in the analysis, country-dummies will however be included in the model as a third set of variables.

Results from the nine different OLS-regressions, i.e. three regressions for each of the dependent variables using block wise inclusion of the independent variables, are presented in Table 5. Looking first at the dimension of horizontal norms, it is clear that the extent to which norms of engagement are endorsed, varies according to the socio-demographic background of citizen. Those of a higher age and with a higher level of education, as well as those who are religious are more inclined to emphasise civic virtues that focus on the way citizens relate to each other in society. The effect of education does however disappear, when controls for political attitudes and country dummies are introduced in model two and three. According to the political variables included in the second block, an engaged citizenry enjoys a higher level of support among people with a bright view of politics. It is the politically interested, with a positive view of the responsiveness of the political system (external efficacy), as well as of the democratic system, that emphasize horizontal virtues. Moreover, left-wing sympathisers are found to be far more inclined than their right-wing counterparts, to support engaged citizenship. This result is in line with previous research as well as with theoretical expectations

based on the social democratic model of citizenship with its cornerstones of involvement and solidarity (Hernes 1988). Results for country dummies included in the last model indicate that differences between the three countries are modest.

Table 5. Different dimensions of good citizenship under control for socio-economic resources, political attitudes and country effects (OLS regression)

	HORIZONTAL			SOCIAL ORDER			TRADITIONAL		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Age / 100	0.50 *** (0.11)	0.43 *** (0.12)	0.40 *** (0.12)	1.55 *** (0.09)	1.56 *** (0.12)	1.54 *** (0.12)	1.13 *** (0.11)	0.96 *** (0.12)	1.00 *** (0.12)
Gender (male)	-0.31 *** (0.03)	-0.35 *** (0.03)	-0.34 *** (0.03)	-0.43 *** (0.03)	-0.44 *** (0.04)	-0.43 *** (0.04)	0.27 *** (0.03)	0.18 *** (0.03)	0.18 *** (0.03)
Marital status (married)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.12 ** (0.04)	0.09 * (0.04)	0.09 * (0.04)
Education	0.42 *** (0.06)	0.09 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	-0.17 ** (0.06)	-0.34 *** (0.07)	-0.36 *** (0.07)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.36 *** (0.07)	-0.33 *** (0.07)
Religiosity	0.62 *** (0.08)	0.55 *** (0.08)	0.54 *** (0.08)	0.49 *** (0.08)	0.52 *** (0.09)	0.51 *** (0.09)	0.33 *** (0.09)	0.20 * (0.08)	0.22 ** (0.08)
Political interest		0.89 *** (0.07)	0.87 *** (0.07)		0.15 * (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)		0.94 *** (0.07)	0.98 *** (0.07)
Internal efficacy		0.00 (0.08)	0.10 (0.10)		0.02 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)		0.45 *** (0.10)	0.39 *** (0.10)
External efficacy		0.37 *** (0.07)	0.37 *** (0.07)		0.09 (0.07)	0.09 (0.07)		0.16 * (0.07)	0.16 * (0.07)
Satisfaction with democracy		0.34 *** (0.09)	0.29 ** (0.09)		0.69 *** (0.09)	0.63 *** (0.09)		0.43 *** (0.09)	0.53 *** (0.09)
Ideological position (right)		-0.78 *** (0.07)	-0.81 *** (0.07)		-0.32 *** (0.07)	-0.34 *** (0.05)		0.15 * (0.07)	0.20 ** (0.07)
Norway			-0.08 (0.04)			-0.09 * (0.04)			0.14 *** (0.04)
Sweden			-0.10 * (0.04)			-0.08 (0.05)			0.18 *** (0.04)
Constant	-0.47 *** (0.07)	-0.79 *** (0.10)	-0.66 *** (0.12)	-0.56 *** (0.07)	-0.94 (0.11)	0.83 *** (0.12)	-0.86 *** (0.06)	-1.59 *** (0.11)	-1.83 *** (0.11)
F-value / sign.	47.71 ***	64.99 ***	54.73 ***	93.96 ***	48.43 ***	48.42 ***	50.37 ***	52.67 ***	45.71 ***
R <sup>2</sup>	0.06	0.18	0.18	0.13	0.16	0.17	0.07	0.15	0.16
Adj.R <sup>2</sup>	0.06	0.18	0.18	0.13	0.16	0.16	0.06	0.15	0.16
N	3959	2936	2936	3595	2936	2936	3595	2936	2936

Notes: Entries are unstandardised regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. All independent variables are coded on a scale of 0 to 1. Dependent variables: factor scores derived from the principal component analysis in table 3. Model 1: socio-demographics, Model 2: socio-demographics + political attitudes, Model 3: socio-demographics + political attitudes + country dummies. Denmark is used as a reference category. For more variable information see appendix. Data: ISSP.

The second norm of good citizenship that is analysed is the dimension of social order. Here results show that age is the most dominant explanatory factor with the strongest displayed effect in all of the three models analysed. Civic virtues, in terms of following laws and not evading taxes, clearly have a significantly stronger support among the older generations, but also among women and citizens with lower levels of education. Religiosity once more turns out to have a relatively strong and positive effect. Among the political variables, satisfaction with democracy correlates positively with support for social order and left wing supporters also give more weight to these aspects. However, in general, the importance of the political

variables is not very extensive. Political interest, subjective political competence or the view of the responsiveness of the political arena does not have a significant influence on the extent to which social order is stressed. Once more differences between countries are found to be modest.

The third and last dimension analysed in Table 5, deals with traditional norms, or what can be described as vertical norms with a political emphasis. Voting in elections, keeping watch on the actions of government, and being willing to serve in the military are civic virtues that are highly endorsed by the older generations. Thus, age once more stand out as one of the most powerful predictors. Other socio-demographic factors of importance are marital status, education, gender, and religiosity. People who are married or living together as married are more inclined to attribute importance to this ideal, a result inline with research on actual behaviour such as turnout, where those living together with someone have proven to be easier to mobilise (Evans 2004, 156). The result concerning education does at first sight appear as puzzling. In the first model, the effect is not significant. However, when controls for political attitudes are introduced the effect of education becomes negative and significant, which is probably due to a more positive view of politics among the older generations with a generally lower level of education than their younger counterparts. Over all, men and religiously inclined people transpire to be more supportive of the traditional, or duty-based dimension of good citizenship.

Among the political variables included in the second block, political interest emerges as having the strongest and most positive effect. The subjective political competence (internal efficacy), also plays a significant role while the effect of external efficacy is more modest. In order to support a traditional model of citizenship it is thus more important to have a positive view of ones own political competence than to consider the system as responsive. As for the previous two dimensions analysed, satisfaction with democracy displays a positive effect. It is noteworthy that traditional norms of citizenship, in contrast to the other two dimensions, attract right wing sympathisers to a larger extent. The third and last model that controls for country-differences shows that the support for traditional norms of citizenship is somewhat higher in both Norway and Sweden compared to Denmark.

When we compare the results presented for each of the three dimension of good citizenship there are interesting differences, as well as similarities. The most striking similarity is the effect of age. Although with different strength, the same tendency applies to all three dimensions: good citizenship of all kinds are more

strongly endorsed by older generations. The effect is clearly much stronger when it comes to norms on the vertical dimension, i.e. traditional-based norms as well as norms of social order, but age also displays a positive effect for horizontal civic virtues. The results found by Dalton in the American context, where he claims that the young attribute more importance to engaged norms of citizenship than the elderly do, is thus not replicated in the Scandinavian sphere. If we are assuming that we are dealing with generational effects, a rather pessimistic picture for the future of norms of citizenship is provided. If, on the other hand, norms of citizenship evolve with age, changes over time might not be extensive. Two other general observations are that religiosity as well as satisfaction with democracy has a general tendency to reinforce norms of citizenship, no matter of what kind. Religious people and people with a positive view of democracy are thus more likely to have higher expectations of their fellow citizens in relation to society as well as the political sphere.

One of the interesting differences between the dimensions analysed is the effect of education. While an engaged citizenry is supported by the relatively highly educated, the result for social order and traditional norms displays the opposite result. Education obviously strengthens values such as respect for the opinions of others, politically aware consumption and showing solidarity with others, although the two last might have to do with economic prerequisites as an effect of higher education. Another difference has to do with the importance of political interest, where activity appears to play an important role. Civic virtues that stress passive law-abiding are not reinforced by an interest in political matters, while the effect becomes stronger the closer we come to the arena of representative democracy. Concerning any ideological leaning there is a clear predisposition for left-wing supporters to endorse engaged, as well as law-abiding norms, while traditional norms are more strongly enforced by right-wing sympathisers.

## Conclusions

When Helga Maria Hernes (1988) introduced the concept of citizenship into the Scandinavian scholarly debate she described Scandinavian civiness as a specific, social democratic model, characterised by being activist, participatory and egalitarian. The virtues presented as central by Hernes are today all considered as threatened in the general public debate. Turnout is decreasing, as is engagement in civil society, and values are claimed to be becoming more individualised in

character. From a general perspective, it appears as if the model presented by Hernes is under pressure.

Unfortunately, we do not possess data that allows us to determine if a change, in line with this development in society, has taken place in the norms fostered by citizens. However, if we consider the altered living standards, the educational revolution, the changes in social interaction, gender roles, social diversity, and geographical mobility that have characterised our societies the last decades, it would be far more surprising to find that it had not affected the way citizens view, and relate to the political sphere and their fellow citizens.

What our present data can provide us with is the fact that norms of citizenship look very much alike in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The data also confirm that good citizenship, in the eyes of the Scandinavian public, relies more on the relationship between the public and government than on the relationship between citizens and other members of society. Participation, which is described as central to the Scandinavian model, is indeed important, but mainly in terms of voting in elections and keeping an eye on the actions of government, and not so much with an involvement in associations. Another vital part of good citizenship is to support social order, to obey laws and pay taxes.

A distinct strata of the public gives higher priority to the horizontal norms of citizenship, and in line with the thoughts presented by Hernes, they tend to be found on the left side of the ideological continuum. In addition, even though horizontal norms of citizenship are supported by citizens who tend to be less at age than supporters of vertical dimensions of civic virtues, they still increase with age. On this point, the Scandinavian public deviates from the American. A plausible explanation for this deviation is the strong influence of the social democratic model of citizenship, which has created strong norms of solidarity and civic participation, mainly among the older generations.

Over all, the tendency to stress the importance of all dimensions of civic virtues for good citizenship increase by age. Older generations have higher expectations of their fellow citizens than the younger. Unfortunately, we cannot determine if the strong overall effect of age on norms of citizenship is of generational character, and thus causes a long-term decline in civic virtues, or if we are dealing with life cycle effects. The question of whether future norms of citizenship will be undermined can only be determined over time. Naturally, we cannot be sure of the causal relationship between norms of citizenship and political behaviour. We might expect values to influence the way voters choose to behave, but it also appears likely that activity of certain kinds cause citizens to shift their

values (Theiss-Morse & Hibbing 2005, 230). In order to clarify the role of norms of citizenship, further studies will have to be carried out.

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## APPENDIX

*Norms of citizenship*

‘There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a good citizen. As far as you are concerned personally, on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it...?’

1. Always to vote in elections
2. Never try to evade taxes
3. Always to obey laws and regulations
4. To keep watch on the actions of government
5. To be active in social or political associations
6. To try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions
7. To choose products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, even if they cost a bit more
8. To help people in (COUNTRY) who are worse off than yourself
9. To help people in the rest of the world who are worse off than yourself
10. To be willing to serve in the military at a time of need.

Recoded into a scale of 0 to 1, 0.5 = can't choose.

*Independent variables:*Socio-demographics

Age:	Age divided by 100
Gender:	1 = male, 0 = female
Marital status:	1 = married or living together as married, 0=other
Education:	1 = university degree completed, 0=no formal education (five categories)
Religiosity	1 = attends religious services several times a week, 0 = never attends (eight categories)

Political:

Political interest: ‘How interested would you say you personally are in politics?’

1 = very interested, 0=not interested at all, 0.5=can't choose

Internal efficacy: Additive index based on two questions:

‘I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing (COUNTRY)’

0 = strongly disagree, 1 = strongly agree, 0.5 = can't choose / neither agree nor disagree)

'I think most people in (COUNTRY) are better informed about politics and government than I am'

0 = strongly agree, 1 = strongly disagree, 0.5 = can't choose / neither agree nor disagree

External efficacy: Additive index based on two questions:

'People like me don't have any say about what the government does'

'I don't think the government cares much what people like me think'

0 = strongly agree, 1 = strongly disagree, 0.5 = can't choose / neither agree nor disagree

Satisfaction with democracy: 'How well does democracy work in (COUNTRY) today?'

0 = very poorly, 1 = very well, 0.5 = can't choose (ten point scale).

Ideological position: 0 = far left, 1 = far right, 0.5 = centre and hesitators (five point scale)

## DO ISSUES MATTER? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE ISSUE-ORIENTED RATIONALITY OF VOTERS

*Göran Djupsund*

“In order to plan its politics so as to gain voters, the government must discover some relationship between what it does and how citizens vote. In our model, the relationship is derived from *the axiom that citizens act rationally in politics. This axiom implies that each citizen casts his vote for the party he believes will provide him with more benefits than any other*” (Downs 1965, 30, italics added).

Anthony Downs uses these words to lay the foundation of his conception of rational voting behaviour. There exist, however, a great variety of obstacles hindering the citizen to behave in this rational way. Downs himself stresses the uncertainty and the lack of information that characterises the situation of the individual voter. We do not wish to embark upon a discussion and criticism of the inner logic of Downsian theory. Our aim is only to stress the Downsian axiomatic point of departure, the assumption that the citizen wishes to make rational political decisions based on some kind of cost-benefit analysis of existing alternatives.

The Downsian theory is fairly old and has been thoroughly criticised from many angles. The general judgement thus seems to be that the theory is somewhat oversimplified, due to a large extent that its basic elements come from the world of economics.

The basic Downsian notion of rationality - the voter's strive for rational decisions - is nevertheless very much alive. In a metaphorical way of speaking it still today constitutes the anchor for a great part of electoral research (see, for example, Holmberg 1981; Pesonen, Sänkiäho & Borg 1993; Oskarsson 1994; Borg & Sänkiäho 1995; Gilljam & Holmberg 1995). Researchers that maintain that "issues" have passed "class or socio-economic origin as the main set of explanations for voting behaviour" would be on thin ice if it were not for this basic Downsian assumption of voter rationality (cf. Oskarsson 1994). Hence, the conception of issue voting presupposes the existence of the voter's issue-oriented rationality; voters compare their own views on issues that they find important with the corresponding views of candidates running for office.

Having pinpointed the basic importance of the notion of rationality in electoral research, especially regarding issue voting, we leave the more or less pure theoretical discussions aside. Instead, this article sets out to shed further light on empirical aspects of voting behaviour. The aim of this study is to empirically explore the level of voter's issue-oriented rationality, hereafter IOR, and circumstances that possibly explain variations as to this level.\*

## Introduction; the Problem

The overall problem in empirical studies of voter's issue-oriented rationality is twofold. The first problem is the vast amount of possibly relevant issues that are connected to parliamentary elections in general. Researchers trying to bring down the number of issues to a researchable level meet with both empirical and theoretical problems hard to solve. Secondly, one usually faces problems regarding the access to relevant information. The logic behind empirical tests of IOR presupposes knowledge of the opinions of both voters and candidates. Information regarding opinions of the voters is, by and large, not hard to come by. Far greater problems arise when it comes to candidates and their opinion on different issues. Partly this problem stems from the great number of candidates in many elections. Still, the main problem seems to be the reluctance of political candidates to give more or less categorical answers regarding political decisions yet to come. Previous researchers display a number of ways to deal with these problems. One method is to compare the voter's own positions on different issues with their perceptions of the positions of different parties (see, for example, Denver & Hands 1990; Middendorp, Luyten & Pooms 1993). The common denominator of previous studies seems to be the researcher's lack of firsthand knowledge regarding the candidates, as well as the voter's opinions on issues considered vital for the upcoming elections.

These two obstacles have thus characterised the empirical testing of the issue-oriented rationality of voters; the great number of potentially pertinent issues and the fact that relevant information on both candidates, and voters, standpoints is very hard to come by.

In this study we focus on the Finnish election of members to the parliament of the European Union. The election that took place in 1996 is, in many

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ways, particularly well suited for a test of IOR. The division of seats was, as usual in Finnish elections, calculated on the basis of the share of votes gained by each party. Still, the importance of individual candidates was strongly emphasised. This was partly due to the fact that, in contrast to other Nordic countries, the praxis of listing the candidates within each party is not in use in Finland. The individual candidate that gathers the greatest number of personal votes within a certain party gets the party's first seat in the parliament. Secondly, almost without exception of the parties managed to show a more or less unanimous party policy regarding the development of the EU and its relations to Finland. This fact placed a still bigger weight on the individual candidate and his/hers opinions than what is the case in normal parliamentary elections. The total number of candidates was also remarkably low. Since the entire country was treated as one electoral district – instead of the common division into 13 districts – the parties nominated only 16 candidates each. The total number of candidates running for the Finnish seats in the European union's parliament was thus only 160 (for a more thorough description of the election, see Anckar 1997).

As a consequence of the conditions mentioned above, the campaign that took place might be characterised as a highly personalised one. The candidates took turns in presenting their views and in swinging at each other - both within and between parties - while the parties themselves remained more or less in the background.

This particular election suits our aims in one further way. The number and the scope of issues debated prior to the election were quite limited and narrow compared to normal parliamentary elections. One might say that the controversial issues were few but rather large. They touched upon the general policies of the EU and Finland's role in the union, rather than upon a great number and variety of specific and tangible issues.

Hence, the campaign as a whole can be characterised as one where a rather small number of candidates debated a surprisingly limited number of fairly large and important issues. From the voters' point of view, this meant that it was far easier than in a regular parliamentary election to obtain information regarding the views of individual candidates. The comparisons between candidates were also easier than normal. Thus we maintain that the prerequisites for issue-oriented rationality among the voters were exceptionally high in this election.

## Data and Methods

The design of our empirical study is rather simple and straightforward. A special newsdesk at the Finnish Broadcasting Company (A-studio at YLE) conducted a study of opinions regarding the European Union about one month before the election. The target population of this study was the bulk of candidates participating in the election. The outcome of the study was successful, in so far as all candidates, except for a handful, answered the questions. The questionnaire consisted of twenty questions with fixed alternative answers. The topics of the study had been chosen in order to cover heavier and more serious as well as lighter or more image-oriented aspects of the EU and its relations to Finland.

The topics, items and alternative answers might not have been the actual ones, had we only been given the opportunity to influence the construction of the questionnaire. Despite this remark, we maintain that the 20 questions, as a whole, covered the pre-election discussions and campaigning quite well.

After negotiations with the news-desk in question, we thus, some two weeks prior to the elections, had at our disposal a data-set describing practically every candidate's views on the bulk of topics that had been discussed during the electoral campaign.

The next stage consisted in gathering still a further set of data, one that would describe the opinions of the voters regarding these twenty topics related to the EU. Since our concept of issue-oriented rationality is, by definition, connected to voters as individuals not as a group, we had no need to pull a representative sample of the electorate in general. Instead, we chose younger, educated voters as our target population. We thus ran the twenty questions to three groups of students (overall N=143). In connection to the filling of questionnaires, the students were offered a chance to recollect their memories of the candidates. All the printed material used by the candidates during their campaigns was gathered and presented on a number of billboards.

The questionnaire presented to the students departed to some extent from the one answered by the candidates. The questions we had added mapped the socio-economic background, age, previous political activity and the level of political interest of the students. The respondents were also asked to name the candidate they were going to vote for in the upcoming election. Since Election Day was due in less than a week, some of the students had actually already voted using the possibility to vote in advance at state post offices. Since the object of this study was IOR, we added one further area of inquiries to the questionnaire. The respondents



were thus asked to weight the importance of eight listed components that they might take into consideration while choosing a candidate. These eight components or grounds for decisions were the candidate's party affiliation, age, experience and competence, opinions, sex, personality, place of residence and probability of being elected. Thus, this question gives us a picture of how the respondents perceive the grounds for their own voting behaviour.

As a whole we maintain that our set of data is rather unique in a number of ways. It covers the opinions of nearly all candidates regarding almost all the central topics that were debated during the campaign. If one of our respondents picked a candidate who was among the few that had not answered the questionnaire this candidate was contacted. None of them refused to answer. Thus, the data set covers all candidates that received votes by our set of respondents. Furthermore, it gives us the same information for a group of voters supplemented with information regarding the actual voting behaviour and personal characteristics of these voters. Hence, this set of data gives us an opportunity to measure the level of IOR among the voters. This is, in general terms, done by comparing the opinions stated by the individual, the candidate he or she voted for, and the rest of the candidate population. In this context we assume that a Downsian view on IOR would require the voter to pick a candidate that matches his/her opinions to a quite high extent. Rather than choosing a candidate representing different views, the voter should opt for an MP sharing as many views as possible.

The empirical questions that we now turn to are the following ones: What was, in these terms, the level of issue-oriented rationality, IOR, among the voters studied? Secondly, how and to what extent might the level of IOR be explained in terms of the voters' socio-economic background, previous political voting behaviour, stated political interest and self-perceived grounds for political decisions?

We have earlier stated that the twenty questions put to the candidates and voters fairly well covered the topics raised during the election campaign. Yet it is evident that only some of these questions touch upon matters and perspectives that can be seen as principally quite important for both the EU and its relations to Finland. Typical questions of this sort concern the plausible federal character of the EU, or the plans regarding a common European currency and monetary policy (EMU). Another set of questions does not dwell upon matters of this magnitude but can still be seen as important, at least in the electoral context. What we have in mind are the questions that draw vast popular attention and seem to raise the temperature of the campaign. Some of these questions are rather vague; "Do you

think that people and goods already today travel freely over the borders?”, whereas other items are pretty concrete; “Are the salaries of the members of the EU parliament placed on a proper level?”

The calculus of the individual voter surely consists of a mixture of questions of both kinds, important and heavy as well as more marginal and even populist ones. In order to account for this fact, we constructed three different measures of what we call the voters IOR. As a basis for the construction of these measures, the list of twenty questions was divided into two groups. The first of these consisted of 11 items connected to what can be seen as more principal and important perspectives on the EU and Finland’s relations to this union. The second set of items (8 items) map the voters’ and candidates’ opinions on questions that stand out as less important or as more image-oriented and thus more hard to get a hold on. One of the original twenty items was set aside due to huge problems regarding its validity. The criteria for these two groups of items are admittedly rather vague. Still, we maintain that this particular division is both important and highly relevant in this context. Two independent judges did the classification of items. The correspondence between the two listings was very high (0.95); 19 out of 20 items were classified in the same manner. Both judges left the classification of one item, the one finally excluded, open for discussions.

The two groups of items are presented in Table 1. For the sake of simplicity we have chosen to label the categories as ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ issues. We think that these items, especially the heavy ones, fairly well illustrate the inner core of issue-oriented rationality. Few voters would feel content having voted for an MP whose views on these questions differ largely from their own. It also seems far more important to reach an acceptable agreement, or level of IOR, between a voter and his/her candidate regarding the so-called heavy issues than the issues of less importance.


The level of IOR was measured separately for the heavy, the light, and for all issues together. The measures that we constructed take into account three different but still interrelated aspects of IOR. The first aspect covers the correspondence between the views of a particular voter and the candidate that he or she was going to vote, or already had voted, for. The values on this variable varied between 0 and 11 for the heavy, and between 0 and 8 for the light issues. Secondly, we checked the number of better candidates, that is, the amount of candidates whose views corresponded to a higher degree with those of the particular voter. The third aspect on the level of IOR measures the distance

between the candidate chosen by the voter and the group of better candidates. The following figure illustrates the combination of these three aspects of IOR.

Table 1. Items used in the empirical study

'Heavy issues'
The common currency of the EU is named Euro. Do you think that a common currency is a good idea?
Should Finland be among the first nations to adopt the common currency?
Is a joint defence-policy a good goal to strive for?
Should Finland opt for a membership in the WEU and thereby concentrate its military Cupertino to the WEU?
Should Finland apply for a membership in NATO?
Should the EU-parliament gain more power at the expense of other power centres?
Do you think that the effects of Finland's membership, in the EU, have been either positive or negative?
Do you think that the membership in the EU entails security for Finland?
Should the development in the EU be guided towards a federation of states?
Should the EU strive for a higher level of common legislation?
Should the countries of former Eastern Europe be accepted as members of the union at a fast pace?
'Light issues'
Do you think that the bureaucracy of the EU needs to be cut?
Should we put an end to the EU-employees constant travelling between Brussels and Strasbourg?
Are the salaries of the members of the EU parliament placed on a proper level?
Do you think that people and goods already today travel freely over the borders?
Should Finland act seriously on all directives from the EU?
Do you think it is reasonable that the EU has directives regarding the size and form of cucumbers?
Should all citizens in the EU be permitted to get a job in Finland?
Do you think that the borders of the EU should, when needed, be seen as a tight wall?

Figure 1. A three-component measure of the voters IOR



The level of IOR for heavy issues was thus calculated using the following formula:

$$\text{Level of IOR} = P * (1 - (a/128)^2) * (1 - (m/11)^2), \text{ where}$$

P= the number of corresponding answers for the voter and his/her actual candidate

a= the number of candidates with a larger number of answers identical with those of the voter

m= the distance, in terms of identical answers, between the chosen candidate and the mean for the group of better candidates.

The constant 128 equals the number of candidates participating in the study. The constant 11 illustrates the number of so-called heavy items. In calculating the level of IOR for light items this constant consequently was given the value 8.

## Empirical Analysis

Our empirical analysis proved, at an early stage, that our ambition to use three different measures of issue-oriented rationality, for heavy, light, and all items together, was partly fruitful and relevant, partly somewhat ambitious. The following correlation analysis illustrates these comments.

Table 2. Correlation analysis; Number of corresponding answers (NOCA) between voters and their candidates for heavy, light and all items (Pearson Correlations)

	NOCA-total	NOCA - heavy	NOCA – light
NOCA – total	1,000	,727**	,675**
NOCA – heavy	,727**	1,000	-,016
NOCA – light	,675**	-,016	1,000

*Notes:* \*\* Significant at the 0,01 level, 2-tailed

It is interesting to note the total absence of systematic relations between the numbers of corresponding answers for heavy and light items. This observation in itself does not tell us much, but we dare take it as an indication of the relevance and possible fruitfulness of the division of the questions into these two groups. The fairly high, significant and logically fully expected correlation between heavy, respectively light items, and the whole set of items gives us a legitimate reason to discard the measures regarding the total set of items in the analysis to come. Hence, we concentrate on IOR regarding heavy, respectively light issues.

The general level of IOR, measured separately according to the previously presented logic and formula, is presented in Table 3. These results are interesting in two ways. First of all, the levels of IOR for both heavy and light issues display large similarities. This is especially the case when we take into account the number of items, 11 respectively 8, included. Also the share regarding corresponding answers (NOCA) is almost exactly the same for heavy (41,09 %) and light issues (41,85 %). Secondly, we notice that the mean levels of IOR are fairly low. The average voter shares only 4,52 out of 11 views on heavy and 3,34 views out of 8 on light items with his or her candidate.

Table 3. Level of Issue-Oriented Rationality (IOR) for heavy (h) and light (li) issues

	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. deviation
IOR-h			3,9847	2,0791
NOCA-h	1	9	4,5245	1,7354
NOBC-h	0	125	40,2378	33,9801
DTBC-h	0	4,30	1,6846	0,7022
IOR-li			2,8247	1,7813
NOCA-li	0	7	3,3357	1,6140
NOBC-li	0	125	50,8741	36,4160
DTBC-li	0	4,40	1,5706	0,6116

*Notes:* NOCA: number of corresponding answers, NOBC: number of better candidates, DTBC: distance to better candidates

We admit that it is a clearly normative, as well as cumbersome, task to pinpoint the level of an acceptable or optimal IOR. There also exist situations where one might even say that almost 5 hits out of 11 possible is good enough, especially if the voter considers these five items as important above the average. Anyhow, we maintain that the empirical levels of IOR found in this study are surprisingly low. From a perspective that stresses issues as core determinants of electoral behaviour the levels might be labelled as alarming indicators of model impurity. There are two particular observations that strengthen this argument. First of all, we would like to point at the fact that even if the mean numbers of corresponding answers are 4,52 respectively 3,34 (heavy/light issues) there still exist, on average, 40,24 respectively 50,87 candidates that to a larger extent match the views of the voter regarding heavy respectively light issues.

Furthermore, the mean values for the distance between the chosen candidate and the group of better candidates (DTBC) indicate that the candidates in question are not only marginally better than the candidates that were actually chosen. At an average this group of candidates share common views with the voter on 1,68 (h) respectively 1,57 (li) more topics than does the candidate that was chosen by the voter. Our conclusion is that the empirical level of IOR is so low that it points at some sort of flaws in the theories that strongly emphasise issues as determinants of voting behaviour. The results of our empirical study also show that there exists a fair amount of variance - std.deviation for IOR: 2,08 (h) respectively

1,78 (li) - as to the levels of IOR within the electorate. This in turn raises our next question: Is there systematic variations in the relations between levels of IOR and voters of different kinds?

In the analysis to come we do not have the ambition to describe the voters in all possible ways. Instead, we try to capture a more limited number of characteristics that we find particularly important in this context. Thus, we have measured the previous political activity and voting behaviour of the voters, their socio-economic background and their stated interest in politics. Last, but not least, we have studied the voters' perceptions regarding the grounds on which they make their own political decisions.

Our first question is whether there exist differences as to the ways the voters perceive their own political behaviour. The results of the following factor analysis indicate that this seems to be the case.

Table 4. The voters' perceptions of grounds on which they make their political decisions, Factor analysis (Varimax rotation)

	Factor 1	Factor 2
Sex	<b>,77169</b>	-,09076
Party affiliation	<b>,44043</b>	-,19763
Place of residence	<b>,52346</b>	,09828
Competence	-,06552	<b>,70512</b>
Age	<b>,73045</b>	,16797
Opinions	-,01556	<b>,72196</b>
Personality	,26398	<b>,70205</b>
Chance of being elected	,28127	,16140

The patterns in which the variables load on these factors are surprisingly clear. Thus the results indicate the existence of two types, or groups of voters. The first group (factor 2) states that they focus on the competence, opinions and personality of the candidates leaving more or less the candidate's sex, age, hometown, party affiliation and possibilities of being elected aside. We label the voters of this kind as personalised. The second group seems to consist of voters who examine the candidates in what might be called as a more traditional manner. They place significant weight on both age and sex and consider seriously also questions

concerning where the candidate comes from and which party he or she represents. The candidates' opinions, competence and personality are not ranked significantly high among these traditionalist voters. Since the results of this factor analysis seem to be fairly clear as well as theoretically comprehensible, they were saved as variables to be used in trying to explain the earlier found variations in the levels of issue-oriented rationality.

The tests of whether, and to what extent, our set of independent variables explain the levels of IOR proved to be rather disappointing. Neither an analysis of regression, nor a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) resulted in models with noteworthy levels of explanation; the regression analysis resulted in  $R=0,052$ , with IOR-heavy as the dependent variable, and  $R=0,052$  with IOR-light as dependent. For the ANOVA-models the mean squares and levels of significance were 4,047 and 0,492 (IOR-heavy) respectively 2,710 and 0,497 (IOR-light).

The evident conclusion to be drawn is that the set of explanatory variables is too narrow. This, on the other hand, does not prove our independent variables unimportant or uninteresting.

In order to shed at least some light on the potential importance of these variables we somewhat revised our explanatory and statistical ambitions. Hence, we run a correlation analysis that included both of our dependent variables as well as the independent variables mentioned earlier. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.

First of all, we notice that the number of significant correlations is fairly small. The correlations found are also on a rather low level. The significant correlations within the set of independent variables can be described as rather expected. Thus, the correlations between previous political activity stated interest in politics and a personalised profile as grounds for decisions form a quite logical pattern easy to comprehend. Our earlier interpretation of the factor solution is even more strengthened by the correlation found between party-loyalty and factor 1, traditionalism.



Table 5. Correlations; IOR-heavy, IOR-light and independent variables

	Level of IOR-heavy	Level of IOR-right	Party-loyalty	Pol. activity	Stated political interest	Socio-econ. backgr.	Fact 1 Trad.	Fact 2 Pers.
Level of IOR-heavy	1,000							
Level of IOR-light	-.022	1,000						
Party-loyalty	,049	,000	1,000					
Political activity	,030	-,094	-.010	1,000				
Stated political interest	,059	,081	-,122	,165*	1,000			
Socio-economic background	-,040	,143	-,036	-.062	-.056	1,000		
Fact 1 Traditionalists	-,059	-,118	,217*	,129	-.019	,027	1,000	
Fact 2 Personalization	,220**	,040	-.066	,189*	,300**	-.012	,000	1,000

*Notes:* Pearson correlations, two-tailed test. Significance: \*, .05-level, \*\*, .01-level.

A look at the correlations regarding the dependent and the independent variables gives us an indication as to why the regression models failed to come up with acceptable levels of explanation. The levels of IOR for both heavy and light issues are more or less uncorrelated with the set of independent variables. One exception from this rule is worth mentioning however. Factor 2, personalization, is significantly correlated to the level of IOR for heavy issues. Even though the correlation is fairly weak this could indicate that voters who emphasise competence, opinions and personality as grounds for their decisions also tend to reach higher levels of IOR regarding heavy issues. This result does not carry the element of surprise but still it does not lack relevance. It shows that placing weight on opinions and competence rather than on factors like age, sex and party-affiliation seems to lead the voter to candidates that in a better way match their own opinions.

## Conclusions

We started this study by pointing at the Downsian research tradition that places considerable weight on concepts, and phenomena as issues, opinions and rational voting behaviour. Our empirical study has shown that the level of issue-oriented rationality, IOR, seems to be fairly low seen from a rationalistic point of view. Voters choose candidates with whom they share a rather modest amount of opinions while leaving aside candidates that regarding their opinions would be far more suitable. Our results also indicate, weakly but still, that voters who place a relatively heavy weight on the candidates person; his or her competence, opinions and personality tend to pick better candidates in terms of IOR than voters who in a more traditional manner stress the importance of the candidate's gender, party-affiliation, hometown and age.

Thus, our study suggests that the importance of issues and opinions might have been somewhat overestimated in previous electoral research. Issues and opinions surely matter, but to what extent is a question that still lacks an answer. We conclude by suggesting an interpretation that gives credit both to earlier research and the results of this study. Could it be that the voters use a twofold calculus when choosing their candidate? To a certain part they focus on the opinions of candidates, but this is true regarding merely a small handful of issues. All candidates that thus fulfil these criteria are considered potential voting objects. The final decision between candidates in this group is made on grounds that are hard to get a firm hold on. We believe that aspects such as the personality and image even the looks of the candidate, might consciously or not, play an important role at this stage.

Hence, the voters' final decision might be seen as a mixture of rational and issue-oriented, as well as more irrational and/or image-oriented considerations. This study has not set out to find these irrational factors and considerations. But, we have empirically shown that the issue-oriented rationality is at such a low level that it surely leaves the voting decisions open for a great deal of less rational considerations.

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## POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION AND VOTER TURNOUT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

*Kimmo Grönlund*

### Introduction

Political scientists tend to consider people's political participation as a vital part of democracy. For most scholars, citizens' involvement in democratic decision-making is desirable (e.g. Verba & Nie 1972; Kaase & Marsh 1979, 27-56; Barber 1984; van Deth & Elff 2004).<sup>1</sup> Participation is valued as a positive action that strengthens democracy: "government by the people" (Heywood 2002, 69). Consequently, the prerequisites for taking part in politics are discussed in political science. Further, the latter discussion can be divided into at least two sub families of arguments. First, there are pluralist or egalitarian views where full political equality is seen as desirable (Barber 1984; Beitz 1989) and inclusiveness is defined as a precondition for democracy: "The demos should include all adults subject to the binding collective decisions of the association" (Dahl 1989, 120). Second, there are authoritative or elitist views where voters are seen as ill informed about politics and their citizenship is limited to the selection of elites (Schumpeter 1942; Schattschneider 1960).

The scholarly debate on the pros and cons of participatory versus liberal democracy is of a normative character. Benjamin Barber (1984), for example uses the epithets 'strong' and 'thin' for participatory and liberal democracy, respectively. Even though the conclusions and views differ, citizens' knowledge of the political system and parties' policy differences play a central role in democratic theory. When it comes to empirical analyses, aggregated political knowledge at the individual level has been found to increase turnout at the macro level (Milner 2002, 64).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> It must, however, be pointed out that a high level of participation is not necessarily good for democracy (c.f. Tingsten 1937, 225-26). Neither does a high participation level guarantee influence on policy, this is the case especially in totalitarian states where the leader wants his followers to attend meetings and similar activities in order to indoctrinate them (Lipset 1983, 183).

<sup>2</sup> Milner's evidence is limited to 12 Western countries and to a knowledge question pertaining to the United Nations. He scatters aggregated knowledge means against macro-level turnout means in local elections. However, the obtained  $R^2$  for OLS regression is impressively high at .70.

Political information is a key component in most individual-based theories of voting behaviour. Especially rational choice theories tend to emphasize the costs related to acquiring information in order to have the necessary knowledge to vote. Downs (1957) defined instrumental rationality and pointed out that the costs of gaining information normally exceed the returns, i.e. the likelihood that an individual's vote is decisive in elections. In spite of this, a majority of eligible voters tend to vote in democracies. This fact is often referred to as the 'paradox of voter turnout' (Green & Shapiro 1994).

The present chapter highlights the relationship between political sophistication and political participation. The behavioural importance of political knowledge is examined empirically, and in a comparative manner. In the chapter, political participation is operationalized narrowly and it is restricted to *voting at parliamentary elections*. This can be motivated by the fact that voting is the most important and common political act that citizens take in representative democracies (Aldrich 1993, 246-47). Naturally, the concept of political participation covers a variety of dimensions beyond that of voting. In the last fifty years, also the study of political participation has witnessed an expansion in the forms of involvement (van Deth 2001, 15-16; Marien et al. 2010; Christensen 2011).

The explanatory variables behind voter turnout are expected to have both structural and psychological roots. This cross-sectional contextual approach is possible thanks to a survey material that has been collected within the project Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). The levels of education and political knowledge are seen as independent variables affecting turnout. Their genuine impact is tested through controls for several intervening variables at the individual level, as well as two structural variables at the macro level, namely the electoral system and the longevity of democracy.

The aim of the chapter is to examine how education and political knowledge affect voter turnout at the individual level. By doing so it attempts to deepen the scientific understanding of the knowledge-based determinants of voting. The chapter is organised as follows. In the next section the concept of political sophistication is discussed and operationalised, after which hypotheses are formed and the used CSES data are described. Thereafter, the analyses are carried out and discussed. In a final passage, the somewhat problematic relationship between political knowledge and political interest is pondered upon.

## The Concept of Political Sophistication

Possessing information about politics and political parties is a logical prerequisite for voting. In *Voting*, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee conclude (1954, 308): “The democratic citizen is expected to be well-informed about political affairs. He is supposed to know what the issues are, what their history is, what the relevant facts are, what alternatives are proposed, what the party stands for, what the likely consequences are.” In representative democracy, citizens need this information when they decide how to vote, or whether to vote at all.

The primary concept of this chapter is knowledge, which relates to both political knowledge and education through school, college and university. In the following, the concept of *political sophistication* is used as a synonym of the combined effect of (1) *formal education* and (2) *political knowledge*. Hence, a politically sophisticated or knowledgeable person is one who is highly educated and politically well-informed whereas a person with low education and little political knowledge is politically less sophisticated or non-knowledgeable according to this classification. Consequently, there are several levels of knowledge in accordance with the combinations of different degrees of education and political knowledge.

The terminology related to politically relevant knowledge is somewhat diverse in the literature. First, there are the concepts of political knowledge and political information. These are often, but not always, used synonymously. Lupia and McCubbins (1998, 24) distinct information from knowledge by stating that information is merely data; whereas they define knowledge as people’s ability to make accurate predictions. Second, we have the concept of civic literacy, which is closely related to political knowledge. Civic literacy consists of the “skills to act as competent citizens” (Milner 2002, 3). Civic literacy resembles another notion, namely political sophistication, which has been defined as the quantity and organisation of a person’s political cognitions (Luskin 1987). Third, there is the concept of citizen competence (Kuklinski & Quirk 2001). Competence, as Sartori (1987, 117) has pointed out, can be conjoined with knowledge but should be separated from information.

Political sophistication and citizen competence relate directly to a cognitively oriented discussion on the interplay between political knowledge and civic education (Torney-Purta et al. 2001). This literature emphasises classroom-based civic education and its importance to the acceptance of democratic principles and political participation (Galston 2001). Civic education of this kind is seen as an

independent variable in relation to political knowledge, and in psychological research this linkage is studied.

In the present chapter, the operationalisation calls attention to (politically relevant) *knowledge* and its participatory consequences. On the whole, Lupia's and McCubbins' (1998, 24-25) view is adapted: "Knowledge requires information because accurate predictions require data... (Y)ou can know a long list of facts and fail to put them together in a way that allows you to make accurate predictions. Thus, although you cannot have knowledge without having information, you can have information without having knowledge".

Education is measured through the highest level of education, whereas the objective measurements of political knowledge represent the additional component of knowledge. The two variables capture different aspects of knowledge; formal school and university education stand for the *analytic* dimension of knowledge, whereas citizens' information on politics represents the *factual* dimension of knowledge. According to this operationalisation, the two dimensions complement each other into the concept of knowledge. Possessing information does not guarantee that you are knowledgeable; data are not knowledge if they cannot be processed and analysed. Nor are analytical capabilities sufficient without relevant data. Since no reliable data on respondents' analytical capabilities are gathered in cross-national political surveys, formal education serves as a proxy for them. It is reasonable to deduce that the length and level of education increases (or covaries with) the capability of analysing facts.<sup>3</sup>

Education is a classic as a micro level independent variable in the study of political behaviour. Ever since the first electoral studies, the universal rule has been: "the better-educated people have more political interest than the less educated" (Berelson et al. 1954, 25). It has also been established that education is a key to political participation and to democratic values and practices (Almond & Verba 1963, 315-24; Lipset 1983, 40). Education promotes interest in politics and understanding of it, and encourages voting (Milner 2002, 47-49). Blais (2000, 51-53) exploits CSES data for nine countries and finds that education and age are the most important variables explaining voter turnout, followed by religiosity.<sup>4</sup> An analysis provided by Norris (2002) is based on larger evidence, consisting of voting in 22 countries. Using the 1996 Role of Government III survey of the International

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<sup>3</sup> The fact that we are not in a position to evaluate respondents' analytical skills has led to the use of 'knowledge' in stead of 'sophistication' or 'competence' in the present article.

<sup>4</sup> Australia, Czech Republic, Great Britain, Israel, Poland, Romania, Spain, Taiwan and United States.



Social Survey Program (ISSP), she establishes that turnout among the group with the highest education is 9.5 percentage points higher than in the group with the lowest education (Norris 2002, 94). Age, however, is the most important independent variable at the micro level explaining turnout according to Norris (2002, 86-87). Regarding the importance of education, there are contradictory findings as well. In a European analysis of voting in 16 countries 1960-1992, turnout was not found to vary according to the level of education (Topf 1995, 48-50). In fact, even Norris' results confirm this non-causal pattern between education and turnout in Western Europe (Op.cit.).

Political knowledge is the second micro level independent variable, or more correctly a set of three variables, whose effects on turnout is studied in the present chapter. Political knowledge is a vast concept and needs to be operationalized. It can cover at least three dimensions. First, information can pertain to the individual's level of knowledge of the political system – “the rules of the political game”. Secondly, information can relate to the individual's knowledge of everyday politics – the current political debate and agenda. Thirdly and partly intertwined with the second dimension, a voter can possess knowledge of the political actors, persons or parties, and their differences ideologically or in relation to policies.<sup>5</sup>

The three types of information are separable; even though they may covary in practice. In an empirical analysis that attempts to assess the importance of voter's political knowledge, it would be ideal to be able to measure people's information on the political system, as well as the knowledge of the political debate and policy differences. The measure instrument should i.e. cover the different dimensions of political knowledge. The use of secondary data limits the possibilities to capture the different dimensions of political knowledge. Yet, the problem might be more theoretical than empirical. Having conducted a special survey for political knowledge, Delli Karpini and Keeter (1993, 1185) conclude that “measures of national political knowledge in one domain can provide reasonably good – though

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<sup>5</sup> Since there is no standardised knowledge instrument, the categories within which political information is measured vary, even within the same nation. In Swedish election studies, for example, there have been questions pertaining to parties' policy differences, party leaders, local candidates, leading politicians from other than the voter's own constituency, and questions of the facts of the political system (Holmberg & Oscarsson 2004, 197). The question types have varied somewhat over time but the central dimensions of political information as described above have been covered rather well by the five decades of the Swedish electoral studies programme.

not ideal – measures of overall knowledge about national politics”.<sup>6</sup> Further, the authors infer that political knowledge is a relatively unidimensional concept and that a citizen’s level of factual knowledge can be measured with a short series of survey questions (1993, 1203). These findings increase the validity of measurement in a cross-national survey where the questions pertaining to political knowledge have not been standardised.

## Hypotheses

In the history of electoral studies, there have been several systematic attempts to decipher the determinants of voter turnout. In a theoretical sense, the most important analyses are usually comparative, using either register data at the macro level or survey data at the micro level (e.g. Crewe 1981; Powell 1980; 1982; 1986; Blais & Carty 1990; Franklin 1996; Blais 2000; Norris 2002; 2004).

One of the most thorough macro comparisons has been carried out by Blais and Dobrzynska (1998). Their study involves all electoral democracies in the world from 1972 to 1995. Moreover, all lower house parliamentary elections in these 91 democracies are included in the analysis. Altogether, voting in 324 national elections is analyzed. According to Blais and Dobrzynska, proportional electoral systems encourage voting. The main difference in turnout is between PR systems, including corrective mixed systems, and all other systems (1998, 248). There is a negative logarithmic relationship between the size of population and turnout. This indicates that there is a substantial difference between small countries and all the other countries. Voters in demographically diminutive countries vote more frequently than voters in large countries (1998, 243-44).

The difference in turnout between proportional and majoritarian systems has been verified also in more recent comparative studies. In a global comparison of turnout in the 1990s, non-democracies included, the mean difference in average turnout between majoritarian and proportional systems is almost ten percentage points (Norris 2004, 162). In an analysis of turnout in 22 democracies from 1945 till 1999, Franklin (2004, 143) acknowledges the importance of the proportionality of the electoral system in a similar manner: “PR systems attempt to make every vote count everywhere. In majoritarian systems, every vote counts only in districts that are close fought. If all districts are close fought, then majoritarian systems perform

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<sup>6</sup> The authors also suggest a five-item index from the NES questions (1993, 1198-99). The items capture the three dimensions suggested in the present article well.

like PR systems in terms of the wasted vote syndrome; but if the race is a foregone conclusion in even quite a small number of districts, then the number of votes wasted overall could be quite large. In districts where the race is a foregone conclusion, many potential voters will not see the point of voting and turnout will be lower.”

Since it has been established that turnout varies substantially between electoral systems (Blais & Dobrzynska 1998; Blais 2000; Norris 2004), the role of the electoral system needs to be discussed further. Can we anticipate that the electoral system itself alters the mechanisms of the relationship between knowledge and turnout? Even though comparisons between countries tell us a lot of the effects of different electoral systems, they encounter a possible dilemma. How can we be sure that turnout in PR systems is higher because of the electoral system, and not because of some nation-specific variables?<sup>7</sup> This is why analyses within nations can cast additional light on the subject. There are, in fact, countries where the electoral system varies within the nation, mostly at local elections. In an analysis of Swiss communal elections, Ladner and Milner (1999) find significant differences between the communes who make use of the PR and communes who have a majoritarian system. Voters in PR communes vote more frequently, even when the authors control for the size of the municipality. In another study, Bowler et al. (2001) trace turnout effects of cumulative voting (CV), a semi-proportional system used in about 80 jurisdictions at the local level in the USA. They hold variations in social, cultural and, naturally, national, context constant. The effect of the CV system is clear, and turnout is approximately 5 percentage points higher under CV than in similar plurality settings.

In conclusion, proportional electoral systems increase overall turnout. Hence, there might be something in the logic of electoral systems that influences the mechanisms of political knowledge and its relation to turnout. Already in 1951 Duverger acknowledged the fact that the electoral system affects voters psychologically. Especially the single member plurality system guides voters towards two major parties; it is not instrumental to vote for fringe parties and people often need to vote ‘strategically’ (Farrell 2001) or ‘tactically’ (Kim & Fording 2001) for their next best choice or even a less favourable party just because they want to act against a party they do not like. It has been claimed that the common characteristics of the proportional systems, few wasted votes and consensual multi-partism, would foster civic literacy (Milner 2002, 89). The fact that turnout differs between the electoral systems, combined with the known psychological effects

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<sup>7</sup> Naturally, comparing voting in all democracies makes this risk very small.

imply that it is important to check whether the mechanisms of knowledge work differently in proportional and majoritarian electoral systems.

The electoral system affects voters psychologically, but so does the stability of the democratic system. Citizens of new democracies struggle with different kinds of problems than citizens of old democracies. Especially in Western Europe, the political systems have been characterised by a 'frozen' party system (Lipset & Rokkan 1967), whereas voters in new democracies have witnessed a transition from an authoritarian regime to liberal democracy, a change in the electoral system and a volatile party system. In a recent analysis, Norris (2004, 160) shows that voter turnout in the 1990s was seven percentage points lower in new democracies than in old democracies. The consolidation of democracy in countries, which are in the process of transition from autocracy to democracy coincides often with an insecure economic development (Lane & Ersson 2003, 144-45). The mechanisms of knowledge in relation to voting might be different in newly democratised countries and in mature democracies. Therefore, this structural variable will be controlled for in the empirical analysis.

Macro comparisons are important but the role of knowledge at the individual level requires studies among individual voters. In rational choice terms, acquiring relevant information is a cost that needs to be compared with the expected benefits of voting (Blais 2000, 2). *Per se*, the limits and merits of rational choice theory fall beyond the purposes of the present chapter but as the role of information is central in rational choice theory, the cost-benefit aspect needs to be discussed in some detail.

Since the probability for an individual vote to be decisive in a national election is minuscule, it is, from an individual's point of view, irrational to be well-informed, as Downs (1957, 246) himself pointed out. Rational choice theorists have made several attempts to explain why a majority of voters in fact vote even though it is irrational from an instrumental point of view. Typically, these amendments add a new term to the original rational choice equation in order to explain why people's perceptions of the returns can exceed the costs of voting. This term stands for expressive returns or the civic duty a citizen feels when pondering upon voting against abstention (Riker & Ordeshook 1968). Along the same lines can arguments where people vote out of "desire to see democracy work" (Downs 1957, 268) be placed. Amendments of this kind have been subject to criticism due to an obvious risk of tautological argumentation (Green & Shapiro 1994; Blais 2000).

A second family of amendments to the rational choice model has to do directly with the cost of voting. Niemi (1967) suggests that the cost of voting is

extremely low in a national election. Voting does not require a long time, and since it is taken out of leisure time, many people do not perceive high costs. This amendment fails to acknowledge the fact that the real cost of voting has to do with the time before elections. The opportunity cost of getting the information to decide how to vote is bound to be higher than the actual cost of the voting act (Blais 2000, 8). Downs points out that the cost of being informed is relative: low-income citizens have a harder time paying the cost than high-income citizens. Therefore, it takes higher returns to get low-income citizens to vote. Low-income citizens also have fewer data and are more uncertain in relation to vote choices (Downs 1957, 274).

When we consider Niemi's suggestion that the cost factor is small in national elections, and weigh it against the counter argument by Blais, and take into account Down's observation of the relativity of the cost component, it seems clear that rational choice has a lot to offer to our object of interest. *At the time of the election it is instrumentally rational to vote if you are knowledgeable.* Consequently, the cost of voting is higher to non-knowledgeable citizens and therefore it is not as rational for them to vote.

Figure 1. Hypothetical effects of education and political knowledge on turnout

		Level of political knowledge	
		High	Low
Education	High	High turnout	Average turnout
	Low	Average turnout	Low turnout

The hypothetical effects of different levels of knowledge on turnout are presented in Figure 1. This typology is presented as a closed system, without any references to the control variables at this point. The matrix consists of four cells and combines two levels of education and political knowledge. As previous research demonstrates, we can anticipate that voters with low education and political knowledge levels do not attend the polls as frequently as other voters. In the same

way, highly educated voters with a lot of political knowledge are expected to vote to a large extent. The remaining two cells are expected to represent average turnout. In these cases the contradictory dimensions are assumed to override each other's effects so that voters with these characteristics frequent the polls to the same extent as the average citizens do at elections.

The present study is cross-national and exploits comparable interview data. The novelty in the approach, compared with previous studies, is the combined effect of formal education and political knowledge. The two dimensions of knowledge form the independent variable. Moreover, there are a number of other variables whose effects must be controlled for. These have been chosen based on recent comparative studies of the determinants of voting (as referred to above). At the macro level there are two control variables, the electoral system and the longevity of democracy.

## Data and Methods

Objective measurements of political knowledge are not common in cross-national studies. In fact, the discipline has no generally accepted measure of citizens' knowledge of politics (Delli Karpini & Keeter 1993, 1180). So far, the best available comparative data set with political knowledge items can be found in the CSES. Nevertheless, the use of the CSES data set raises questions pertaining to validity. It is a cross-national survey, and the sets of questions vary slightly from country to country.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, certain prequalification measures are needed in order to create a comparable data set for the purposes of this study. The selection of countries from which respondents are included is based on three criteria. First, the country should be democratic. If we are to analyze the determinants of political participation through the act of voting, an essential criterion is liberal democracy. This selection is based on Freedom House ratings.<sup>9</sup> Second, countries with effective compulsory voting are excluded amongst democracies. This can be motivated

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<sup>8</sup> Actually, the CSES is a combination of coordinated national surveys.

<sup>9</sup> The Freedom House seven scale ratings on political rights and civil liberties have been reversed, i.e. 7 corresponds to the freest nation, whereas 1 is the least free. Moreover, instead of using the arithmetic mean of the two dimensions, the scores have been multiplied with each other. This product can vary between 1 (the least democratic value) and 49 (the most democratic value). The threshold for democracy has been set to 30. The method based on the product of reversed FH scales has been suggested by Welzel and Inglehart (2001, 6-11). The selection based on the product is strict; a country must respect both political rights and civil liberties to a same extent.

through the fact that compulsory voting boosts turnout by 11 percentage points (Blais & Dobrzynska 1998, 246).<sup>10</sup> Third, and more pragmatically, we need values on the independent and dependent variables of interest. To be precise, in some countries the surveys have not included items on political knowledge. The relevant data for each country according to the above mentioned criteria can be found in an appendix.

After the selection process, there are 19 countries in which voting and abstaining is to be analysed. Moreover, Spain is included twice, since it meets the criteria at two elections, in 1996 and 2000. The Spanish samples are so small that they can be brought in without a problem of national bias. Thus, there are altogether 31,746 respondents to be studied. The countries are listed in table 1. Some relevant data have been included; first the fact whether the country is an old or a new democracy is listed.<sup>11</sup> The electoral system of the country is shown as well as the number of respondents in the CSES material. The election at which the survey was conducted is also registered, followed by turnout statistics – the arithmetic mean amongst the respondents in the survey compared to the actual turnout in the relevant election.

As can be seen in Table 1, the countries are not evenly distributed according to the electoral system. There are three single member plurality systems, six mixed member systems, of which four are majoritarian and two proportional. The remaining ten cases have proportional representation. The electoral systems have been classified according to Farrell (2001). As mentioned earlier, Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) found that turnout varies between proportional and all other forms of electoral systems. For this reason, the electoral system variable is dichotomized in order to test whether there is a difference in the relationship between knowledge and turnout in the two electoral families. In the dummy setting the category of proportional electoral systems consists of 12 countries and 13 elections, whereas 7 countries and elections belong to the majoritarian category. In terms of respondents the same relation prevails; a total of 22,681 respondents vote under a proportional electoral rule, whereas 12,100 respondents are from countries with a majoritarian electoral system. The analyses will be carried out in two phases; first in the whole sample and secondly within the four control contexts; proportional and majoritarian electoral systems, and new and old democracies. Old

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<sup>10</sup> Blais (2000) included Australia in his analysis, as described above. It is clear that there is no comparability in voting and abstaining between a country with effective compulsory voting and a country where the choice of casting a vote is free.

<sup>11</sup> Countries have been coded as old democracies if they were democratic in 1980 (and since) according to Freedom House classification.

Table 1. The countries and elections from which respondents are included in the study

Country	Old vs. New democracy	Electoral system	Type of electoral system	N	Election year	Turnout in the CSES data (i)	Actual turnout (j)	Diff. (i) - (j)
Canada	Old	SMP	M	1 851	1997	78,2	67,0	11,2
Czech Rep.	New	PR	P	1 229	1996	88,2	76,3	11,9
Germany	Old/New	MMP	P	2 019	1998	83,0	82,2	0,8
Great Britain	Old	SMP	M	2 931	1997	81,6	71,5	10,1
Hungary	New	MMM	M	1 525	1998	67,1	56,7	10,4
Israel	Old	PR	P	1 091	1996	83,2	79,3	3,9
Japan	Old	MMM	M	1 327	1996	76,9	59,0	17,9
Mexico	New	MMM	M	1 441	2000	76,7	57,2	19,5
Netherlands	Old	PR	P	2 101	1998	77,6	73,2	4,4
New Zealand	Old	MMP	P	4 080	1996	94,6	88,3	6,3
Norway	Old	PR	P	2 055	1997	85,7	78,0	7,7
Poland	New	PR	P	2 003	1997	55,0	47,9	7,1
Portugal	Old	PR	P	1 303	2002	86,7	62,8	23,9
Romania	New	PR	P	1 175	1996	80,9	76,0	4,9
Spain_1	Old	PR	P	1 212	1996	77,8	78,1	-0,3
Spain_2	Old	PR	P	1 208	2000	68,5	68,7	-0,2
Sweden	Old	PR	P	1 157	1998	86,9	81,4	5,5
Switzerland	Old	PR	P	2 048	1999	58,8	43,2	15,6
Taiwan	New	MMM	M	1 200	1996	80,8	76,2	4,6
USA	Old	SMP	M	1 534	1996	75,6	66,0	9,6

### Notes

Old democracies: Free according to Freedom House at least as of 1980.

Electoral systems: SMP (Single Member Plurality), MMM (Mixed Member Majoritarian), MMP (Mixed Member Proportional) PR (Proportional Representation)

Type of electoral system: M = majoritarian, P = proportional.

Turnout in per cent of registered voters. Source: IDEA.

democracies predominate in the country category with 12.5 units, the German sample being divided into West and East Germany.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> East Berlin was coded as a new democracy, together with the former DDR *Länder*.



The set of countries is ideal when it comes to another possible structural intervening variable, the size of the population. Blais and Dobrzynska (op. cit.) found that voter turnout is higher in the smallest countries, whereas there were no substantial differences among the rest of the countries. In the present chapter, none of the countries are diminutive in terms of demographic size.

In the CSES material, education is measured through the level of highest achieved education. The variable has eight different values.<sup>13</sup> Political knowledge is measured through three questions pertaining to the political system or everyday politics. Unfortunately, the questions related to political knowledge are not fully comparable across nations. In some countries the questions measure the respondents' knowledge of the political system. In the Czech case, for instance, people were asked if they knew the electoral threshold in parliamentary elections, the name of the minister of transport, and the number of seats in the Czech Parliament. In some countries, like in the USA, the questions were related to persons, not to the rules of the political system. The American respondents were asked to identify the office held by the persons whose names were read.<sup>14</sup>

Even though the validity of the measure of political knowledge is bound to suffer some from the variation, it does not jeopardise the analysis, taking into account the fact that the units of interest are individuals, not countries. Nevertheless, the variation makes nation-to-nation comparisons with the data meaningless. It should be noted that education and political knowledge correlate positively even though they are not statistically collinear in the present survey material; their bivariate correlation measured by Kendall's tau is .217 ( $p=.000$ ).

In order to make the regression analyses easier to interpret, the independent variables have been recoded into a scale from zero to one if the variable is ordinal, or into a dummy (0/1), if the variable is dichotomous. Of the independent variables, education can obtain eight values and political knowledge four values (from no information to all three items correct) on a scale from zero to one. Age, for example, is divided by 100. The dependent variable, voting at the individual level, is dichotomous and requires logistic regression analysis. Also, some visual observations in terms of turnout among different voter groups are made use

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<sup>13</sup> Education varies from 'none' to 'completed university undergraduate degree'. The CSES codebook can be consulted for exact values.

<sup>14</sup> These were Al Gore, William Rehnquist and Newt Gingrich. A full list of the questions in each country can be found in the codebook with can be downloaded from the CSES website.

of. The primary interest of the study is in individual variation in the whole sample and across different electoral systems, leaving national variation aside.<sup>15</sup>

The analysis is carried out in two phases; first the dimensions of knowledge are dichotomised and there will be an analysis of variance procedure in order to trace differences in turnout for different classes of citizens. Thereafter, logistic regression analyses are used so that the genuine impact of education and political knowledge can be established when controlling for a set of variables at the independent level. Moreover, the structural intervening variables, the electoral system and the longevity of democracy will be controlled for by running separate regressions within the relevant contexts. This procedure will enhance our understanding of the role of knowledge in different systems.

## Results

We start with simple matrices in accordance with the typology of the hypotheses, as presented above in Figure 1. Figure 2 cross-tabulates voters according to their levels of education and political knowledge. In this initial analysis, the two dimensions are dichotomised. Thus, there are four types of electors. Turnout levels are presented for the whole sample, followed by the two categories of electoral systems, as well as new and old democracies, respectively. The average turnout (the arithmetic mean) within each context is reported as well.

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<sup>15</sup> The CSES data includes three weights; 'sample', 'demographic' and 'political'. As the labels imply, the first weight aims to correct problems related to the sample in general, the second makes the sample representative in terms of age and gender, and the third one aims to correct problems that arise from variables pertaining to political issues, especially voting in comparison with hard election data. For the present analysis, the data have been weighted by the sample weight.

Figure 2. Turnout among four groups of voters in different contexts

**Whole sample (77.5%)**

		Political knowledge	
		high	low
Education	high	<b>86,9</b>	<b>75,4</b>
	low	<b>82,1</b>	<b>70,8</b>

**Proportional electoral systems (78.3%)**

		Political knowledge	
		high	low
Education	high	<b>87,9</b>	<b>78,2</b>
	low	<b>82,0</b>	<b>72,0</b>

**Majoritarian electoral systems (76.2%)**

		Political knowledge	
		high	low
Education	high	<b>85,6</b>	<b>71,6</b>
	low	<b>82,4</b>	<b>68,5</b>

**New democracies (75.1%)**

		Political knowledge	
		high	low
Education	high	<b>87,6</b>	<b>72,5</b>
	low	<b>80,6</b>	<b>65,8</b>

**Old democracies (78.6%)**

		Political knowledge	
		high	low
Education	high	<b>86,6</b>	<b>76,1</b>
	low	<b>83,0</b>	<b>73,1</b>

As anticipated, the highest turnout is found among the highly educated and informed voters.<sup>16</sup> The pattern is clear in the whole sample as well as within the four political contexts. Almost 87 per cent of them claim to have voted in the latest parliamentary election. Moreover, these knowledgeable voters seem to be slightly more active in proportional systems than in majoritarian systems. As hypothesised, voters with a combination of low education and little political knowledge abstain most; approximately 71 per cent of them turn out. The effect of low knowledge is especially clear in majoritarian systems and in old democracies. Of the remaining two categories, people with high education and a low political knowledge level seem to vote according to the hypothesis, their turnout represents average turnout, especially in proportional systems and in new democracies. The average turnout in the whole sample is 77.5 per cent; whereas it is 78 per cent in proportional systems and 76 per cent in majoritarian systems. In new democracies, turnout is 75 per cent and in old democracies 79.<sup>17</sup> Low education combined with a high level of political knowledge generates a fairly high turnout, 82 per cent of these people vote in the whole sample, as well as in both electoral systems. This group of voters seems to vote to a similar extent also in new and old democracies.

Of the components of knowledge, information seems to increase turnout more than education. Education, on the other hand, seems to have a greater impact in proportional systems. A test of the statistical significance of the differences has been carried out through an analysis of variance. The F-value for the overall differences between groups in the whole sample is 318 ( $p=.000$ ). Also within the four political contexts the ANOVA confirms that the overall turnout differences are significant. Post hoc Bonferroni t-tests were used in order to trace the significances in pairwise comparisons. All pairwise comparisons in the total sample validate that the differences in turnout are significant at the .001-level. This is also the case for comparisons between groups in proportional systems as well as in new and old democracies. In majoritarian systems the difference in mean turnout between less knowledgeable voters and voters with a high education combined with a low information level is not significant according to the Bonferroni test. All the

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<sup>16</sup> Thresholds for 'low' respectively 'high' have been defined as follow. Low education is from none up to completed secondary school. High education is from post-secondary trade or vocational school up to completed university education. Low information is zero or one correctly answered political knowledge questions in the survey. High information is two or three (the total is three) correctly answered questions.

<sup>17</sup> According to real electoral records, the average turnout figures are lower: 72 per cent in the elections with a proportional system and 65 per cent in the elections with a majoritarian system. Therefore, the compared context levels in the present article are aggregated among individual survey respondents' answers.

remaining pairwise comparisons are statistically significant also in majoritarian systems.

Separate one sample t-tests were carried out for each cell in order to gauge if the turnout differs from the comparable overall turnout in the whole sample. The same procedure was followed within each electoral context. Figures in bold indicate a turnout which, statistically speaking, differ from the compared average turnout of the context. There are only two cases where turnout does not differ from the compared turnout; voters with high education but little political knowledge vote to as actively as all voters in proportional electoral systems and in old democracies. These two cases are, in fact, outcomes in line with the hypotheses presented earlier.

In Table 2, the groups of voters are placed in a matrix where the structural macro variables are combined. Thus, we can compare how four groups of voters turn out in four contexts. These are combined of the dichotomies of the longevity of democracy and the electoral system. As in Figure 2, turnout levels that differ from the compared turnout in each context (given within parentheses) are given in bold. In this cross table, consisting of 16 cells, there are two columns where voters behave in a similar manner regardless of system characteristics, and two columns where the turnout pattern is more diverse. In the former category, we have the politically sophisticated voters, of whom 9 of 10 turn out regardless of the system. Also less educated voters with a high level of political knowledge turn out to a similar degree in every system, albeit their turnout levels are lower. Amongst the less knowledgeable voters, turnout is highest in the old proportional democracies, only five percentage points below the national average. Especially in new democracies, the less knowledgeable voters abstain from polls. Moreover, the electoral system does not affect turnout levels in this group in new democracies. This observation is logical; the psychological effects of the electoral system should be effective in the long run. Nevertheless, voters with high education and little political knowledge behave according to our hypothesis in all proportional systems, regardless of the longevity of democracy. Their turnout levels correspond to the national average.

Table 2. Turnout according to individual and contextual characteristics

		Low education		High education	
		Low	High	Low	High
		knowl.	knowl.	knowl.	knowl.
New democracy	Proport. (75.1)	<b>64,7</b>	<b>79,3</b>	76,3	<b>90,8</b>
	Majorit. (75.2)	<b>66,9</b>	<b>82,6</b>	<b>69,7</b>	<b>85,0</b>
Old democracy	Proport. (79.3)	<b>74,2</b>	<b>83,3</b>	78,5	<b>87,0</b>
	Majorit. (76.9)	<b>69,9</b>	<b>82,1</b>	<b>72,2</b>	<b>85,9</b>

If the results are placed in the initial typology, the following outcomes can be obtained (Figure 3). Outcomes in accordance with the hypotheses are written in italics. In proportional systems, three hypotheses gain support. Knowledgeable voters indeed vote more frequently than others, whereas high education and low information generates a turnout which corresponds to the national average. Less knowledgeable voters are the most passive ones at elections. Only the group of voters with low education and high information deviate from the hypothesis; its turnout is higher than average. In majoritarian systems the extreme groups with highest and lowest levels vote according to the hypotheses, and the group of low education and high information voters turn out more than average. Highly educated voters with low information, however, seem to vote less frequently than anticipated. Therefore, only two hypotheses seem to be verified in majoritarian systems. Even though the pattern is similar in both electoral families, the two dimensions of knowledge seem to work slightly differently in proportional and in majoritarian systems. While both dimensions of knowledge affect turnout in proportional systems, possessing political knowledge seems to be far more important than school education in majoritarian electoral systems. Whether this initial pattern holds in a multivariate setting remains to be seen in the following analyses.

Figure 3. Preliminary results; turnout among groups of voters

		Level of political knowledge	
		High	Low
Education	High	High turnout	Average turnout in proportional systems; Fairly low turnout in majoritarian systems
	Low	Fairly high turnout	Low turnout

The analyses of variance above were carried out with categories of voters and give the impression that political knowledge is a powerful predictor of voter turnout. In order to establish how knowledge affects the probability of voting in relation to a set of competing individual variables, multivariate logistic regression analyses are carried out. It is also of interest to examine whether the two dimensions of knowledge complete each other in an additive or a multiplicative way. Therefore, an interaction term for political knowledge and education will be added to the regression models.

Table 3 consists of three competing models, after which a final model is formulated. In the first model, only the components of knowledge and the interaction term are entered. The second model controls for individual characteristics: party identification, age, gender, marital status, having young children living at home (less than 18-year-olds), membership in a trade union, unemployment and the income level of the respondent's household in national quintiles. Finally, a parsimonious model with the best fit is presented.

Knowledge increases the probability of turning out to vote as the first model demonstrates. However, education and political knowledge seem to affect turnout as separate dimensions, and they do not interact beyond the additive function. This means that education and political knowledge do increase the probability of turning out to vote both independently and together, but they do not have a multiplicative effect on the probability of voting. It should also be noted that

the model suggests that possessing political knowledge increases the odds of voting more than education.

Table 3. The determinants of voting in the whole sample, logistic regression

Dependent variable: Voting (no=0, yes=1)	Sophistication			Add control variables			Final		
	B	Wald	p	B	Wald	p	B	Wald	p
<b>education</b>	0,53	32	***	0,79	37	***	0,86	161	***
<b>political knowledge</b>	1,00	110	***	0,74	38	***	0,81	315	***
<b>education*knowledge</b>	0,21	2		0,28	2				
party id				1,05	805	***	1,12	1196	***
age/100				1,59	135	***	1,55	271	***
male				-0,05	2				
married				0,26	29	***	0,20	41	***
widowed				-0,06	1				
divorced				-0,25	11	***	-0,27	18	***
children				-0,01	0				
union				0,46	104	***	0,43	117	***
unemployed				-0,24	10	***			
income				0,04	1				
Constant	0,47			-0,77	71	**	-0,79	165	***
N	34 437			25 897			33 324		
Missing cases, percent	1,0			25,5			4,2		
Percent correctly predicted	77,6			79,3			78,5		
Model Chi-sq.	1053		***	1178		***	3027		***
-2 Log likelihood	32634			22238			29102		
Nagelkerke R Sq.	0,05			0,15			0,15		

Notes: significance \* at the .05-level, \*\* at the .01-level, \*\*\* at the .001-level. Knowledge = (education\*political information).

In the second model, control variables at the micro level are entered. Of them, possessing party identification is the most powerful predictor of voting, followed by age. They increase the odds of turning out to vote, as do trade union membership and marriage. The components of knowledge are significant also in this second model, although the effect of political knowledge is weaker than in the first model. Moreover, it seems that being married promotes voting whereas being divorced or unemployed increases the probability of abstaining. Gender is of no importance, neither is being widowed or having under-aged children. It is interesting to notice that the respondent's income level does not affect the odds of



voting. According to rational choice arguments, the cost of being informed is lower among the people who are well off. In any case, there is no individual positive effect of income, at least when political knowledge is included in the same model. The goodness of fit in the second model seems to be higher than in the first model, but we should be cautious in comparing these statistics between models where the  $N$  varies in a considerable way. Since we have a cross-national survey and a large number of respondents there is a problem with missing values. The more variables we enter in the model, the more missing cases we end up with. This is a true dilemma both statistically and theoretically. It is difficult to establish whether 'don't knows' and refusals are non-randomly distributed in the material. In order to reduce structural or motivational bias in the results, the final model tries to avoid variables that have several thousands of missing values. Especially the variable measuring the income level of the respondent's household is plagued by a large number of missing cases.

In the final model the independent variables arrive at a satisfactory goodness of fit. The share of missing values is merely 4.2 per cent. The Nagelkerke pseudo  $R$ -squared is .15 compared to .05 in the first model, and the model Chi-squared exceeds 3000, compared to 1053 in the first model. The most important independent variables behind voting are age, party identification, education and political knowledge. If we concentrate on the logistic regression coefficients, i.e. try to establish the odds of voting against abstention, the order is as above. The Wald values, on the other hand, indicate that party identification affects voting in a more uniform way than the rest of the variables. The order of the 'uniformity' of the effect according to the Wald values (i.e. minimised standard errors of coefficients) would be party id, followed by political knowledge, age and education. Of the remaining variables in the final model, union membership and marriage encourage voting. Divorcees and the unemployed are inclined to abstain at elections, even though the impact of the latter is small.

The fact that party identification has the most uniform impact on the probability of voting against abstaining is hardly surprising. Voters who identify themselves with a political party tend to vote in order to demonstrate solidarity with their own social class and the political party that is linked to it (Manin 1997). When party identity outweighs the components of knowledge, it indirectly demonstrates the fact that acquiring relevant information is costly. Citizens with a

clear party preference are not as puzzled in an election as are voters who lack a clear party identity and therefore need more information in order to vote.<sup>18</sup>

The whole sample is analysed in Table 3, and control analyses within the four electoral contexts are carried out in Table 4 in order to confirm that the mechanisms of turnout work in a similar manner in different macro contexts. The test is carried out separately in new and old proportional and majoritarian systems.

Table 4. The determinants of voting in four electoral contexts, logistic regression.

Dependent variable: voting (no=0, yes=1)	Prop.new dem.			Maj.new.dem.			Prop.old dem.			Maj. old dem.		
	B	Wald	p	B	Wald	p	B	Wald	p	B	Wald	p
<b>education</b>	1,31	44	***	0,52	9	**	0,88	75	***	0,98	37	***
<b>political knowledge</b>	0,80	51	***	1,20	112	***	0,70	98	***	0,92	77	***
party id.	0,89	120	***	0,74	91	***	1,35	736	***	1,13	255	***
age/100	1,69	55	***	1,14	23	***	1,17	68	***	3,05	186	***
married	0,25	10	**	0,22	8	**	0,24	24	***	0,02	0	
divorced	-0,08	0		0,04	0		-0,28	9		-0,50	16	***
union	0,85	53	***	0,37	11	**	0,43	57	***	0,13	2	
Constant	-1,24	62	***	-0,57	13	***	-0,54	37	***	-1,58	99	***
N	5032			4386			16 525			7381		
Missing cases %	7,3			2,3			4,2			3,0		
Correctly predicted %	76,8			76,0			80,3			77,7		
Model Chi-sq.	557			375			1520			779		
-2 Log likelihood	4625			4800			13516			5896		
Nagelkerke R-sq.	0,17			0,12			0,15			0,18		

*Note:* significance \* at the .05-level, \*\* at the .01-level, \*\*\* at the .001-level.

The regression models within the four political contexts are more similar than dissimilar. This proves that the mechanisms of voter turnout work in a similar manner universally. Political knowledge is an important independent variable at the individual level explaining turnout. Intervening variables do not change the

<sup>18</sup> Another relevant evidence in this direction is provided by Franklin (2004, 162-67). He stresses that the function of party id is often misunderstood. He finds that it prevents turnout from falling as far as it might otherwise fall in a low-turnout election. In a high-turnout election, however, it does not help to boost turnout further.

explanatory power of political knowledge. Party identification and age are also important determinants of turnout. Old partisan knowledgeable voters are bound to vote, whereas the probability is small among young politically ignorant citizens with no party identification. There are, however, some differences between the contexts. If we compare voters in new democracies, education increases the probability of turning out to vote more in proportional systems, whereas political knowledge has more influence in majoritarian systems. A result that could be expected on based on the evidence in Table 2. In old democracies, however, this difference is more diverse. Education seems to have a less uniform impact on turnout in old majoritarian democracies, even though the logit coefficient for education has a higher value than in old proportional democracies. Party identity is, quite logically, less important in new democracies than in old democracies. In old proportional democracies party identification is the most important independent variable, whereas age is the most important predictor of voting in old majoritarian democracies.

## Conclusions

Politically sophisticated persons vote more than average, and less knowledgeable persons remain passive more often than others. The core hypotheses gain i.e. support in the light of the comparative data. Conceptually, the main findings of the chapter are twofold. First, we have seen that the operationalisation of political knowledge as a combination of factual and analytic capabilities generates a powerful predictor of turnout. The two dimensions of knowledge affect citizens' voting or abstention in a similar way but they should rather be treated as additive than multiplicative components.<sup>19</sup> Second, it has been acknowledged that political knowledge possesses an explanatory power of its own.<sup>20</sup> Despite the fact that we control for individual variables such as age or structural variables such as the electoral system, political knowledge still affects the probability of attending the polls.

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<sup>19</sup> However, it should be pointed out that at separate control tests, when only the interaction term of education and political information was entered instead of the single variables, it could be established that the product of knowledge becomes the most powerful variable behind turnout. The odds of voting are influenced more by the *product* of knowledge than by party id.

<sup>20</sup> Also the other component of knowledge, education, affects turnout on its own, but that relationship has been established in several studies earlier.

Even though political knowledge is a powerful predictor of voting in different political contexts, it seems to work somewhat differently in proportional and in majoritarian systems. Voters in proportional systems are more evenly spread in terms of political knowledge than voters in majoritarian systems (Grönlund & Milner 2006). In the former, political knowledge seems to be more independent of age and education, whereas it seems to covary with education in the latter. This finding is interesting *per se*. Majoritarian electoral systems are often justified through the fact that they are easier to understand than proportional systems. Countries with a majoritarian electoral system have usually fewer parliamentary parties than countries where a proportional formula is used. In spite of this, and the fact that many of the questions pertaining to political knowledge in the surveys deal with parties, the levels of political knowledge vary more among voters in majoritarian systems.

Although the importance of knowledge has been established convincingly, a concern remains to be discussed. There is a possibility that the used interview method actually overemphasizes the importance of knowledge. The fact that respondents tend to overreport voting in surveys is known. Even in the present data, the average turnout is higher in the national samples than in real elections (see Table 1). Overreporting would not be a severe problem if it were randomly distributed. But empirical evidence suggests overreporting to vary according to certain characteristics. Exploiting U.S. data Bernstein et al. find that non-voters who feel that they *should have voted*, tend to overreport more than other non-voters. The pattern is clear: “Among all non-voters, the most likely to overreport are the more educated, the more partisan, the more religious, and those who have been contacted and asked to vote for a candidate” (Bernstein et al. 2001, 41). In the light of their findings, knowledge, consisting of education and political knowledge, might be slightly less important as an explanatory variable behind voting than the survey data, which have been analyzed in the present chapter, suggest.

Knowledgeable citizens do vote more often than others but they might also overreport more often than other people. The same applies to citizens with a party identity, and, most likely to older voters. The independent variables in the present study might according to this logic have less impact in a real-life election. The sense of civic duty increases real turnout but it may also inflate reported turnout beyond the established effect. There is not much we can do with the present dataset in order to control the reliability of the turnout variable. There are no comparable cross-national register-based electoral records broken down by

education; even less possible would it be to determine citizens' turnout levels according to what they know of politics.

## Discussion

Even though credible, the results in the present chapter raise new questions. The causal relationships between the concepts political interest, political knowledge and political participation remain blurred. Within electoral research, we are sometimes keen on finding high statistical inference so desperately that theoretically valid reasoning is overlooked. Therefore, we must ask ourselves whether there is a chance that political knowledge is merely a proxy for political interest.

Political interest (e.g. Norris 2002; Franklin 2004) and the strength of party identification (e.g. Franklin 2002; Franklin 2004) are often treated as independent variables in relation to turnout. Putnam (2000), who emphasizes social capital, links the negative trend in associational and other civic participation with a similar fall in political interest among Americans. Further, political knowledge seems to vary according to age in contemporary USA. Younger generations (people born after 1964) have less political knowledge and interest than older generations, which is rather a new phenomenon. From the earliest polls in the 1940s to the mid-1970s, younger people were at least as well informed as their elders were (*Ibid.*, 36). Another sign for less political knowledge and interest among young Americans is their indifference to media coverage of public affairs (Bennett 1998).

Van Deth provides an innovative perspective where subjective political interest is compared with the relative importance of politics as measured against the citizen's other interests in life. A typology of the dimensions interest and salience produces four types of citizens: the involved, the committed, the spectators and the aloof. The involved are citizens for whom politics are interesting and salient whereas the committed are not interested in politics even though they find politics important for some reason. The spectators are interested but rank politics as less important than other aspects of life. Finally, the aloof are neither interested nor do they evaluate politics as important (van Deth 2000, 131). Van Deth tests a hypothesis where people with a high level of individual autonomy, i.e. rich in economic and social resources, become political spectators: "politics has lost its obligatory character – it is interesting and probably important to follow what goes on in this area, but compared with other matters, its relevance is relatively low" (van Deth 2000, 138). Even though the share of spectators is small, one of ten

citizens have the characteristics, he finds some proof for the hypothesis in a West European context 1990-1998. The distinction between interest and salience is a promising attempt to deepen the understanding of citizens' orientation towards politics. Moreover, as van Deth implies, the dimensions can be separated from a theoretical point of view. In real life, as his interview data suggest, the dimensions seem to covary. But since they are not fully collinear, the distinction can be useful in further analyses.

Party identification is a concept that is widely used in the study of political behaviour. Since the concept was introduced by the 'Michigan-school' in 1950s (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960), a whole research tradition has been based on the theory. Party identification is no doubt an important milestone in deciphering the mystery of voting. How children are socialized into political beings or how the environment affects people's values and their feelings towards political parties, are and were important supplements to known macro associations, such as class voting. Yet, especially in relation to party choice it is difficult to recognise it as a genuine independent variable whose explanatory power can be measured against other variables, say, education, age or social position. Party identification should probably be seen as a result of several other variables, such as family background, education and social class. Therefore it should be treated as a *reinforcing* variable in a path from socio-economics to voting (Anckar & Ståhlberg 1980).

When political interest and party identification are treated as explanatory variables in relation to voting behaviour, we encounter a dilemma. The variables are very close to the phenomenon which they are supposed to explain. Statistically, they may explain a lot of the variance in the dependent variable. Nevertheless, treating political interest and party identification as independent variables in relation to voting involves an obvious risk for tautological argumentation where we simply claim that "people vote because they are interested in voting" or that "people vote for the party they identify themselves with".

It should be admitted that political knowledge may involve problems of the same kind as an independent variable behind voting. Theoretically speaking, however, being well-informed about politics is more distinct from participation than political interest and party identity are. Moreover, information is statistically speaking a far more suitable variable than interest. The former can be measured objectively, whereas the latter relies on subjective evaluation (Milner 2002, 38).<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Instead of relying on the subjective interest measurement, van Deth and Elff (2004) use political discussion as a proxy for political interest.

Still, the concept of political knowledge and its role in relation to other variables, mainly education on the hand and political interest on the other hand should be studied more closely. These studies could be useful either in cross-national and/or in experimental settings. The role of civic education and the role of political interest ought to be deciphered.<sup>22</sup> It is reasonable to conclude that people want to gather information on something they are interested in. In rational choice terms, there are no information costs for the politically interested. Also the role of social interaction in how citizens become politically informed and thereby active needs closer investigation. According to experimental research, political discussion in social networks seems to have the strongest influence on low status individuals (McClurg 2003).

For these purposes large cross-national, longitudinal and consistent survey projects, like the CSES, are needed. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that, for reasons of validity, the instrument through which political knowledge is measured should be standardized. Therefore it is most promising that the fourth module of the CSES contains four standardized political knowledge items. The fieldwork within this module takes place as of 2012 in the CSES member countries.

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<sup>22</sup> A suitable object for experimental studies could be adult education, whose importance to civic literacy and political participation has been emphasized by Milner (2002, 117-33).

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## WHEN PRESIDENTS LOSE

*Axel Hadenius*

In the forthcoming election of 2012 the current President, Barack Obama, is seeking reelection. When I write this essay, in September 2012, nobody knows the outcome of the race. All we can imagine, so far, is that the contest between the two candidates, the president and Governor Mitt Romney, is likely to be a fierce battle. According to the recent opinion polls, it is almost a tie between the contenders.

Looking at the historical record, though, the president would have reason to be fairly optimistic. In the 19 elections since 1900, where an officeholder has taken part, he has often been successful. In 14 of these elections the president has prevailed. In effect, accordingly, a serving president has a probability of around 75 % to win. A few times, however, that has not been the case. This essay will focus on these failed elections (seen from the incumbent's perspective) - in the interest of observing some general patterns that could explain when presidents lose.

### The Advantage of Incumbency

Generally, as we saw, most presidents who have sought reelection have been victorious. From a broader perspective, that of course is not surprising. Practically all political systems tend to further the life-expectancy of its men and women in office. That holds indeed for authoritarian systems, whose rationale is in essence to safeguard the maintenance of the powers to be (Karvonen 2008). The more such systems are marked by political closeness, the longer are normally the terms in office (Hadenius & Teorell 2007).

But the advantage of incumbency can, as we know, be seen also in open, democratic systems. In The American Congress, the senators and representatives that stand for election can be fairly certain about a happy outcome. In the latest election, 2010, which was marked by a relatively high degree of turnover (it resulted in the greatest loss for the ruling party in a mid-term election since 1938) 86 percent of the members of the House of Representatives who sought reelection were returned. In the Senate races which took place at the same time, the corresponding figure was 80 percent: in 16 cases out of 20. It should be noted, though, that among

the four senators who lost, two were eliminated already in the primary process, which regularly antedates the final election.

Accordingly, a few political hopefuls are able to make it to the halls of Congress by challenging an incumbent. Yet the safest route is certainly to stand as a party candidate in an open election (where no serving congressman takes part). Among the 2010 Senate elections, 15 were open, normally because the office holder wanted to retire. Hence, these elections constitute the main instrument for rejuvenation of the Senate. The same holds for the House of Representatives, but here the relative share of open elections is usually lower (USpolitics.about.com 2010).

The fact that incumbents normally prevail in elections has several explanations. One important factor, of course, is name recognition. Members of Congress are normally well known personally in the state or electoral district which they represent. As elected officials they are often exposed in media, and they are regularly invited to take part in all kind of local events. Moreover, the office itself brings a number of resources of electoral consequence, such as a circle of professional aides, access to regular channels of information and money for travel. On top of that, incumbents normally find it easier than their adversaries to bring in campaign resources.

On the whole, the same sort of advantages, but with greater consequence, comes with the highest public office, the presidency. It gives huge name recognition, massive public attention and access to a broad range of professional and infrastructural capacities. However, as for campaign resources - which involve both monetary and human properties - the conditions in presidential elections are normally more even than in a typical congressional election. Two main conditions contribute to this state of affairs. First, in terms of organizational and financial capacity, the two major parties have for a long time been fairly equally supplied at the national level, and they have been prepared to give their best to mobilize these assets in support of their front figure. Second, since the 1970s presidential candidates have had access to fairly substantial amounts of public funding, which has leveled the playing field (Reiter 2008; Thurber 2010; Hadenius 2012).

Still, it is evident that the holding of the presidential office have brought an advantage on election-day. Most of the time, presidents have been successful when they have tried to be reelected. But there are exceptions. We will now look into these cases, for the purpose of finding some general conditions that may explain why presidents become rejected, and (by implication) what it takes for a president to win.

Accordingly, we examine the following five elections: 1912, 1932, 1976, 1980 and 1992 in order to establish what the main causes of failure were.

## The 1912 Election

In several respects, the 1912 election was a very special event. A long period of party dominance was broken, and a great political figure saw the end of his career. What is more, the electoral outcome for the president was unusual indeed.

Since the end of the mid-1890s up to the early 1930s, political life in Washington was dominated in the main by the Republican Party. Over this period, eight presidential elections were won by a representative of this party. Only two times did a democratic candidate succeed. It happened for the first time in 1912, when Woodrow Wilson was declared the winner. Wilson was then reelected four years later and, thus, became the first Democratic two-term president since the 1830s.

The 1912 election also marked the final showing of an extraordinary colorful politician, namely Theodore Roosevelt - once labeled "the Lion in the White House". This man had, to start with, a remarkable personal background. Besides the normal elite schools, a career as lawyer and a number of political assignments (such as Governor of New York) he had also been a cowboy, a war hero, and a renounced leader of jungle and mountain expeditions. He became president by accident. In 1901 the newly reelected president, William McKinley, was shot by a terrorist, and hence Roosevelt who served as vice president took over.

Coming from the back stage (the vice presidency was then an insignificant position; Roosevelt had been placed there to be kept aside) the frenetic new president turned out a portal figure of a new era. He was the first really active, reform oriented president. To that end, he devoted a lot of energy to actively influence public opinion – which earlier presidents had seldom tried to do.

Roosevelt was reelected in 1904, and in that campaign he made a pledge not to be a candidate next time around (there were still no formal time limits for presidents, but a strong convention called for only two terms). In keeping with his promise, Roosevelt stepped aside in 1908. But he made sure that his close political ally, William Taft (a lawyer and a War Secretary under Roosevelt), got the Republican nomination (Donald 2007).

As strongly associated with the popular outgoing president, Taft easily won the election. It was soon evident, however, that the performance of the new president did not meet the expectations of his mentor. Taft was a conservative bureaucrat - not a reform minded political animal like his predecessor. To the surprise of many, Roosevelt made clear that he was disappointed with Taft and wanted to replace him in the next election. Accordingly, he declared himself candidate for the Republican nomination. The process that followed was marked by several dramatic incidents.

In the phase when parties pick their candidate, a new means of measuring support was introduced in 1912: the primary election (which lets the party people on the ground have a say). This was a method that suited Roosevelt well; in all primaries where he took part he turned out the winner. But to his misfortune, the new method was not the key decision mechanism. In the lion share of states, it was the party apparatus that made the selection of delegates to be sent to the Party Convention. And the leading party people had nowadays misgivings about Roosevelt, who had become increasingly radical since he left office. In effect, the party organizations generally throw their support behind Taft.

At the Convention, which was unusually noisy and conflict-ridden, it was soon evident that the Taft camp could control all vital decisions. Hence, the outcome was clear. The serving President was declared the party nominee (which was not of course an unusual selection). But Roosevelt did not give in. He immediately announced his candidacy as the front figure of a new party, the Progressive Party (or the 'Bull Moose Party'<sup>1</sup>), which he dominated completely.

At the same time the Democratic Party had made its choice. Here the process had been very complicated owing to the fact that a minority could veto all decisions (a rule which was applied in order to safeguard the interest of the South). After almost 50 ballots, however, a presidential candidate could be presented: Woodrow Wilson - a political science professor and Governor of New Jersey, who represented the progressive (reform oriented) wing of the Party (Link 1972).

In the election Wilson turned out the winner. He received 42 percent of the votes. Roosevelt came second with 27 percent, while Taft received 23 percent (Robinson 1970, Chase 2004). These results were astonishing in several ways. Never before - or later - has a president in office performed so poorly. And never

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<sup>1</sup> This popular name was founded due to a statement made by Roosevelt after an attack by a gunman before a public meeting under the election campaign. Roosevelt was shot in the breast, where he fortunately had his manuscript, which saved his life. With the bullet still in his body, he gave his speech as intended. To the astonished press he remarked afterwards, that "it takes more than that to kill a bull moose".



before - or later - has a third party candidate taken such a big share of the votes. Yet the most important implication of the election is the fact that the splintering of the votes for the two originally Republican representatives probably laid the ground for Democratic victory. Because together, as we saw, the two got 50 percent – against Wilson’s 43.

It is obviously hard to tell what had been the result if Roosevelt had surrendered after the Party Convention and, as has often happened in similar situations, given his support to the party candidate. Taft was by no means a great politician. But with a unified party behind him, and especially with the support of the flamboyant former president, he would have had a fair chance of winning - as the united Republican marginal to Wilson was as substantive as 7 percent units.

What could be established, though, is that given the actual, relatively even splintering of the votes between the Republican candidates, President Taft not only lost his office; he was also humiliated in an unparalleled way.

## The 1932 Election

The election just described had certainly been dramatic, and unique in several ways. But with respect to the broad political picture, it was not a formative election (an election where the political landscape is changed for years to come). A Democrat took office, but after his two terms, things went back to normal. In the 1920s, three presidential elections in a row were won by Republican candidates - and generally by a wide margin. The twentieth was an era of rapid economic advancement and growing prosperity among the citizenry. The Republican Party was generally seen as the political architect of this development, and was thus rewarded at election time. The election of 1928 was particularly successful for the Republican Party. Its candidate, Herbert Hoover, virtually knocked out his Democratic contender (Al Smith) and prevailed with a margin of 17 percent units (58-41).

Hoover had started as a manager in the mining business, and relatively early in life he had become very rich. Having accomplished that, he turned to public life. He worked first in international relief sector; then he became a US Government Secretary. His approach was that of an efficiency-boosting technocrat. In 1928 he had easily become his party’s presidential candidate, and we know what happened thereafter.

Less than a year after the successful election, however, Hoover and his government was upset by a blow of gigantic magnitude. In October 1929 the stock

market collapsed; this was the most devastating economic crash in American history. It signaled the beginning of the Great Depression, which affected the USA and the industrialized world for several years ahead.

The election year of 1932 marked the very low point of the depression. Since 1929 (before the crash) the American GNP had been reduced by almost 50 percent. A great majority of the banks had gone bankrupt, and in many economic sectors production had been heavily restrained and sometimes become completely stagnant. The unemployment rate was 25 percent – a rise from 4 percent in 1928.

In view of these conditions, the electoral prospects for the president were certainly gloomy. Nevertheless, Hoover wanted to stand up for the government's way of handling the crises, which he strongly believed in. The government's basic line was non-intervention. In Hoover's mind, the economic problems could only be solved by the self-healing capacity of the market. As for the social side of the matter, voluntary engagement was the best approach.

Despite vocal criticism within the Republican Party, Hoover became the party nominee almost without competition at the Convention. He was elected on the first ballot with 98 percent of the votes.

As had usually been the case, the Democratic candidate selection was more complicated due to the decision rule applied, namely 2/3 majority. The leading aspirant, the New York Governor Franklin Roosevelt (who was Theodore's 5th cousin) needed several ballots to secure the nomination. The turning point was his decision to join forces with a leading Southerner of the old school: John Garner who would be his running mate, as candidate for the vice presidency. The two thus started a long-enduring partnership of tactical nature that would result in an unusual degree of animosity and strife (as Garner sometimes openly sided with Roosevelt's critics).

Roosevelt appeared as a moderate-liberal Democrat. He was a good organizer and had a winning personality. Yet he suffered from a severe physical handicap: from his late thirties his legs had been paralyzed (probably due to Polio). Hence he could not actually walk and he could barely stand. These conditions were, however, kept secret. Accordingly, on practically all pictures he was sitting.

The Democratic had traditionally been torn by internal division - between north and south, between the agricultural and the urban-industrial camps, etc. As a skillful deal-maker (as we saw) Roosevelt managed in an unprecedented way to unite the different factions behind his candidacy. And he also brought in new support groups, particularly the trade unions, who since then have been vital

sponsors of the Democratic Party. In addition, Roosevelt introduced a strategy of tying minority groups to the party (Landy & Milkis 2008).

Roosevelt's main approach during the election campaign was to blame the president for the misery that marred the country. As for his own policy agenda, he was fairly unclear, however. It was only after the election, when he had moved into the White House, that he presented his famous New Deal agenda, involving massive public efforts to stimulate economic activities and to introduce schemes for social protection. During the campaign, no hints about these coming programs were actually made. Defying the president in person was naturally an easy line of attack. Hoover had become extremely unpopular among large segments of the population. When he was out on rallies, he was frequently met with unmistakable hostility. People were throwing fruits and eggs at him, and he could sometimes not even get out of his car (Carcasson 1988).

Given the economic and social hardships, and the strong sentiments against the president, the outcome of the election would seem a foregone conclusion. Without doubt, Roosevelt won a stunning victory. He received 57 percent of the votes, against 40 for Hoover. Nevertheless, the margin between the two candidates was almost identical with that in 1928 - which underscores the degree of success last time around, when the "economic current" was in Hoover's favour (Robinson 1970).

The election of 1932 turned out to have far-reaching consequences. With the election of Roosevelt a new tone was set in Washington. In a way, the active presidency of his relative Theodore was re-established - but it was a huge difference in methods and scale. Whereas his relative had mainly concentrated on policies of regulatory nature (with little consequence for the public purse), the new president's reform agenda involved giant economic contributions by the public authorities, and a great enlargement of the central government's role in society as a whole.

Roosevelt's innovative organizational work also had lasting effects. The establishment of the new "Rainbow Coalition" (or 'New Deal Coalition'), vitalized the Democratic Party and made it a very effective electoral instrument in coming years. From now on, the Democrats were no longer a second-rate party, as it had been most of the time since the Civil War (Kennedy 1999, Smith 2008). Roosevelt's triumph marked the beginning of an era of Democratic dominance. Of the nine presidential elections between 1932 and 1964, the Party only lost two.

On many accounts, Franklin Roosevelt was a brilliant political leader; he stands out as the most important US president in the twentieth century. But his

first victory - when he managed to oust the president- was very much driven by political fortune. In all probability, he would not have made it four years earlier. Given the atmosphere of despair that prevailed in the year of 1932, almost any normally talented challenger would have carried the election. Hence, a door of opportunity for political change was opened. It was entered by a man who turned out a remarkable innovator, and eventually a national leader of historic caliber.

## The 1976 Election

The 1976 election was special in a particular way. The president, Gerald Ford, who was standing had not been elected. And as it happened, he never became elected.

Ford had started his political career as member of the House of Representatives. Having served for several years, he worked his way up the Republican Party ladder to become Minority Leader in the mid-1960s. In that position he gained a reputation as a political moderate and respected deal-maker. When the Vice President, Spiro Agnew, in 1973 was forced to resign, due to charges of economic criminality (during his time as Governor in Maryland), President Richard Nixon, was advised by senior congressional spokesmen of both parties, that Ford was the only acceptable replacement - which was a strong recommendation, keeping in mind that the selection needed to be confirmed by Congress. As the president followed the advice, the nomination of Ford was secured by an overwhelming majority in both chambers. This happened in October 1973.

Less than a year later, in August 1974, American political life was shaken in a dramatic and unprecedented way: President Nixon announced his resignation from office. The background was the Watergate scandal. New evidence could prove that Nixon had been actively involved in the cover-ups, and in consequence resignation or impeachment (where the outcome was clear) were the only alternatives.

Accordingly, Ford became president – the only office holder who had neither been elected president nor vice president. He took over in hard times. Not only was the economy in poor shape (marked by growing inflation combined with recession), Ford's most demanding task was to handle two prevailing national crises: the Vietnam War and Watergate. As for the war, Ford was given the role of administrating the final retreat - which unquestionably meant defeat. In view of the long and burdensome involvement in the war, this was certainly a great setback.

Nevertheless, the withdrawal from Vietnam was seen with relief by many Americans. Watergate became his toughest challenge. His solution to the problem was to pardon Nixon soon after his inauguration. This, however, was a very controversial move. Vocal opponents saw the decision as the result of a corrupt bargain struck with Nixon (in order for Ford to become president). Nobody knows for sure the real story behind, but the Nixon pardon evidently became a political burden for the president. Ford's own motivation - which he did not express until wrote his memoirs - was that he wanted to put an end to this national trauma and at the same time save the Nixon family from further humiliation. The fact that he did not openly defend his decision while in office added to the prevailing feeling of mistrust among the general public.

Before the election in 1976 Ford announced his candidacy for a new term in office. In the nomination process, however, he was challenged by a very talented candidate from the party's conservative side: Ronald Reagan, former Governor of California. The latter did well in the primary elections (which had now become the chief selection method). In the end it was almost dead heat between the contenders, but with a slight superiority for Ford. At the Party Convention Ford managed to win the nomination on the first ballot - but it was, for a president, an unusually close call. This of course affected president's political standing in a detrimental way.

On the Democratic side the nomination race was from the outset a fairly open affair. A number of renowned congressmen and governors had announced their intention to stand. But already in the first contest, in the Iowa caucus-election, a practically unknown former governor, Jimmy Carter, won a surprising victory. And despite strong efforts to stop him by more established candidates, he managed in the end to become his party's nominee.

For a presidential candidate, Carter had a fairly limited political résumé. He had been a one-term governor and a two-term state senator. All his political assignments had been constrained to his home state, Georgia. Coming from this part of the country made him, from one perspective, an unlikely president. No candidate from the Deep South had won a presidential race since the 1840s. Yet from another perspective, being from a remote area, and with no earlier involvement in national politics, could be seen an advantage.

Carter ran his campaign as an outsider and reformer, who was untainted by Washington political scandals. In the wake of the Watergate affair, many voters found his political style attractive. At an early stage of the presidential campaign, he held a huge lead in the polls. But eventually, by boosting his political experience (and pointing to Carter's want thereof) and by effectively using the time in the

limelight - which comes with the office and always gives the president a favor - Ford could steadily close the gap. In the end it was a narrow race. Carter carried the election, with 50 percent versus 48 (Green 1995, Kaufman & Kaufman 2006).

In the analyses following the election it is generally understood that Ford's defeat had several underpinnings. The economic situation, with an unemployment rate over 7 percent, was a disfavor. The hard struggle to gain his party's nomination was another drawback. But all tend to agree that Ford's connection with the Watergate scandal was his heaviest political burden. He had certainly not been involved in the scandal himself, but he was tied to it indirectly as Nixon's chosen vice president and, most importantly, by using his power of pardon to clear Nixon from all criminal charges. In view of the strong reactions that followed the pardon, Ford's silence about the motives only added to the atmosphere of distrust and suspicion that surrounded the Watergate scandal (Frum 2000).

## The 1980 Election

Conditions had certainly been in Jimmy Carter's favor in 1976, when he - coming almost from nowhere - could win his party's nomination and later move into the White House. But in the next election, in 1980, he could no longer play the (once so effective) outsider-card. Watergate had come to be seen a historical event, and he had himself, as president, become an undisputable political insider. Besides, he was facing severe political difficulties, both at home and abroad. And on top of that, he was challenged by strong contenders, both in the nomination phase and in the final election.

In the economic field, conditions were gloomy overall in the late 1970s. The underlying problem was spelled stagflation - stagnated growth together with inflation, which was a new phenomenon. In effect, the unemployment rate was permanently relatively high, often above 7 %. The Carter administration had inherited these economic difficulties (things were not better under Ford) but it had not accomplished much to change conditions for the better.

On the international scene, the popular uprising in Iran had created increasing pain for the Carter government. As the old Shah regime was overturned, American personnel at the embassy in Tehran were caught and taken hostage. This was an evident violation of international diplomatic conventions and was an obvious provocation against the US, which for a long time had been a dependable ally of the Shah. For more than 14 months, starting in late 1979, 52 Americans were

held imprisoned by the new revolutionary Iranian government. In the spring of 1980 the US military launched an operation in Iran to rescue the hostages. But the action turned out a complete disaster and only energized the sentiment of embarrassment and disgrace among the American public. The fact that the hostages were released on January 20, 1980 - the same day Carter left office - indicates that Iranian government had a direct intent of ruining the president's prospects of reelection.

To get his Party's nomination, Carter had to fight a hard struggle against Ted Kennedy, who was strongly backed by the Party's liberal fraction, which criticized Carter for being a weak leader and too moderate in policy terms. Kennedy was a leading senator with great name recognition, as the brother of Jack and Bob Kennedy. He was a serious challenger indeed. But in the primary elections he did not get the support he needed. In the end Carter held a 60 – 40 lead over Kennedy in votes at the coming Party Convention. Despite that, Kennedy was committed to fight to the end at the Convention. The controversy that ensued created an atmosphere of conflict and division within the party, which was hardly a good way of preparing for the coming fight against the Republicans (Kaufman & Kaufman 2006; Stanley 2010).

Nevertheless, Carter was once again the Democratic presidential candidate. The person who would be his opponent was quite obvious. Reagan who closely lost the nomination in 1976 had made a glorified comeback. With a conservative policy agenda and an unusual personal charisma, he had gained wide support in the Republican Party. But the moderate wing that once had dominated the party had its favorite, who was prepared to stand up to Reagan - namely George H.W. Bush. The latter actually succeeded in a number of well-attended primaries. But overall Reagan had a stable lead in the state-wise 'beauty contests' where the party people could express their preferences. At the Party Convention, Reagan held a 75-25 majority among the delegates. Hence the outcome was evident. Reagan was elected the Republican candidate. As a means of enhancing party cohesion Reagan suggested his contender, Bush, as his running mate (which the latter accepted). Hence, the Republicans left the Convention Hall considerably more united than the Democrats.

In the election Reagan won a comfortable victory: 51 percent, against 41 for Carter.<sup>2</sup> Reagan's share of the vote (which signified absolute majority) was the biggest ever won against a serving president.

As we have seen, several circumstances may have contributed to Carter's defeat. One factor was the economy – which Reagan alluded to in a famous question to the views in a TV-debate: “Are you better off today than four years before?” Another thing was the Iran debacle. Moreover, the degree of internal party strife made a difference. In addition to all this, the personality factor played a significant role. Carter was regarded a nice and honest man, but as a politician he was a fairly grey figure. He had not the capacity – as his contender – to practically electrify an audience. Reagan had a natural talent for political communication that few have been granted. It was not easy for Carter to deal with an opponent of that caliber (Busch 2005, Hayward 2009).

## The 1992 Election

Of all the elections that have been lost by a president (since the beginning of the twentieth century) the outcome for George H.W. Bush in 1992 tends for many people to be the most difficult to comprehend, in my experience. After all, he was the president who won the Cold War against the Soviet Union, and he also led the successful Gulf-war where Saddam Hussein of Iraq was decisively defeated. In light of these international triumphs, how come he was so unrewardingly received among the American public that he could not be reelected?

The man he lost to, Bill Clinton, had given an answer to that question already under the electoral campaign, when he coined the famous slogan: "It's the economy, stupid". There is certainly something to this argument; the economic situation in the country was a weak point for the president. As we will see, however, that was not his only difficulty.

First a few words about Bush. Like several earlier presidents he was a man of wealth. Yet like Hoover (but unlike the two Roosevelts and Kennedy) he was essentially a self-made man, having earned his money in the oil industry. In Hoover's vein he turned to public life at an early stage, serving first in the House of Representatives and then holding a number of administrative and diplomatic top-

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<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, 6 percent went to a third candidate, Congressman John Anderson, who had come far behind in the Republican primaries and had decided to run as an independent. His participation had little effect on the balance between the two leading candidates.



positions. Under Reagan he was Vice President. When he was now seeking reelection as president he had been in the public-cum-political sphere in thirty years. He was certainly experienced.

The election year began, as usual, with a long nomination process - starting with primaries in the spring, followed by Party Conventions in the summer. On the Republican side, Bush was not really challenged. The opinion polls had been extremely encouraging for the president in the year before the election. In early 1991 (after the Gulf War) he had a job approval rating at 90 percent, which is one of the highest scores during the time period such surveys have been conducted (they started with Franklin Roosevelt in 1941). Eventually the figures dropped. In November he was down at around 60 percent – which nevertheless represents a good assessment (many presidents have most of the time had ratings in the region below). These figures gave the president an image of being invincible, and therefore no political heavyweight was inclined to enter the race.

The only opponent of significance in the primaries was Pat Buchanan. He was a well-known TV personality (with a strongly conservative leaning) but he had not held any elected office. To the surprise of many observers, Buchanan made a relatively good showing in the early, and always well attended, New Hampshire primary. He got 38 percent of the votes, as compared to 53 for Bush. That a contender of his capacity could do so well against the president indicated that the latter had an important part of his party against him. It signaled, moreover, that he would face more problems than expected in the forthcoming presidential election. Yet in the long run Buchanan had neither the political skill, nor the organizational ability to stand up to the president, who easily won the nomination at the Convention.

The Democratic race was a more open affair by far. The list of contenders included a number of respected names. But they could all be seen as high-odds candidates. The outcome of the first primaries gave a very incoherent picture, as the winners seemed to come and go. But eventually, a man who had been practically unknown at the outset started to take a lead which soon became even more pronounced. The man was Bill Clinton; he was a former, long-term, governor of Arkansas, and his political credentials were essentially limited to his home state. As for Carter in 1976, the primary process gave him the first opportunity to appear on the national scene.

The decisive event was Clinton's victory in California, where he defeated the local favorite, former Governor Jerry Brown, who had been a presidential aspirant on several occasions before, and had been the winner of a number of

primaries this year. This ‘blow’ on the contender’s home arena, had immense symbolic consequence and it gave Clinton a great quantity of delegate votes at the coming Party Convention. From now on, it was evident that only Clinton could gain the nomination. And this also happened; the newcomer from the faraway state of Arkansas was elected on the first ballot (Hamilton 2003).

A special feature in the 1992 election was the attendance of a third candidate of real importance. That was not a new phenomenon; we know of 1912, and third party candidates also play a role a few times thereafter (especially 1924 and 1968). The remarkable thing about the 1992 race was, firstly, that the candidate had no previous political experience (which his counterparts before used to have) and, secondly, that he five months before election had taken a lead in the polls.

The person in case was Ross Perot, who had made a fortune in the computer business and on short notice had become an aspirant for the presidency. His policy agenda combined fiscal conservatism and populism. The public deficit should by all means be eliminated, and ordinary people should be given a stronger say in political decision making (e.g., through direct voting, via computers, in the municipalities). Having announced his ambitions in a television talk show, a spirited grassroots movement erupted in support of his candidacy. In June, opinion polls showed he had a popular support of around 50 percent, far ahead of the candidates of the two major parties (which was indeed a very strange situation). But soon thereafter he stepped out of the race for unclear reasons.<sup>3</sup> In October, however, he re-started his campaign, but now he had lost much of his momentum. Yet he was still a factor of significance. On election-day he got 19 percent of the votes (Posner 1996).

So what happened to Bush - whose prospects looked so glaring? In short, his popularity dropped dramatically at the beginning of 1992. By the mid-spring his job approval score was down at 40 percent. And the trend continued: in the early summer he had ratings at the 30 percent level.

His problems originated in an earlier, very controversial tax decision, which now (when the war euphoria had subsided) became a strong argument against him. When he was elected in 1988 he had given a promise not to raise taxes (“Read my lips: no new taxes”). But two years later he was forced by the Democratic leaders in Congress (who controlled both chambers) to make a deal that involved both

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<sup>3</sup> He referred to family reasons but also to the fact that the Electoral College, if he would come out on top, could be unable to select a president and hand over the matter (as prescribed by the Constitution) to the House of Representatives – a way of dealing with the issue that he obviously disliked.

spending cuts and tax increases - in the interest of reducing the budget deficit.<sup>4</sup> His move had not been well anchored among his own party people, however. Many leading Republicans protested loudly, and in the House of Representatives a majority of Republicans voted against the proposal - which was very unusual and provocative action; in a question of such magnitude the party people are supposed to support their president.

It was the conservative wing of the party that protested. As was evident, the moderate, compromise-oriented president was not well received by the conservative faction, which now dominated the party. Buchanan, who opposed him in the primaries, was tied to that faction and made the tax deception his main point. Bush had not done much so far to defend his decision to break the tax promise. But now, under pressure to get the nomination, he had to speak up. He did not, however, stick to his guns. Instead he asked for apology; he admitted he had given in to the Democrats too easy and promised not to do the same mistake again. This respond had devastating effects on the public's opinion of Bush's character (he had broken an election pledge and he did not have the guts to stand up for his action). The result was a remarkable confidence-tumble (Green 2000).

The surprisingly high opinion scores for Perot and his anti-establishment agenda can be seen as an expression of these sentiments. At his peak, however, Perot surprisingly left the scene. Yet another challenger waited in the wings; I am referring to Clinton.

In the summer Clinton had secured the Democratic nomination. Policy-wise he had a moderate orientation; labeling himself a 'New Democrat'. His lack of former involvement in national politics could be seen a weakness, but since the president had been damaged by a severe confidence-loss, such a background could be turned into an advantage. His greatest asset, though, was his personal aptitude – his charisma. In his acceptance address at the Convention he made a spectacular appearance. Being a communicator of the Reagan-format, he gave a speech (about the need to unite the nation after years of division) that made the arena almost explode, and it made him in one stroke renowned over the country. Never before had such a 'Convention bounce', in opinion terms, been registered. From a support of around 25 percent in the spring he was up at 55 percent after the Convention – far above the score for Bush.

During the rest of the campaign, Bush remained behind and became clearly defeated in the election. Clinton won by 43 percent, against 38 for Bush (Defrank & Millner 1994).

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<sup>4</sup> Had he not accepted the deal, the federal agencies had been shut down for lack of money.

To what extent did Perot's participation affect the outcome for the other contenders? Probably not very much. On the whole it seems, he took as many potential votes from the Republican side as from the Democratic side (Lacy & Burden 1999). Accordingly, Clinton's victory (and Bush's loss) cannot be attributed to involvement of a third candidate. The outcome of the 1992 presidential election was determined mostly by political miscalculations made by the president and the appearance of an opponent of unusual political ability.

### When Presidents Lose – Deciding Factors

As is obvious, several circumstances contributed to the fate of these presidents who tried, in vain, to be reelected. In my understanding, these were the more important conditions behind.

The involvement of a *third candidate* certainly played a role in 1912. We don't know what had been the outcome if Roosevelt had stepped aside after the Party Convention. Had he endorsed President Taft as the party nominee, the latter would have been in a much better position. But with the popular ex-president in the game as a contender, it was clear from the start of the campaign that Taft stood almost no chance of winning.

Eighty years later a third candidate also made a remarkable showing. But as we recently saw, Perot's unusual success had no repercussions to speak about for the other candidates.

Running as president in *hard times* could naturally be a receipt for electoral defeat. The hardships could be of a political nature. President Ford's connection to the Watergate scandal (through party association and obvious links to Nixon) was certainly a drawback when he sought reelection. Another form of difficulty, which was hard to cope with, affected Carter in the 1980 election. I am referring to the Iranian dilemma - which was not essentially caused by Carter; he got stuck politically because the rebels in Teheran wanted to retaliate against the US and to humiliate its prime power holder. On the home front (as intended) Carter had to pay a price.

A more common form of hardship, though, has to do with problems of economic nature. President Hoover's loss in 1932 was unmistakably triggered by the extraordinary hard economic conditions. With unemployment on the 25 percent level, the prospects of winning for an incumbent must be close to zero.

Even unemployment rates on a much lower level could be an embarrassment for an office holder. It is interesting to note that all presidents who failed later on – Ford, Carter and Bush – were affected by a rating above 7 percent (which is significantly higher than the average for the post-war period). In light of that observation, it could be asked whether an unemployment score in that area actually prohibits reelection. There is one exception from the pattern, though. I am referring to Reagan, who was reelected in 1984 with a rating of that magnitude (7,2 %). Despite that he won in a landslide. The margin toward his opponent (Mondale) was 18 percent units – which suggests that he could have succeeded even with a higher level of unemployment. This fact also seems to indicate that the economic hardships, even if they had a negative impact, were not the decisive factor for the presidents just mentioned. Other difficulties (that did not trouble Reagan) were part of the picture.

One such factor is *attacks from the inside*. Ford faced that problem in 1976 when he was challenged by Reagan during the nomination process. The same happened to Carter four years later, when he had to take on Kennedy. Such confrontation tends to lower the presidents credibility, and can also create a division of enduring consequence. Especially Kennedy's attack had such implication, as he was inclined to continue the struggle at the Convention (whereas Reagan withdrew in a friendly mood). The internal opposition against Bush was, at the face of it, of more harmless nature. Buchanan was not a first-rate contender. Yet he was the exponent of a powerful conservative grouping that was not prepared to give the president the support he had needed.

Another factor is *political miscalculation* - which caused problems for Ford and Bush. Ford's decision to employ the president's power of pardon in the case Nixon soon after his inauguration was of course a risky undertaking, and it was certainly a very controversial political move. Moreover, he showed no intention to communicate his motives (which, as they were later expressed, could have been seen as fairly sensible). Instead he was silent, which invited to all kinds of rumors that invigorated the prevailing sentiment of suspicion.

Despite his experience, Bush miscalculated the political implications of his tax decision. The problem he was facing had several dimensions. One had to do with the very fact that he agreed to raise taxes. That alienated his party's conservative wing - which was now the principal party faction, and very much needed in the coming election, as a base for recruitment of volunteers working for the party candidates. Another side of the issue was the broken election promise. That was a behavior that almost anyone could point to as inappropriate (and was

used not least by Clinton in the election campaign). Furthermore, Bush did not do much initially to defend his move. He might have hoped that it would eventually be forgotten, especially as he soon thereafter became a champion on the international scene. But the question was reintroduced in the primary season, which started the election year. And the kind of defense (or rather the absence thereof) that he now put up only made things worse. In effect, the president was affected by a considerable confidence-loss among the general public. That opened the door for his opponents – first, as it seemed, for Perot and later for Clinton.

Finally another factor that could affect the fate of presidents should be accounted for, namely *the quality of the contender*. Sometimes a remarkably talented challenger enters the arena, which makes the “fight” harder than it would otherwise have been. Carter was affected by this factor, as he was confronted by Reagan, who has been renowned for his unusual natural talent in the game of politics. Even Bush got an opponent of similar aptitude: Clinton. It is interesting to note that when people nowadays are asked in surveys to make an assessment of presidents in recent years, Reagan gets the highest mark, closely followed by Clinton (Gallup 2010).<sup>5</sup> Carter and Bush had the misfortune of entering “the ring” with one of these men in the other corner.

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## FULL PROPORTIONALITY IN SIGHT?

*Hannu Nurmi*

### Ballot Types and Proportionality

It is customary to divide electoral systems into two broad classes: majoritarian and proportional (PR) ones.<sup>1</sup> Some confusion prevails regarding the defining characteristics of these systems, but it seems that the former class consists of single-member constituency systems, while the latter return several candidates from each constituency. Within each class there is a considerable variation in the actual computational formulae used in determining the winner(s).

An unduly neglected aspect of elections is the type of balloting resorted to. The most common type is one that I will call one-option balloting. In this system the voters are entitled to one vote each and their voting strategies, thus, consist of symbols (numbers or letters of the alphabet) that designate parties or candidates. Some systems, notably the single transferable vote (STV), use balloting whereby the voters submit preference rankings over candidates of their district. In STV the winners are then determined using a special computational formula that aims at a situation where a “sufficient” number of voters ranks winners first among the candidates that remain after candidates with weak support have been successively eliminated and their votes transferred to stronger candidates. Our interest here is not to discuss details of the STV, but to point out the type of balloting that underlies it.<sup>2</sup>

This will be here called rank-order balloting. From the voters’ point of view it provides a much richer way to express opinions on candidates or – as the case may be – on parties. It is important to notice that the STV computations are but one specific way of dealing with rank-order ballots. Indeed, almost any voting system could be implemented using rank-order balloting. In fact, in the theory of voting systems, the most common assumption regarding voting opinions is precisely the one that boils down to

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<sup>1</sup> A wide variety of electoral systems is presented and discussed by Karvonen (2009, Ch2).

<sup>2</sup> Inspired by Doron and Kronick (1977) I have discussed a couple of – at least theoretically – significant weaknesses in the process of computing the STV winners (Nurmi 1997).

complete and transitive preferences over candidates, i.e. the rank-order balloting.

While the above two balloting systems are by far the most common ones, other systems have been envisaged. Thus, for example, Merrill and Nagel (1987) have introduced the concept of approval balloting which enables each voter to present a list of candidates that he/she approves of.<sup>3</sup> This differs from the plurality balloting type in expanding the voters' strategy set from  $K$  (the number of candidates) to all subsets of  $K$ . It also differs from the rank-order balloting in not allowing the voters to express their preferences in any more detail than by using the dichotomy approved – not approved.

Even richer than approval or rank-order balloting types can be suggested. In his classic book Riker (1982) discusses voting systems based on aggregating utility values given to candidates or policy alternatives. A more recent suggestion is due to Balinski and Laraki (2010): the majority judgement system. This is based on voter evaluations of each candidate using an ordinal scale (e.g. *laudatur*, *eximia cum laude approbatur*, *magna cum laude approbatur*, *cum laude approbatur*, *non sine laude approbatur*, *lubenter approbatur*, *approbatur*, *improbatur*). While the systems discussed by Riker use numerical evaluations and result in winners determined by computing maximum scores by summation or multiplication of values, the majority judgment which determines the winner by median evaluations, needs only an ordinal scale voter input. Hence, no mathematical computations are needed. Several ways of breaking median-values are suggested by Balinski and Laraki.

In sum, a host of balloting systems can be envisioned. Each one, together with the formula determining the winner(s), is associated with a standard for determining proportional outcomes. Thus, the proportionality is a profoundly ambiguous concept, i.e. it can take on several mutually incompatible meanings. Not only is the concept ambiguous, it is also vague. For any given interpretation of proportionality there are degrees in which any voting result satisfies the intended proportionality.

But – supposing that one strives for proportional representation – what is it that ought to be distributed proportionally? The common answer to this is: the seats in the parliament. Maximum proportionality in this standard view

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<sup>3</sup> A PR system based on approval balloting is introduced and analyzed by Brams and Kilgour (2011). See also Kilgour and Marshall (2012). Of course, this balloting type is intimately related to approval voting introduced by Brams and Fishburn (1983). See also the persuasive article by Dag Anckar (1984) advocating its adoption in the Finnish presidential elections.

is achieved when the distribution of votes to parties is identical with the distribution of seats of these parties in the parliament. In the most recent electoral reform proposal in Finland, this was the primary target. The following table (Table 1) gives the results under the prevailing system and under the proposed one in the most recent parliamentary election in Finland.<sup>4</sup>

Table 1. Results in mainland Finland in the 2011 parliamentary election

parties	votes	%	seats: current	seats: new	seat % new	seat % current
KOK	599138	20.4	44	42	21.1	22.1
SDP	561558	19.1	42	39	19.6	21.1
PS	560075	19.1	39	39	19.6	19.6
KESK	463266	15.8	35	32	16.1	17.6
Vas	239039	8.1	14	16	8.0	7.0
Vihr	213172	7.3	10	15	7.5	5.0
SFP	125785	4.3	9	8	4.0	4.5
KD	118453	4.0	6	8	4.0	3.0

Overall, the proposed system is closer to the intended target than the current one with the exception of SFP. This observation holds, of course, under the proviso that we accept the one-option balloting and plurality voting. We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the ambiguity associated with proportionality.

### The Ambiguity of Proportionality

To illustrate the ambiguity of proportionality let us consider the following preference profile of 10 voters over 4 candidates A, B, C and D. This could also be viewed as a set of rank-order ballots submitted by 10 voters (Table 2).

<sup>4</sup> A brief analysis of results and campaign is given by Nurmi and Nurmi (2012). The province of Åland is a single-member constituency. Its party system also differs from the mainland. Hence it is excluded from the present discussion.

Table 2. A Preference profile of 10 voters and 4 candidates

4 voters	3 voters	2 voters	1 voter
A	B	C	A
C	D	D	D
D	C	B	C
B	A	A	B

Our task is to proportionally elect 2 candidates out of 4. Plurality choice set is  $\{A,B\}$ , while the choice set under Borda-based proportionality is  $\{C,D\}$ , i.e. these two systems would result in distinct choices. What is proportional seems, indeed, ambiguous.

Introducing proportionality means, in general, that the choice sets become more inclusive in each district. One might then be tempted to argue that the possibility that an eventual Condorcet winner is not elected will thereby be decreased, i.e. that with multiple candidates elected, one would certainly retain the Condorcet winner among the chosen candidates under one-option proportionality. Upon closer inspection this is, however, not true. In other words, it may happen that even proportional systems may fail to elect the Condorcet winner. This is demonstrated in Table 3.

Table 3. Proportionality does not guarantee the choice of a Condorcet

1 voter	2 voters	2 voters
A	B	C
B	A	A
C	C	B

In Table 3, A is the Condorcet winner. Yet, it would not be elected even if all but one candidate would be returned from this constituency. It is noteworthy that A is also the Borda winner. Hence, the one-option ballot and plurality-based proportionality may not include the Borda winner in their set of winning candidates.

The discrepancy between the Borda-based proportionality and Condorcet

systems goes further than single-member constituencies. To wit, the Borda- based proportionality may exclude even a strong Condorcet winner (and eo ipso the plurality winner), as in the following profile (Table 4).

Table 4. Borda-proportionality does not guarantee the choice of a Condorcet winner

8 voters	7 voters
A	B
B	C
C	D
D	E
E	A

If two candidates are chosen based on Borda-proportionality, the strong Condorcet winner A is not elected, while B and C are. This would also be the case if approval ballots were used and all voters would approve of three of their highest-ranked candidates.

So, depending on the ballot type and the procedure for determining the winner, proportionality can take on several non-equivalent meanings. There is, however, an even more profound source of ambiguity, viz. what is it that we wish to distribute proportionately?

### Seats or Power

The main channel through which the parliament exerts its power over the citizens is legislation. When adopting a PR system we are in fact attempting to make the distribution of opinions regarding inter alia legislation similar in the legislature and in the population at large. By assigning seats to parties roughly in proportion to their electoral support we are acting as if a party with x % of electoral support would determine x % of the legislation. But of course this kind of proportionality, no matter how perfect, doesn't make sense. In parliamentary systems, the parties with more than 50 % of the seats normally determine 100 % of the legislation. The rules of decision-making in parliaments are variations of the majoritarian theme.

Since parties typically have different – sometimes even diametrically opposed – views on many aspects of legislation, random assignment of decisive roles to various parties to guarantee full proportionality would inevitably lead to majority frustration and internally inconsistent legislation. Therefore, the parliamentary decision rules are needed. These are, as was just pointed out, normally majoritarian in spirit.

This combination of proportionality in seat distribution and majoritarianism in decision making complicates the picture of influence distribution in parliaments and other collective decision making bodies. Is there a way of measuring the influence of actors (e.g. parties) endowed with various resources (seats or voting weights) over decision outcomes? In fact, there are several such ways. The classic indices of a priori voting power are all based on the following assumptions:

- only winning coalitions have power,
- all winning coalitions have an equal power,
- a player's (party's) power is reflected by his/her critical membership in winning coalitions

A player is critical in a winning coalition if his/her absence – *ceteris paribus* – would render the coalition non-winning. The majoritarian aspect of decision-making is taken into account by focusing on winning coalitions. Whether a coalition is winning or not depends on the decision rule or majority threshold. This is the new aspect introduced by power indices to the study of influence over outcomes.

Historically, the first classic power index was devised by Penrose (1946) in 1940's, but it went largely unnoticed until its re-invention by Banzhaf (1965) some two decades later. It is therefore called the Penrose-Banzhaf index.<sup>5</sup> Formally, it is defined as follows:

$$\beta_i = \frac{\sum_{S \subseteq N} [v(S) - v(S \setminus \{i\})]}{2^{n-1}}$$

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<sup>5</sup> The literature on power indices is vast. For a thorough historical and theoretical account, see Felsenthal and Machover (1998). A more recent treatment is Laruelle and Valenciano (2008). For applications to the European Union, see Cichoński and Zyczkowski (2010).

Here  $S$  denotes a coalition and  $s$  the number of members in  $S$ , while  $N$  is the set of all players. It consists of  $n$  players. The function  $v(S)$  is a two-valued (characteristic) function which gets the value 1 if  $S$  is winning. Otherwise,  $v(S) = 0$ . This prima facie somewhat messy-looking formula simply means that the index lists all conceivable coalitions and gives each player  $i$  a power value that can be obtained by counting his/her critical presences (a.k.a. swings) in all winning coalitions and dividing this by the number of coalitions in which  $i$  is present. The power index values thus defined do not necessarily add up to one which makes the comparison of different voting contexts somewhat difficult. This is rectified by the standardized version defined as:

$$\bar{\beta}_i = \frac{\sum_{S \subseteq N} [v(S) - v(S \setminus \{i\})]}{\sum_{j \in N} \sum_{S \subseteq N} [v(S) - v(S \setminus \{j\})]}.$$

The only difference between the two is the denominator which is the sum of all swings of all players. Hence the interpretation of the Banzhaf index is that it gives for each player the relative share of his/her swings among all swings.

The third classic index is known as the Shapley-Shubik one (Shapley and Shubik 1954). The formal definition of  $i$ 's voting power is as follows:

$$\phi_i = \sum_{S \subseteq N} \frac{(s-1)!(n-s)!}{n!} [v(S) - v(S \setminus \{i\})].$$

This index differs from the two preceding ones in giving each swing related to  $S$  a weight that depends on the number of members in  $S$ . This weight is

$$\frac{(s-1)!(n-s)!}{n!}$$

While the values of the Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices often differ from each other, they always result in the same order of powerfulness of players in one-chamber voting bodies. In multi-chamber bodies, however, they

might end up with different orders (Straffin 1988). From the viewpoint of proportionality it is more pertinent to ask whether the power index value distributions differ much from the seat distributions and, if so, how one might go about devising a seat distribution that – given the decision rules in the elected body – precisely correspond to the support-distribution of parties.

With the Shapley-Shubik index one could circumvent this problem by resorting to random decision rules (Shapley 1962). In other words, if the majority threshold to be adopted in the voting body is determined by a random draw from values in the 50 – 100 percentage interval, then it can be shown that the expected influence over outcomes of the players coincides with their Shapley-Shubik index values. Thus, no seat redistribution is needed to obtain perfect match between the a priori voting power and seat distributions. Randomized decision rules are, of course, theoretical devices. Their adoption in voting bodies like parliaments would call for dramatic changes in the ways legislative work is looked upon by parliamentarians and general public. Adjusting seat distribution towards a better fit with the a priori voting power (whichever index is used to measure the latter) would also represent a radical departure from our current ways of thinking about election results. The point being made, however, is that full proportionality in terms of a priori influence over the legislative outcomes typically differs from proportionality in terms of support and seat distributions. In what follows we shall show that distributing influence over parties in a proportional manner faces even more serious problems – independently of the particular index adopted to measure the influence.

### More Votes, Less Power

The classic power indices are based on the *prima facie* intuitively plausible assumption that more resources (seats) are accompanied with more (or at least equal) power. This does not necessarily hold in indices based on players' preferences, i.e. it may happen that a player with less resources has more influence over outcomes than a player with more resources. In the preference-based indices the influence is measured by the distance of the voting outcomes and the player's ideal point in a policy space: the closer the outcomes to the voter's ideal point, the greater influence he/she has over the outcomes. Ever since the work of Garrett and Tsebelis (1996), the distinction between the



classic and preference-based indices has divided the power index community.

The setting investigated by the classic power indices is one where dichotomous decisions are being made. This is very restrictive even in cases where the actual balloting consists of a sequence of yes-no votes (as in the Finnish parliament). An additional complicating factor in these settings is the agenda which determines the sequence of those votes. Sometimes the agenda setter has a crucial role in determining the outcomes.<sup>6</sup> In some decision making bodies other decision procedures are being resorted to. The next example (Table 5) shows that when a relatively common procedure is in use, more resources do not necessarily bring about more influence in the sense of the classic indices.

Table 5. A hypothetical 63-voter preference profile

22 voters	21 voters	20 voters
A	B	C
B	C	A
C	A	B

In this 63-strong voting body, the plurality runoff is being used for selecting one alternative out of the set  $\{A, B, C\}$ . With all voters voting according to their preferences, the runoff will be held between A and B, whereupon A wins (since it presumably will be voted upon by those whose first preference is C). Suppose now that the 21-voter group had somewhat less voting resources so that two of these voters joined the 22-voter group and another two joined the 20-voter group. The left-most group now has 24 and the right-most one 22 voters, while the middle one has only 17 voters. In the new situation, the runoff takes place between A and C, whereupon C wins. Hence, the outcome is now closer to the middle group's ideal one, viz. B, than in the situation where this group had four more votes. This shows that any preference-based index may encounter a setting where more voting resources moves the outcome further away from the group's ideal outcome.

<sup>6</sup> The theoretical possibilities of agenda manipulation are literally boundless in the spatial voting models studied by McKelvey (1979). For a brief discussion on the importance of agenda is given in Nurmi (2010).

The same example also shows that the left-most group is better off with less votes than with more votes: when it consists of 22 voters, the outcome is its ideal one, A, but when it gets more resources (two more voters) the outcome is a lot worse, viz. C. The following example (Table 6) illustrates the well-known no-show paradox (Fishburn and Brams 1983) which is another way of showing that in the plurality runoff system a party may be better off with less than with more seats.

Table 6. The no-show paradox

5 voters	5 voters	4 voters
A	B	C
B	C	A
C	A	B

Since no candidate gets more than 50% of the votes, a runoff takes place between A and B. This is won by A. If 2 or 3 voters from the middle group abstain, the runoff is between A and C, whereupon C wins. Again, less votes is accompanied with more power in the sense of bringing about a more desirable outcome.

It can easily be shown that also the amendment procedure can lead to counterintuitive distribution of influence over outcomes. The following example (Table 7) is an instance of Schwartz' (1995) paradox. A 100-person voting body consisting of three parties is making a decision about three policy alternatives a, b and c using the amendment agenda where a represents the status quo, b a new law proposal (motion) and c an amendment to b. The preferences of the party members can be seen in the following table.

Table 7. Schwartz' paradox

party A 23 seats	party B 28 seats	party C 49 seats
a	b	c
b	c	a
c	a	b

As usual in these kinds of situations the amendment agenda is:

- motion b vs. amendment c,
- the winner of the preceding vs. a

With sincere voting, b defeats c in the first vote, whereupon a beats b in the second vote. The outcome is obviously the worst possible one for party B members. Suppose that this party had fewer voting resources, say, two voters from party B would join party A and two voters party C. Under this new profile, c would become the Condorcet winner and, thus, by definition would beat all the others in pairwise comparisons. Hence c would emerge as the winner. This would mean that the diminished party B is more powerful than the original 28-strong party B since the voting outcome is closer to its ideal policy. In sum, also the amendment system can lead to the bizarre conclusion that less votes may bring about outcomes closer to one's ideal ones than those associated with less voting resources.

### Power and Proximity of Outcomes

The preference-based power indices are vulnerable to other kinds of counter-intuitive settings as well. The fundamental result in this field is apparently unrelated to voting power. It has been proven by Baigent (1987). It deals with intuitively plausible procedures, viz. those that satisfy anonymity and respect unanimity. In anonymous systems the re-labelling of voters never changes the outcome, *ceteris paribus*. Systems that respect unanimity, in turn, always choose a preference ranking on which all voters agree whenever such a ranking exists. Let us now recall the theorem.

**Theorem 1** Anonymity and respect for unanimity cannot be reconciled with proximity preservation in the following sense: choices made in profiles more close to each other ought to be closer to each other than those made in profiles less close to each other (Baigent 1987).

In other words, a violation of proximity preservation occurs if a small group

of voters, by changing its mind about the preference ranking, changes the outcome more than had a large group of voters changed its mind. The theorem says that smaller groups can, under any reasonable voting rule, have larger impact on outcomes than larger groups.

To illustrate the theorem, consider a drastic simplification of NATO's policy options with regard to the uprising in Libya in the spring of 2011.<sup>7</sup> Let us assume that there are only two partners in NATO (1 and 2) and two alternatives: impose a no-fly zone in Libya (NFZ) or refrain from military interference (R) in Libya. To simplify things even further, assume that only strict preferences are possible, i.e. both decision makers have a strictly preferred policy. Four profiles are now possible (Table 8).

Table 8. Four two-partner profiles

P <sub>1</sub>		P <sub>2</sub>		P <sub>3</sub>		P <sub>4</sub>	
1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
NFZ	NFZ	R	R	R	NFZ	NFZ	R
R	R	NFZ	NFZ	NFZ	R	R	NFZ

We denote the voters' rankings in various profiles by  $P_{mi}$  where  $m$  denotes the number of the profile and  $i$  the voter. We consider two types of metrics for measuring differences in opinions: one is defined on pairs of rankings and the other on profiles. The former is denoted by  $d_r$  and the latter by  $d_p$ . The two metrics are related as follows:

$$d_p(P_m, P_j) = \sum_{i \in N} d_r(P_{mi}, P_{ji}).$$

In other words, the distance between two profiles is the sum of distances between the pairs of rankings of the first, second, etc. voters. No further assumptions on the metric are needed.

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<sup>7</sup> The argument is a slight modification of Baigent's (1987, 163) illustration.

Take now two profiles,  $P_1$  and  $P_3$ , from the above table and express their distance using metric  $d_P$  as follows:

$$d_P(P_1, P_3) = d_r(P_{11}, P_{31}) + d_r(P_{12}, P_{32}).$$

Since,  $P_{12} = P_{32} = NFZ \succ R$ , and hence the latter summand equals zero, this reduces to:

$$d_P(P_1, P_3) = d_r(P_{11}, P_{31}) = d_r((NFZ \succ R), (R \succ NFZ))$$

Taking now the distance between  $P_3$  and  $P_4$ , we get:

$$d_P(P_3, P_4) = d_r(P_{31}, P_{41}) + d_r(P_{32}, P_{42})$$

Both summands are equal since by definition:

$$\begin{aligned} d_r((R \succ NFZ), (NFZ \succ R)) = \\ d_r((NFZ \succ R), (R \succ NFZ)). \end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$d_P(P_3, P_4) = 2 \times d_r((NFZ \succ R), (R \succ NFZ))$$

In terms of  $d_P$ , then,  $P_3$  is closer to  $P_1$  than to  $P_4$ . This makes sense intuitively.

The proximity of the social choices emerging out of various profiles depends on the choice procedures, denoted by  $g$ , being applied. Let us make two very mild restrictions on choice procedures, viz. that they are anonymous and respect unanimity. These, it will be recalled, feature in Baigent's theorem

above. In our example, anonymity requires that whatever is the choice in  $P_3$  is also the choice in  $P_4$  since these two profiles can be reduced to each other by relabelling the voters. Unanimity, in turn, requires that  $g(P_1) = \text{NFZ}$ , while  $g(P_2) = \text{R}$ . Therefore, either  $g(P_3) = g(P_1)$  or  $g(P_3) = g(P_2)$ . Assume the former. It then follows that  $d_r(g(P_3), g(P_1)) > 0$ . Recalling the implication of anonymity, we now have:

$$d_r(g(P_3), g(P_1)) > 0 = d_r(g(P_3), g(P_4))$$

In other words, even though  $P_3$  is closer to  $P_1$  than to  $P_4$ , the choice made in  $P_3$  is closer to - indeed identical with - that made in  $P_4$ . This argument rests on the assumption that  $g(P_3) = g(P_1)$ . Similar argument can, however, be made for the alternative assumption, viz. that  $g(P_3) = g(P_2)$ . The example, thus, shows that anonymity and respect for unanimity cannot be reconciled with proximity preservation (Baigent 1987; Baigent and Klamler 2004).

The example shows that small mistakes or errors made by voters are not necessarily accompanied with small changes in voting outcomes. Indeed, if the true preferences of voters are those of  $P_3$ , then voter 1's mistaken report of his preferences leads to profile  $P_1$ , while both voters' making a mistake leads to  $P_4$ . Yet, the outcome ensuing from  $P_1$  is further away from the outcome resulting from  $P_3$  than the outcome that would have resulted had more indeed both - voters made a mistake (whereupon  $P_4$  would have emerged). It should be emphasized that the violation of proximity preservation occurs in a wide variety of voting systems, viz. those that satisfy anonymity and unanimity. This result is not dependent on any particular metric with respect to which the distances between profiles and outcomes are measured. Expressed in another way the result states that in nearly all reasonable voting systems it is possible that a small group of voters has a greater impact on voting outcomes than a big group.

### Concluding Remarks

The concept of proportionality is both vague and ambiguous. The major focus of public debate has been on the former, i.e. efforts have been made to increase proportionality using a specific ballot type as the point of

departure. However, there are many ways of defining the ballot type and decision rule in terms of which proportionality can be measured. So, the notion is also ambiguous in that it can refer to several different things. Moreover, even the object of proportionality is imprecise: is it the seats or voting power that we wish to distribute proportionally?

Full proportionality is not in sight. Not even had the proposed reform of the Finnish electoral system been adopted. Our current way of thinking about proportionality is fixed to the one-person-one-vote method used in the opinion elicitation that is being used in elections. The reason for this fixation is not clear. Presumably, the fact that in the settings involving only two alternatives it is most natural, plays a role. But here, as in the choice theory in general, three is not only quantitatively but also qualitatively different from two.

The upshot of the preceding is

- that different balloting systems and choice rules are accompanied with different criteria of proportionality,
- that distributing influence over decision outcomes to parties in proportion to their electoral support – which at first sight would appear reasonable – opens up a host of new and so far unsolved methodological problems
- that the classic power indices perform in general no worse than the preference-based ones as measures of legislative influence, and
- that all indices seem to be vulnerable to paradoxical situations where they clearly contradict with our basic intuitions regarding how power should be distributed.

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## SUPPORT FOR POPULIST PARTIES IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES

*Heikki Palobeimo*

## What Is Populism?

During the last twenty years, populist parties have been in rise in most Western European nations. New parties with populist orientations have been founded. Some old parties have changed their policy stance and adapted styles of politicking and policy-making that are typical of populist parties.

However, it is not self-evident which parties should be labeled populist and which should not. When we talk about populism do we talk about an ideology, a special kind of mass movement, a family of political parties, a special kind of political strategy, or a special way of politicizing affairs. The values and policy goals of populist parties vary so much from one country to another and from one time period to another that it is not reasonable to classify populism as an ideology. Even if we say that populism is not a coherent ideology, it however reflects the belief that the instincts and wishes of the people provide the principal legitimate guide to political action (Heywood 2012, 291). It may also be analysed as a special style of politicizing affairs (Laclau 2005). From the point of view of ideologies, populist parties have loaned clothes. In their programs we may find principles rising from liberalism, nationalism, authoritarian conservatism, socialism, and distributive theories of justice (Mudde 2007).

There are some common features typical of populist parties. According to Paul Taggart (2000), populist parties have three features in common. They engage themselves to a singular nation and claim to represent the true values and interests of that nation. According to populist parties, the nation they represent has a common history with valuable achievements. Based on this history, the nation has a common culture with its norms and traditions. Cultures and traditions differ from one nation to another. According to populists, growing internationalization weakens and degenerates national traditions and cultures.

Populist parties have an idealized view of the past history. According to them, conditions of life used to be better in the past. Something has gone wrong. Politics, economy, and social life are not as good nowadays as they were in the past. Populists look backward. They want to have back the golden age that we have lost. Thirdly, populist parties have a dualistic, black and white view of the world; we

versus the others, good versus bad, common people versus alienated elites, our nation versus other nations.

Populist parties' attitude towards democracy is ambivalent (Taggart 2000, 108–14). On one hand, they demand that political decisions should represent the values and interests of the people. On the other hand, they are hostile towards multiculturalism and pluralism, admire strong political leadership, and law and order (Lukacs 2005; Mesežnikov, et al. 2008).<sup>1</sup>

In the Nordic countries it is quite evident which parties should be classified as populist. In *Denmark* a small break away party from Venstre was founded in the 1950s. This Independent Party (De Uafhængige) took a populist platform criticizing centre-right parties' co-operation with the Social Democrats and political elites in general. The party never got any important position in Danish politics. In the 1970s it was left in the shadow of the newly founded Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet, FRP) that criticized political elites and the overgrowth of the public sector. In the 1980s FRP started to turn attention to immigration with xenophobic tones. Its leader Mogens Glistrup demanded that Denmark should be made a muslim free zone (Arter 2008, 117–19; Givens 2005, 136–39).

The Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) was founded as a break away from FRP in 1995. Along with the FRP it opposed multicultural society, but opposed the all or nothing policy of the FRP, and tried to become politically acceptable. In few years it grew to be the third largest party in Denmark and from 2001 to 2011 it was in an important position in the Danish parliament. At that time there was a centre-right minority government in Denmark which needed support of the Danish People's Party for the promotion of its legislation. The popularity of DF also made established political parties more restrictive in their immigration policies.

In *Finland*, traditions of populist politics were earlier mainly rural (Helander 1971). From 1966 on, there has always been at least one MP representing a populist party in the Finnish parliament. The Small Farmers' Party (Suomen Pientalonpoikien Puolue, SPP) was a break away from the Agrarian Party. It later took the name Finnish Rural Party (Suomen Maaseudun Puolue, SMP). The party gained its first big victory in the general election 1970 by criticizing government's economic policy that accelerated urbanization and deprived rural areas. Another victory it gained in the general election 1983. At that time party criticized political

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<sup>1</sup> In its admire for law and order and strong leadership right wing populism is not ideologically far away from fascism. On fascism see Karvonen, L. 1990. *Fascismen i Europa*. Lund: Studentlitteratur. However, contemporary Western European populism is more strongly committed to democracy than authoritarian populism in Eastern Europe and Latin America.

corruption and the degeneration of Finnish parliamentarism (Paloheimo 2007, 259–60).

Immediately after the general election of 1995 SMP bankrupted, and a new populist party True Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset, PS) was founded on the ruins of the SMP. In the last years of its lifespan, SMP already had called for a more restrictive immigration policy. In the activities of the True Finns this topic became gradually even more important. The party has also been critical towards the European Union and has insisted on Finnish resignation from the EU. From 1995 to 2011 party was represented in the Finnish parliament with a tiny amount of seats. In the electoral term 2007–2011 several issues weakened the popularity of established political parties. Among these were the international financial crisis, Greece debt crisis and the huge amounts of money needed for the bailout packages, frauds found in the campaign financing of 2007, as well as some unpopular issues in domestic austerity policy. As a result, the popularity of True Finns skyrocketed, and in the general election of 2011 support for the party rose to nineteen per cent of valid votes. The party gained 19,5 per cent of the MPs and became the third largest party in the Finnish parliament (Borg 2012).

*Norwegian* Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP) was founded in 1972.<sup>2</sup> Its party platform was rather similar compared to that of the Danish FRP (Widfeldt 2000). In the 1970s, the support for the party only once passed over the four per cent electoral threshold. Support for the party began to rise in the 1980s when the party actively propagated for a more restrictive immigration policy. In the 1990s it became the third largest party in the Norwegian parliament and in the last two general elections (2005 and 2009) it has been the second largest party.

*Sweden* was a latecomer in the founding of the contemporary populist parties (Rydgren 2005). The Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD) was founded in 1988, but quite soon after the founding of the party it stayed in the shadow of the populist party, New Democracy (Ny demokrati, ND), founded in 1991. Both parties had a welfare chauvinist program. Swedish welfare state should be for the Swedes. For this purpose, they demanded restriction in immigration policy. In the year of its founding (1991) New Democracy gained 25 members in the Swedish parliament, but almost immediately after the election the party was driven in a state of dissolution. Support for the party fall down and in 2000 the party bankrupted. On the other hand, support for the Sweden Democrats began to

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<sup>2</sup> The original name of the party was Anders Langes Parti til sterk nedsettelse av skatter, avgifter og offentlige inngrep (Anders Lange's party for the strong restriction of taxes, tolls and public intervention).

rise after the internal dissolution and bankrupt of the ND. In the general election 2010 Sweden Democrats for the first time broke the four per cent threshold and gained 20 seats in the Swedish parliament.

Table 1 presents figures on the support for populist parties in parliamentary elections in the four Nordic countries. Averages for two periods, 1980-89 and 2000-2011 have been calculated, as well as the change between these two periods. In all the four Nordic countries, support for populist parties has risen. The last column in the table presents figures on the percentage share of parliamentary seats in the beginning of the year 2012. The Norwegian Progress Party holds almost one quarter of the seats in the Norwegian parliament. In Finland, the True Finns Party holds one out of five seats in the Finnish parliament.

Table 1. Support for populist parties in the Nordic countries

Country	Party	Per cent of votes in parliamentary elections; average for periods and change			Percentage share of parliamentary seats 2012
		1980–89	2000–11	Change	
Norway	FrP	7,1	19,9	12,8	24,3
Finland	SMP and PS	6,6	7,8	1,2	19,5
Denmark	FRP and DF	6,6	13,0	6,4	12,3
Sweden	NyD and SD	0,0	3,3	3,3	5,7
Mean		5,1	11,0	5,9	15,5

*Notes:* Parties classified as populist parties:

*Denmark:* Fremskridtspartiet (FRP) ja Dansk folkeparti (DF)

*Finland:* Suomen Maaseudun Puolue, Rural Party (SMP) ja Perussuomalaiset, Basic Finns (PS)

*Norway:* Fremskrittspartiet (FrP)

*Sweden:* Ny Demokrati (NyD) ja Sverigedemokraterna (SD)

*Source:* Parties & Elections. The database about parliamentary elections and political parties in Europe, < <http://www.parties-and-elections.de/>>

## Reasons for the Rise of Populism

When explaining reasons for the rise of populist parties during last decades we have to divide our analysis into two different levels. Firstly, we have to analyse what are the general reasons for the rise of populist parties in Western Europe. There are many similar trends in social, economic and political development all over Western Europe. Secondly, there are different national features that on a national level may either enhance or prevent possibilities open for the populist parties. Among these are for instance openness of the economy, electoral system, party system, styles of co-operation between political parties, and relative deprivation of some occupations, some areas or some other sections in society.

In this chapter, I will mainly analyse some general reasons for the rise of populism in Western Europe and focus my empirical analysis on the four Nordic countries. In this comparative context the rise of populism may be seen as 1. a reaction towards the unpleasant effects of economic liberalization, 2. a reaction towards multicultural society, 3. a reaction towards the erosion of traditional values, 4. a reaction rising from the decreased trust in politicians and political institutions, and 5. a reaction against the increasing complexity of politics.

1. *Unpleasant effects of economic liberalization.* In the global economy, there are waves that are longer than normal business cycles. After the Second World War there was a long boom, a period of rising prosperity in the developed economies from the late 1940s to the 1970s. During this period, there was a worldwide economic growth, which often has been called the golden age of economic growth. In Western European nations, economic cycles were modest, levels of employment rose, and as a result of redistributive policies, levels of income inequality declined (Cornia & Kiiski 2001).

From the late 1970s and early 1980s on, this golden age came to an end. After the oil price shocks of the 1970s, economic policies have been liberalized both on national and international levels. Liberalization of the capital markets has had big effects on the activities of business firms as well as the economic policy role of governments in Western Europe. As a result of economic liberalization, business firms now have good opportunities for building their production plants in countries most suitable for maximizing their profits. Firms have incentives in transferring their production from one country to another in order to reduce labour costs, or tax liabilities, or to escape legal regulation that increases production costs.

Economic liberalization also sets limits to the activities of governments. Firms have incentives in investing in countries where the burden of corporate taxation is low, and also incentives in transferring their production plants to countries with corporate friendly taxation policy. As a result of economic liberalization, great many firms have closed their production plants in Western Europe and opened new plants in countries with lower production costs.

In this international context, the national borders are lower for capital compared to labour. It is easy for capital to move out of the country as a result of unfavourable decisions by the government. For the labour moving from one country to another is not as easy. As a result, power relations in the political system have changed. The power of economic markets and its actors has increased at the expense of political actors and institutions, and the power of international actors and organizations has increased at the expense of national governments.

Economic liberalization has increased economic efficiency, but not without costs. In Western Europe, insecurity in the labour market has increased, as firms move their labour intensive production plants to countries with lower labour costs. The possibilities of governments to implement redistributive policies have been confined, and as a result, from 1980s on, income inequality has been rising in most Western European nations (OECD 2011). Populism is a reaction against these unpleasant effects of economic liberalization in Western Europe.

In the round five of the European Social Survey (ESS) there are questions that can be used for analysing how satisfied respondents are with the present state of the economy in their country, and do they think that immigration is good or bad for the country's economy. Table 2 summarizes results on these questions in four Nordic countries. The first question in the table measures respondents' satisfaction with the economic situation in general. The second question measures respondents' opinions on the economic usefulness of immigration.

In the table, respondents are classified in three groups based on their party identification. Party identification is based on the following question: Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties. Respondents who felt closer to Danish People's Party (Denmark), True Finns Party (Finland), Progress Party (Norway), or Sweden Democrats (Sweden) were classified to be close to the populist party. Respondents who felt closer to some other party were classified to be close to some non-populist party. Respondents who felt that no party feels closer than all the other parties were classified to the category of no party. In the following, terms close to a populist party and supporter of a populist party are used as synonyms. No data on actual support in elections is used in this paper.



In the table, t-test is used to test whether the group mean of those respondents who are close to a non-populist party is statistically different compared to the group mean of those who are close to the populist party. In a similar way it is tested whether the group mean of those who are not close to any party differs statistically from the group mean of those classified as populists.

Table 2. Evaluations of the economy

	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
On the whole, have satisfied are you	with the present state of the economy in (country)?			
Populist party	5,16	5,51	6,95	4,30
Other party	5,41	6,22***	7,69***	6,62***
No party	5,45	5,97*	7,40*	6,33***
Would you say it is generally bad for (country) economy that people come to live here from other countries?				
Populist party	3,48	4,11	4,37	2,81
Other party	5,56***	5,63***	6,04***	6,17***
No party	5,02***	5,01***	5,45***	5,64***

*Notes:* Party identification is based on the following question: Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties. Respondents who felt closer to Danish People's Party (Denmark), True Finns (Finland), Progress Party (Norway), or Sweden Democrats (Sweden) were classified to the populist party group. Respondents who felt closer to some other party were classified to the other party group. Respondents who felt that no party feels closer than all the other parties we classified to the no party group.

In the first question alternatives ranged from 0 to 10, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied. In the second question alternatives ranged from 0 to 10, where 0 means bad for the economy and 10 means good for the economy.

Figures in the table are means for the party identification groups.

T-test is used to test whether the other party group mean differs statistically from the populist party group mean. In the same way it is tested whether the no party group mean differs statistically from the populist party group mean.

The notation of the levels of significance is as follows

\*\*\* < 0.001    \*\* < 0.01    \* < 0.05

*Data:* European Social Survey (ESS), round 5, 2010 <<http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round5/>>

In Finland, Norway and Sweden those who were close to the populist party were less satisfied with the present state of the economy compared to those who were close to some other party or who were not close to any party. In Denmark, supporters of the Danish People's Party were not less satisfied than supporters of

other parties. This finding contradicts our assumption. It is probably due to the important role of Danish People's Party in Danish politics from 2001 to 2011.

In all four nations supporters of the populist party had a much more negative picture on the economic effects of immigration than supporters of non-populist parties or non-partisans. In Sweden the difference between the populist and non-populist parties is bigger than in other Nordic nations, and in Denmark it is bigger than in Norway and Finland. This result correlates with the inflows of foreign population in these countries. In the Nordic countries, inflow of foreign population has in the recent years been biggest in Sweden, and second largest in Denmark (Salt 2002).

2. *Multicultural vs. monocultural society.* Not all reactions towards international interaction are economic. There are also cultural reactions. International interaction gives rise to multiculturalism and pluralism. In Europe, there are clear cultural cleavages between north and south, as well as between east and west. The cleavage between east and west has become more visible in everyday life since the enlargement of the EU to Eastern Europe. At the same time, immigration pressures from Africa and Asia to Western Europe have been in rise.

During the last decades, most established parties in Western Europe have given their support to more open, liberalist orientation in international relations, and at least partly abandoned their older national orientations (Ladrech 2009). As a reaction to this development, there has been a revitalization of nationalist ideas (Karolewski & Suszycki 2009). A part of the population in Western European states thinks that international interaction has gone too far and threatens the valuable elements of national cultures. Immigration is seen as a threat to the national culture. All over the Western Europe, nationalist feelings have been in rise. On the political arena, populist parties have successfully appealed to citizens who oppose the development towards a multicultural society.

Round five of the ESS survey includes several questions on immigration. The two questions in table 3 can be used as proxies for the support for a multicultural or monocultural society. The first question in the table analyses generally the goodness or badness of immigration, while the second question focuses on immigration of groups that are ethnically different compared to the majority of the nation. In all Nordic countries supporters of populist parties have a more negative view of immigration than supporters of other parties. In this case, too, difference between the supporters of populist and non-populist parties is biggest in Sweden, and second largest in Denmark. Sweden Democrats' general

attitudes towards immigration are even more negative than attitudes of the supporters of populist parties in other Nordic countries. On the other hand, xenophobic attitude towards immigrants with a different ethnic background seems to be strongest among the supporters of the Danish People's Party and True Finns.

Table 3. Multicultural versus monocultural society

	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
Is (country) made a worse or better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?				
Populist party	3,88	4,08	3,88	3,07
Other party	6,24***	5,73***	5,68***	6,72***
No party	5,62***	5,21***	5,21**	6,26***
To what extent should (country) allow people of a different race or ethnic group to come and live here?				
Populist party	2,04	2,06	2,31	2,26
Other party	2,82***	2,46***	2,88***	3,29***
No party	2,68***	2,28***	2,75***	3,16***

*Notes:* In the first question respondents were asked to give their opinion on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 means worse place to live and 10 mean better place to live.

In the second question alternatives were 4 allow many to come and live here, 3 allow some, 2 allow few, and 1 allow none.

Parties are grouped in the same way as in Table 2.

Figures in the table are means for the three different party identification groups.

Statistical tests were calculated as in Table 2.

*Data:* European Social Survey (ESS), round 5, 2010

<<http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round5/>>

3. *Erosion of traditional values and communities.* Another factor increasing the popularity of populist parties is the increasing pluralism in society. It is part of cultural modernization and is connected to the development towards a more multicultural society. In this case, the main problem is not the otherness of ethnic groups and a xenophobic attitude, but the liberalization of values and norms in society. It is almost a megatrend in contemporary developed democracies that people should tolerate different customs and ways of life, and that the rights of different minorities in society should be protected. There are several quite new international agreements concerning the rights of different kind of minorities. According to

populists this kind of pluralism erodes the necessary social cohesion in society and degenerates precious moral values.

Emile Durkheim's old concepts on organic solidarity and mechanical solidarity can be used in analysing disagreements concerning the erosion of traditional values (Durkheim 1964). In a society exhibiting mechanical solidarity, its cohesion and integration comes from the homogeneity of habits and cultural traditions. Organic solidarity comes from the interdependence that arises from complementarities between people and the specialization of work. Supporters of a pluralist society rely on social cohesion between people with different cultural traditions and way of life. Populists, on the other hand, find their life troublesome in a pluralist society, and they believe that the erosion of a homogenous culture increases criminality and social exclusion.

With the data in table 4 we can analyse two different topics related to the support for traditional values. In the first question respondents of the European Social Survey take a stance on the lifestyle of sexual minorities. In the second question they take a stance on sentences given to lawbreakers. In all Nordic countries supporters of populist parties have a more positive stance on harsh sentences compared to supporters on non-populist parties or non-partisans. In Finland and Sweden, opinions of populists are even harder than opinions of populists in Denmark and Norway. In general, harsh sentences have biggest support in Finland, and least support in Denmark.

In the question of sexual life style differences between countries are big. Attitudes are most tolerant in Sweden and Denmark and least tolerant in Finland. In each nation, differences between populists and non-populists are smaller than in case of sentences. In Denmark, supporters of non-populist parties were more certain on their opinions compared the supporters of Danish People's Party. About 60 per cent of the supporters of non-populist parties agreed totally with the question. Of the supporters of the Danish People's Party only 39 per cent agreed totally. In all, among the Nordic nations, Danish culture is most liberal, and the Finnish one most traditional.

Table 4. Liberal pluralism versus traditional values; per cent of those who agreed or agreed totally

	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
<i>1. Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish</i>				
Populist party	90	66	82	93
Other party	92 ***	75	85 *	90
No party	88	76 *	81	91
<i>2. People who break the law should be given much harsher sentences than they are these days</i>				
Populist party	66	93	73	81
Other party	39 ***	72 ***	52 ***	51 ***
No party	46 ***	75 ***	58 ***	54 **

*Notes:* Options in the questions were: totally agree, agree, disagree, totally disagree.

$\chi^2$ -test was used in testing whether there was a statistical difference in the distributions of answers given by the supporters of non-populist parties compared to those of the supporters of populist parties. Statistical significance of the difference between supporters of populist party and non-partisans was tested in the same way.

The notation of the levels of significance is as follows

\*\*\* < 0.001    \*\* < 0.01    \* < 0.05

*Data:* European Social Survey (ESS), round 5, 2010

<<http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round5/>>

4. *Decreased trust on politicians and political institutions.* During the last decades, political institutions of the developed democracies have been under stress. Citizen trust on politicians and political institutions has declined in most developed democracies (Kaase & Newton 1995; Norris 1999; Dalton 2004). Along with the declining trust, figures on party membership and voter turnout have diminished. There are probably several reasons for the decline of trust in political actors and institutions. Changes in the power relations described earlier in this paper have probably undermined trust in politicians and political institutions. National political institutions seem to be less powerful in relation to market forces. Ideological differences between established political parties have diminished and a there seems to be a wider cleavage between politicians and ordinary citizens.

In a much debated paper Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1995) claimed that in advanced democratic polities parties are more and more interpenetrated with the

state and at the same time inter-party co-operation has increased. In all the Nordic countries coalition capacity of political parties on the governmental level has increased. In Finland, almost any kind of coalition is possible. In Denmark, Norway and Sweden, coalition capacity between the centre-right parties has increased (Arter 1999). Due to public financing of political parties and the increasing role of administrative experts in the making of party platforms and electoral campaigns, parties do not need large cadres of rank-and-file members as much as earlier (Dalton & Wattenberg 2000).

The other side of the coin in this development is that the distance between ordinary citizens and political elites has grown. Declining trust in politicians and political institutions is a favourable ground for the support of populist parties. In the European Social Survey respondents were asked how much they trust politicians and different political institutions. Figures based on these questions are presented in table 5. In each Nordic country, supporters of populist parties trust politicians and political institutions less than supporters of non-populist parties or non-partisans. On the whole, the difference in political trust between the supporters of the populist party and non-populist parties is biggest in Sweden. This can be seen by subtracting in each country and in each variable the mean for the populist party from the mean for the non-populist parties, and summing then up all the five differences. In Sweden this summed up difference is 10.8, in Finland it is 7.4, in Norway 5.4, and in Denmark only 4.2. Biggest difference between the populist and non-populist parties is in their trust in national parliaments, and in their trust in politicians. Smallest differences between the supporters of populist and non-populist parties will be found in their trust in the United Nations. Supporters of the Danish People's Party trust the European Parliament less than any of the national political institutions. Supporters of the Sweden Democrats have an extremely low trust in politicians.

Table 5. Trust in politicians and political institutions

	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
1. Trust in national parliament				
Populist party	4,98	4,11	4,74	3,81
Other party	6,05 ***	5,88 ***	6,52 ***	6,47 ***
No party	5,66 **	5,14 ***	5,68 ***	6,00 ***
2. Trust in politicians				
Populist party	4,65	3,23	4,04	2,56
Other party	5,21 **	4,89 ***	5,33 ***	5,26 ***
No party	4,83	4,22 ***	4,67 ***	4,71 ***
3. Trust in political parties				
Populist party	4,77	3,71	4,15	3,07
Other party	5,37 **	5,03 ***	5,30 ***	5,34 ***
No party	4,93	4,25 **	4,64 **	4,72 ***
4. Trust in the European Parliament				
Populist party	3,91	3,90	4,55	3,09
Other party	5,16 ***	5,54 ***	5,15 **	5,11 **
No party	4,89 ***	4,87 ***	4,82	4,73 *
5. Trust in the United Nations				
Populist party	5,61	5,85	6,34	5,32
Other party	6,30 **	6,87 ***	6,92 ***	6,48
No party	6,07 *	6,38 **	6,44	6,09

*Notes:* The question was: Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0–10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.

Parties are grouped in the same way as in Table 2.

Figures in the table are means for the three different party identification groups.

Statistical tests were calculated as in Table 2.

*Data:* European Social Survey (ESS), round 5

<<http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round5/>>

5. *Complexity of politics.* By time, politics has become more and more complicated (Rose 1989; Harrison 2012). Politics is made in complicated international networks. The amount of legal norms rises year after year. Public budgets have grown and the mechanisms of control related to the implementation of public budgets have become highly detailed, and in the case of the budget of the European Union, also highly bureaucratized. Many people think that politics has become so complicated

that it is often difficult to understand what is going on. The complexity of politics intensifies developments towards a cartelized party system and increases cleavage between ordinary people and elites.

Populist parties blame for the complexity of politics. They long for a political life where alternatives in decision-making would be simple and clear. Therefore, we could suppose that people who find politics too complicated to understand are often prone to support populist parties. We can test this assumption with the following question presented in the fourth round of the European Social Survey: How often does politics seem so complicated that you can't really understand what is going on? In table 6 we have figures on those who said that this is the case regularly or frequently as per cent of all respondents. In the round four of the ESS, Sweden Democrats were not classified separately. In that survey it was included in the category "some other party". Therefore, Sweden is not included in this table.

In all the three nations, a bigger share of supporters of the populist party find politics too complicated to understand compared to the supporters of non-populist parties. In the Finnish case, the difference is not statistically significant, which is mainly due to the small number of populist party supporters in the round four of the ESS (3 per cent of the data set). There is however a ten percentage points difference between those who are close to the True Finns and those who are close to some other party.

Table 6. How often does politics seem so complicated that you can't really understand what is going on? Per cent of those who chose option frequently or regularly

	Denmark	Finland	Norway
Populist party	31	47	29
Other party	16 ***	37	15 ***
No party	32	52	31

*Notes:* Options were: never, seldom, occasionally, regularly, frequently. Statistical significance between the party groups are tested as in table 4.  
*Data:* European Social Survey (ESS), round 4 <  
<http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round4/>>



Another interesting finding in table 6 is that in all the three nations, respondents who are not close to any party find politics as complicated as those who are close to the populist party. This indicated that populist parties have potential for raising their support among non-partisan citizens.

### Summary Analysis

In this paper, five different factors explaining the support for populist parties have been analysed. To conclude the paper, I will analyse which of these factors are most important in explaining support for populist parties. This will be done with a binary logistic regression analysis (table 7) where support for either populist party (coded with 1) or non-populist party (coded with 0) is the dependent variable. As independent variables I use variables presented in tables 2–5. Variable in table 6 is based on round four of the European Social Survey and cannot be combined in a simultaneous analysis with the other independent variables coming from round five of the European Social Survey.

The effect of independent variables on party identification can be analysed with the odds ratios and their statistical significance calculated in the logistic regression and presented in table 7. Odds ratios that are bigger than one indicate that big values of the variable increase respondents' likelihood to be close to the populist party. Odds ratios smaller than one indicate that big values of the variable increase respondents' likelihood to be close to a non-populist party. Independent variables that in a bivariate context were statistically correlated with the party identification variable do not always have statistically significant scores in a multivariate analysis. There are interdependencies between most of the independent variables, and in a multivariate analysis highly correlated variables in a way eat out their effects as explaining variables.

Table 7. Binary logistic regression on the determinants of populism

	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
Satisfaction with the present state of the economy	1.1 0	0.9 8	1.01	0.7 ** 0
Economic effect of immigration	0.8 9	0.9 9	0.84 **	0.8 4
Effect of immigration in general	0.7 *** 2	0.7 *** 6	0.76 ***	0.6 ** 5
Immigration of people with a different ethnic group	0.5 *** 1	0.9 3	0.62 **	0.4 4
Gay men and lesbians should be free to live as they want	1.0 4	1.0 6	1.13	1.2 6
People who break the law should have harsher sentences	1.4 *** 9	1.9 *** 0	1.20	0.7 8
Trust in national parliament	0.7 ** 8	0.8 (*) 7	0.77 ***	0.8 6
Trust in politicians	1.1 0	0.8 * 0	0.95	0.7 9
Trust in political parties	1.1 9	1.3 ** 2	1.01	0.8 7
Trust in the European Parliament	0.8 * 5	0.8 * 2	1.06	1.1 7
Trust in the United Nations	1.1 1	1.0 2	1.10	1.0 8
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.3 4	0.2 7	0.30	0.4 7
Number of cases	913	844	818	835

*Notes:* Dependent variable is a dummy variable where supporter of a populist party is coded with 1, and supporter of non-populist party with 0.

Independent variables are the ones presented in tables 2–5.

Scores in the table are odds ratios ( $e^B$ ) of the logistic regression.

Statistical significance of the coefficients is tested using Wald statistics.

Levels of significance of the Wald statistics are presented with the following notation:

\*\*\* < 0.001    \*\* < 0.01    \* < 0.05    (\*) < 0.10

The goodness of fit of the models is calculated with the Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup>.

A critical or negative attitude towards immigration seems to be a common feature of the supporters of populist parties in all the four Nordic countries. Negative

attitude towards immigration of people with a different ethnic group explains support for populism especially in Denmark and Norway. Questions of law and order explain support for populism especially in Denmark and Finland. A low trust in the national parliament explains support for populism especially in Norway and Denmark. A low trust in the European Parliament explains support for populism in Denmark and Finland.

In table seven, there is one finding that may look strange. It is the odds ratio between trust in political parties and party identification in the Finnish data. In a bivariate analysis, respondents who were close to the True Finns trusted political parties less than respondents who were close to other parties. In a multivariate context, the relationship is reversed. This finding can be explained with the interdependencies of the independent variables. In a bivariate context, respondents who were close to a non-populist party trusted all the political institutions more than respondents who were close to the True Finns. The difference between the supporters of the True Finns and non-populist parties was however smaller in their trust in political parties compared to their trust in national parliament, politicians, and European Parliament. As a result, multivariate analysis in table 7 gives the picture that closeness to a non-populist party explains low trust in political parties. This result may be connected to the campaign financing scandals and the resulting decline in the trust in Finnish political institutions during the electoral term 2007–2011. Trust in political parties declined all over the party system regardless of citizen's party identification.

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*Electronic data*

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- European Social Survey (ESS), round 5, 2010. Electronic data loaded from  
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